## 1

#### The Role of the ballot is to the test if the resolution is true.

#### 1] Constitutivism: The ballot asks you to either vote aff or neg based on the given resolution a) Five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means its intrinsic to the nature of the activity b) the purpose of debate is the acquisition of knowledge in pursuit of truth – a resolutional focus is key to depth of exploration which o/w on specificity. It’s a jurisdictional issue since it questions whether the judge should go outside the scope of the game and can only endorse what is within their burden c) Even if another role of the ballot is better for debate, that is not a reason it ought to be the role of the ballot, just a reason we ought to

#### 2] Isomorphism: ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it’s solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn’t a closest estimate.

## 2

### FWK

**I value morality. Ethical Internalism is true:**

**1. Epistemology – A) Equality – Externalism incorrectly assumes certain individuals have stronger epistemic access to moral truths which justifies the exclusion of those individuals from the creation of ethics and B) Inaccessibility – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point. Externalism claims that some individuals have better ability to access the truth but that doesn’t explain how we deliberate between who is motivated correctly.**

**2. Motivation – A) Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it B) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.**

**Thus, agents justify their actions based on individual moral preferences and deal with ethical dilemmas by prioritizing certain beliefs. It’s a constitutive feature of humanity to rationally maximize value under a particular index of the good. Gauthier 98,** Essay by David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, “Why Contractarianism”, within the book Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals By Agreement. Book written by Peter Vallentyne [https://b-ok.cc/book/975363/60f3f7] 1998, ///AHS PB //Recut by Scopa

Fortunately, **I do not have to defend normative foundationalism**. One problem with accepting moral justification as part of our ongoing practice is that, as I have suggested, we no longer accept the world view on which it depends. But perhaps a more immediately pressing problem is that **we have**, ready to hand, **an alternative mode for justifying our choices and actions**. In its more austere and, in my view, more defensible form, this is to show that **choices and actions maximize the agent ’s expected utility, where utility is a measure of considered preference**. In its less austere version, this is to show that choices and actions satisfy, not a subjectively defined requirement such as utility, but meet the agent ’ s objective interests. **Since I do not believe that we have objective interests**, I shall ignore this latter. But it will not matter. For the idea is clear; **we have a mode of justification that does not require the introduction of moral considerations**. 11 Let me call this alternative nonmoral mode of justification, neutrally, deliberative justification. Now moral and deliberative justification are directed at the same objects – our choices and actions. What if they conflict? And what do we say to the person who offers a deliberative justification of his choices and actions and refuses to offer any other? **We can say**, of course, that his **behavior lacks moral justification, but this seems to lack any hold, unless he chooses to enter the moral framework**. And such entry, he may insist, lacks any deliberative justification, at least for him. **If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise, in relation to choice and action, does not perish with it. Rather**, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that deliberative justification is more clearly basic, that it cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental. **Deliberative justification relates to our deep sense of self. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, and provides the basis for rationality, is the capacity for semantic representation. You can, as your dog on the whole cannot, represent a state of affairs to yourself, and consider in particular whether or not it is the case, and whether or not you would want it to be the case. You can represent to yourself the contents of your beliefs, and your desires or preferences. But in representing them, you bring them into relation with one another**. You represent to yourself that the Blue Jays will win the World Series, and that a National League team will win the World Series, and that the Blue Jays are not a National League team. And in recognizing a conflict among those beliefs, you find  rationality thrust upon you. Note that the first two beliefs could be replaced by preferences, with the same effect. Since **in representing our preferences we become aware of conflict among them, the step from representation to choice becomes complicated. We must, somehow, bring our conflicting desires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And** there is only one plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle. **We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and deliberative justification.** There is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be. The foundational crisis of morality thus cannot be avoided by pointing to the existence of a practice of justification within the moral framework, and denying that any extramoral foundation is relevant. For **an extramoral mode of justification is already present**, existing not side by side with moral justification, **but in a manner tied to the way in which we unify our beliefs and preferences and so acquire our deep sense of self**. We need not suppose that this deliberative justification is itself to be understood foundationally. All that we need suppose is that **moral justification does not plausibly survive conflict with it.**

#### Since agents take their own ability to act as intrinsically valuable, permissibility is avoided through a system of mutual self restraint where agents refrain from impeding upon the actions of other agents, under the expectation that others will do the same out of rational self interest. This is achieved through a system of contracts which both parties’ consent to in order to regulate behavior.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with Contractarianism. And, the framework outweighs on actor specificity: States are not physical actors, but derive authority from contracts that allow them to constrain action.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1. Flexibility – Contracts are key to a) Encompassing all other ethical calculus into our decision since we process the consistency of those frameworks with our self interest and b) Value pluralism – recognizing a singular ethic fails to account for the complexity of moral problems and genuine moral disagreement. My framework solves since we can recognize multiple legitimate values while allowing individuals to exclude ones that are bad.

#### 2. Bindingness – A) Arising of Ethics – Every interaction with another agent is mediated by consent to participate in that interaction since otherwise agents could simply leave, which means there is an implicit social contract formed in every ethical interaction and B) Culpability – Only contracts can ensure agents are held to their agreements since there is a verifiable basis for judging their action as wrong as well as a pre-established punishment for breaking it.

### Offense

#### I negate that the appropriation of outer space is unjust.

#### [1] Banning appropriation prevents private entities from fulfilling existing contracts with governments.

Loren Grush, daughter of 2 NASA engineers so she knows whats up, June 18, 2019, The Verge, “Commercial space companies have received $7.2 billion in government investment since 2000”, [https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/18/18683455/nasa-space-angels-contracts-government-investment-spacex-air-force] mc

Early investments from a government agency, like NASA or the Air Force, can be a crucial step in the evolution of commercial space companies from scrappy startups to successful businesses. That’s according to a new report from Space Angels, an investment firm focused on the space industry, which quantified how much money government agencies have invested in private aerospace firms over the last 18 years. The analysis reveals just how important a role the government still plays in the private space industry. It found that early public investment can sometimes be the difference between life and death for a company. “I think it’s really important for people to recognize **that it isn’t just the private sector deciding to do something**,” Chad Anderson, CEO of Space Angels, tells The Verge. “**The government has played a key role** in the development of entrepreneurial space companies.” “THE GOVERNMENT HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SPACE COMPANIES.” Space Angels made the report at the request of NASA, as the agency wanted to know just how its investments over the last couple of decades have affected the private sector. Ultimately, Space Angels found that 67 space companies received a total of $7.2 billion in investments from the government between 2000 and 2018. And about 93 percent of that investment went into companies dedicated to launching rockets. “It’s no surprise,” says Anderson. “Government funding has been directed at reducing the barriers to entry, and the biggest barrier in the beginning is launch.” The report highlights SpaceX as a prime example of how early government investment contributed to the success of a company. During its first decade of operation, SpaceX operated off of $1 billion, and about half of that money came from government contracts from NASA, according to the Space Angels report. Musk notably thanked NASA for the agency’s support after SpaceX launched its very first Dragon cargo capsule to the International Space Station in 2012. “They didn’t do this alone,” says Anderson. “They couldn’t have done it without the help of NASA.”

#### [2] Forecloses the ability for future contracts.

**Christensen 16,** "Building Confidence and Reducing Risk in Space Resources Policy," Ian Christensen. Project Manager [https://room.eu.com/article/building-confidence-and-reducing-risk-in-space-resources-policy] // recut ahs emi

Like most areas of economic activity, **space resource** utilisation **business plans are based** **upon** the ability to **access a resource**, produce a product, service, or goods based from the resource, **and produce revenue** from that product based on established market activities. An economic system requires a level of regulation and oversight to ensure it functions. Regulation and governmental oversight is part of an overall market framework that provides stability and confidence in validity for commercial entities and those that invest in them. Just as the commercial companies are in the initial stages of developing and validating hardware, governments have begun to establish regulatory and policy frameworks. US President Barack Obama signed into a law in November 2015 a fairly comprehensive piece of legislation focusing on the development of the US commercial space sector, the ‘US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015’. One title of this law, Title IV - Space Resource Exploration and Utilization, has elicited considerable international attention. It authorises US commercial entities engaged in the recovery of space resources to possess, own, transport, use and sell space or asteroid resources obtained in accordance with US and international law. In layman’s terms, the Act makes asteroid mining permissible under US law for US entities. This provision has led many to question whether the US law violates the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the document which represents the primary source of international law governing space activities. At issue is whether authorising the use of space resources violates Article II of the Treaty, which states ‘Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by other means’. The most prohibitive interpretation of this Article would suggest all **extractive** or consumptive **uses of space resources** on celestial bodies would be **prohibited**. An interpretation of this type **would have obvious negative impact on business** plans focused on space resources utilisation, **and** by extension the **security of investments** in those plans. However, opinion is consolidating around the interpretation that the US law is in compliance with the OST. Both the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) - the primary international professional society for attorneys in the space sector - and European Union (EU) officials have issued statements indicating belief that the Act is compliant. The Act itself contains an explicit disclaimer of extraterritorial sovereignty. In February 2016, the Government of Luxembourg announced its intent to develop a specific legal and regulatory regime focused on space resources. While the exact details of this legislation are unknown at this time, it is certain that it will be supportive of the legal right to access, possess, use, transport and sell space resources, as the policy is part of a broader initiative designed to attract space resources companies to operate from Luxembourg. While the question of how the US Act relates to Article II of the OST is not the primary focus of this article, the discussion does highlight the current role of political risk in the nascent space mining industry. Speaking at a panel in 2013, Bob Richards, CEO of prospective lunar resources company Moon Express, stated there was a risk in assuming governments will be supportive in defending space resources businesses’ rights to operate in space. He said: “We are making some broad assumptions and interpretations to existing treaties that were set up by governments in the past. We are assuming that commercial ventures will be allowed and there will not be some kind of international backlash.” **Signalling** this **support** - ie**, reducing political risk and establishing** the underlying frameworks to enable **activity** - is one reason governments enact legislation of the type represented by the US Act. Legislation and regulation is also a means by which governments ensure that they meet obligations to international agreements and treaties. In this regard the US law is as notable for what it does not include, as for what it does. Article VI of the OST establishes an obligation for states to be responsible for the space activities of their entities, including non-governmental actors such as commercial companies. It states, in part, that ‘the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorisation and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty’. States typically respond to this obligation through national regulations, laws and licensing regimes. The space resources provisions in the US Act did not establish any elements of this regulatory framework, instead requiring the executive branch of the US government to deliver a report with recommendations (which would cover other activities in addition to space resources). It can be expected that the pending legislation in Luxembourg might also address a regulatory approach. This results in a condition of **uncertainty – or risk** – as the commercial entities continue to execute their business plans. The lack of a regulatory framework does **not** necessarily create an environment c**onducive to business** development. The current situation in the US is one in which the government has clearly signalled its intent to support commercial space resources development - but has yet to fully implement the regulatory framework to enable that support. The passage of the US Act, legislative action in other countries and the increasing activities of space resources-focused commercial enterprises creates a window - and a need - for additional action to define a regulatory scheme that reduces the political risk faced by the commercial sector while simultaneously upholding national obligations to the international legal system.

#### [3] Private appropriation is consistent with international law. No OST violation – sovereignty and private property are distinct.

Pace 11 (Scott Pace is the director of the Space Policy Institute at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and former Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation at NASA. “Merchant and Guardian Challenges in the Exercise of Spacepower” Toward a Theory of Spacepower, Chapter 7, February 2011, National Defense University Press, http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch7.html, TDA)recut emi

Current international law recognizes the continued ownership of objects placed in space by governments or private entities. Similarly, resources removed from outer space (such as lunar samples from the Apollo missions) can be and are subject to ownership. Other sorts of rights in space, such as to intellectual property and spectrum, are also recognized. Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, however, specifically bars national appropriation of the Moon or other celestial bodies by claims of sovereignty or other means. It also says that states shall be responsible for the activities of persons under their jurisdiction or control. Thus, the central issue is the ability to confer and recognize real property rights on land, including in situ resources found on the Moon and other celestial bodies. In common law, a sovereign is generally required to recognize private property claims. Thus, the Outer Space Treaty, by barring claims of sovereignty, is usually thought to bar private property claims. Many legal scholars in the International Institute of Space Law and other organizations support that view. Other scholars, however, make a distinction between sovereignty and property and point to civil law that recognizes property rights independent of sovereignty.34 It has also been argued that while article II of the treaty prohibits territorial sovereignty, it does not prohibit private appropriation. The provision of the Outer Space Treaty requiring state parties to be responsible for the activities of persons under their jurisdiction or control leaves the door open to agreements or processes that allow them to recognize and confer property rights, even under common law.

#### [4] the aff is not in mutual self-interest because countries want to keep their own economies ahead of others. only privatization can spur that economic growth.

Edwards 09 (Chris, Director of Tax Policy Studies @ CATO Institute, M.A. in Economics, “Privatization”, February 2009 <http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/privatization>) recut mc

Governments on every continent have sold off state-owned assets to private investors in recent decades. Airports, railroads, energy utilities, and many other assets have been privatized. The privatization revolution has overthrown the belief widely held in the 20th century that governments should own the most important industries in the economy. Privatization has generally led to reduced costs, higher-quality services, and increased innovation in formerly moribund government industries. The presumption that government should own industry was challenged in the 1980s by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and by President Ronald Reagan. But while Thatcher made enormous reforms in Britain, only a few major federal assets have been privatized in this country. Conrail, a freight railroad, was privatized in 1987 for $1.7 billion. The Alaska Power Administration was privatized in 1996. The federal helium reserve was privatized in 1996 for $1.8 billion. The Elk Hills Petroleum Reserve was sold in 1997 for $3.7 billion. The U.S. Enrichment Corporation, which provides enriched uranium to the nuclear industry, was privatized in 1998 for $3.1 billion. There remain many federal assets that should be privatized, including businesses such as Amtrak and infrastructure such as the air traffic control system. The government also holds billions of dollars of real estate that should be sold. The benefits to the federal budget of privatization would be modest, but the benefits to the economy would be large as newly private businesses would innovate and improve their performance. The Office of Management and Budget has calculated that about half of all federal employees perform tasks that are not "inherently governmental." The Bush administration had attempted to contract some of those activities to outside vendors, but such "competitive sourcing" is not privatization. Privatization makes an activity entirely private, taking it completely off of the government's books. That allows for greater innovation and prevents corruption, which is a serious pitfall of government contracting. Privatization of federal assets makes sense for many reasons. First, sales of federal assets would cut the budget deficit. Second, privatization would reduce the responsibilities of the government so that policymakers could better focus on their core responsibilities, such as national security. Third, there is vast foreign privatization experience that could be drawn on in pursuing U.S. reforms. Fourth, privatization would spur economic growth by opening new markets to entrepreneurs. For example, repeal of the postal monopoly could bring major innovation to the mail industry, just as the 1980s' breakup of AT&T brought innovation to the telecommunications industry. Some policymakers think that certain activities, such as air traffic control, are "too important" to leave to the private sector. But the reality is just the opposite. The government has shown itself to be a failure at providing efficiency and high quality in services such as air traffic control. Such industries are too important to miss out on the innovations that private entrepreneurs could bring to them.

## 3

#### Vote negative to endorse the aff

#### The counterplan disrupts their Western understanding of scholarship as property and shatters imperial control of the academy. We are plagiarizing the AC.

Jones and Reddy 04 Dr. Mike Reddy and Ms. Victoria Jones [University of South Wales] “TOWARDS A SOCIAL MODEL OF PLAGIARISM” Paper for the International Integrity and Plagiarism Conference. 2004. IB [<https://www.plagiarism.org/paper/towards-a-social-model-of-plagiarism>]

In the ten years since the first International Plagiarism conference, little has changed in evolving the view of plagiarism as more than an academic offence. The importance of plagiarism from a student’s perspective, rather than that of the existing academy hierarchy, has never been more relevant. This paper builds upon previous practical work that identified the need for overcoming the power imbalance in Further and Higher Education, and the disruptive force of the Internet. A social model of plagiarism is proposed that builds upon a practical definition of plagiarism – The Four Cs – and identifies its cause as products of the power relationships and educational climate in universities and colleges today. This challenges us to simultaneously address the social and cultural aspects that give rise to the occurrence, identification and regulation of plagiarism. Finally, a call is made for us to recognize the forces that maintain the status quo in Education, and to take direct action against the „Institutional Plagiarism‟ that this creates. 1 Introduction This paper will be unlike any of the others at this conference, in that the last thing that will be discussed is plagiarism per se. This is not to make excuses for breaking one of academia’s most enshrined taboos, but to question whether it is a good principle; this should not be confused with post-modernist thought that anything is fair game. Deeper questions are needed, such as “What is the purpose of assessment?” and even “What is the purpose of learning?” Therefore, this paper will propose a social model of plagiarism and learning as „political acts‟, which identifies the potential for improper power relationships and a lack of progress made in formal adult education in the last three decades. While the definition, identification and occurrence of plagiarism (and other academic offences) has undergone a phase shift in recent years, little work has been done to address the social and cultural factors that arguably create an environment where it can flourish. Therefore, a novel, if contentious, redefinition of plagiarism might be necessary. The power structures in the established culture of Western academia has constructed systems to safeguard knowledge, but these rules can serve to limit learning. This „disenabling‟ process needs exploration because it provides a convenient smokescreen for those in privileged positions to maintain the status quo in education. This social model will attempt to make explicit novel perspectives of our current education system. This will aid recognition of the hierarchy of power that exists in education, which allows „institutional plagiarism‟ to occur. 2 It’s a Crime, isn’t it? The idea that plagiarism is an “academic offence” has been almost universally accepted (Mallon 2001). Although, if it is a crime, it is hard to understand who the victim is, or what has actually been taken from them. “No concept is truly unique, and all ideas are created in the context of the society and culture in which they are engendered. Therefore, there cannot be any true ownership, or indeed theft, of these artefacts as they are an integral part of the environment that learning is taking place within.” (Reddy & Jones 2004) One argument is that plagiarism, or more simply the act of copying, is academic „self-harm‟, because it removes learning opportunities for the „plagiarist,‟ even where such behaviour may be justified by financial or personal circumstances. Isserman (2003) argues that we all stray into grey areas and are, therefore, unqualified to judge without being guilty of self-righteous vindictiveness. A view shared by Hunt (2002), who is concerned that there is a discrepancy between students and lecturers with regard to citation, because “typically, the scholars are achieving something positive; the students are avoiding something negative.” Isserman suggests that some acts of plagiarism might be the least worst solution, when personal and financial constraints apply, and that plagiarists are as much the victims as the perpetrators. So, in a world where ideas are infinitely reproducible, is taking credit where it is not due actually a criminal act? Maybe this is true for Western cultures, such as in the USA and the EU where the free market gives value to the ownership of ideas. Foucault (1969) labeled this idea of authors creating not just publications but the idea itself as „transdiscursive‟ (p114), but it may be less so for other cultures where intellectual ownership is not so rigid. This can be a commonly used explanation for non-western students use of plagiarism. McCabe (1997) suggests there is a grain of truth in this stereotype, but while his survey work is valuable, it does not query the implicit belief that plagiarism is cheating, rather than being a mere example of cultural norms; the difference being where one draws the line defining „unacceptable‟. So, if plagiarism is not exactly illegal, is it immoral?

## 4

#### Interpretation: If either debater proposes an explicit role of the ballot that differs from the conventional truth testing model, they must indicate what advocacies are acceptable under the role of the ballot in a delineated text in the 1AC

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### Resolvability: Absent specification, it’s impossible to debate and adjudicate especially when debaters derive offense under the role of the ballot using separate methods or the same method in different ways. Since these arguments are incomparable, the judge is forced to intervene. Resolvability is an independent voter since every round needs a winner, which means that this shell is a prior question.

#### Strat Skew: By not meeting these conditions, they make it impossible to formulate a strategy because I don’t know what links to their evaluative mechanism. Strategy is key to formulating arguments and engaging in positions. If I go for a policy action and then you say the ROB is about speech acts then I lose any ability to engage in that new framing in the 2AR.

## Case

#### Social doubling is an intrinsic part of the subject – you mistake a doubled self as a ‘fake’ self but it’s just another form of authenticity.

**Jaeggi 14,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa.

The positions of both authors can be reduced to the following common denominator: **roles are less alienating than constitutive for the development of persons and personality**. They are constitutive in the sense that they are directly bound up with a person’s development and, so, “productive.” At first glance this position might seem to come down on one side of the two alternatives—an unconditional affirmation of roles—but after giving a brief account of the position, I will make use of it to move beyond the two alternatives. Once the “productivity thesis” has been articulated, it will be possible to distinguish between alienating and non-alienating aspects of role behavior. THE HUMAN BEING AS DOPPELGÄNGER Roles are productive. In and through them we first become ourselves. This is the essence of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of the positive significance of roles (which he developed as a direct response to critiques of them as alienating). “**The human being is always** himself only in **‘doubling’ in relation to a role** figure he can experience. Also, all that he sees as comprising his authenticity is but the role he plays before himself and others.22 **Roles** on this view **are not only necessary in order to make social interaction possible**, whether this be a “being together” of individuals or a benign “passing each other by;” **interaction mediated by roles is also constitutive of an individual’s relation to herself**. When Plessner speaks of a “doubling in relation to a role figure,” he means that one depends on roles not only to become a “figure” of experience for others but also in order to become such a figure for oneself. Plessner’s thesis that the human being is a Doppelgänger is grounded in a comprehensive theory of human nature that, beginning from the fundamental concept of “eccentric positionality,” is critical of every idea of immediacy or spontaneity.23 According to Plessner: The distance that the role creates in family life, as well as in one’s profession, work, or public offices, is the human being’s characteristic detour to his fellow human being; it is the means of his immediacy. Whoever wants to see in this an instance of selfalienation misunderstands the human essence and foists on it a possibility of existence such as animals have on the level of life or angels have on the spiritual level. . . . Only the human being appears as a Doppelgänger, on the outside in the figure of his role and on the inside, privately, as himself. 24 Although at first glance the talk of a Doppelgänger raises the suspicion that Plessner, too, is trapped in a model of doubling that relies on an opposition between authenticity and role behavior—between the inner and the outer—this suspicion turns out to be unwarranted: **the Doppelgänger character of human beings is illusory because there are not two real entities there; our character as a “double” is a construct. There is not an internal division** here to be overcome; **rather, doubling is constitutive of the human self. “The human being cannot abolish his status as a Doppelgänger without negating his humanity.** He cannot complain of this doubling and play it off against the ideal of an original oneness, for I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself. **The human being gets a hold of himself in others. He encounters these others on a detour via roles, exactly as the others encounter him.**”25 If the other “gets a hold of himself” in the other, and if these two can encounter each other only through roles, then **a self that is prior to or outside roles is a fiction**. When Plessner says that “I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself,”26 he is referring to a constitutive internal division that precedes all possible unity—it points to the fact that **one’s relation to oneself must also be conceived of as a certain kind of relation, namely, one mediated by a relation to the outside or to others. Thus I am not “someone” already at the outset; I can become someone only in relation to others and hence only via the roles in which we reciprocally encounter one another**: “The human being gets a hold of himself in others.” Behind all roles, then, there is nothing or, in any case, there is no “authentic being” there. No matter where we look, behind roles we find nothing we can grab hold of except for more roles that one “plays before oneself and others.” **We could call this an onion conception of the self: there are various layers but no inner core**.

#### Foreclosing the possibility of space as a place for radical potential locks in status quo power structures

Valentine 12 - David Valentine, Anthropological Quarterly, Fall 2012“Exit Strategy: Profit, Cosmology, and the Future of Humans in Space” [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/488890] Accessed 1/13/22 SAO

The ideology of the necessary relationship between entrepreneurialism and a rejuvenated human future has a strongly contemporary flavor, activating social scientists’ understandings of the incessant search of globalizing—now, literally universalizing—neoliberal capitalism for new resources, products, and markets, and the negative consequences to both human communities and to the environment. But can we dismiss NewSpace visions of space settlement as just more of the same, as the new spatial fix, as only fantasies of capitalist expansion and extraction? Gibson-Graham (2006) argues that critical treatments of neoliberalism as homogenous and totalizing have in part helped build the ideological unity of late capitalism. Collins (2008) has also argued, directly in relation to conceptions of the future, that contemporary anthropology is actually aligned with neoliberal imaginaries by assuming that the market is the inevitable shaper of the future. Following these arguments, it seems to me that if we accept the argument that the market, or profit motive, are the only explanatory frameworks for these activities, we ignore other central and consequential aspects of the **utopian visions at the heart of NewSpace endeavors**. Harvey (2000) and Frederic Jameson (2005) both argue that utopian thinking is a key mode for a progressive and socialist politics, but that such a mode must account for spatial context, temporality, and local conditions. The key here is to think about the utopian imaginations of capitalists in the same terms, ones that do not simplify or homogenize them. And as I will show, NewSpace activities are not simply in the realm of fantasy: companies are actually building rockets, spaceports, and habitats. My overall point is thus very simple: without denying the potential significance of outer space as a site for new capital accumulation (and recognizing the desires of my NewSpace interlocutors for this very thing), or the need to critically examine the implications of such a phenemenon, we should not assume that such goals can explain private space enterprise in toto. Real fears of species extinction, ideologies of exploration as key to human nature, and a desire to escape the strictures of contemporary state formations (and capital) are all powerful motivations for the hopes of space settlement. These resonate strongly with capital’s need for a “spatial fix,” but they are not the same thing. In the following pages, I examine some of the tensions within NewSpace utopian thinking and imaginations of the future, both to contribute to debates about the complexity of contemporary capitalism; but also to ask how cosmology (rather than only capitalist ideologies and profit motives) may explain the extraordinary plans and work of NewSpace entrepreneurs and advocates.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)