## 1

**Subjectivity is constituted fundamentally by loss –**

**Fluidity- A) Differentiation - signifiers refer to other signifiers without having a final signified to relate to which produces a constitutive lack from the inability to reach true meaning. This instability forces us to form a world in pursuit of the lost gaps to fulfill the subject’s desires. B) Language is constantly changing- it’s contextually produced with respect to temporality and cultures because every individual indexes to language differently.**

The 1AC is an endorsement of a never-ending quest for knowledge, a striving toward the known, the material, calculable – the acquisition of knowledge is inseparable from an unconscious paranoia that eats at the subject as its lifelong quest for meaning is for not. In an attempt to know the world around us, we sacrifice the very nature of knowledge itself while disintegrating our psychic integrity and crushing any value to life. Mills, Mills, Jon. “Lacan on Paranoiac Knowledge.” *Dr. Jon Mills Psychoanalyst Philosopher Psychotherapy Psychologist*, Process Psychology, www.processpsychology.com/new-articles/Lacan-PP-revised.htm.When these aspects of human life are broadly considered, it becomes easier to see how our linguistic-epistemological dependency has paranoiac *a priori* conditions. From Freud to Klein and Lacan, **knowledge is a dialectical enterprise** that stands **in relation to fear--to the horror of possibility**--the possibility of the *not*: **negation**, conflict, **and suffering saturate our very beings, beings whose self-identities are linguistically constructed. The relation between knowledge and paranoia is** a **fundamental** one, and perhaps no where do we see this dynamic so poignantly realized than in childhood. From the 'psychotic-like' universe of the newborn infant (e.g. see Klein, 1946), to the relational deficiencies and selfobject failures that impede the process of human attachment, to the primal scene and/or subsequent anxieties that characterize the Oedipal period, leading to the inherent rivalry, competition, and overt aggression of even our most sublimated object relations, -- fear, trepidation, and dread hover over the very process of knowing itself. **What is paranoid is that which stands in relation to opposition**, hence that which is **alien to the self. Paranoia is** not simply that which is beyond the rational mind, but it is **a generic process of *nosis***--**'I take thought, I perceive,** I intellectually **grasp,** I **apprehend'**--hence have ***apprehension* for what I encounter in consciousness**. With qualitative degrees of difference, we are all paranoid simply because others hurt us, a lesson we learn in early childhood. **Others hurt us with their knowledge**, with what they say, as do we. **And we hurt knowing. 'What will the Other do next?' We are both pacified yet cower in extreme trembling over what we may and may not know**--what we may and may not find out; and this is why **our relation to knowledge is fundamentally paranoiac**. For Aristotle (1958), "all men by nature desire to know" (p. 108). **This philosophic attitude is kindled by our educational systems** perhaps informing the popular adage, **'knowledge is power.' But whose?** There is no doubt that the acquisition of knowledge involves a power differential, but what if **knowledge itself is seen as too powerful because it threatens our psychic integrity**? In the gathering of **knowledge** there **is** simultaneously **a covering-over**, a blinding **to what one is exposed to**; moreover, **an erasure**. I ~~know~~ (No)! Unequivocally, **there are things we desire to know nothing about at all; hence the psychoanalytic attitude places unconscious defense--negation**/denial and repression--**in the foreground of human knowledge, the desire not to know. When we engage epistemology**--the question and meaning of knowledge--**we are intimately confronted with paranoia**. For example, there is nothing more disturbing when after a lifetime of successful inquiry into a particular field of study it may be entirely debunked by the simple, arrogant question: 'How do you know?' **Uncertainty, doubt, ambiguity, hesitation, insecurity--anxiety!: the process of knowing exposes us** all **to immense discomfort. And any epistemological claim is equally a metaphysical one**. Metaphysics deals with first principles, the fundamental, ultimate questions that preoccupy our collective humanity: 'What is real? Why do I exist? Will I *really* die?' Metaphysics is paranoia--and we are all terrified by its questions: 'Is there God, freedom, agency, immortality?' *Is? Why? Why not? Yes but why?!* **When the potential meaning and quality of one's personal existence hinge on the response to** these **questions, it is no wonder** why most **theists say only God is omniscient**. And although Freud (1927) tells us that the very concept of **God is an illusory derivative** of the Oedipal situation--a wish to be rescued and comforted from the anxieties of childhood helplessness, He--our exalted Father in the sky--is ***always* watching**, judging. Knowing this, the true believer has every reason to be petrified. For those in prayer or in the madhouse, **I can think of no greater paranoia**.

**The affirmatives utopian reimagining of politics without explicit praxis to overcome the structural realities of oppression is not a benign political demand – it is empty rhetoric and symbology that reduces the subject to an object of our own sadistic enjoyment.**

**Lundberg 12** Christian O. Lundberg, Director of Cultural Studies and Associate Professor of Rhetoric at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, pub. University Alabama Press, p. 165-175 // ahs ss

The first reading, which focuses on Mel Gibson’s *The Passion of the Christ,* takes up the economic exchange between identitarian practices and the ontological register of public making by tracing the metaleptic exchanges that constitute an evangelical Christian public around the metaphor of constitutive violence. i engage in a close reading of *The Passion* and the tropological exchanges it performs in constituting an evangelical public through, around, and beyond the film. The sec ond reading focuses less on a close reading than on characterizing the logic of investment and formal rhetorical processes that animate a specific kind of demand: in this case, the demands of radical antiglobalization protestors to be recognized as dangerous. Thus, my reading of radical anti-globalization protest takes up the political possibilities of the democratic demand, arguing that a purely formal account of the demand eschews attention to the rhetorical production of enjoyment and therefore overstates the political potential both of the democratic demand and a politics of resistance. Here i would like to show how a rhetorically inflected reading of Lacan’s work provides an analytic prescription for public politics that moves beyond enjoyment and aims at the articulation of collective political desire. if the first reading is focused on the relationship between the specific imaginary contents that underwrite a public bond, the sec ond is engaged in understanding the ways that symbolically constituted practices of address and investment imply determinate political consequences. Both of these readings imply critiques of conventional rhetorical practices of interpretation, suggesting an alternative analytic practice of engaging the nexus between trope and affective investment. Thus, these readings form a criti cal-inter pretive couplet: in reading *The Passion,* i would like to demonstrate the shortcomings of fetishizing the imaginary in isolation from the broader symbolic economy that underwrites it; conversely, in reading the demands of radical antiglobalization protest, i would like to show the shortcomings of a purely formal account of the demand that operates in isolation from the practices of enjoyment and the imaginary relations of address under writing radical demands.

#### The aff’s resentment produces a form of apathy that causes their harms.

Leslie Paul Thiele, Distinguished Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida, Twilight of Modernity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Politics. Political Theory, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug., 1994), pp. 468-490///AHS PB

**If we could** somehow **achieve** an Archimedean point allowing an **impartial judgment** of life's worth, Kateb observes, then the abundant cruelty, waste, and ugliness of life would preclude its justification: "**existence on the earth fails every test that is strenuously pressed by moral or teleological inquir- ers**."45 But such metaphysical hypothesizing is beside the point. Kateb takes seriously Nietzsche's understanding that we cannot properly evaluate life's worth. **Without a God's eye point of view, we can no more muster reasons to justify existence than we can muster reasons to condemn it. Religious or metaphysical justifications of life** (under whose rubric we may subsume all moral and teleological efforts) are ill-begotten: at best they will **fail to convince us of their impartiality and hence their prerogative to judge; at worst they will prove counterproductive, begetting a destructive resentment of all the wickedness in life, for wnich they ultimately cannot account. This resentment of life may lead to political apathy or to a hyperactive pursuit of mastery, either of which may allow or promote nuclear war making. It follows** that attachment to existence is best cultivated, and therefore **the threat of human extinction best addressed, when all religious and metaphysical at- tempts to justify existence have been thoroughly discredited.**

**The alternative is to traverse the fantasy—this requires internalizing desire in order to reject the master signifier. Only through accepting lack as a constitutive feature of the human subject can we escape this never-ending desire for wholeness.**

**McGowan ‘13** “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis” (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont) AHS// EMM

Like philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis also has a history of opposing itself to fantasy**. Its basic trajectory appears to involve curing the patient of an excessive investment in fantasy life.** It seems as if neurotics come to psychoanalysts suffering from their fantasies and that the sessions allow the neurotics to gain some distance from these fantasies and thereby see them for what they are. Gaining purchase on one’s fantasy life — or **simply becoming aware that one is fantasizing — is one predominant image of the psychoanalytic process.** My own therapy, for instance, consisted in gaining awareness of the nonexistence of normal people. The analyst’s unremitting silence in response to my questions about how everyone else would react in similar situations ultimately allowed me to recognize the obvious fact that there was no such thing as a normal reaction or normal person. I was invested in the fantasy of normality without realizing that it was a fantasy, and analysis laid this fantasy bare and thus facilitated a disinvestment in it. In this way, like so many patients I felt as if I was able to move beyond a barrier that I did not even know existed. **Many theorists who recognize the political importance of psychoanalysis do so because of its ability to combat fantasy.** For example, this dimension of psychoanalysis leads Yannis Stavrakakis, in Lacan and the Political, to **see the contemporary political task of psychoanalysis as one of “traversing the fantasy of utopian thought.”**25 In the vein of the philosopher or the Marxist, Stavrakakis sees a danger in the way that **fantasy hides the gap that haunts the symbolic order.** As he notes, “**Fantasy negates the real by promising to ‘realise’ it, by promising to close the gap between the real and reality, by repressing the discursive nature of reality’s production.”**26 Here, Stavrakakis sees the ideological dimension of fantasy, and psychoanalysis for him facilitates this recognition and provides a way to dissolve fantasy’s power. This kind of psychoanalytic politics evinces the attitude toward fantasy that both modern philosophy and Marxism take up, and this attitude certainly seems faithful to psychoanalytic practice and its attempt to assist the subject in “traversing the fantasy.” But despite the seeming antipathy directed toward fantasy in its very practice, for psychoanalysis the political valence of fantasy is not so unambiguous as it is for philosophy and Marxism. To unlock fully the political potential of psychoanalysis, we must turn our attention to the positive significance that psychoanalysis bestows on fantasy. Both philosophy and Marxism are, of course, right about the role that fantasy has in disguising our social situatedness. But the problem with this conception of politics is that, by focusing on what fantasy conceals, it fails to consider what fantasy reveals. It is at this point — the point of what fantasy reveals to us — that we can see the political significance of psychoanalysis. The value of psychoanalysis in relation to philosophy lies in the ability of psychoanalysis to grasp the political importance of fantasy in a way that philosophy and Marxism have been unable to do. At the same time that **fantasy disguises our subjection to the signifier and makes it difficult for us to experience this subjection, it also has the effect of making otherwise impossible experiences possible.28 Fantasy offers the subject a transcendent experience, and this transcendence, despite its illusory quality, has a political content. It represents a moment at which the subject is no longer bound by the limitations of the symbolic structure that ordinarily constrain it.** As such, this moment of fantasmatic transcendence poses for the subject a fundamental challenge to the authority of that symbolic structure. In fact, the radical import of fantasy is located in precisely the same feature that causes fantasy to further ideology: **the illusions of fantasy keep subjects content with the ruling symbolic structure,** but they also provide a venue for thinking beyond that structure**.** In contrast to modern philosophy and Marxism, psychoanalysis permits us to see this political complexity inhering within the structure of fantasy. From the beginnings of psychoanalysis, this respect for fantasy makes itself felt. When it comes to the psyche of the subject in analysis, the fantasy has more significance than actual memories. For instance, Freud’s early essay “Screen Memories” describes early childhood memories as screens for unconscious fantasies. The sexual content of the fantasy, Freud contends, can only appear through the vehicle of a genuine memory. He writes: “It is precisely the coarsely sensual element in the phantasy which explains why it . . . must be content to find its way allusively and under a flowery disguise into a childhood scene.”29 Freud’s point here is not that we must subtract the distortion of fantasy from the memory in order to discover what actually happened but that what actually happened has far less psychic importance than the fantasy it conceals.The subject uses the memory of a genuine scene to access and at the same time disguise a fantasy. Fantasy distorts, but its distortion embodies subjectivity itself and transports the subject outside the constraints of actual experience, which is why Freud values it over memory. This valuation is part of the implicit political project inhering within psychoanalytic thought, and it distances the politics of psychoanalysis from other political projects rooted in the Enlightenment. Because it allows the subject an experience of transcendence beyond the limits of the ruling symbolic structure, fantasy has tangible political benefits. These benefits can be characterized in three related ways: (1) through fantasy, we experience alternatives to the ruling symbolic structure that remain unthinkable within this structure; (2) fantasy facilitates an encounter with traumatic disruption that our everyday reality guards against; and (3) **fantasy makes evident the link between loss and enjoyment, allowing us to conceive of a politics that embraces loss rather than attempting to escape it.** These political dimensions of fantasy all manifest themselves in the thought of Freud and Lacan, even though neither conceives of fantasy (or psychoanalysis as a whole) in a political sense.

**The ROTB is to endorse the debater who best performatively and methodologically rejects the lack.**

**Ruti 10** Mari Ruti. (2010). *Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a Postmodern World. American Imago, 67(3), 353–374.[*doi:10.1353/aim.20 [sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1353/aim.2010.0016)] [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/414021/pdf] // ahs emi

Let us consider Lacan first.1 As we know, Lacan’s theory of subject formation is premised on the notion of foundational lack or alienation. The transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic—from preoedipal drives to the collective social space of signification and meaning production—is, for Lacan, a process of primordial wounding in the sense that the subject is gradually brought face to face with its own lack. While the internalization of the signifier brings the subject into existence as a creature of desire (thereby giving it access to a fully “human” existence), it simultaneously reveals that the surrounding world is much larger and more powerful than any individual subject could ever be—that the self is always merely a minor participant in a system of signification that operates quite independently of its “private” passions and preoccupations. In this manner, the signifier shatters the fantasies of omnipotence and wholeness that characterize the emerging ego of the mirror stage. One could, then, say that, in the Lacanian scenario, we purchase our social subjectivity at the price of narcissistic injury in the sense that we become culturally intelligible beings only insofar as we learn to love ourselves a bit less.It is worth noting right away that one of the things that drives a wedge between Lacan and Winnicott is that while Winnicott regards the ego as what allows the subject to enter into an increasingly complex relationship to the world, Lacan associates it primarily with narcissistic and overconfident fantasies that lend an illusory consistency to the subject’s psychic life. Lacan explains that the subject’s realization that it is not synonymous with the world, but rather a frail and faltering creature that needs continuously to negotiate its position in the world, introduces an apprehensive state of want and restlessness that it finds difficult to tolerate and that it consequently endeavors to cover over by fantasy formations. In other words, because lack is devastating to admit to—because the subject experiences [lack] it as a debilitating wound—it is disposed to seek solace in fantasies that allow it to mask and ignore the reality of this lack. Such fantasies alleviate anxiety and fend off the threat of fragmentation because they enable the subject to consider itself as more unified and complete than it actually is; by concealing the traumatic split, tear, or rift within the subject’s psychic life, they render its identity (seemingly) reliable and immediately readable. As a result, they all too easily lead the subject to believe that it can come to know itself in a definitive fashion, thereby preventing it from recognizing that “knowing” one version of itself may well function as a defense against other, perhaps less reassuring, versions. One consequence of the subject’s dependence on such egogratifying fantasies is that they mislead it to seek self-fulfillment through the famous objet petit a—the object cause of desire that the subject believes will return to it the precious sense of wholeness that it imagines having lost.2 In this scenario, the subject searches for meaning outside of itself, in an object of desire that seems to contain the enigmatic objet a. Lacan’s goal, in this context, is to enable the subject to perceive that this fantasmatic quest for secure foundations is a waste of its psychic energies. His aim is to convince the subject that the objet a will never give it the meaning of its existence, but will, instead, lead it down an ever-**widening spiral of existential deadends.** How, then, does the Lacanian subject find meaning in its life? Lacan’s answer is that it is only by accepting lack as a precondition of its existence—by welcoming and embracing the primordial wound inflicted by the signifier—that the subject can begin to weave the threads of its life into an existentially evocative tapestry. It is, in other words, only by exchanging its ego for language, its narcissistic fantasies for the meaning making capacities of the signifier, that the subject can begin to ask constructive questions about its life.3 For Lacan, there are of course no definitive answers to these questions. But this does not lessen the value of being able to ask them. The fact that there is no stable truth of being does not prevent the subject from actively and imaginatively participating in the production of meaning.

**Prefer: A) recognition and embrace of our shared lack is the basis point of collective identity to form political change in the first place. B) Everything is constrained by the lack, even the flow because communication will always be coopted. C) most reciprocal because u cant embrace the lack more or less- it’s a binary so its more reciprocal and resolvable because one of us cant embrace more.**

## 2

#### The aff’s form is a voting issue:

**1. Roleplaying leads to an addiction to self-projection onto the political sphere which is violent.**

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No amount of scrutiny will reach the end of the abyss that is Donald Trump. **Looking closer at his image will not yield any more knowledge than one had about him, or his intentions, before undertaking the act of observation**. Trump is pure image insofar that he does not actually care about what he says but rather that he can be able to reproduce his image, his voice, and his name everywhere. As Hannah Arendt writes in The Human Condition, the political and the public realm signifies that everything is public. She writes: “The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear **assures us of the reality of the world** and ourselves” (Arendt, 1989:50). What is done overtime, through our gaze, is that we combine the two; **the public realm is political**. We no longer find ourselves dependent on ourselves to prove our existence. Rather, **the political realm and the spectacle becomes not even an event of enjoyment, but an event to create identity.** Everyone is now left with the question from Jean Baudrillard: “**Do we continually have to prove to ourselves that we exist**” (Baudrillard, 2010:21)? **No longer is politics something one enters into as a realm of debate and dialogue. Politics is a non-event; it never ends because we are trapped in the reality show of fake decisions. Politics is used today as an object outside of ourselves in which we formulate our identity.** In our postmodern times we are told to constantly assume new identities, to radically be authentic and actualize ourselves. Yet past the image of the political realm, **we find ourselves not really existing**. Thus the political spectacle, in its image, becomes a projection **of our want for existence**. The political rise of Donald Trump shows us that we are finally accepting the fact that we are in postmodern times and he is the first figure to successfully manipulate the postmodern political condition.

#### 2. Death and disaster are employed by the media to shock and titillate the viewer, which turns the event itself into a form of mass entertainment that loses any reference to the real world but must constantly be given credibility by new images of destruction.

**Baudrillard in 94** [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 55-58]

In the case of the Romanian revolution, it was the faking of the dead in Timisoara which aroused a kind of moral indignation and raised the problem of the scandal of 'disinformation' or, rather, of information itself as scandal.

It was not the dead that were the scandal, but the corpses being pressed into appearing before the television cameras, as in the past dead souls were pressed into appearance in the register of deaths. It was their being taken hostage, as it were, and our being held hostage too, as mystified TV viewers. Being blackmailed by violence and death, especially in a noble and revolutionary cause, was felt to be worse than the violence itself, was felt to be a parody of history. All the media live off the presumption of catastrophe and of the succulent **imminence** of **death**. A photo in Liberation, for example, shows us a convoy of refugees 'which, some time after this shot was taken, was to be attacked by the Iraqi army'. Anticipation of effects, morbid simulation, emotional blackmail. It was the same on CNN with the arrival of the Scuds. Nothing is news if it does not pass through that horizon of the virtual, that hysteria of the virtual - not in the psychological sense, but in the sense of a compulsion for what is presented, in all bad faith, as real to be consumed as **unreal**. In the past, to show something up as a fake, we said: 'It's just play-acting', 'It's all romance!', 'It's put on for the cameras!'. This time, with Romania and the Gulf War, we were able to say, 'It's just TV!' Photographic or cinema images still pass through the negative stage (and that of projection), whereas the TV image, the video image, digital and synthetic, are images without a negative, and hence without negativity and without reference. They are virtual and the virtual is what puts an end to all negativity, and thus to all reference to the real or to events. At a stroke, the contagion of images, engendering themselves without reference to a real or an imaginary, itself becomes virtually without limits, and this limitless engendering produces **information** as **catastrophe**. Is an image which refers only to itself still an image? However this may be, that image raises the problem of its indifference to the world, and thus of our indifference to it - which is a political problem. When television becomes the strategic space of the event, it sets itself up as a deadly self-reference, it becomes a bachelor machine. The real object is wiped out by news – not merely alienated, but abolished. All that remains of it are **traces** on a **monitoring screen.** Many Romanian eyewitness accounts speak of being dispossessed of the event in this way, deprived of the lived experience they have of it by being submerged in the media network, by being placed under house arrest in front of their television screens. Spectators then become exoterics of the screen, living their revolution as an exoticism of images, themselves exogenous, touristic spectators of a **virtual history**. From the moment the studio becomes the strategic centre, and the screen the only site of appearance, everyone wants to be on it at all costs, or else gathers in the street in the glare of the cameras, and these, indeed, actually film one another. The street becomes an extension of the studio, that is, of the non-site of the event, of the virtual site of the event. The street itself becomes a virtual space. Site of the definitive confusion of masses and medium, of the real-time confusion of act and sign. There is no will to communicate in all this. The only irresistible drive is to occupy this non-site, this empty space of representation which is the screen. Representation (political representation too) is currently a trough of depression - meteorological depression - which the media fill up with their turbulences, with the same consequences as occur when any kind of space is suddenly depressurized. The highest pressure of news corresponds to the lowest pressure of events and reality [Ie reel]. The same unrealism in the Ceausescu trial. It is not the judicial procedure itself which is scandalous but the video tape, unacceptable as the only, bloodless trace of a bloody event. In the eyes of the whole world, this will remain an event forever suspect, for the sole reason of its - strangely obscene - scenic abduction. This hidden jury, its voice striking out against the accused, these defendants we are forced to see even though they are virtually dead, these dead prisoners shot a second time to meet the needs of news. One might even wonder whether the actors in this staged event were not deliberately trying to make themselves seem suspect in the eyes of world opinion, as though playing at sabotaging their image. At the same time, the Ceausescu trial was pulled off perfectly as a video production, betraying a sharp sense of the image function, the blackmail-function, the deterrence- function. Deep down, the intuitive grasp of these things has grown more sophisticated over there, in the shadow of dictatorship, than it has with us. We have nothing to teach them. For, if the Romanians themselves got high on this media speculation which served them as a revolutionary aphrodisiac, they also dragged all the Western media into the same news demagogy. By manipulating themselves, they caused us spontaneously to swallow their fiction. We bear the same responsibility as they do. Or, rather, there is no responsibility anywhere. The question of responsibility cannot even be raised. It is the evil genius of news which promotes such staging. When information gets mixed in with its source, then, as with sound waves, you get a feedback effect - an effect of interference and uncertainty. When demand is maximal (and everywhere today the demand for events is maximal), it **short-circuits** the initial situation and produces an uncontrollable response effect. That is, ultimately, why we do the Romanians an injustice when we accuse them of manipulation and bad faith. No one is responsible. It is all an effect of the infernal cycle of credibility. The actors and the media sensed obscurely that the events in Eastern Europe had to be given credibility, that that revolution had to be lent credibility by an extra dose of **dead** **bodies**. And the media themselves had to be lent credibility by the reference to the people. Leading to a vicious circle of credibility, the result of which is the decredibilizing of the revolution and the events themselves. The logical sequence of news and history turns back against itself, bringing, in its cyclical movement, a kind of deflation of historical consciousness. The Americans did just the same in the Gulf War. By the excessive nature of their deployment and stagecraft, by putting their power and news control so extravagantly to the test, they decredibilized both war and news. They were the Ubus of their wn power, just as the Romanians were the Ubus of their own mpotence. Excess itself engenders the parody which invalidates the facts. And, just as the principle of economics is wrecked by financial speculation, so the principle of politics [Ie politique] and history is wrecked by media speculation.

## 3

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must not defend a non-status quo policy option. To clarify, the affirmative may not fiat their advocacy

#### Violation: They do

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision – the resolution doesn’t entail an actor nor does it an action – they are definitionally not topical or even a subset of the resolution – vote them down –

#### A] stasis point – the topic is the only reasonable focal point for debate – anything else destroys the possibility of debate because we will be two ships passing

#### B] internal link turn – violating semantics justifies the aff talking about whatever with zero neg prep or prediction which is the most unfair and educational –

#### C] Jurisdiction – you can’t vote for them because the ballot and the tournament invitation say to vote for the better debater in the context of the resolution –

#### D] objectivity – only semantics are objective whereas pragmatics are subjective which means intervention

#### 2] Limits – they explode them – they are super Extra T and justify an infinite possible number of affirmatives and different actors – none of which are part of the resolution which means there is no prediction ground. Multiple Impacts – A] Stable Ground – they deck neg preparation ability and impose an infinitely reciprocal research burden on the negative to have to guess the infinite policy options and possible permutations and to cut specific disads to those - B] Predictability – no actor or action means its impossible to have a way to predict affs on this topic which decks quality engagement and education – C] Infinite Abuse – being non-topical justifies picking a trivially true aff which means they always win

#### 3] TVA – don’t defend an action and use ideal theory to explain why appropriation is bad - That’s better – it promotes in-depth philosophical clash over law that’s constitutive to LD