## 1

#### Interpretation – Debaters must only read framework warrants that prove the truth of their framework outside the context of debate.

#### Violation – You read a performativity standard which appeals to the truth of your framework given the nature of debate.

#### Standards –

#### 1] Strat Skew:

#### 2] Phil Ed:

## 2

**The standard is consistency with the standpoint of the skeptic.**

**Prefer –**

**1] Holding ourselves to a standard of absolute truth is necessary:**

**A) Culpability –**

**B) Outcomes –**

#### The skeptic would argue –

#### Morality is impossible

#### 1] Human moral evaluations are contaminated by personal affective states, making them arbitrary and unfair.

Scott Jenkins, Professor of Philosophy at University of Kansas, Nietzsche's Transformation of the Problem of Pessimism in Human, All Too Human, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Volume 50, Issue 2, Autumn 2019, pp. 272-291 (Article), ///AHS PB

In his summary of Dühring’s introduction to The Value of Life, Nietzsche recognizes the importance of this claim about content and states that for Dühring, “no estimation of value [Werthschätzung] is pure knowledge, all are affections of the mind [Gemüths-Affektionen]” (KSA 8:9[1], p. 135). He continues, “A judgment of the value of life can never be pure knowledge. But I wish to add that it would be more correct to call all such judgments impure knowledge [unreine Erkenntnisse]”—and the rest of a draft of HH 32 follows. For my purposes, two aspects of this impurity are worth emphasizing (in addition to the original claim concerning drive-based content). First, Nietzsche notes that since we are “subject to moods and fluctuations” our drives are themselves in flux (HH 32). And second, our knowledge of the object evaluated in a judgment of value “can never be complete” (HH 32). Thus judgments of value express the relation between our fluctuating conative-affective states and our idiosyncratic representations of a given object. This is why Nietzsche, contra Dühring, regards judgments of value as impure. While they may seem to be as authoritative as theoretical judgments that arguably have some claim to objective (and thus intersubjective) validity, they actually express nothing more than an individual’s shifting practical orientation and idiosyncratic theoretical point of view. From the impurity of evaluative judgments, Nietzsche draws the further conclusion that such judgments are unjust (HH 32). By this he means that in making such judgments, we illegitimately privilege our own drives and affective orientations in relation to others’. He arrives at this conclusion by noting that we cannot refrain from making impure judgments of value: “Perhaps it would follow from all this that one ought not to judge at all; if only it were possible to live without evaluating, without having aversions [Abneigung] and partialities [Zuneigung]!—for all aversion is connected with [hängt zusammen mit] an evaluation, likewise all partiality” (HH 32).16 As living beings, we evaluate entities in accordance with our drives.17 And as human beings, we express such implicit evaluations in judgments of value: “A drive to something or away from something divorced from a feeling one is desiring the beneficial or avoiding the harmful, a drive without some kind of knowing evaluation of the worth of its objective, does not exist in humanity” (HH 32). Nietzsche’s idea here must be that we typically take such judgments to express something about the object itself. We are thus guilty of injustice insofar as we unwittingly take our own subjective orientation to objects, and not those of other actual or possible valuers, to have the authority to determine objects as, say, beneficial or harmful.18 And while we can recognize, on reflection, that judgments of value express only a subjective point of view, we typically think and act as if they do not. Our default state is injustice grounded in what Nietzsche terms our “illogical original relationship [Grundstellung] with all things” (HH 31).

#### 2] There is no moral truth for everyone.

J.L Mackie, Australian Philosopher, The subjectivity of values, 1977, ///AHS PB

[First] The Argument from Relativity The argument from relativity has as its premiss the wellknown variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order subjectivism: radical differences between first order moral judgements make it difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way. Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people ’ s adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy. Of course, the standards may be an idealization of the way of life from which they arise: the monogamy in which people participate may be less complete, less rigid, than that of which it leads them to approve. This is not to say that moral judgements are purely conventional. Of course there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers, people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can usually be understood as the extension, in ways which, though new and unconventional, seemed to them to be required for consistency, of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. In short, the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values. But there is a well-known counter to this argument from relativity, namely to say that the items for which objective validity is in the first place to be claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all society – such principles as provide the foundations of what Sidgwick has called different methods of ethics: the principle of universalizability, perhaps, or the rule that one ought to conform to the specific rules of any way of life in which one takes part, from which one profits, and on which one relies, or some utilitarian principle of doing what tends, or seems likely, to promote the general happiness. It is easy to show that such general principles, married with differing concrete circumstances, different existing social patterns or different preferences, will beget different specific moral rules; and there is some plausibility in the claim that the specific rules thus generated will vary from community to community or from group to group in close agreement with the actual variations in accepted codes. The argument from relativity can be only partly countered in this way. To take this line the moral objectivist has to stay that it is only in these principles that the objective moral character attaches immediately to its descriptively specified ground or subject: other moral judgements are objectively valid or true, but only derivatively and contingently – if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right. And despite the prominence in recent philosophical ethics of universalization, utilitarian principles, and the like, these are very far from constituting the whole of what is actually affirmed as basic in ordinary moral thought. Much of this is concerned rather with what Hare calls “ideals” or, less kindly, ‘fanaticism’. That is, people judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses in others. ‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible description of what supplies many of our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’. With regard to all these starting points of moral thinking the argument from relativity remains in full force. [Second] The Argument from Queerness Even more important, however, and certainly more generally applicable, is the argument from queerness. This has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. These points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of nonnatural qualities, and by the intuitionists in their talk about a ‘faculty of moral intuition’. Intuitionism has long been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. What is not so often stressed, but is more important, is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. Of course the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking. But, however complex the real process, it will require (if it is to yield authoritatively prescriptive conclusions) some input of this distinctive sort, either premisses or forms of argument or both. When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘a special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clearheaded objectivist is compelled to resort. Indeed, the best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade this issue, but to look for companions in guilt. For example, Richard Price argues that it is not moral knowledge alone that such an empiricism as those of Locke and Hume is unable to account for, but also our knowledge and even our ideas of essence, number, identity, diversity, solidity, inertia, substance, the necessary existence and infinite extension of time and space, necessity and possibility in general, power, and causation. If the understanding, which Price defines as the faculty within us that discerns truth, is also a source of new simple ideas of so many other sorts, may it not also be a power of immediately perceiving right and wrong, which yet are real characters of actions? This is an important counter to the argument from queerness. The only adequate reply to it would be to show how, on empiricist foundations, we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have of all these matters. I cannot even begin to do that here, though I have undertaken some parts of the task elsewhere. I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given in empirical terms. If some supposed metaphysical necessities or essences resist such treatment, then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the targets of the argument from queerness. This queerness does not consist simply in the fact that ethical statements are ‘unverifiable’. Although logical positivism with its verifiability theory of descriptive meaning gave an impetus to non-cognitive accounts of ethics, it is not only logical positivists but also empiricists of a much more liberal sort who should find objective values hard to accommodate. Indeed, I would not only reject the verifiability principle but also deny the conclusion commonly drawn from it, that moral judgements lack descriptive meaning. The assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless but false. Plato ’ s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be. The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something ’ s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it. Or we should have something like Clarke ’ s necessary relations of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such- andsuch an action somehow built into it. The need for an argument of this sort can be brought out by reflection on Hume ’ s argument that ‘reason’ – in which at this stage he includes all sorts of knowing as well as reasoning – can never be an ‘influencing motive of the will’. Someone might object that Hume has argued unfairly from the lack of influencing power (not contingent upon desires) in ordinary objects of knowledge and ordinary reasoning, and might maintain that values differ from natural objects precisely in their power, when known, automatically to influence the will. To this Hume could, and would need to, reply that this objection involves the postulating of value-entities or value-features of quite a different order from anything else with which we are acquainted, and of a corresponding faculty with which to detect them. That is, he would have to supplement his explicit argument with what I have called the argument from queerness. Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural features. What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty – say, causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? And how do we know the relation that it signifies, if this is something more than such actions being socially condemned, and condemned by us too, perhaps through our having absorbed attitudes from our social environment? It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which ‘sees’ the wrongness: something must be postulated which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the mysterious consequential link between the two. Alternatively, the intuition required might be the perception that wrongness is a higher order property belonging to certain natural properties; but what is this belonging of properties to other properties, and how can we discern it? How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be if we could replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality is said to be consequential.

**Thus I contend the skeptic would negate the resolution.**

**1. The skeptical conclusion being true triggers permissibility: It denies that moral obligations exist. That negates – A) Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics o/w – 1) it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res and 2) it’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text B) Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent**

**2. Skep linguistically negates because sentences derive meaning from their linguistic properties corresponding to facts about reality. For example, a claim like “my dog has four legs” requires you to have a dog and for that dog to actually have four legs. If ought means morality and that doesn’t exist, the statement is false.**

## Case

### Hijack

#### Panpsychism is true: Something cannot come from nothing - A object cannot be created from a substance that doesn’t have the properties to create it. (ie we cannot create a wooden door without wood) therefor in order for a mind to be created it must be formed of mind like structures, if this is the case, everything that has a mind must be created from substances that also have minds, therefor it is either the case that nothing has a mind and it was never created, or it is the case that everything has a mind- since we agree that humans have a mind, every object made of the same particles a mind is, must have minds in and of themselves. This means that all matter is capable of practical reason: That negates 1] reducing ip violates their freedom 2] the practical steps to pass the aff require you to violate the freedom of matter like paper and the floor.

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)