## 1

### FWK

**I value morality. Ethical Internalism is true:**

**1. Epistemology – A) Equality – Externalism incorrectly assumes certain individuals have stronger epistemic access to moral truths which justifies the exclusion of those individuals from the creation of ethics and B) Inaccessibility – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point. Externalism claims that some individuals have better ability to access the truth but that doesn’t explain how we deliberate between who is motivated correctly.**

**2. Motivation – A) Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it B) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.**

**Thus, agents justify their actions based on individual moral preferences and deal with ethical dilemmas by prioritizing certain beliefs. It’s a constitutive feature of humanity to rationally maximize value under a particular index of the good. Gauthier 98,** Essay by David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, “Why Contractarianism”, within the book Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals By Agreement. Book written by Peter Vallentyne [https://b-ok.cc/book/975363/60f3f7] 1998, ///AHS PB //Recut by Scopa

Fortunately, **I do not have to defend normative foundationalism**. One problem with accepting moral justification as part of our ongoing practice is that, as I have suggested, we no longer accept the world view on which it depends. But perhaps a more immediately pressing problem is that **we have**, ready to hand, **an alternative mode for justifying our choices and actions**. In its more austere and, in my view, more defensible form, this is to show that **choices and actions maximize the agent ’s expected utility, where utility is a measure of considered preference**. In its less austere version, this is to show that choices and actions satisfy, not a subjectively defined requirement such as utility, but meet the agent ’ s objective interests. **Since I do not believe that we have objective interests**, I shall ignore this latter. But it will not matter. For the idea is clear; **we have a mode of justification that does not require the introduction of moral considerations**. 11 Let me call this alternative nonmoral mode of justification, neutrally, deliberative justification. Now moral and deliberative justification are directed at the same objects – our choices and actions. What if they conflict? And what do we say to the person who offers a deliberative justification of his choices and actions and refuses to offer any other? **We can say**, of course, that his **behavior lacks moral justification, but this seems to lack any hold, unless he chooses to enter the moral framework**. And such entry, he may insist, lacks any deliberative justification, at least for him. **If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise, in relation to choice and action, does not perish with it. Rather**, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that deliberative justification is more clearly basic, that it cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental. **Deliberative justification relates to our deep sense of self. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, and provides the basis for rationality, is the capacity for semantic representation. You can, as your dog on the whole cannot, represent a state of affairs to yourself, and consider in particular whether or not it is the case, and whether or not you would want it to be the case. You can represent to yourself the contents of your beliefs, and your desires or preferences. But in representing them, you bring them into relation with one another**. You represent to yourself that the Blue Jays will win the World Series, and that a National League team will win the World Series, and that the Blue Jays are not a National League team. And in recognizing a conflict among those beliefs, you find  rationality thrust upon you. Note that the first two beliefs could be replaced by preferences, with the same effect. Since **in representing our preferences we become aware of conflict among them, the step from representation to choice becomes complicated. We must, somehow, bring our conflicting desires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And** there is only one plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle. **We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and deliberative justification.** There is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be. The foundational crisis of morality thus cannot be avoided by pointing to the existence of a practice of justification within the moral framework, and denying that any extramoral foundation is relevant. For **an extramoral mode of justification is already present**, existing not side by side with moral justification, **but in a manner tied to the way in which we unify our beliefs and preferences and so acquire our deep sense of self**. We need not suppose that this deliberative justification is itself to be understood foundationally. All that we need suppose is that **moral justification does not plausibly survive conflict with it.**

#### Since agents take their own ability to act as intrinsically valuable, permissibility is avoided through a system of mutual self restraint where agents refrain from impeding upon the actions of other agents, under the expectation that others will do the same out of rational self interest. This is achieved through a system of contracts which both parties’ consent to in order to regulate behavior.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with Contractarianism. And, the framework outweighs on actor specificity: States are not physical actors, but derive authority from contracts that allow them to constrain action.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1. Flexibility – Contracts are key to a) Encompassing all other ethical calculus into our decision since we process the consistency of those frameworks with our self interest and b) Value pluralism – recognizing a singular ethic fails to account for the complexity of moral problems and genuine moral disagreement. My framework solves since we can recognize multiple legitimate values while allowing individuals to exclude ones that are bad.

#### 2. Bindingness – A) Arising of Ethics – Every interaction with another agent is mediated by consent to participate in that interaction since otherwise agents could simply leave, which means there is an implicit social contract formed in every ethical interaction and B) Culpability – Only contracts can ensure agents are held to their agreements since there is a verifiable basis for judging their action as wrong as well as a pre-established punishment for breaking it.

#### 3. Regress – A) Reason – Only my framework answers the question “why be moral”, since agents have a reason to restrain their conflict due to self-interest rather than some non-existent transcendental principle B) Debates – When we compare between frameworks we suppose a higher evaluative mechanism, which presupposes a higher one, which means only self-contained rules in contracts are coherent.

#### 4. Action theory – Only contracts explain why agents have normative potential with the power to establish ethical principles. Anything else alienates the subject from their own conception of ethics. Lord et al 17, Lord, Errol & Plunkett, David (2017). Reasons Internalism. In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 324-339.//Scopa A third motivation for internalism connects to the idea that the purpose of reason ascriptions is to point out a consideration that an agent would be wrong to ignore by her own lights. That might be wrong. But there is a more general, related idea in the background which might well support a form of reasons internalism: the idea that an agent’s normative reasons should be the kinds of things that are tailored for her, which she should not be hopelessly alienated from. If that is right, it’s natural to think that normative reasons must be connected to an agent’s psychology in an appropriate way. (See Railton 1986 for connected discussion about the idea of what is good for a person.) Such a non-alienation idea connects to Kate Manne’s recent defense of internalism, which centers on the idea that normative reasons are tied to the activity of people reasoning together about what to do. Manne considers which attitudes are normatively appropriate in giving genuine advice to an agent about what to do, and, on that basis, argues for a form of internalism. Giving appropriate advice to an agent A, Manne argues, needs to be fundamentally tied to A’s psychology, lest the “advice” simply turn into a form of brow-beating or manipulation. (See Manne 2014. See Smith 1994 for connected discussion about the normative constraints on giving genuine advice.) A fourth important motivation for internalism concerns the epistemology of normative reasons. Consider the facts about psychology at the center of a given internalist view (e.g., facts about what an agent desires, or what would promote those desires). We are arguably capable of learning about such facts through non-mysterious methods— and, moreover, gaining knowledge about them and making reliable judgments about them. Hence, internalism seems to provide a solid foundation for the epistemology of normative reasons. This broad idea gets developed in different ways. For example, Sharon Street argues that the psychology-dependence of ethical facts helps explain our reliability in ethical judgment, including, crucially, our judgments about normative reasons (see Street 2006).

#### And, alienation is a side-constraint: A) Pre-req – Every exercise you engage in to establish some relation to the world requires non-alienation to be normatively legitimate B) Agency – Only viewing an agent as an active body capable of generating intentions can hold agents culpable and decipher the difference between actions and wishes.

### Offense

#### I negate that the appropriation of outer space is unjust.

#### [1] Banning appropriation prevents private entities from fulfilling existing contracts with governments.

Loren Grush, daughter of 2 NASA engineers so she knows whats up, June 18, 2019, The Verge, “Commercial space companies have received $7.2 billion in government investment since 2000”, [https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/18/18683455/nasa-space-angels-contracts-government-investment-spacex-air-force] mc

Early investments from a government agency, like NASA or the Air Force, can be a crucial step in the evolution of commercial space companies from scrappy startups to successful businesses. That’s according to a new report from Space Angels, an investment firm focused on the space industry, which quantified how much money government agencies have invested in private aerospace firms over the last 18 years. The analysis reveals just how important a role the government still plays in the private space industry. It found that early public investment can sometimes be the difference between life and death for a company. “I think it’s really important for people to recognize **that it isn’t just the private sector deciding to do something**,” Chad Anderson, CEO of Space Angels, tells The Verge. “**The government has played a key role** in the development of entrepreneurial space companies.” “THE GOVERNMENT HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SPACE COMPANIES.” Space Angels made the report at the request of NASA, as the agency wanted to know just how its investments over the last couple of decades have affected the private sector. Ultimately, Space Angels found that 67 space companies received a total of $7.2 billion in investments from the government between 2000 and 2018. And about 93 percent of that investment went into companies dedicated to launching rockets. “It’s no surprise,” says Anderson. “Government funding has been directed at reducing the barriers to entry, and the biggest barrier in the beginning is launch.” The report highlights SpaceX as a prime example of how early government investment contributed to the success of a company. During its first decade of operation, SpaceX operated off of $1 billion, and about half of that money came from government contracts from NASA, according to the Space Angels report. Musk notably thanked NASA for the agency’s support after SpaceX launched its very first Dragon cargo capsule to the International Space Station in 2012. “They didn’t do this alone,” says Anderson. “They couldn’t have done it without the help of NASA.”

#### [2] Forecloses the ability for future contracts.

**Christensen 16,** "Building Confidence and Reducing Risk in Space Resources Policy," Ian Christensen. Project Manager [https://room.eu.com/article/building-confidence-and-reducing-risk-in-space-resources-policy] // recut ahs emi

Like most areas of economic activity, **space resource** utilisation **business plans are based** **upon** the ability to **access a resource**, produce a product, service, or goods based from the resource, **and produce revenue** from that product based on established market activities. An economic system requires a level of regulation and oversight to ensure it functions. Regulation and governmental oversight is part of an overall market framework that provides stability and confidence in validity for commercial entities and those that invest in them. Just as the commercial companies are in the initial stages of developing and validating hardware, governments have begun to establish regulatory and policy frameworks. US President Barack Obama signed into a law in November 2015 a fairly comprehensive piece of legislation focusing on the development of the US commercial space sector, the ‘US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015’. One title of this law, Title IV - Space Resource Exploration and Utilization, has elicited considerable international attention. It authorises US commercial entities engaged in the recovery of space resources to possess, own, transport, use and sell space or asteroid resources obtained in accordance with US and international law. In layman’s terms, the Act makes asteroid mining permissible under US law for US entities. This provision has led many to question whether the US law violates the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the document which represents the primary source of international law governing space activities. At issue is whether authorising the use of space resources violates Article II of the Treaty, which states ‘Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by other means’. The most prohibitive interpretation of this Article would suggest all **extractive** or consumptive **uses of space resources** on celestial bodies would be **prohibited**. An interpretation of this type **would have obvious negative impact on business** plans focused on space resources utilisation, **and** by extension the **security of investments** in those plans. However, opinion is consolidating around the interpretation that the US law is in compliance with the OST. Both the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) - the primary international professional society for attorneys in the space sector - and European Union (EU) officials have issued statements indicating belief that the Act is compliant. The Act itself contains an explicit disclaimer of extraterritorial sovereignty. In February 2016, the Government of Luxembourg announced its intent to develop a specific legal and regulatory regime focused on space resources. While the exact details of this legislation are unknown at this time, it is certain that it will be supportive of the legal right to access, possess, use, transport and sell space resources, as the policy is part of a broader initiative designed to attract space resources companies to operate from Luxembourg. While the question of how the US Act relates to Article II of the OST is not the primary focus of this article, the discussion does highlight the current role of political risk in the nascent space mining industry. Speaking at a panel in 2013, Bob Richards, CEO of prospective lunar resources company Moon Express, stated there was a risk in assuming governments will be supportive in defending space resources businesses’ rights to operate in space. He said: “We are making some broad assumptions and interpretations to existing treaties that were set up by governments in the past. We are assuming that commercial ventures will be allowed and there will not be some kind of international backlash.” **Signalling** this **support** - ie**, reducing political risk and establishing** the underlying frameworks to enable **activity** - is one reason governments enact legislation of the type represented by the US Act. Legislation and regulation is also a means by which governments ensure that they meet obligations to international agreements and treaties. In this regard the US law is as notable for what it does not include, as for what it does. Article VI of the OST establishes an obligation for states to be responsible for the space activities of their entities, including non-governmental actors such as commercial companies. It states, in part, that ‘the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorisation and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty’. States typically respond to this obligation through national regulations, laws and licensing regimes. The space resources provisions in the US Act did not establish any elements of this regulatory framework, instead requiring the executive branch of the US government to deliver a report with recommendations (which would cover other activities in addition to space resources). It can be expected that the pending legislation in Luxembourg might also address a regulatory approach. This results in a condition of **uncertainty – or risk** – as the commercial entities continue to execute their business plans. The lack of a regulatory framework does **not** necessarily create an environment c**onducive to business** development. The current situation in the US is one in which the government has clearly signalled its intent to support commercial space resources development - but has yet to fully implement the regulatory framework to enable that support. The passage of the US Act, legislative action in other countries and the increasing activities of space resources-focused commercial enterprises creates a window - and a need - for additional action to define a regulatory scheme that reduces the political risk faced by the commercial sector while simultaneously upholding national obligations to the international legal system.

#### [3] Private appropriation is consistent with international law. No OST violation – sovereignty and private property are distinct.

Pace 11 (Scott Pace is the director of the Space Policy Institute at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and former Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and Evaluation at NASA. “Merchant and Guardian Challenges in the Exercise of Spacepower” Toward a Theory of Spacepower, Chapter 7, February 2011, National Defense University Press, http://www.ndu.edu/press/space-Ch7.html, TDA)recut emi

Current international law recognizes the continued ownership of objects placed in space by governments or private entities. Similarly, resources removed from outer space (such as lunar samples from the Apollo missions) can be and are subject to ownership. Other sorts of rights in space, such as to intellectual property and spectrum, are also recognized. Article II of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, however, specifically bars national appropriation of the Moon or other celestial bodies by claims of sovereignty or other means. It also says that states shall be responsible for the activities of persons under their jurisdiction or control. Thus, the central issue is the ability to confer and recognize real property rights on land, including in situ resources found on the Moon and other celestial bodies. In common law, a sovereign is generally required to recognize private property claims. Thus, the Outer Space Treaty, by barring claims of sovereignty, is usually thought to bar private property claims. Many legal scholars in the International Institute of Space Law and other organizations support that view. Other scholars, however, make a distinction between sovereignty and property and point to civil law that recognizes property rights independent of sovereignty.34 It has also been argued that while article II of the treaty prohibits territorial sovereignty, it does not prohibit private appropriation. The provision of the Outer Space Treaty requiring state parties to be responsible for the activities of persons under their jurisdiction or control leaves the door open to agreements or processes that allow them to recognize and confer property rights, even under common law.

#### [4] the aff is not in mutual self-interest because countries want to keep their own economies ahead of others. only privatization can spur that economic growth.

Edwards 09 (Chris, Director of Tax Policy Studies @ CATO Institute, M.A. in Economics, “Privatization”, February 2009 <http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/privatization>) recut mc

Governments on every continent have sold off state-owned assets to private investors in recent decades. Airports, railroads, energy utilities, and many other assets have been privatized. The privatization revolution has overthrown the belief widely held in the 20th century that governments should own the most important industries in the economy. Privatization has generally led to reduced costs, higher-quality services, and increased innovation in formerly moribund government industries. The presumption that government should own industry was challenged in the 1980s by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and by President Ronald Reagan. But while Thatcher made enormous reforms in Britain, only a few major federal assets have been privatized in this country. Conrail, a freight railroad, was privatized in 1987 for $1.7 billion. The Alaska Power Administration was privatized in 1996. The federal helium reserve was privatized in 1996 for $1.8 billion. The Elk Hills Petroleum Reserve was sold in 1997 for $3.7 billion. The U.S. Enrichment Corporation, which provides enriched uranium to the nuclear industry, was privatized in 1998 for $3.1 billion. There remain many federal assets that should be privatized, including businesses such as Amtrak and infrastructure such as the air traffic control system. The government also holds billions of dollars of real estate that should be sold. The benefits to the federal budget of privatization would be modest, but the benefits to the economy would be large as newly private businesses would innovate and improve their performance. The Office of Management and Budget has calculated that about half of all federal employees perform tasks that are not "inherently governmental." The Bush administration had attempted to contract some of those activities to outside vendors, but such "competitive sourcing" is not privatization. Privatization makes an activity entirely private, taking it completely off of the government's books. That allows for greater innovation and prevents corruption, which is a serious pitfall of government contracting. Privatization of federal assets makes sense for many reasons. First, sales of federal assets would cut the budget deficit. Second, privatization would reduce the responsibilities of the government so that policymakers could better focus on their core responsibilities, such as national security. Third, there is vast foreign privatization experience that could be drawn on in pursuing U.S. reforms. Fourth, privatization would spur economic growth by opening new markets to entrepreneurs. For example, repeal of the postal monopoly could bring major innovation to the mail industry, just as the 1980s' breakup of AT&T brought innovation to the telecommunications industry. Some policymakers think that certain activities, such as air traffic control, are "too important" to leave to the private sector. But the reality is just the opposite. The government has shown itself to be a failure at providing efficiency and high quality in services such as air traffic control. Such industries are too important to miss out on the innovations that private entrepreneurs could bring to them.

## Case

### Contracts Hijacks

**kant collapses to contractariainism- The conclusion of the aff is to refrain from impeding upon the actions of other agents. This is only achieved through a system of contracts which both parties’ consent to in order to regulate behavior.**

**Prefer additionally:**

**1. Culpability – Only contracts can ensure agents are held to their agreements since there is a verifiable basis for judging their action as wrong as well as a pre-established punishment for breaking it.**

**2. Action theory – only my framework can explain the nature of agency which is protected through social contracts mediated by consent to participate in interactions. This ensures that agents treat themselves as normatively valuable such that they choose to engage in pragmatic deliberation which means it’s a side constraint.**

### OV

#### 1) it’s ableist— Kantianism basis moral worth on the capacity for agency, but cognitively disabled people do not have the access to rationality that kant presupposes, making them dispensible and not worthy of moral obligations.

#### 3A) It’s impossible to weigh between obligations since each argument is an intrinsic reason that is a side constraint B) It’s impossible to verify the intention of another agent since its intrinsic to their own mind, so evaluating offense is incoherent C) it’s impossible to determine whether our action was our own – your own author concedes it. That makes the framework irresolvable since freedom is necessary for evaluation of an actions’ goodness. Kant 81, Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn. 1781. Under heading “Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity.” available online: http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/cprrn10.txt

The real morality of **actions[’]**--their **merit or demerit**, and even that of our own conduct, **is completely unknown to us. Our estimates can relate only to** their **empirical character. How much is the result of the action of free will, how much is to be ascribed to nature and** to **blameless error**, or to a happy constitution of temperament (merito fortunae), **no one can discover, nor, for this reason, determine with perfect justice.**

### FWK

No apriori ethics:

1] Nonsense, we can’t epistemically access truth from some higher realm.

2] Empirically denied, babies are born with no knowledge, and don’t immediately derive the same conclusions about everything.

Is/ought- we provide a moral theory

Uncertainty- 1] Just warrants that we could be deceived, not that there is any possibility we are 2] internalism resolves isought- To decide about the content of my own mind is to deliberate between reasons – only this can prevent the contents of my own mind from being external to me since I may not be able to control the external definitions of my thoughts but I can control the deliberation between them which solves epistemic skep about my ability to have true beliefs.

On koorsgaard- No impact, just says people have empirical identities besides being a reasoner but our argument is that reason is false

On reason

On constitutive authority:

A] Circular, reason relies on an unjustified premise to justify itself.

B] Not a warrant, you just assert reason is X and we can’t escape it with no explaination what it is. #MakeKantFrameworksNotBeBlippyShitStormsAgain

C] Infinitely regressive, their would have to be a reason for reason, but that isn’t justified.

D] Conflates logical and practical reason. The ability to set and pursue ends is not the same as a justification for an argument.

E] Reason is contaminated by expierence since, it doesn’t occur from a neutral starting point, but instead our brain chemistry, positon in the world ect.

On universiability:

A] Empirically denied, people take non unuviersal actions all the toime which proves it isn’t a contradiction that makes your head explode. You can just opt out of it.

B] Tailoring objection: You can just tailor a maxim so it only applies to you. IE only Mason can kill people.

**Kant Offense**

**Kant negates –**

**1] Outer space is unowned frontier. Appropriation of unowned resources cant be unjust because injustice presupposes one whose rights has been violated, which cannot be the case if the resource is unowned.**

**Feser 1**, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//recut mc

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that **external resources are initially unowned**. Consider the following example. Suppose an **individual A seeks to acquire** some previously unowned **resource R. For** it to be the case that **A commits an injustice in acquiring R**, it would also have to be the case that **there is some individual B** (or perhaps a group of individuals) **against whom A commits the injustice**. But **for B to have been wronged** by A’s acquisi- tion of R, **B would have** to have had a rightful claim over R, **a right to R**. By hypothesis, **however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned**, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is **only after** some- **one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them**, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

**2] Preventing private entities from appropriating outer space is violation of freedom as it hinders one’s ability to interact with external objects. It prevents private entities from setting and pursuing their own ends and exercising their freedom of appropriation.**

**3] Injustice requires someone wronged, but initial acquisition doesn’t violate any entity’s rights– therefore, private appropriation of outer space cannot be unjust, Feser 05:**

Edward Feser, [Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College] “THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION,” 2005 //LHP AV

The reason **there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition** of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of **justice**, that is to say, simply **does not apply** to initial acquisition. **It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place**. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that **external resources are initially unowned**. Consider the following example. **Suppose** **an individual** **A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R**. **For it to be** the case that A commits an **injustice** in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that **there is some individual** **B** (or perhaps a group of individuals) **against whom A commits the injustice**. **But for B to have been wronged** by A’s acquisi- tion of R, **B would have to have had a rightful claim over R,** **a right to R**. By hypothesis, **however**, **B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all**. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, **the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R**. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. **The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer**. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

**4] Our freedom necessitates being able to set and pursue external things as our ends, including exercising our rights on property. Restricting this arbitrarily limits our freedom which is unjust.**

**Feser 3**, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

V. Some Implications If what I have argued so far is correct, then the way is opened to the following revised case for strongly libertarian Lockean-Nozickian prop-erty rights: **We are self-owners, having full property rights to our body parts, powers**, talents, energies**, etc. As self-owners, we also have a right**, given the SOP, **not to have our self-owned powers nullified —we have the right, that is, to act within the extra-personal world and thus to acquire rights to extra-personal objects that the use of our self-owned powers requires.**39 This might involve the buying or leasing of certain rights or bundles of rights and, correspondingly, the acquiring of lesser or greater degrees of ownership of parts of the external world, but as long as one is able to exercise one’s powers to some degree and is not rendered incapable of acting within that world, the SOP is satisfied. In any case, such rights can only be traded after they are first established by initial acquisition. **In initially acquiring a resource, an agent does no one an injustice (it was unowned, after all)**. Furthermore, **[they] has mixed [their] labor with the resource, significantly altering it and/or bringing it under his control**, **and is** himself **solely responsible for whatever value or utility the resource has come to have**. Thus, **[they] has a presumptive right to it**, and, **if his control and/or alteration (and thus acquisition) of it is (more or less) complete, his own- ership is accordingly (more or less) full.** The system of strong private property rights that follows from the acts of initial acquisition performed by countless such agents results, as a matter of empirical fact, in a market economy that inevitably and dramatically increases the number of resources available for use by individuals, and these benefited individuals include those who come along long after initial acquisition has taken place. (Indeed, it especially includes these latecomers, given that they were able to avoid the hard work of being the first to “tame the land” and draw out the value of raw materials.)40 The SOP is thus, in fact, rarely, if ever, violated. The upshot is that a system of Lockean-Nozickian private property rights is morally justified, with a strong presumption against tampering with exist- ing property titles in general. In any case, there is a strong presumption against any general egalitarian redistribution of wealth, and no case what- soever to be made for such redistribution from the general theory of prop- erty just sketched, purged as it is of the Lockean proviso, with all the egalitarian mischief-making the proviso has made possible.

**5] Private entities utilize their own property and resources to fund and conduct space exploration which means – Prohibition of it is a violation of a). Their ability to use their own property(like their rocketships or fuel) to set their ends in space and b) Their freedom to explore unknown horizons such as space.**

**lbl –**

**on walla- a] no reason as to why property rights require government, I can say I own a rock without the government**

**on stiltz- we turn- the fact that there is no governing authority means that ur not violating anyones freedom since no one owns it intially**

**AT property rights stuff**

**On a –**

**1] inevitable –**

**A] we have to act in the state of nature that exists, which requires appropriating objects, like food, shelter, clothes, etc.**

**B] people have to assert self-ownership – ie ownership of their own body – even absent a state in order to act at all, including the action required to form a state – arbitrary to say we can’t assert control of external objects if we mix our labor and possess control**

**2] Not intrinsic to the resolution –**

**A] we could form new states in space that arbitrate property claims**

**B] we could extend sovereignty into space from existing states**

**On b –**

**a] by exploring we get a conception**

**b] ca govs fill in**

**c] no reason we don’t have a conception – we hve been in space**

**at I law- err neg, ur card just asserts that it violates but doesn’t give a reason. Our card articulates that the ost only address national sovereignty. It also shows how actual laws distinguish private entiites and nations**