## 1

**I value morality. Ethical Internalism is true:**

**[1] Epistemology – A) Equality – Externalism incorrectly assumes certain individuals have stronger epistemic access to moral truths which justifies the exclusion of those individuals from the creation of ethics and B) Inaccessibility – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point. Externalism claims that some individuals have better ability to access the truth but that doesn’t explain how we deliberate between who is motivated correctly.**

**2. Motivation – A) Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it B) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.**

**Thus, agents justify their actions based on individual moral preferences and deal with ethical dilemmas by prioritizing certain beliefs. It’s a constitutive feature of humanity to rationally maximize value under a particular index of the good. Gauthier 98,** Essay by David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, “Why Contractarianism”, within the book Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals By Agreement. Book written by Peter Vallentyne [https://b-ok.cc/book/975363/60f3f7] 1998, ///AHS PB //Recut by Scopa

Fortunately, **I do not have to defend normative foundationalism**. One problem with accepting moral justification as part of our ongoing practice is that, as I have suggested, we no longer accept the world view on which it depends. But perhaps a more immediately pressing problem is that **we have**, ready to hand, **an alternative mode for justifying our choices and actions**. In its more austere and, in my view, more defensible form, this is to show that **choices and actions maximize the agent ’s expected utility, where utility is a measure of considered preference**. In its less austere version, this is to show that choices and actions satisfy, not a subjectively defined requirement such as utility, but meet the agent ’ s objective interests. **Since I do not believe that we have objective interests**, I shall ignore this latter. But it will not matter. For the idea is clear; **we have a mode of justification that does not require the introduction of moral considerations**. 11 Let me call this alternative nonmoral mode of justification, neutrally, deliberative justification. Now moral and deliberative justification are directed at the same objects – our choices and actions. What if they conflict? And what do we say to the person who offers a deliberative justification of his choices and actions and refuses to offer any other? **We can say**, of course, that his **behavior lacks moral justification, but this seems to lack any hold, unless he chooses to enter the moral framework**. And such entry, he may insist, lacks any deliberative justification, at least for him. **If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise, in relation to choice and action, does not perish with it. Rather**, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that deliberative justification is more clearly basic, that it cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental. **Deliberative justification relates to our deep sense of self. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, and provides the basis for rationality, is the capacity for semantic representation. You can, as your dog on the whole cannot, represent a state of affairs to yourself, and consider in particular whether or not it is the case, and whether or not you would want it to be the case. You can represent to yourself the contents of your beliefs, and your desires or preferences. But in representing them, you bring them into relation with one another**. You represent to yourself that the Blue Jays will win the World Series, and that a National League team will win the World Series, and that the Blue Jays are not a National League team. And in recognizing a conflict among those beliefs, you find  rationality thrust upon you. Note that the first two beliefs could be replaced by preferences, with the same effect. Since **in representing our preferences we become aware of conflict among them, the step from representation to choice becomes complicated. We must, somehow, bring our conflicting desires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And** there is only one plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle. **We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and deliberative justification.** There is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be. The foundational crisis of morality thus cannot be avoided by pointing to the existence of a practice of justification within the moral framework, and denying that any extramoral foundation is relevant. For **an extramoral mode of justification is already present**, existing not side by side with moral justification, **but in a manner tied to the way in which we unify our beliefs and preferences and so acquire our deep sense of self**. We need not suppose that this deliberative justification is itself to be understood foundationally. All that we need suppose is that **moral justification does not plausibly survive conflict with it.**

#### Since agents take their own ability to act as intrinsically valuable, permissibility is avoided through a system of mutual self restraint where agents refrain from impeding upon the actions of other agents, under the expectation that others will do the same out of rational self interest. This is achieved through a system of contracts which both parties’ consent to in order to regulate behavior.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with Contractarianism. And, the framework outweighs on actor specificity: States are not physical actors, but derive authority from contracts that allow them to constrain action.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1. Flexibility – Contracts are key to a) Encompassing all other ethical calculus into our decision since we process the consistency of those frameworks with our self interest and b) Value pluralism – recognizing a singular ethic fails to account for the complexity of moral problems and genuine moral disagreement. My framework solves since we can recognize multiple legitimate values while allowing individuals to exclude ones that are bad.

#### 2. Bindingness – A) Arising of Ethics – Every interaction with another agent is mediated by consent to participate in that interaction since otherwise agents could simply leave, which means there is an implicit social contract formed in every ethical interaction and B) Culpability – Only contracts can ensure agents are held to their agreements since there is a verifiable basis for judging their action as wrong as well as a pre-established punishment for breaking it.

#### 3. Regress – A) Reason – Only my framework answers the question “why be moral”, since agents have a reason to restrain their conflict due to self-interest rather than some non-existent transcendental principle B) Debates – When we compare between frameworks we suppose a higher evaluative mechanism, which presupposes a higher one, which means only self-contained rules in contracts are coherent.

## Offense

#### I negate the resolution- A just government ought to not recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### 1] Contracts recognize the right to strike as conditional. Your NLRB card shows that there is a contract that recognizes for a conditional right to strike in the squo. You cant change existing contracts if they were created fairly- otherwise it causes permissibility as anyone can break a contract and claim that they changed the contract.

#### 2] Striking violates the contract to work for a company a] you are not working if you are striking b] you agree to certain work conditions and wages in your contract and striking against those conditions violates the contract c] since companies must compete for the labor force, people have the capacity to weigh between companies that are incentivized to increase benefits for workers—means striking goes against the inherent nature of attaining a job in the first place

#### 3] Strikes inhibit the ability to create contracts, create power imbalances, and violate individual contracts.

**Levine 1** [Peter. "The Libertarian Critique of Labor Unions." Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 21.4 (2001): 17-24. (Peter Levine is the Associate Dean for Research and Lincoln Filene Professor of Citizenship & Public Affairs in Tufts University’s Jonathan Tisch College of Civic Life. He has secondary appointments in the Tufts Philosophy Department and the Tufts Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute. He was the founding deputy director (2001-6) and then the second director (2006-15) of Tisch College’s CIRCLE, The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, which he continues to oversee as an associate dean]

Libertarians strongly defend freedom of choice and association. Thus, when workers choose to act collectively, negotiate together, or voluntarily walk off the job, libertarians have no reasonable complaint--even if other people are harmed--because they support the right to make and exit voluntary partnerships. But unions gain strength **by overriding private rights.** They routinely block anyone from working **under a non-union contract**, and they prevent employers from making offers--even advantageous ones--to individual workers unless the union is informed and consents. Unions declare strikes and establish picket lines to prevent **customers and workers** from **entering company property**; they may **fine employees who cross these lines.** They also extract fees from all workers who are covered by their contracts. Although covered workers may avoid paying for certain union functions (such as lobbying) that are not germane to contract issues, they must pay for strikes and other activities that some of them oppose. The great libertarian theorist Friedrich Hayek concluded that unions “are the one institution where government has signally failed in its first task, that of preventing coercion of men by other men--and by coercion I do not mean primarily the coercion of employers but the coercion of workers by their fellow workers.” Hayek may have been thinking mainly of corrupt and unaccountable union leaders. But even a completely democratic union sometimes supplants private rights. As libertarians like Morgan O. Reynolds point out, majorities within a union are able to ignore minorities’ preferences.

## 2

#### Hong Kong doesn’t allow political strikes

Tang and Pang 20 [Nickolas Tang, writer on Hong Kong’s self-determination for the Nation, and, Jun Pang, writer and researcher of migration and detention for the Nation, 3-12-2020, "‘I Am Willing to Take a Bullet for You. Are You Willing to Go on Strike for Me?’," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/hong-kong-unions-strike/]/Kankee

After the wave of political mobilization in the 1960s, the British colonial government attempted to defuse activism by strengthening social service provisions, including implementing free basic education, shorter working hours, and increasing the availability of public housing. Academic Agnes Ku notes that the government continually pointed to the example of the 1967 riots as an example of the threat of social upheaval, stressing instead the importance of state-directed efficiency, stability, and prosperity. This continued after the handover, with the government adopting policies prioritizing Hong Kong’s economic development and competitiveness, presenting them as a panacea to all social and distributive issues. Article 27 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law—the territory’s mini-constitution—guarantees residents the right to form and join associations, including trade unions. The right to form a union is reserved for those who ordinarily reside in Hong Kong; that does not necessarily include migrant workers, though some have mobilized through unions and other networks to fight for stronger protections. Notably, there are no provisions for collective bargaining for anyone, which means that negotiations between employers and trade unions are not protected by law. Furthermore, strikes are legally protected only when they pertain solely to labor disputes—which is why, for example, the Hospital Authority recently warned striking medics that they may face repercussions for their politicized strike action. Carol Ng, the chairperson of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, the largest pro-democracy union organization in Hong Kong, believes that many of the city’s unions have failed to reflect their members’ political views. “For example, there are seven unions representing railway workers in Hong Kong, but they are all pro-establishment, and disconnected from their members’ grievances,” she says. “It wasn’t until the formation of Railway Power [a pro-democracy union] last October that rank-and-file workers have a union actively supporting their demands.”

#### Backing down on the Hong Kong strike implodes the CCP and escalates Chinese nationalism – star this card

Hiciano 20 [Lery Hiciano, graduate student at Claremont, 2020, “Nearly Halfway There: The Future of Hong Kong, China, and One Country Two Systems,” Claremont Colleges, https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3513&context=cmc\_theses]/Kankee

Chapter 5: Domestic Legitimacy, The CCP, and Xi Jinping Today, Hong Kong’s democratic movements pose even less risk than before to China’s economic growth. In fact, 2019’s protest shows that an actively rebellious Hong Kong can still meet the requirements for China’s domestic market. With the 2047 date looming ever closer, the Central Government likely feels assured of eventual economic integration. The seriousness with which Beijing treats Hong Kong protest movements, as well as other offenses to China’s territorial integrity, are driven not by economic concerns, but more foundationally by concern about the CCP’s ability to survive into the future. Mainland reactions to the protests of 2003 and 2012 compared to the protests of 2014 and 2019 demonstrate China’s policymakers have become significantly less tolerant of Hong Kong demands for democracy, autonomy, and personal freedoms. The balancing act between Beijing’s credibility, China’s domestic security, and defense of its territorial sovereignty on one hand, and the need for a prosperous, placated Hong Kong on the other, is the central issue in Beijing’s calculations regarding the territory. The CCP betrays its anti-colonial roots when it suppresses local autonomy in the name of unification. China is not the first nation that disregarded its revolutionary origins. Zakaria’s theories are founded in the fact that the U.S underwent a similar process when it went from advocating a European-free hemisphere to seeking its own colonies. Within China, the same fears of Hong Kong secessionism and pro-independence ring even louder as Chinese officials view Hong Kong as merely an arena for Chinese nationalism to compete with local elements. As one expert put it, “Hong Kong’s resilient struggle for autonomy is seen as presenting similar challenges already apparent in China’s peripheries: terror attacks in Xinjiang, self-immolations in Tibet, and political agitation in Taiwan.”180 Xinjiang and Tibet, although different due to the role ethnicity has played in both region’s resistance to Chinese rule and subsequent Chinese tactics of repression, are fundamentally related to the issue of Hong Kong and stages on which the CCP can demonstrate its commitment to territorial integrity no matter the cost. Snyder’s most relevant observation is that states’ adherence to the myth of domino theory – “losses in the empire’s periphery can easily bring a collapse of power at the imperial core” – can lead to strategic blunders and over-expansion.181 He cites this as, additionally, a product of the myth of the “turbulent frontier,” the belief that the best defensive strategy is one that continuously expands into the periphery in order to tame anarchic forces seeking to undermine the state in those same territories. Some of the first moves made by the newly founded PRC were on shoring up periphery, on the national front invading Tibet and forcing the Dalai Lama into exile, reintegrating the nascent second East Turkestan Republic into Xinjiang (literally translated to “new frontier”), and the First Taiwan Crisis. Within China, the concept of untamed, peripheral, frontiers is central to the nation’s creation myth. Zhongguo, or China, most accurately translates to “middle country,” a designation derived from the old imperial system in which the Chinese emperor not only governed China, but in fact, invested legitimacy in other monarchs. Confucian maps from pre-modern China show a world in which the emperor is at the center, with each concentric ring radiating out, signifying not just physical distance, but also cultural distance, or civilizational distance. Cartographers placed Korea in the second ring, since Koreans adopted Confucianism and used Chinese characters. Semi-nomadic, semi-Confucian barbarians in areas under nominal Chinese authority made up the third ring. Beyond them, untamed nomadic settlers made up the fourth. Centralized, Chinese authorities delegating autonomy to frontier, non-Chinese groups is part of a wider web of narratives that nationalist groups promote as an integral part of China’s legacy. The PRC, deriving legitimacy from this historical tradition, no doubt was inspired by dynastic precedent. The original basis for OCTS, even before Deng offered it to Taiwan, has its roots in a 17-point proposal from 1951 to allow Tibet to maintain autonomy. That proposal itself derived from Qing imperial policy that encouraged border areas to maintain local autonomy for a short period of time, before eventual integration within China. As Ho-fung Hung states, “The “one country, two systems” formula for Hong Kong is just a tactical and transitional arrangement. What awaits Hong Kong is what Tibet has seen since 1959: forced assimilation and tight direct control by Beijing.”182 Part of the CCP’s suppression of Hong Kong’s autonomy is the use of very paternal language. Xi himself stated in a 2017 speech, “It has been 20 years since Hong Kong’s return. According to China’s tradition, a man enters adulthood at the age of 20. So today, we are celebrating the coming of age of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (HKSAR), which has grown with the vigor of a bamboo or pine tree.”183 His language is obviously patronizing, and by specifying that the HKSAR had not yet entered “adulthood,” he reduces the conflicts of the Umbrella Movement to adolescent rebelliousness. Xi’s words speak to a larger trend of thought within the ranks of the CCP. Another official once stated that Hong Kong residents’ different understanding of OCTS necessitated not just “serious attention,” but that “the people of Hong Kong should be re-enlightened about the ‘one country, two systems’ policy.”184 Behind this rhetoric, it is clear that there is growing tension within the PRC to how to resolve the issues within Hong Kong. Ultimately, the CCP finds itself at a critical juncture. Its core interests, and the lengths it goes to in order to protect them from slights, betray an inherent insecurity within the CCP apparatus. It has been abundantly clear for much of the decade that the way forward for the CCP and China looks very different from the path it has taken so far. The same methods of economic growth are no longer possible, the demographics of the nation are different, the global stage is changed, and institutional ossification within the CCP has only further set in. The 2019 Hong Kong protests touched on various sensitive nerves within a party that is increasingly wary of threats, however real or imaginary, to its rule. Simultaneously, the CCP is currently led by Xi Jinping, who is the first leader since Mao to abandon the party’s practices of ruling-bycommittee. The CCP Within a State-Party system such as China, the fundamental goal of the party is to survive. Following Mao, the CCP staked its legitimacy on economic progress, with its nationalist defense of Chinese honor in close second.185 To describe nationalism as natural, or to assume Chinese people are inherently more nationalistic than others, would be a mistake. The CCP has made it an explicit goal to foster nationalism within China through educational means and statecontrolled media. The Taiwan issue became the third rail of Chinese politics because of years of propaganda initiatives. It is such a problem that many within China, from officials to military generals to average citizens, remain convinced that “No regime could survive the loss of Taiwan.”186 There is no way for any observer to know if this is true, but Shirk states, “…the myth linking the political survival of the CCP regime to Taiwan is so pervasive that it creates its own political reality, especially in Communist Party headquarters.”187 If Taiwanese independence, something that has been the de-facto reality for seven decades, is a threat to the CCP’s survival, then Hong Kong’s moving away from China through democracy would assuredly be a setback. Hong Kong’s independence, the first time China would have lost territory following the Century of Shame, would be such a disaster for the party’s ability to rule that it is not mentioned as a potential possibility. The question of regime survival in the aftermath of Taiwanese, or worse, Hong Kong secession, is a question Chinese leadership is keen to avoid, hence the tension around the lack of any law in the territory supporting Article 23. The CCP’s Propaganda Ministry is ultimately responsible for the wellspring of domestic pressure that a Chinese official has termed a “hostage” situation, in which Chinese citizens, taught to care about Taiwan and Hong Kong as integral territories of China cut off by foreign powers, refuse to allow government acquiescence. The Chinese Communist Party depends on its nationalist image: the party fought off Japanese invasion in World War II, won the Civil War despite the KMT receiving significant amounts of foreign aid, and eventually negotiated the peaceful return of Hong Kong and Macau back to Chinese sovereignty. In the 1990s, in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the impending return of Hong Kong, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Propaganda Ministry led the “patriotic education campaign” to improve CCP legitimacy, a strategy that now severely distorts rhetoric with regards to Hong Kong democratic movements or Taiwanese elections. The Chinese professor who said that China can afford to let Taiwan go dared not voice this opinion even in a time of “soft politics” and the current domestic political situation in Mainland China is far from the softer politics that dominated pre-2008 and especially pre-Xi Jinping.188 In describing the CCP’s crisis of nationalism, Snyder states, “it may nonetheless become politically entrapped in its own rhetoric. Insofar as the elite’s power and policies are based on society’s acceptance of imperial myths, its rule would be jeopardized by renouncing the myths when their side effects become costly. To stay in power and to keep central policy objectives intact, elites may have to accept some unintended consequences of their imperial sales pitch.”189 In this case, the unintended consequences include political upheaval and the potential dissolution of the stateparty apparatus. Conventional logic dictates Chinese political survival is staked upon satisfying not the opinion of the “silent majority,” Chinese citizens who mostly likely could do without Taiwan or Hong Kong if it guaranteed continued economic growth, but instead those citizens who feel so strongly and buy into nationalist rhetoric so much that they may participate in mass protests against the government.190 This had led to a growing problem within Chinese policy-making: the country’s military power continues to increase relative to the United States and Taiwan, yet the party has lost control of the narrative of Taiwan’s flirtation with independence or US undermining of strategic interests.191 Furthermore, this nationalist juggernaut occurred nearly simultaneously with Taiwan’s switch from authoritarian, Chinese-facing and mainlander-dominated rule, to a democratic system in which younger generations of Taiwanese lack the romantic ideals of a reunified China.192 Ergo, the “unintended consequences” originally conceived decades ago have continuously increased in volatility. An earlier example of this would be the anti-American protests following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. 193 If such an accident were to happen today, with higher tensions, more modern weapons, and current leadership, the ensuing crisis could quickly spiral into conflict. In China’s Hong Kong, A Political and Cultural Perspective, Jiang Shigong attempts to reflect on Hong Kong’s role within China. Throughout the work, he uses the word “empire” with positive connotations, actively encouraging the CCP to incorporate elements of dynastic legitimacy and justifying the CCP’s decisions in Hong Kong by saying it ensured “patriotic people ruled Hong Kong.”194 According to him, “The return of Hong Kong was legitimate in political philosophy. Its legitimacy came from historical traditions- ‘Hong Kong as a part of China since ancient times.”195 The emphasis on history goes hand in hand with his earlier quote on “coercion” via modernity. Modernity inconveniences the government because Basic Law, the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and OCTS are not agreements that can easily be ignored. Ideally for him, the CCP could pick and choose when ‘one country’ or ‘two systems’ takes priority. However, his main thesis is that China must transform the identity of Hong Kong residents into people who first and foremost identify with the Chinese nation, or the arrangement of OCTS will never be sufficient. This is an opinion that is not unique to him, but that has circulated within policy-making circles.196 Jiang is not a harmless intellectual- he served as a researcher within the Hong Kong and Macau Liaison office, where he published several books.197 Throughout Jiang’s work, as well as in state media coverage of the city, the city’s history and independent culture is often reduced. Wai-Man Lam writes, “Hong Kong is re-emphasised, and in fact minimalised by Chinese officials as an economic city.”198 To briefly return to Anderson’s theories on nationalism and national identities, the goal of this language is to ensure that the imagined community of Hong Kong not only stays on the sub-national level, but that its existence is reduced to the imagination of just a few. Acknowledgement of democratic demands, or infractions against Basic Law, would implicitly not just support protestors, but also implicitly support the other imagined communities that the CCP hopes to erase. Even Xi himself stated, “China’s continuous and rapid development over the years provides an invaluable opportunity, an inexhaustible source of strength, and a broad space for Hong Kong’s development. As a saying in Hong Kong goes, “After leaving Suzhou, a traveler will find it hard to get a ride on a boat,” meaning an opportunity missed is an opportunity lost.”199 Hong Kong protestors waving British or American flags, Western media outlets’ favorable depiction of democratic movements, and increasing mutual suspicion all play a part in mainland depictions of the protests. News stories for The People’s Daily, all throughout the Umbrella Movement, as well as the Anti-Extradition Protests, cite “hostile foreign forces” as attempting to undermine Chinese sovereignty.200 The Simon Cheng incident during the 2019 protest illustrates how protests strike at the heart of the CCP’s PR problem, and how the divergent international and domestic audiences conflict. In August, Chinese security forces detained, interrogated, and tortured Simon Cheng, a Hong Kong resident and British consulate worker. At the Hong Kong-Shenzhen high-speed rail link, Chinese police stopped Cheng and placed him on a train going back to Shenzhen, reinforcing the increasing blurriness of the legal boundaries between Hong Kong and the Mainland.201 During interrogation, police mostly focused on his role as an agent for the British government to incite unrest in Hong Kong UK government sources found his claims credible, and Chinese police later released a tape of Cheng confessing to soliciting prostitutes, a common tactic used to shame political prisoners. The incident greatly inflamed China-UK relations, whose officials increasingly took a pro-protestor position, and it also further incited anger in the city as Cheng alleged that with him in prison were several Hong Kong protestors. 202 However, domestically, it is effective for the CCP to kidnap a consular worker as it allows them to continue to cite outside enemies. This tactic not only perpetuates myths about a hostile Western world, when the reality is a much murkier situation of aggression on both sides, but also undermines the legitimate complaints of the Hong Kong population. In one small study about news coverage of the Hong Kong protests, the writers found that there was a negative correlation between nationalism and attitudes toward democracy or pro-democratic movements.203 The same study also showed that people who were against the protests were more likely to read state news media in China. Overseas Chinese who had access to outside sources were more likely to support protestors, and less likely to cite reasons such as “foreign forces” as arguments behind the protests. However, like many other propaganda tactics, this narrative severely limits the government’s ability to bargain with protestors. To acquiesce in Hong Kong is not to listen to fellow Chinese citizens, it is to be misled by the West once again attempting to transform China into a liberal democracy. Therefore, the protests, Hong Kong, and democracy are inextricable from the tension in China’s relationship with the United States. Snyder’s relevant observations do not end at merely describing domino theory. His analysis of the domestic situations within Japan and Germany that led both countries down a path of world war and eventual destruction has several parallels within modern day China. He finds that late industrialization, including “large government role in in mobilizing and allocating investment, centralized financial institutions, relatively low levels of mass consumption, and economic concentration in the hands of a few giant cartels,” played a massive role in the expansion undertaken by both nations, as the melding of government and financial institutions led to a feedback loop with little space for democratic intervention.204 China’s economic rise demonstrates all of these issues: state-owned enterprises dominate the economy and a political banking sector secures cheap lines of credit for favorite firms. Successful Chinese enterprises often work in tandem with the state on matters such as trade policy and the development of technologies considered essential for the CCP’s larger goals. The limited levels of consumption in turn limit firm’s abilities to expand within China’s domestic market, and contribute to severe wealth stratification and income inequality that threatens cohesion as economic progress is confined to select urban areas primarily located on the eastern seaboard.205 The byzantine nature of the CCP, with its many councils, committees, and massive membership adds more complications with regard to China’s policy aims. As Snyder explains, a cartelized government, in which various different factions pull policy in different ways may lead to a situation in which the end result is an unintended consequence by all parties involved. In China, this is reflected in the complex process by which CCP leadership is chosen, a process that over the years has increasingly played out in the public sphere. For example, during the campaigns by Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping, both publicly criticized each other in the media, previously unheard of within internal CCP politics.206 Nien-Ching Chang Liao states, “China’s provocative behavior is driven by the dysfunctional internal dynamics of the government’s decision-making process. Certain ministries or agencies- the military, the fishing industry, the oil industry, various maritime agencies, provincial governments, and other local actors- might harbor parochial objectives of increasing their budget, promoting trade, or ensuring adequate supplies of energy.”207 The different goals of various government actors, either local officials, leaders of state-owned enterprises, or institutional actors, reflects inconsistency and unreliability. How does this relate to Hong Kong? Due to the autonomy promised within Basic Law, the Liaison Office in Hong Kong, the Office of the HKSAR in Beijing, and the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region all influence policy with regards to Hong Kong. Some believe that the Hong Kong government’s initial missteps during the early stages of 2019’s crisis were caused in part by the conflicting instructions received from different offices. 208 Therefore, not only does cartelization make China’s domestic and foreign policy unwieldly, it also played a direct role in how the situation in Hong Kong deteriorated further.

#### The perception of backing down on a “core interest” magnifies the link – the aff is seen as compromising national sovereignty

Hiciano 20 [Lery Hiciano, graduate student at Claremont, 2020, “Nearly Halfway There: The Future of Hong Kong, China, and One Country Two Systems,” Claremont Colleges, https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3513&context=cmc\_theses]/Kankee

Core Interests In Mainland criticisms and observations of Hong Kong’s status, several sources present a focus on the definition of “one country.” In another speech contained within The Governance of China, Xi highlights that for OCTS to function, there must be a “strong sense of one country.” He further adds that sovereignty is not for negotiation, and that it is China’s “red line.”209 The mythmaking around China’s history: the imperial system that placed Han civilization at the center of the world, which was then erased in “The Century of Shame,” in turn defines the CCP’s core interests. The nationalist core of CCP legitimacy and mythmaking is that the party will be the vanguard to lead China out of the ruins of that horrible period. Starting with the First Opium War and continuing until the CCP’s victory over the communists, China was the scene of some of history’s most tragic stories. The First Opium War was followed by the Second Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, Dungan Rebellion, Boxer Rebellion, the First Sino-Japanese War, the Warlord Period, the First Chinese Civil War, and the Second World War. In one century, China suffered tens of millions of deaths inflicted by combat, disease, famine, and natural disasters. Following the CCP’s victory in 1949, Chinese leaders across different eras have all explicitly made reference to the goal of returning the nation to its previous heights. Despite the party’s missteps in the 20th century, it has succeeded in rapidly moving China up in the global hierarchy. In a country such as China, a framework like OCTS is particularly groundbreaking because it is an agreement between the CCP and the people of Hong Kong. Not only that, it is also an agreement with the people of China, as it forever alters the contract between rulers and subjects by creating distinctions between the rights of different subnational entities. At the same time, it drastically widens the purview of “politics,” as the individual distinctions between subnational entities are negotiated. To do this between the PRC, a nominally communist authoritarian state, and one of the world’s most free-market cities required a significant amount of compromise to ensure a smooth transition. One writer states, “By casting reunification as an uncompromisable issue of national sovereignty, the Chinese government made this a default justification for all political, economic, social, and cultural changes. That is, reunification with Hong Kong demanded the supreme power of sovereignty to act ethically by not abiding by existing (Maoist) socialist norms and laws.” Now that the initial transition is complete, the justifications used to drive reform and originally put forward the concept of OCTS can now be used to harshly respond to the city’s democratic impulses. As the matter of reunification is “uncompromisable” to the extent that socialism is no longer at the core of the CCP, at the very least in one area, then any attempts to damage that relationship strike at the heart of the CCP’s authority. Since 2009, the CCP has given the general policies associated with this goal the name “core interests.”210 Starting with the territorial claims in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, they have now expanded to include regime stability, and continued economic development. The CCP is unwilling to negotiate on these issues. However, the full list of core interests as defined by the CCP has never been published or revealed. One army advisor stated, “as China becomes stronger, we can publicize by installments those core interests that our country can effectively safeguard”211 That quote is a clear admission that as China gains strength, the core interests will expand. In other words, there is no effective route of appeasement or clear stopping point for China’s potential expansion. However, the CCP is not only unwilling to negotiate on this vague list of issues, it also has a tendency to force others to acknowledge its position. For external audiences, the punishment for failing to follow the CCP agenda could come in the form of economic sanctions or corporate espionage. H.R McMaster, a former White House national security advisor, stated that the CCP’s tactics were “successful in part because the party is able to induce cooperation, wittingly or unwittingly, from individuals, companies, and political leaders.”212 In 2010, the CCP sanctioned Norway for the decision to award a Nobel Prize to dissident Liu Xiaobo. In another episode, Marriot International Hotels had to apologize for “violating national laws and hurting the feelings of the Chinese people” after perhaps insinuating that Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are independent from China.213 When Daryl Morey, General Manager of the Houston Rockets, tweeted his support for the 2019 Hong Kong Protests, the Houston Rockets had all their games banned from Chinese television, with threats that the same would happen to other NBA franchises. Other international firms consistently face the same pressure to conform to these narratives. Internal audiences, subject to actual enforcement of these policies, have no ability to dissent. The CCP’s track record regarding human rights and civil liberties is well-known to be abysmal. Human rights activists accurately compare it to a 21st century 1984, complete with mass surveillance, censored news & media, advanced facial recognition software, and much more. The personal costs of disagreeing can be extraordinarily high, even for something as apparently innocuous as a social media post. This also obscures whatever the true opinions of Chinese citizens may be. During the 2019 Hong Kong protests, many famous Chinese celebrities posted messages in support of the police or of the CCP.214 However, could any celebrity realistically have posted any message in support of the protestors? In a recent Athenaeum speech at Claremont McKenna College, a Chinese human rights lawyer questioned if the “resistance” had the ability to resist, if the state had made it impossible to do so. Hong Kong residents, through cases such as the disappearances of the booksellers, have already seen what awaits them under the CCP’s human rights regime. The CCP has succeeded in lasting this long by continuously adapting, however it is approaching the longest rule ever by a single party government. Minxin Pei, a foremost China expert, writes about how the CCP has survived by fueling mass consumerism, nationalism, and learning how to “fine tune” its repression tactics.215 However, with slowing economic growth and contentious power politics in the Asia-Pacific, it remains to be seen if increased repression is an effective tool with which to ensure regime survival. In South Korea and Taiwan, the authoritarian, economically focused, developmental states eventually gave way to democratic transitions. China is now nearing the point at which middle class citizens would call for democracy and greater participation in government ($10,000 per capita GDP).216 It remains to be seen whether in the face of growing potential crises, the CCP once again faces internal calls for democracy.

#### Authoritarianism limits the CCP’s ability to make concessions

Sala 19 [Ilaria Maria Sala, journalist based in Hong Kong, 8-7-2019, "Hong Kong Strikes, and Strikes a Nerve in Beijing The Chinese government is acting as though it would come unmoored if it made any concession to the protesters.," NYT, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/opinion/hong-kong-protests-strike-china.html]/Kankee

This is not to say that all Hong Kongers are of one mind. Demonstrations in support of the police have taken place regularly, too, if less frequently and with fewer participants. In those rallies, which are never visited by riot police officers, participants stress their support for China, waving Chinese flags and wielding banners that declare their roots in various Chinese cities and provinces. The fault line running through Hong Kong is, more and more, about how much the city should be allowed to maintain its distinct identity or be refashioned as China’s Hong Kong. On Tuesday, Yang Guang, the spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in Beijing, held his office’s second news conference since the beginning of the crisis more than two months ago. Previously, the office had only one in more than two decades, after Britain handed control of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Mr. Yang didn’t address any of the protesters’ grievances or demands, such as the withdrawal of the proposed extradition bill that set off the unrest or an independent inquiry into police brutality. The mainland authorities repeated their support for the city’s chief executive and the police. They strongly condemned the violence — by protesters, that is — calling them “reckless violent groups” who will “pay the price if they play with fire.” They admonished, patronizingly, that all this striking and demonstrating was damaging Hong Kong’s economy. “Do not mistake our restraint as being soft,” Mr. Yang also said. “Do not underestimate the central government’s determination in maintaining stability.” It was a veiled threat, and an admission of weakness, too. One of the most powerful governments in the world is acting as though it would come unmoored if it made any concession to popular demands. China seems as fragile as only a truly authoritarian government can be.

#### Declining credibility causes CCP war over Taiwan to distract attention – it’s a key driver of Chinese political dynamics

Blumenthal 20 [Dan Blumenthal, senior fellow and the director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute9-28-2020, "China's aggressive tactics aim to bolster the Communist Party's legitimacy," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, https://www.aei.org/articles/chinas-aggressive-tactics-aim-to-bolster-the-communist-partys-legitimacy/]/Kankee

Why does China seem to be on the warpath? In the first half of the 2020, Chinese soldiers killed dozens of Indian troops over disputed borders, sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel, and launched a record number of incursions into Taiwanese airspace. Beyond military coercion, China’s belligerence included selling arms to Serbia despite concerns expressed by NATO about military dependence, pressuring the WHO to censor anti-China content, and sentencing a Canadian national to death. and placing crushing tariffs on Australia for criticizing Beijing’s handling of the coronavirus. The prevailing wisdom is that Beijing is more aggressive now because it is ascendant and the United States is distracted and declining. This “Chinese ascendancy school” argues that President Xi Jinping has successfully consolidated domestic power and built China’s military and economic might to enable his vision of an aggressive, revisionist foreign policy. But this account is overly-simplistic: Chinese aggression is not merely a result of China’s strength, but also of its weakness. Xi Jinping’s overwhelming concern with domestic stability, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy and party unity are crucial drivers of China’s bellicosity. China has faced two disasters in 2020—the coronavirus and historic floods—which exposed its fragilities and created internal unrest. Its response to both was the same: escalating aggression against its neighbors. China’s economic and military power made these provocations possible, but its need to suppress internal divisions made them necessary. The question is not why China has disputes with neighbors, but why now. If China’s aggression were only a result of its economic and military strength, then it could have paused its aggressive foreign policy as the political leadership back in Beijing refocused on dealing with the destructive wages of the coronavirus. Typically, governments in chaos have little time for adventurism abroad and must focus on remedies at home. In fact, many experts predicted that China would face inward during 2020, to focus on restarting economic growth and preventing new coronavirus cases. Yet for the CCP, external aggression is a necessary tool to combat internal weakness. The CCP is obsessed with its fragilities, such as the threat of losing popular support and legitimacy and demands for more justice and freedoms. When Chinese people criticize their government, China must act more aggressively abroad. Beijing uses external aggression to fan Chinese nationalism and cast the CCP as the protector of the people and champion of a new era of Chinese glory. Coronavirus was a true moment of weakness for the CCP, as it exposed fissures in China’s overcentralized authoritarian political system to light. A now-infamous example of Chinese paranoia over potentially out-of-control domestic crises was the case of Dr. Li Wenliang. On February 7, Li, a doctor who warned of the coronavirus but was quickly censored by the Wuhan police, died from the virus himself. Li’s death quickly became the top trending topic on Chinese social media with hashtags such as “We want freedom of speech.” The CCP censored all mentions of Li or any coronavirus failings, fearing more organized protests. Simultaneously, the coronavirus battered China’s economic growth, which underpins the CCP’s claim to legitimacy, with an unprecedented 6.8 percent Q1 contraction. Far from the unified front which Beijing seeks to project, the coronavirus revealed the CCP’s dysfunction. For example, Dali, a midsize city, intercepted and distributed a shipment of surgical masks headed to the hard-hit municipality of Chongqing. Similarly, the City of Qingdao instructed customs officials to hold on to a shipment of masks and medical products headed to Shenyang. At the same time, Hong Kong dealt the CCP a major political embarrassment when it halted traffic coming in from the mainland. These reports demonstrate the government’s inability to enforce basic order among competing cities and provinces. In response to the tumult caused by the coronavirus crisis, the CCP mobilized popular support by reigniting conflicts with its neighbors. On April 2, during the peak of the coronavirus, a Chinese maritime security vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Parcel islands. Just two weeks later on April 16, China escalated a month’s long standoff with Malaysia by deploying the coast guard to a disputed oil shelf. China also stepped up its military activities targeting Taiwan—who’s coronavirus response was strong and effective—with as many as three incursions in a single week in June. These episodes were widely condemned by the international community, but greeted with nationalist revelry at home. The need to project strength and unity domestically explains the timing of China’s border dispute with India. In May, violent brawls broke out between Chinese and Indian soldiers near Sikkim. On June 15, the Indian government reported that twenty Indian soldiers were killed by Chinese soldiers in the Galwan River Valley, a disputed border region controlled by India but claimed by China. The CCP has made full use of the crisis to rally nationalism. China’s foreign ministry issued statements blaming India for the clashes and state-propaganda popularized the slogan “China is not afraid.” The Global Times, a propaganda outlet, cast the clashes as an Indian invasion, saying “India has illegally constructed defense facilities across the border into Chinese territory in the Galwan Valley region.” Importantly, Chinese state-owned news outlets were also running news about India’s poor coronavirus response at the time, in contrast to its own “successes.” The recent border clashes mirror China’s 2017 standoff with India at Doklam, a strategic point near Bhutan. During the conflict, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made statements that cast the conflict as an Indian attack upon China, and state media circulated images from the 1962 Sino-Indian War, to remind the China populace that Beijing had defeated Delhi before. The India clashes coincided with another threat to CCP legitimacy: a fight to remove pro-democracy advocates from the Hong Kong Legislative Council. China ended up harshly cracking down on the supposedly autonomous city as well. Understanding China’s weaknesses is essential for policymakers attempting to make sense of its aggression. This dynamic is not only a Xi Jinping phenomenon: China’s modern history shows that domestic crises are often followed by belligerence. A study that pre-dated Xi’s rule, with a dataset of over three thousand interactions between the United States and China, found that the CCP was twice as likely to initiate disputes when the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) experienced a substantial drop. The SSE is a barometer of elite sentiment in China because the government pledges to protect elite investments and uses SSE listings to reward party insiders. Insight into the CCP’s domestic political objectives helps determine the magnitude of the conflict and appropriate response. The editor of the Global Times wrote that a belligerent foreign policy was “necessary to satisfy the Chinese people.” Policymakers can use history to deduce what levels of aggression are “necessary” for the CCP’s goals. In India, it is unlikely that clashes will escalate into invasion because the current skirmishes satisfy the CCP’s purpose of bolstering legitimacy. However, Taiwan may be in particular danger from China’s reactionary aggression. This is because the ways in which conflict with Taiwan would bolster the CCP’s legitimacy align more closely with more violent coercion—reunification is a core element of the CCP’s platform and Taiwan’s clear success fighting the coronavirus is a major blow to Beijing’s legitimacy. Because Taiwan’s “threat” to the CCP stems from its mere existence, it is particularly vulnerable to reactionary aggression. Xi is a self-proclaimed follower of Mao. So, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis is a powerful example; Mao needed to generate support for the great leap forward and deflect criticism from poor economic growth. To stir the nation, Mao seized islands controlled by Taiwan and threatened an invasion of the country until restrained by American nuclear brinksmanship. Over the last three months, China has faced another crisis in the form of historic floods. The Yangtze river basin has been inundated, affecting sixty-three million Chinese and inflicting over twenty-five billion dollars in direct damages. Many Chinese have raised concerns that the government’s massive infrastructure projects have worsened the crisis by draining wetlands and promoting development in flood-prone areas. Poor transparency has stirred more backlash as the CCP has been accused of hiding the extent of damages and censoring criticism. One political commentator in Beijing even predicted that the “Chinese public will question Beijing from this year’s continuous natural and man-made disasters, and even question China’s governance model and its effectiveness.” Instead of hoping that the crisis created by the current floods will give China’s neighbors breathing space, the United States should brace itself for the possibility of renewed aggression. The CCP must prove its worthiness to the tens of millions of displaced people across China, making it prone to lashing out. Taiwan may be an appealing target; it has been spared from flooding and has been visible in assisting neighboring countries like Japan with post-flood reconstruction. Already, China has begun live-fire sea-crossing drills near Taiwan. Recognizing the nature of the problem is the first step to successfully confronting China’s threats. China’s aggression is enabled by its power but motivated by its fragility. The coronavirus crisis makes it clear that the CCP views external aggression as a key tool to shore up its domestic support and legitimacy. Instead of viewing China’s aggressions merely as a “natural” function of its supposedly inevitable ascendency, neighbors, policymakers should start examining China’s weaknesses for signs of looming threats. The United States and its allies can both better prepare for onslaughts of aggression and devise better deterrent policies.

#### Taiwan goes Nuclear.

Talmadge 18 [Caitlin, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-China War Could Spiral Out of Control,” accessible online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option>, published Nov/Dec 2018]//re-cut by Elmer

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a **military confrontation**—resulting, for example, **from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan**—**no longer seems** as **implausible** as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. **China**, by contrast, not only has **nuclear weapons**; it has also **intermingled** them **with its conventional** military **forces**, **making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other**. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. **Conventional forces** can threaten nuclear forces in ways that **generate pressures to escalate**—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. **If U.S. operations endangered** or damaged China’s **nuclear forces,** Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, **Beijing might** reluctantly **conclude** that limited **nuclear escalation**—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—**was** a **viable** option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The **most worrisome flash point** for a U.S.-Chinese war **is Taiwan**. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored **U.S. strategy** to ensure a conventional victory **would** likely **endanger** much of China’s **nuclear arsenal** in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in **wartime developments** that could **shift** **China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions.** If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline. If such escalation appears far-fetched, China’s history suggests otherwise. In 1969, similar dynamics brought China to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In early March of that year, Chinese troops ambushed Soviet guards amid rising tensions over a disputed border area. Less than two weeks later, the two countries were fighting an undeclared border war with heavy artillery and aircraft. The conflict quickly escalated beyond what Chinese leaders had expected, and before the end of March, Moscow was making thinly veiled nuclear threats to pressure China to back down. Chinese leaders initially dismissed these warnings, only to radically upgrade their threat assessment once they learned that the Soviets had privately discussed nuclear attack plans with other countries. Moscow never intended to follow through on its nuclear threat, archives would later reveal, but Chinese leaders believed otherwise. On three separate occasions, they were convinced that a Soviet nuclear attack was imminent. Once, when Moscow sent representatives to talks in Beijing, China suspected that the plane transporting the delegation was in fact carrying nuclear weapons. Increasingly fearful, China test-fired a thermonuclear weapon in the Lop Nur desert and put its rudimentary nuclear forces on alert—a dangerous step in itself, as it increased the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch. Only after numerous preparations for Soviet nuclear attacks that never came did Beijing finally agree to negotiations. China is a different country today than it was in the time of Mao Zedong, but the 1969 conflict offers important lessons. China started a war in which it believed nuclear weapons would be irrelevant, even though the Soviet arsenal was several orders of magnitude larger than China’s, just as the U.S. arsenal dwarfs China’s today. Once the conventional war did not go as planned, the Chinese reversed their assessment of the possibility of a nuclear attack to a degree bordering on paranoia. Most worrying, China signaled that it was actually considering using its nuclear weapons, even though it had to expect devastating retaliation. Ambiguous wartime information and worst-case thinking led it to take nuclear risks it would have considered unthinkable only months earlier. This pattern could unfold again today.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

* Checked

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.