### 1

#### The Role of the ballot is to the test if the resolution is true.

#### 1] Constitutivism: The ballot asks you to either vote aff or neg based on the given resolution a) Five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means its intrinsic to the nature of the activity b) the purpose of debate is the acquisition of knowledge in pursuit of truth – a resolutional focus is key to depth of exploration which o/w on specificity. It’s a jurisdictional issue since it questions whether the judge should go outside the scope of the game and can only endorse what is within their burden c) Even if another role of the ballot is better for debate, that is not a reason it ought to be the role of the ballot, just a reason we ought to

#### 2] Isomorphism: ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it’s solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn’t a closest estimate.

### 2

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not fiat changes to words in the resolution.

#### Violation- Ur changing what the definition of worker is by including new workers as topical. Before the aff plan text is enacted, agricultural people are not considered workers. Only through fiat does it become topical.

#### 1] mixes burdens- it makes it impossible to evaluate topicality because the judge must evaluate whether or not the aff falls within the resolution before they vote on it. Since the aff only becomes topical through the act of fiat, they are never able to resolve an apriori burden before voting. That makes debates irresolvable and comes first.

#### 2] Limits- you justify an infinite number of affirmatives because you can redefine anything as topical. This makes preround prep impossible which destroys both fairness and education. For example, your norm justifies redefining any job or humans or social status as workers and saying they should be allowed to strike and gaining unique offense off of that. This massively advantages making it impossible to negate.

### 3

#### Interp- debaters may not misdisclose.

#### Violation- you disclose a compulsory voting aff but say its an agriculture workers aff in ur round report.

Calendar

Description automatically generated

Graphical user interface, text, application

Description automatically generated

#### Standards

#### 1. Academic honesty – Mis-disclosing is lying and attempting to deceive your opponent into prepping the wrong aff. It also prevents the checking of your arguments and ensuring that you use proper cites which is key to verifying that you weren’t academically dishonest. Academic honesty is an independent voter since debate is an academic setting that is required to ensure good academic practices which is also key to real world engagement for things like college.

#### 2. Pre-round prep – It wastes all the time I have before round to answer your position since I am prepping the wrong arguments. That’s key to fairness since pre-round determines my ability to engage in your position and the quality of arguments. Also means presume all their arguments false and they can’t weigh case since I couldn’t engage in them.

### 4

#### The standard is consistency with the standpoint of the skeptic.

#### Prefer –

#### 1. Performativity –

#### 2. Holding ourselves to a standard of absolute truth is necessary:

#### A) Culpability – Truth is the standard to which we hold people accountable for their actions, absent an understanding of the way the world actually is, people could make up their own understandings which makes it impossible for us to every justify why something someone did was bad, incorrect, etc and tell them to change

#### B) Outcomes – The truth of the world is the ultimate determiner of the success of our actions, for example, if we were to act as though climate change wasn’t real because it is convenient, we would die of climate change must faster C) Resolvability – Debate requires a maintenance of truth – if debaters could make arguments like affirm because 2+2=5 debate as a concept would become incoherent since there’s no metric to determine who is winning based on the truth of their claims.

#### Morality is impossible

#### 1] Human moral evaluations are contaminated by personal affective states, making them arbitrary and unfair.

Scott Jenkins, Professor of Philosophy at University of Kansas, Nietzsche's Transformation of the Problem of Pessimism in Human, All Too Human, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Volume 50, Issue 2, Autumn 2019, pp. 272-291 (Article), ///AHS PB

In his summary of Dühring’s introduction to The Value of Life, Nietzsche recognizes the importance of this claim about content and states that for Dühring, “no estimation of value [Werthschätzung] is pure knowledge, all are affections of the mind [Gemüths-Affektionen]” (KSA 8:9[1], p. 135). He continues, “A judgment of the value of life can never be pure knowledge. But I wish to add that it would be more correct to call all such judgments impure knowledge [unreine Erkenntnisse]”—and the rest of a draft of HH 32 follows. For my purposes, two aspects of this impurity are worth emphasizing (in addition to the original claim concerning drive-based content). First, Nietzsche notes that since we are “subject to moods and fluctuations” our drives are themselves in flux (HH 32). And second, our knowledge of the object evaluated in a judgment of value “can never be complete” (HH 32). Thus judgments of value express the relation between our fluctuating conative-affective states and our idiosyncratic representations of a given object. This is why Nietzsche, contra Dühring, regards judgments of value as impure. While they may seem to be as authoritative as theoretical judgments that arguably have some claim to objective (and thus intersubjective) validity, they actually express nothing more than an individual’s shifting practical orientation and idiosyncratic theoretical point of view. From the impurity of evaluative judgments, Nietzsche draws the further conclusion that such judgments are unjust (HH 32). By this he means that in making such judgments, we illegitimately privilege our own drives and affective orientations in relation to others’. He arrives at this conclusion by noting that we cannot refrain from making impure judgments of value: “Perhaps it would follow from all this that one ought not to judge at all; if only it were possible to live without evaluating, without having aversions [Abneigung] and partialities [Zuneigung]!—for all aversion is connected with [hängt zusammen mit] an evaluation, likewise all partiality” (HH 32).16 As living beings, we evaluate entities in accordance with our drives.17 And as human beings, we express such implicit evaluations in judgments of value: “A drive to something or away from something divorced from a feeling one is desiring the beneficial or avoiding the harmful, a drive without some kind of knowing evaluation of the worth of its objective, does not exist in humanity” (HH 32). Nietzsche’s idea here must be that we typically take such judgments to express something about the object itself. We are thus guilty of injustice insofar as we unwittingly take our own subjective orientation to objects, and not those of other actual or possible valuers, to have the authority to determine objects as, say, beneficial or harmful.18 And while we can recognize, on reflection, that judgments of value express only a subjective point of view, we typically think and act as if they do not. Our default state is injustice grounded in what Nietzsche terms our “illogical original relationship [Grundstellung] with all things” (HH 31).

#### 2] There is no moral truth for everyone.

J.L Mackie, Australian Philosopher, The subjectivity of values, 1977, ///AHS PB

[First] The Argument from Relativity The argument from relativity has as its premiss the wellknown variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order subjectivism: radical differences between first order moral judgements make it difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way. Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people ’ s adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy. Of course, the standards may be an idealization of the way of life from which they arise: the monogamy in which people participate may be less complete, less rigid, than that of which it leads them to approve. This is not to say that moral judgements are purely conventional. Of course there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers, people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can usually be understood as the extension, in ways which, though new and unconventional, seemed to them to be required for consistency, of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. In short, the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values. But there is a well-known counter to this argument from relativity, namely to say that the items for which objective validity is in the first place to be claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all society – such principles as provide the foundations of what Sidgwick has called different methods of ethics: the principle of universalizability, perhaps, or the rule that one ought to conform to the specific rules of any way of life in which one takes part, from which one profits, and on which one relies, or some utilitarian principle of doing what tends, or seems likely, to promote the general happiness. It is easy to show that such general principles, married with differing concrete circumstances, different existing social patterns or different preferences, will beget different specific moral rules; and there is some plausibility in the claim that the specific rules thus generated will vary from community to community or from group to group in close agreement with the actual variations in accepted codes. The argument from relativity can be only partly countered in this way. To take this line the moral objectivist has to stay that it is only in these principles that the objective moral character attaches immediately to its descriptively specified ground or subject: other moral judgements are objectively valid or true, but only derivatively and contingently – if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right. And despite the prominence in recent philosophical ethics of universalization, utilitarian principles, and the like, these are very far from constituting the whole of what is actually affirmed as basic in ordinary moral thought. Much of this is concerned rather with what Hare calls “ideals” or, less kindly, ‘fanaticism’. That is, people judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses in others. ‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible description of what supplies many of our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’. With regard to all these starting points of moral thinking the argument from relativity remains in full force. [Second] The Argument from Queerness Even more important, however, and certainly more generally applicable, is the argument from queerness. This has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. These points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of nonnatural qualities, and by the intuitionists in their talk about a ‘faculty of moral intuition’. Intuitionism has long been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. What is not so often stressed, but is more important, is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. Of course the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking. But, however complex the real process, it will require (if it is to yield authoritatively prescriptive conclusions) some input of this distinctive sort, either premisses or forms of argument or both. When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘a special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clearheaded objectivist is compelled to resort. Indeed, the best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade this issue, but to look for companions in guilt. For example, Richard Price argues that it is not moral knowledge alone that such an empiricism as those of Locke and Hume is unable to account for, but also our knowledge and even our ideas of essence, number, identity, diversity, solidity, inertia, substance, the necessary existence and infinite extension of time and space, necessity and possibility in general, power, and causation. If the understanding, which Price defines as the faculty within us that discerns truth, is also a source of new simple ideas of so many other sorts, may it not also be a power of immediately perceiving right and wrong, which yet are real characters of actions? This is an important counter to the argument from queerness. The only adequate reply to it would be to show how, on empiricist foundations, we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have of all these matters. I cannot even begin to do that here, though I have undertaken some parts of the task elsewhere. I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given in empirical terms. If some supposed metaphysical necessities or essences resist such treatment, then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the targets of the argument from queerness. This queerness does not consist simply in the fact that ethical statements are ‘unverifiable’. Although logical positivism with its verifiability theory of descriptive meaning gave an impetus to non-cognitive accounts of ethics, it is not only logical positivists but also empiricists of a much more liberal sort who should find objective values hard to accommodate. Indeed, I would not only reject the verifiability principle but also deny the conclusion commonly drawn from it, that moral judgements lack descriptive meaning. The assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless but false. Plato ’ s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be. The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something ’ s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it. Or we should have something like Clarke ’ s necessary relations of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such- andsuch an action somehow built into it. The need for an argument of this sort can be brought out by reflection on Hume ’ s argument that ‘reason’ – in which at this stage he includes all sorts of knowing as well as reasoning – can never be an ‘influencing motive of the will’. Someone might object that Hume has argued unfairly from the lack of influencing power (not contingent upon desires) in ordinary objects of knowledge and ordinary reasoning, and might maintain that values differ from natural objects precisely in their power, when known, automatically to influence the will. To this Hume could, and would need to, reply that this objection involves the postulating of value-entities or value-features of quite a different order from anything else with which we are acquainted, and of a corresponding faculty with which to detect them. That is, he would have to supplement his explicit argument with what I have called the argument from queerness. Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural features. What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty – say, causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? And how do we know the relation that it signifies, if this is something more than such actions being socially condemned, and condemned by us too, perhaps through our having absorbed attitudes from our social environment? It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which ‘sees’ the wrongness: something must be postulated which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the mysterious consequential link between the two. Alternatively, the intuition required might be the perception that wrongness is a higher order property belonging to certain natural properties; but what is this belonging of properties to other properties, and how can we discern it? How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be if we could replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality is said to be consequential.

#### 3] a just government is impossible.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” But **justice,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which must not wait.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: **a just decision is always required immediately, "right away." It cannot furnish itself with** infinite information and the **unlimited knowledge of conditions,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And **even if it did** have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, **the moment of decision,** as such, **always remains a finite moment of urgency** and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, **since it always marks the interruption of the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive deliberation that precedes it,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule**

#### 4] Util triggers skep

#### [a] Pleasure and pain aren’t additive or aggregatable just like two headaches don’t equal a migraine.

#### [b] Self Defeating: Always trying to maximize as much X as possible prevents us from actually using X, which means we never experience pleasures goodness.

#### [c] Masochism Objection: There are different standards for what a good sensation is (IE some people like pain), so knowing what end state is desirable under util is impossible

#### [d] Util can never deem certain actions as uniformly prohibited as the only morally relevant feature is whether an action maximizes utility in that situation.

#### [e] Assigning blame is impossible as consequences always trigger more consequences, and there is no brightline for when culpability ends.

#### [f] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events

**Thus I contend the skeptic would negate the resolution.**

**1. The skeptical conclusion being true triggers permissibility: It denies that moral obligations exist. That negates – A) Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[3]](#footnote-3) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics o/w – 1) it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res and 2) it’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text B) Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent C] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true. D] Shiftiness – Permissibility ground encourages the aff to load up with triggers and the 1ar controls the direction of the round which means they can moot all my offense, I need permissibility in the 2n to compensate.**

**2. Skep linguistically negates because sentences derive meaning from their linguistic properties corresponding to facts about reality. For example, a claim like “my dog has four legs” requires you to have a dog and for that dog to actually have four legs. If ought means morality and that doesn’t exist, the statement is false.**

### 5

#### I negate: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### The resolution specifies that the right to strike must be unconditional—this means it cannot be contingent on any authority or have any exceptions.

Thomas Magnell, Philosopher, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, J Value Inquiry (2011) 45:1–12//BA PB

Unconditional rights may be either absolutely unconditional or relatively unconditional. An absolutely unconditional right is a right which every right-holder enjoys as something capable of having rights. These are the most fundamental of all rights. As rights which all right-holders have simply as right-holders, they are common to all people, institutions, corporations, societies, and at least some nonhuman animals. They do not need to be acquired. Because they are held unconditionally, they cannot be overruled. For the same reason, they are as minimal as can be. To draw anything more than the most minimal rights from right-holders as such is almost surely a mistake. The flights of fancy of natural rights theorists led Bentham to shout: ‘‘Natural Rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.’’12 Still, notwithstanding Bentham’s finest flourish of phrasing, there may be some, for example, the right of a right-holder not to be subject to a wanton disregard of its interests. This would seem to be a right that at least some animals have as well as people taken individually or in groups. It is not a particularly robust right. An awful lot of harm can be inflicted upon a right-holder without showing a wanton disregard for the right holder’s interests. Even so, as minimal as it is, it is not a right that is always respected, as National Socialists and International Socialists showed in concentration camps and the Gulag. A relatively unconditional right is a right which all right-holders of a certain kind enjoy without qualification. This gives a clear sense to the much abused term ‘‘human rights,’’ though there may be others. In the strictest sense, human rights are relatively unconditional rights. They are rights which human beings have simply as human beings, or perhaps more precisely as persons, if not all human beings are accounted persons, whatever their role or situation within or apart from a society. A better term for them would be ‘‘person rights,’’ but here the common term is unlikely to be allowed to give way. Human rights are not acquired, though if personhood is a characteristic that human beings can come to have and come to lose, human rights may be gained or lost along with it. Some other right-holders may have the same rights unconditionally, but not all. Narrower on the one hand than absolutely unconditional rights, broader on the other than conditional rights, human rights cannot be conferred by declarations or political manifestos on non-human animals or people: not on non-human animals because non-human animals cannot have them, and not on people because people already have them. In the strictest sense, many of the rights that have come to be labeled as human rights in the fairly recent past, such as the supposed rights to a certain level of income or to a certain level of education are not human rights at all, however politically popular it may be to say that they are. If they are rights in any sense, they are civil rights, acquired rights that are conferred by some civil authority. Human rights in the strictest sense have a more philosophical tone. One notable human right is that of entering into obligations, the right, odd as it sounds, to bear duties. Another is the human right to freedom, the relatively unconditional right that people who are capable of acting autonomously have as such beings. We have a right to liberty without the need for the right to be conferred, while other beings, such as non-human animals that may have the broader absolutely unconditional rights, lack this relatively unconditional right. This is why liberty is intimately tied with human dignity, even as it is demonstrably allied with human prosperity. All other rights that have correlative duties are conditional rights, rights of only some right-holders. They are acquired rights. Their acquisition is conditional on meeting certain qualifications. Someone has a right to have a promise kept only if he meets the qualifications of being the promisee. Someone has a right to receive charity only if he meets the qualification of being in need. From this it should be evident that conditional rights may be either conditioned-rights or unconditionedrights. What makes a right conditioned is a condition of the right itself, that of the correlative duty, an imperfect duty, not being conferred on other qualified rightholders. What makes a right conditional is a condition for acquiring the right in the first place.

#### The right to strike is an conditional right, so viewing it as unconditional is impossible. Fiat doesn’t solve because its intrinsic to the nature of the principle and the aff is a binding policy, not just view X as Y.

#### [1] The right to strike is conditional on the government existing and enforcing it: A] The Sqou proves that without the state, the right doesn’t exist, which means turning the NC non-uniques the aff B] State of nature would just mean people could take the action, not that they have a guaranteed right to do so.

#### [2] The right is conditional on the existence of certain social institutions: IE a workplace and employer to strike against, and a job to stop doing. This doesn’t apply to unconditional rights like freedom or life, since they are intrinsic to human nature not social constructs.

#### [3] Unconditional rights cannot conflict with each other, as otherwise neither would be absolute, but the right to strike conflicts with 1] The right to life of those deprived of stuff like medicine, which is fundamental to every human action, and 2] is intrinsically violent as when enforcing it you must know everything about a particular situation, and you must act immediately in the face of a violation, otherwise you allow injustice to occur. But these are simultaneously impossible since a) we cannot know everything about a particular situation and b) there is not infinite time to make an ethical decision. Given that there must be deliberation over any moral decision to ensure its correctness in relation to the situation, the very act of deliberation is violence, as you allow the injustice to continue, but if you were to act immediately you would act without proper knowledge to correctly address the injustice.

#### [4] Weighing: A] Even if the aff proves that an unconditional right such the right to life or right to freedom entails the right to strike, this doesn’t prove that it is unconditional since it is contingent on another right, and is therefore not sufficient to affirm B] Unconditional rights are unconditionally good and lack exceptions, so one instance where the right is wrong is sufficient to prove it is conditional too that particular circumstance.

#### 5] Plan affs prove that its conditional. The right to strike as a whole isn’t good but is only good in certain instances.

### Case

On comparative worlds

On topic ed

A] no reason as to why tt precludes topic ed, u can still read util under tt and learn about the topic

B] reading things like tricks help with critical thinking also help us in the real world and ow on scope since we can apply critical thinking to everything whereas we only apply topic ed to things that do with the topic

On resolvability

A] u don’t need to weigh, something is either true or false, it cant be both

B] isomorpohism turns this

C

#### Your not topical- the NRLA recognizes the right to strike as conditional.

Lisa Guerin, NOLO, “Strikes”, [https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/strikes.html] mc

A strike is a work stoppage caused by employees' refusal to work, typically to protest an employer decision (to close a plant, freeze wages, cut benefits, impose unpopular work rules, or refuse to improve working conditions, for example). The right to strike is protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), but not all strikes are legal. Whether a strike is lawful depends on the purpose of the strike, whether the collective bargaining agreement includes a "no-strike" clause, and the conduct of the strikers. This article provides some basic information about legal and illegal strikes. For all of our articles on unions and labor, see our Labor Unions page. Lawful Purposes A strike is legal – and therefore protected by the NLRA – if the employees are striking for economic reasons or to protest an unfair labor practice by the employer. In the first scenario, strikers are trying to get some economic concession from the employer, like higher wages, increased benefits, or better working conditions. In the second, workers strike because the employer has engaged in some practice that violates the NLRA, like refusing to bargain with the union or discriminating against union members. (See Unfair Labor Practices for more information.) No-Strike Clauses Even strikes with a legal purpose are not protected by the NLRA If the union's contract with the employer (the collective bargaining agreement) includes a no-strike clause. With a few limited exceptions (for example, if employees are refusing to work because of unusually dangerous working conditions), a strike that violates a no-strike provision is illegal. Strike Misconduct A strike can also become unlawful if strikers engage in serious misconduct, such as violence or threats, physically preventing other from entering or leaving the workplace, or sit-down strikes, in which employees refuse to leave the workplace and refuse to work. These strikes are not protected by the NLRA.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)