### 1

#### A. Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all previously read positions before the debate on their NDCA LD 21-22 wiki page under their own name.

#### B. Violation: You don’t have a wiki

Text

Description automatically generated

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Evidence Quality – Disclosure generates an information database that encourages debaters to find the best evidence on the topic. Key to education since we have better debates with better arguments.

**Nails 13** [(Jacob, NDT Policy Debater at Georgia State University), “A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third Party Disclosure)”,NSDUpdate,10/10/2013EM] I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, **disclosure streamlines research.** Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, **the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can** contribute to and **build off of. Students can look through** the **different studies** on the topic **and choose the best ones** on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. **Quality of evidence increases across the board.**

#### 2. Quality engagement --- disclosure allows in-depth preparation before the round which checks back against unpredictable positions and allows debaters to effectively write case negs and blocks. Not just in the context of this round, but for rounds in general. Quality engagement is an independent voter because the constitutive reason we debate is to engage and clash our arguments otherwise we would just be doing oratory. It’s also key to fairness since I need to have prep to win. This means vote on inclusion since debaters of lower skill level can have a chance to engage with better debaters which makes debate less centered towards those with larger coaching staffs.

#### 3. Academic Ethics --- disclosure deters mis-cutting, power-tagging, abuse of brackets and ellipses, and plagiarism. This is an independent reason to vote you down because it promotes better norms about academic engagement---debate is an academic environment and must ensure that we become fair scholars. Even if you don’t lose on fairness in the round, you will lose in college if you violate academic ethics which establish a crucial real-world norm, and outweighs any in-round impact.

#### Framing: You can’t coopt any of the reasons why procedurals are bad in the context of the affirmative since I don’t constrain your ability to read it– the contention is that this aff should’ve been read, just disclosed. Also, your prep outs argument is nonsense a) prep outs are a 2 way street b) they’re good as per the shell c) being a good debater solves back.

### 2

#### The standard is consistency with the standpoint of the skeptic.

#### Prefer –

#### 1. Performativity – The process of debating requires taking a skeptical approach to your opponents’ arguments and attempting to disprove their most basic principles, which means to say skepticial orientation is bad would deny your ability to respond to my arguments.

#### 2. Holding ourselves to a standard of absolute truth is necessary: A) Culpability – Truth is the standard to which we hold people accountable for their actions, absent an understanding of the way the world actually is, people could make up their own understandings which makes it impossible for us to every justify why something someone did was bad, incorrect, etc and tell them to change B) Outcomes – The truth of the world is the ultimate determiner of the success of our actions, for example, if we were to act as though climate change wasn’t real because it is convenient, we would die of climate change must faster C) Resolvability – Debate requires a maintenance of truth – if debaters could make arguments like affirm because 2+2=5 debate as a concept would become incoherent since there’s no metric to determine who is winning based on the truth of their claims.

#### Morality is impossible

#### 1] Human moral evaluations are contaminated by personal affective states, making them arbitrary and unfair.

Scott Jenkins, Professor of Philosophy at University of Kansas, Nietzsche's Transformation of the Problem of Pessimism in Human, All Too Human, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Volume 50, Issue 2, Autumn 2019, pp. 272-291 (Article), ///AHS PB

In his summary of Dühring’s introduction to The Value of Life, Nietzsche recognizes the importance of this claim about content and states that for Dühring, “no estimation of value [Werthschätzung] is pure knowledge, all are affections of the mind [Gemüths-Affektionen]” (KSA 8:9[1], p. 135). He continues, “A judgment of the value of life can never be pure knowledge. But I wish to add that it would be more correct to call all such judgments impure knowledge [unreine Erkenntnisse]”—and the rest of a draft of HH 32 follows. For my purposes, two aspects of this impurity are worth emphasizing (in addition to the original claim concerning drive-based content). First, Nietzsche notes that since we are “subject to moods and fluctuations” our drives are themselves in flux (HH 32). And second, our knowledge of the object evaluated in a judgment of value “can never be complete” (HH 32). Thus judgments of value express the relation between our fluctuating conative-affective states and our idiosyncratic representations of a given object. This is why Nietzsche, contra Dühring, regards judgments of value as impure. While they may seem to be as authoritative as theoretical judgments that arguably have some claim to objective (and thus intersubjective) validity, they actually express nothing more than an individual’s shifting practical orientation and idiosyncratic theoretical point of view. From the impurity of evaluative judgments, Nietzsche draws the further conclusion that such judgments are unjust (HH 32). By this he means that in making such judgments, we illegitimately privilege our own drives and affective orientations in relation to others’. He arrives at this conclusion by noting that we cannot refrain from making impure judgments of value: “Perhaps it would follow from all this that one ought not to judge at all; if only it were possible to live without evaluating, without having aversions [Abneigung] and partialities [Zuneigung]!—for all aversion is connected with [hängt zusammen mit] an evaluation, likewise all partiality” (HH 32).16 As living beings, we evaluate entities in accordance with our drives.17 And as human beings, we express such implicit evaluations in judgments of value: “A drive to something or away from something divorced from a feeling one is desiring the beneficial or avoiding the harmful, a drive without some kind of knowing evaluation of the worth of its objective, does not exist in humanity” (HH 32). Nietzsche’s idea here must be that we typically take such judgments to express something about the object itself. We are thus guilty of injustice insofar as we unwittingly take our own subjective orientation to objects, and not those of other actual or possible valuers, to have the authority to determine objects as, say, beneficial or harmful.18 And while we can recognize, on reflection, that judgments of value express only a subjective point of view, we typically think and act as if they do not. Our default state is injustice grounded in what Nietzsche terms our “illogical original relationship [Grundstellung] with all things” (HH 31).

#### 2] There is no moral truth for everyone.

J.L Mackie, Australian Philosopher, The subjectivity of values, 1977, ///AHS PB

[First] The Argument from Relativity The argument from relativity has as its premiss the wellknown variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither first order nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order subjectivism: radical differences between first order moral judgements make it difficult to treat those judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity of values. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about. But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to interpret moral disagreement in the same way. Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people ’ s adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy. Of course, the standards may be an idealization of the way of life from which they arise: the monogamy in which people participate may be less complete, less rigid, than that of which it leads them to approve. This is not to say that moral judgements are purely conventional. Of course there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers, people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can usually be understood as the extension, in ways which, though new and unconventional, seemed to them to be required for consistency, of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. In short, the argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values. But there is a well-known counter to this argument from relativity, namely to say that the items for which objective validity is in the first place to be claimed are not specific moral rules or codes but very general basic principles which are recognized at least implicitly to some extent in all society – such principles as provide the foundations of what Sidgwick has called different methods of ethics: the principle of universalizability, perhaps, or the rule that one ought to conform to the specific rules of any way of life in which one takes part, from which one profits, and on which one relies, or some utilitarian principle of doing what tends, or seems likely, to promote the general happiness. It is easy to show that such general principles, married with differing concrete circumstances, different existing social patterns or different preferences, will beget different specific moral rules; and there is some plausibility in the claim that the specific rules thus generated will vary from community to community or from group to group in close agreement with the actual variations in accepted codes. The argument from relativity can be only partly countered in this way. To take this line the moral objectivist has to stay that it is only in these principles that the objective moral character attaches immediately to its descriptively specified ground or subject: other moral judgements are objectively valid or true, but only derivatively and contingently – if things had been otherwise, quite different sorts of actions would have been right. And despite the prominence in recent philosophical ethics of universalization, utilitarian principles, and the like, these are very far from constituting the whole of what is actually affirmed as basic in ordinary moral thought. Much of this is concerned rather with what Hare calls “ideals” or, less kindly, ‘fanaticism’. That is, people judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different responses in others. ‘Moral sense’ or ‘intuition’ is an initially more plausible description of what supplies many of our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’. With regard to all these starting points of moral thinking the argument from relativity remains in full force. [Second] The Argument from Queerness Even more important, however, and certainly more generally applicable, is the argument from queerness. This has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. These points were recognized by Moore when he spoke of nonnatural qualities, and by the intuitionists in their talk about a ‘faculty of moral intuition’. Intuitionism has long been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities. What is not so often stressed, but is more important, is that the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in the end committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. Of course the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking. But, however complex the real process, it will require (if it is to yield authoritatively prescriptive conclusions) some input of this distinctive sort, either premisses or forms of argument or both. When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘a special sort of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clearheaded objectivist is compelled to resort. Indeed, the best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade this issue, but to look for companions in guilt. For example, Richard Price argues that it is not moral knowledge alone that such an empiricism as those of Locke and Hume is unable to account for, but also our knowledge and even our ideas of essence, number, identity, diversity, solidity, inertia, substance, the necessary existence and infinite extension of time and space, necessity and possibility in general, power, and causation. If the understanding, which Price defines as the faculty within us that discerns truth, is also a source of new simple ideas of so many other sorts, may it not also be a power of immediately perceiving right and wrong, which yet are real characters of actions? This is an important counter to the argument from queerness. The only adequate reply to it would be to show how, on empiricist foundations, we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have of all these matters. I cannot even begin to do that here, though I have undertaken some parts of the task elsewhere. I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of these can be given in empirical terms. If some supposed metaphysical necessities or essences resist such treatment, then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the targets of the argument from queerness. This queerness does not consist simply in the fact that ethical statements are ‘unverifiable’. Although logical positivism with its verifiability theory of descriptive meaning gave an impetus to non-cognitive accounts of ethics, it is not only logical positivists but also empiricists of a much more liberal sort who should find objective values hard to accommodate. Indeed, I would not only reject the verifiability principle but also deny the conclusion commonly drawn from it, that moral judgements lack descriptive meaning. The assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgements presuppose, is, I hold, not meaningless but false. Plato ’ s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be. The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; something ’ s being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it. Or we should have something like Clarke ’ s necessary relations of fitness between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for such- andsuch an action somehow built into it. The need for an argument of this sort can be brought out by reflection on Hume ’ s argument that ‘reason’ – in which at this stage he includes all sorts of knowing as well as reasoning – can never be an ‘influencing motive of the will’. Someone might object that Hume has argued unfairly from the lack of influencing power (not contingent upon desires) in ordinary objects of knowledge and ordinary reasoning, and might maintain that values differ from natural objects precisely in their power, when known, automatically to influence the will. To this Hume could, and would need to, reply that this objection involves the postulating of value-entities or value-features of quite a different order from anything else with which we are acquainted, and of a corresponding faculty with which to detect them. That is, he would have to supplement his explicit argument with what I have called the argument from queerness. Another way of bringing out this queerness is to ask, about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its natural features. What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty – say, causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? And how do we know the relation that it signifies, if this is something more than such actions being socially condemned, and condemned by us too, perhaps through our having absorbed attitudes from our social environment? It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which ‘sees’ the wrongness: something must be postulated which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the mysterious consequential link between the two. Alternatively, the intuition required might be the perception that wrongness is a higher order property belonging to certain natural properties; but what is this belonging of properties to other properties, and how can we discern it? How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be if we could replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality is said to be consequential.

#### 3] a just government is impossible.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” But **justice,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which must not wait.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: **a just decision is always required immediately, "right away." It cannot furnish itself with** infinite information and the **unlimited knowledge of conditions,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And **even if it did** have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, **the moment of decision,** as such, **always remains a finite moment of urgency** and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, **since it always marks the interruption of the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive deliberation that precedes it,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule**

**Thus I contend the skeptic would negate the resolution.**

**1. The skeptical conclusion being true triggers permissibility: It denies that moral obligations exist. That negates – A) Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics o/w – 1) it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res and 2) it’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text B) Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent**

**2. Skep linguistically negates because sentences derive meaning from their linguistic properties corresponding to facts about reality. For example, a claim like “my dog has four legs” requires you to have a dog and for that dog to actually have four legs. If ought means morality and that doesn’t exist, the statement is false.**

### 3

**Global tech innovation high now.**

**Mercury News et al 6/4** [Mercury News and East Bay Times Editorial Boards, June 4, 2021, “Editorial: How America can Win the Global Tech War” <https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/06/04/editorial-why-silicon-valley-needs-endless-frontier-bill/> //gord0]

The nation that wins the global tech race will dominate the 21st century. This has been true since the 1800s. Given the rapid pace of innovation and tech’s impact on our economy and defense capabilities in the last decade, there is ample evidence to suggest that the need for investment in tech research and development has never been greater. China has been closing the tech gap in recent years by making bold investments in tech with the intent of overtaking the United States. This is a tech war we cannot afford to lose. It’s imperative that Congress pass the Endless Frontier Act and authorize the biggest R&D tech investment in the United States since the Apollo years. Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Santa Clara, made a massive increase in science and technology investment a major part of his platform while campaigning for a seat in Congress in 2016. Now the co-author of the 600-page legislation is on the cusp of pushing through a bipartisan effort that has been years in the making. Khanna and his co-authors, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., Sen. Todd Young, R-Ind., and Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc., are shepherding the bill through the Senate, which is expected to approve it sometime later this month. That would set up a reconciliation debate between the House and Senate that would determine the bill’s final language. The ultimate size of the investment is still very much up in the air. Khanna would like Congress to authorize $100 billion over a five-year period for critical advancements in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity, semiconductors and other cutting-edge technologies. The Senate is talking of knocking that number down to $50 billion or $75 billion. They should be reminded of China Premier Li Keqiang’s March announcement that China would increase its research and development spending by an additional 7% per year between 2021 and 2025. The United States still outspends China in R&D, spending $612 billion on research and development in 2019, compared to China’s $514 billion. But the gap is narrowing. At the turn of the century, China was only spending $33 billion a year on R&D, while the United States was spending nearly 10 times that amount. The bill would authorize 10 technology hubs throughout the nation designed to help build the infrastructure, manufacturing facilities and workforce needed to help meet the nation’s tech goals. Building tech centers throughout the United States should also create more support for the industry across the country. Tech’s image has taken a beating in recent years — the emergence of the term “Big Tech” is hardly a positive development — and the industry will need all the support it can muster in Congress. The United States continues to have a crucial tech edge over its competitors, most notably China. The only way we can hope to win the 21st century is to make significant investments in research and development that will spark the next wave of innovation.

**Violent strike efforts are increasing – they slow innovation, specifically in the tech sector.**

**Hanasoge 16** [Chaithra; Senior Research Analyst, Market Researcher, Consumer Insights, Strategy Consulting; “The Union Strikes: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,” Supply Wisdom; April/June 2016 (Doesn’t specifically say but this is the most recent event is cites); https://www.supplywisdom.com/resources/the-union-strikes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/]//SJWen

The result: Verizon conceded to several of the workers’ demands including hiring union workers, protection against outsourcing of call-center jobs, and employee benefits such as salary hikes and higher pension contributions, among others and thus bringing an end to the strike in June.

The repercussion: The strike witnessed **several instances** of **social disorder**, **violence** and **clashes**, ultimately calling for third party intervention (Secretary of Labor – Thomas Perez) to initiate negotiations between the parties. Also, as a result of the strike, Verizon reported **lower** than **expected revenues** in the **second quarter of 2016**.

Trade unions/ labor unions aren’t just this millennia’s product and has been in vogue since times immemorial. **Unions**, to **ensure fairness** to the working class, have **gone on strike for better working conditions** and employee benefits since the **industrial revolution** and are as strong today as they were last century. With the **advent of technology and advancement in artificial intelligence**, machines are grabbing the jobs which were once the bastion of the humans. So, questions that arise here are, what relevance do unions have in today’s work scenario? And, are the strikes organized by them avoidable?

As long as the concept of labor exists and employees feel that they are not receiving their fair share of dues, unions will exist and thrive. Union protests in most cases cause work stoppages, and in certain cases, disruption of law and order. Like in March 2016, public servants at Federal Government **departments across Australia** went on a series of **strikes** over failed pay negotiations, **disrupting operations** of many **government departments** for a few days.  Besides such direct effects, there are many **indirect effects** as well such as **strained employee relations**, **slower work processes**, **lesser productivity** and **unnecessary legal hassles**.

Also, union strikes can **never be taken too lightly** as they have prompted major overturn of decisions, on a few occasions. Besides the **Verizon incident** that was a **crucial example** of this, nationwide strikes were witnessed in India in March and April this year when the national government introduced reforms related to the withdrawal regulations and interest rate of employee provident fund, terming it as ‘anti-working class’. This compelled the government to withhold the reform for further review. In France, strike against labor law reforms in May turned violent, resulting in riots and significant damage to property. The incident prompted the government to consider modifications to the proposed reforms.

However, aside from employee concerns, such incidents are also determined by a number of other factors such as the country’s political scenario, economy, size of the overall workforce and the unions, history of unionization, labor laws, and culture. For example, it is a popular saying that the French are always on strike as per tradition (although recent statistics indicate a decline in frequency). In a communist government like China, strikes have steadily risen in number. In 2015, China Labor Bulletin (CLB), a Hong Kong-based workers’ rights group recorded 2,700 incidents of strikes and protests, compared to 1,300 incidents in 2014. Most of them have stemmed out of failure by the government to respect the basic rights of employees and address labor concerns.

Interestingly, unions have **not been able to gain a strong foothold** in the **IT-BPO industry**. While many countries do have a separate union to represent workers from the sector, incidents of strikes like Verizon **have been relatively lo**w.  However, workplace regulations, in addition to other factors mentioned could be a trigger for such incidents, even if on a smaller scale. For example, a recent survey that **interviewed several BPO employees** in India revealed that while **forming a union** in the BPO sector was **difficult**, irksome workplace regulations such as constant surveillance, irregular timings and incentives have prompted employees to express their resentment in smaller ways such as corruption of internal servers and so on.  Such risks are further enhanced in a city like Kolkata, which carries a strong trade union culture.

**Victories like the aff mobilizes unions in the IT sector.**

**Vynck et al 21** [Gerrit De; Carleton University, BA in Journalism and Global Politics, tech reporter for The Washington Post. He writes about Google and the algorithms that increasingly shape society. He previously covered tech for seven years at Bloomberg News; Nitashu Tiku; Columbia University, BA in English, New York University, MA in Journalism, Washington Post's tech culture reporter based in San Francisco; Macalester College, BA in English, Columbia University, MS in Journalism, reporter for The Washington Post who is focused on technology coverage in the Pacific Northwest; “Six things to know about the latest efforts to bring unions to Big Tech,” The Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/26/tech-unions-explainer/]//SJWen

In response to **tech** company crackdowns and lobbying, gig workers have **shifted their strategy** to emphasize building **worker-led movements** and increasing their ranks, rather than focusing on employment status as the primary goal, says Veena Dubal, a law professor at the University of California Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco. The **hope** is that with **President Biden in the White House and an even split in the Senate**, legislators will **mobilize** at the federal level, through the **NLRA or bills such as the PRO Act**, to **recognize gig worker collectives as real unions**.

**Technological innovation solves every existential threat – which outweighs.**

**Matthews 18** Dylan. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the **future**. It’s reasonable to suggest that those **quadrillions** of future people have, accordingly, **hundreds of thousands of times** more moral weight than those of us living here **today** do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most **literal** thing it could mean is preventing human **extinction**, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly **part** of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address **specific threats** to humanity (which he calls “**targeted**” approaches to the far future) have to **complement** “**broad**” approaches, where instead of trying to **predict** what’s going to kill us all, you just **generally try to keep civilization running as best it can**, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with **potential** extinction events in the **future**, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future **doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation**; it also means **acting on pressing needs now**. For example: We’re going to be **better prepared** to prevent extinction from **AI** or a **supervirus** or **global warming** if society as a whole makes **a lot of scientific progress**. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the **best thing**s we can do for the **far future** is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (**potential innovators** who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve **incentives** and **norms** in **academic work** to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)