### OV

#### [1] AFF gets 1ar theory and aff theory is no RVI, Drop the debater, competing interps, under an interp that aff theory is legit A) infinite abuse since otherwise it would be impossible to check NC abuse B) the 2n can dump on a script to a CI and go for RVI’s making it impossible to check abuse C) The 1ar is too short to win theory and substance D) The 2n can always create infinite reasonability arguments the 2ar can’t get through.

#### [2] No new 2n theory arguments and paradigm issues – A) All the paradigm issues were in the aff which means any 2n argument is new and can’t be evaluated B) it becomes impossible to check NC abuse if you can dump on reasons the shell doesn't matter in the 2n

### Shell

#### Interpretation – The negative must concede the affirmative framework or contention level offense.

#### It’s preemptive, you violate by reading turns or defense to my offense and reading an alternative framework.

#### Prefer –

1] Strat skew – A) It’s impossible for the 1AR to win both layers of framing and offense when you can frame me out and read a bunch of turns to the aff making the round impossible in 4min – especially since the 2n can collapse on either the framework or the contention for 6 minutes B) Neg reactivity advantage, aff disclosure, and 1n time allocation means they can craft a perfect 1nc – conceding one layer of substance solves since it gives me weighing recourse and strategic 1ar maneuvers without having to brute force both.

**2] Depth of Clash – We pick and choose whether to debate offense or framework and when, which means we have more discussion of each one every round. Depth o/w since reading 1 page of 100 different books is useless and superficial. Breadth is solved across multiple rounds when people choose a different layer in each. And, hijacks solve all your offense since they contest both the framework and the offense, while maintaining the 1ar ability to win substance.**

### Framework

**I value morality. The Meta-Ethic is Non-Naturalism.**

**[1] The naturalistic fallacy – examples of goodness fail to define the ultimate good. Moore 03,**

[Moore, G. E. “Principia Ethica” <http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/>. Published 1903] SHS ZS

Good, then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is **good**, **is incapable of any definition**, in the most important sense of that word. The most important sense of definition is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this sense **good has no definition because it** is simple and **has no parts**. **It is** one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves **incapable of definition**, because they are the ultimate terms of reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be defined. That there must be an indefinite number of such terms is obvious, on reflection; since we cannot define anything except by an analysis, which, when carried as far as it will go, refers us to something, which is simply different from anything else, and which by that ultimate difference explains the peculiarity of the whole which we are defining: for every whole contains some parts which are common to other wholes also. There is, therefore, no intrinsic difficulty in the contention that **good denotes a simple and indefinable quality**. There are many other instances of such qualities. **Consider yellow**, for example. **We may** try to **define it**, **by** describing its physical equivalent; we may state what kind of **light-vibrations** must stimulate the normal eye, in order that we may perceive it. **But** a moment’s reflection is sufficient to shew that those light-vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. **They are not what we perceive**. Indeed, we should never have been able to discover their existence, unless we had first been struck by the patent difference of quality between the different colours. The most we can be entitled to say of those vibrations is that they are what corresponds in space to the yellow which we actually perceive. Yet **a mistake of this** simple **kind has** commonly **been made about good**. **It may be true that all things which are good are also something else**, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. **But** far **too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good**; that these properties, in fact, were simply not other, but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the naturalistic fallacy and of it I shall now endeavour to dispose.

**[2] Only a priori knowledge is epistemically reliable. Descartes 41,**

René, 1641. Discourse On Method ; and, Meditations on First Philosophy, NPR

Yet from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there is not something else which does not allow even the slightest occasion for doubt**?** Is there not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts into me the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts**?** In that case am not I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me**.** In that case I too undoubtedly exist**,** if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something**. So** after considering everything very thoroughly**,** I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. ButI do not yet have a sufficient understanding of what this ‘I’ is, that now necessarily exists. So I must be on my guard against carelessly taking something else to be this ‘I’, and so making a mistake in the very item of knowledge that I maintain is the most certain and evident of all. I will therefore go back and meditate on what I originally believed myself to be, before I embarked on this present train of thought. I will then subtract anything capable of being weakened, even minimally, by the arguments now introduced, so that what is left at the end may be exactly and only what is certain and unshakeable.

[3] Only Non-naturalism through reason solves determinism. Kant 81**, Critique of Pure Reason**. Because this empirical character itself must be drawn from appearances as effect, and from the rule which experience provides, all theactionsof the human beingin appearance are determined **in accord with the order of nature**by **his empirical character and the other** cooperating causes; and if we could investigate all the appearances of his power of choice down to their basis, then there would be no human action that we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as necessary given its preceding conditions. Thus inregard to this empirical character there is no freedom, and according to this character we can consider the human being solely by observing, and, as happens in anthropology, by trying to investigate the moving causes of his actions physiologically But if we consider the very same actions in relation to reason, not, to be sure, in relation to speculative reason, in order to explain them as regards their origin, but insofar as reason is the cause of producing them by themselves — in a word, if we compare them with reason in a practical respect — then we find a rule and order that is entirely other than the natural order. For perhaps everything that has happened in the course of nature, and on empirical grounds inevitably had to happen, nevertheless ought not to have happened. At times, however, we find, or at least believe we have found, that the ideas of reason have actually proved their causality in regard to the actions of human beings as appearances, and that therefore these actions have occurred not through empirical causes, no, but because they were determined by grounds of reason. Suppose now that one could say reason has causality in regard to appearance; could reason’s action then be called free even though in its empirical character (in the mode of sense) it is all precisely determined and necessary? The empirical character is once again determined in the intelligible character (in the mode of thought). We are not acquainted with the latter, but it is indicated through appearances, which really give only the mode of sense (the empirical character) for immediate cognition. Now the action, insofar as it is to be attributed to the mode of thought as its cause, nevertheless does not follow from it in accord with empirical laws, i.e. in such a way that it is preceded by the conditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the appearance of inner sense precede it. Pure reason, as a merely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time, and hence not subject to the conditions of the temporal sequence. The causality of reason in the intelligible character does not arise or start working at a certain time in producing an effect. For then it would itself be subject to the natural law of appearances, to the extent that this law determines causal series in time, and its causality would then be nature and not freedom.  Thus we could say that if reason can have causality in regard to appearances, then it is a faculty through which the sensible condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For the condition that lies in reason is not sensible and does not itself begin. Accordingly, there takes place here what we did not find in any empirical series: that the condition of a successive series of occurrences could itself be empirically unconditioned. For here the condition is outside the series of appearances (in the intelligible) and hence not subject to any sensible condition or to any determination of time through any passing cause. Nevertheless, this very same cause in another relation also belongs to the series of appearances. The human being himself is an appearance. His power of choice has an empirical character, which is the (empirical) cause of all his actions. There is not one of these conditions determining human beings according to this character which is not contained in the series of natural effects and does not obey the laws of nature according to which no empirically unconditioned causality is present among the things that happen in time. Hence no given action (since it can be perceived only as appearance) can begin absolutely from itself**.** But of reason one cannot saythat before the state in which it determines the power of choice, another state precedes in which this state itself is determined**.** For since reason itself is not an appearance and is not subject at all to any conditions of sensibility, no temporal sequence takes place in it even as to its causality, and thus the dynamical law of nature, which determines the temporal sequence according to rules, cannot be applied to it. Reason is thus the persisting condition of all voluntary actions under which the human being appears. Even before it happens, every one of these actions is determined beforehand in the empirical character of the human being. In regard to the intelligible character, of which the empirical one is only the sensible schema, nobefore or after applies, and every action, irrespective of the temporal relation in which it stands to other appearances, is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason; reason therefore acts freely, without being determined dynamically by external or internal grounds temporally preceding it in the chain of natural causes, and this freedom of reason can not only be regarded negatively, as independence from empirical conditions (for then the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of appearances), but also indicated positively by a faculty of beginning a series of occurrences from itself, in such a way that in reason itself nothing begins, but as the unconditioned condition of every voluntary action, it allows of no condition prior to it in time, whereas its effect begins in the series of appearances, but can never constitute an absolutely first beginning in this series. In order to clarify the regulative principle of reason through an example of its empirical use — not in order to confirm it (for such proofs are unworkable for transcendental propositions) — one may take a voluntary action, e.g. a malicious lie, through which a person has brought about a certain confusion in society; and one may first investigate its moving causes, through which it arose, judging on that basis how the lie and its consequences could be imputed to the person. WIth this first intent one goes into the sources of the person’s empirical character, seeking them in a bad upbringing, bad company, and also finding them in the wickedness of a natural temper insensitive to shame, partly in carelessness and thoughtlessness; in so doing one does not leave out of account the occasioning causes. In all this one proceeds as with any investigation in the series of determining causes for a given natural effect.  **Now** even if one believes the action to be determined by these [natural] causes, one nonetheless blames the agent, [because] and not on account of his unhappy natural temper, not on account of the circumstances influencing him, not even on account of the life he has led previously; for one presupposes that it can be entirely set aside how that life was constituted, and that the series of conditions that transpired might not have been, but rather that this deed could be regarded as entirely unconditioned in regard to the previous state, as though with that act the agent had started a series of consequences entirely from themself himself. This blame is grounded on the law of reason**,** which regards reason as a cause that, regardless of all the empirical conditions just named, could have and ought to have determined the conduct of the person to be other than it is. And indeed one regards the causality of reason not as a mere concurrence with other causes, e but as complete in itself, even if sensuous incentives were not for it but were indeed entirely against it;the action is ascribed to the agent’s intelligible character: now, in the moment when he lies, it is entirely his fault; hence reason, regardless of all empirical conditions of the deed, is fully free, and this deed is to be attributed entirely to its failure to act.

**There are three ways to categorize the substance of these non-natural properties: Internally, Externally, or from our Constitutive nature as beings. Internalism and Externalism fail – only constitutivism can be solve their deficiencies. Kastafanas 14,** Kastafanas, Paul. "Constitutivism About Practical Reasons". *Philarchive.Org*, 2014, [**https://philarchive.org/archive/KATCAP**](https://philarchive.org/archive/KATCAP). // Scopa Consider a perfectly homely normative claim, such as “you have to go to the movies.” If we ask what would render this claim true, the answer seems clear: a fact about the agent’s motives. If the claim is true for Allen but false for Betty, this is due to the fact that Allen desires to see the film and Betty does not. It is natural to think that in just this way, reasons will be tied to facts about agent’s motives. But what about **claims such as “you have reason not to murder”**? That claim seems different. It **purports to be universal, applying to all agents**. Moreover, **it does not** seem to **depend on the agent’s motives**. Suppose Allen has many motives in favor of murdering his uncle (getting revenge for past slights, collecting an inheritance, etc.), and no motives that count against it (he’s a sociopath with no compunction about harming others, and he thinks he’s clever enough to contrive a plan that leaves him with no risk of getting caught). In this simplified case, all of Allen’s motives count in favor of murdering his uncle; none count against it. Nonetheless, most of us want to say that he has reason not to murder. So we face contrary pressures: in certain cases, the claim that reasons are grounded in motives looks exceedingly plausible, indeed obvious; in others, the same claim looks like it generates unacceptable consequences. And so we get a familiar, well-worn philosophical debate: **internalists defend the claim that all normative claims are generated in facts about the agent’s motives, whereas externalists deny this**. More precisely: (Internalism) Agent A has reason to φ iff A has, or would have after procedurally rational deliberation, a desire or aim whose fulfillment would be promoted by φ-ing. (Externalism) It can be true both that (i) agent A has reason to φ, and (ii) A does not have, and would not have after procedurally rational deliberation, a desire or aim whose fulfillment would be promoted by φ-ing. **Each of these theories faces certain difficulties. Internalism has trouble with apparently universal normative claims, such as “you should not murder.”** Externalism is tailor-made to capture universal normative claims. Nonetheless, it faces several challenges, including the much-discussed problems of practicality and queerness. First, consider practicality. **Moral claims are supposed to be capable of moving us**. Recognizing that φ-ing is wrong is supposed to be capable of motivating the agent not to φ. **But we might wonder how a claim that bears no relation to any of our motives could have this motivational grip**. As Bernard Williams puts it, “**the whole point of external reasons statements is that they can be true independently of an agent’s motivations. But nothing can explain an agent’s (intentional) actions except something that motivates him so to act**” (1981, 107). William’s suggestion is that if the fact that murder is wrong is to exert a motivational influence upon the person’s action, then the agent must have some motive that is suitably connected to not murdering. And this pushes us back in the direction of internalism. Second, consider Mackie’s argument from queerness. Motives are familiar things, so it seems easy enough to imagine that claims about reasons are claims about relations between actions and motives. Internalism therefore has little difficulty with Mackie’s argument. But what would the relata in an external reasons statement be? Are we to imagine that a claim about reasons is a claim about a relation between an action and some independently existing value? This would be odd: as Mackie puts it, “if there were objective values then they would be entities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different than anything else in the universe” (1977, 38). For if such values existed, then it would be possible for a certain state of affairs to have “a demand for such-and-such an action somehow built into it” (1977, 40). And this, Mackie concludes, would be a decidedly queer property. In sum: **both externalism and internalism have attractive features, yet incur substantial costs**. Traditional **internalism grounds normative claims in familiar features of our psychologies, yet for that very reason has trouble generating universal normative claims. Externalism generates universal normative claims with ease, yet encounters the problems of practicality and queerness**. So we have a pair of unappealing options, and the debate continues. Constitutivism attempts to resolve this dilemma. To put it in an old-fashioned way, **constitutivism sublates internalism and externalism, seeing each position as containing a grain of truth**, but also as partial and one-sided. **The constitutivist agrees with the internalist that the truth of a normative claim depends on the agent’s aims**, in the sense that the agent must possess a certain aim in order for the normative claim to be true. **However, the constitutivist traces the authority of norms to an aim that has a special status—an aim that is constitutive of being an agent. This constitutive aim is not optional**; if you lack the aim, you are not an agent at all. So, while the constitutivist agrees with the internalist that reasons derive from the agent’s aims, the constitutivist holds that there is at least one aim that is intrinsic to being an agent. Accordingly, the constitutivist gets one of the conclusions that the externalist wanted: there are universal reasons for acting.13 Put differently, there are reasons for action that arise merely from the fact that one is an agent. Specifically, these are the reasons grounded in the constitutive aim. **So constitutivism can be viewed as an attempt to resolve the dispute between externalists and internalists** about practical reason, by showing that there are reasons that arise from non-optional aims.14 In so doing, **it generates universal reasons while sidestepping the problems of practicality and queerness**.

**That requires practical reason as the basis for ethics:**

**[1] Regress – Ethical theories must have a basis. We can always ask why we should follow the basis of a theory, so they aren’t morally binding because they don’t have a starting point. Practical reason solves – When we ask why we should follow reason, we demand a reason, which concedes to the authority of reason itself, so it’s the only thing we can follow**

**[2] Inescapability – Every agent intrinsically values practical reason when they go about setting and pursuing an end under a moral theory, as it presupposes that the end they are committing is an intrinsic good. That necessitates practical reason as a necessary means to follow through on any given end.**

**That justifies a universal moral law –**

**1. Absent universal ethics morality becomes arbitrary since it can be meaninglessly applied in different ways without reason. Non-arbitrariness is a side constraint – only non-arbitrary principles can hold agent culpable for their actions since otherwise we could make up ethical rules for different situations to punish people.**

**2. A priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience. That means to allow one to violate a rule without another would be a contradiction. Contradictions are a side constraint – it’s an inescapable condition that undermines all arguments since something can’t be both true and false simultaneously**

**3. Every agent is equally morally relevant, which requires equal treatment and equal standards for ethics.**

**Therefore, In order to respect each agent as a practical reasoner, we require a universal set of moral laws for what counts as a violation of the principles of rational reflection. That’s the categorical imperative – it has 4 formulations. Pecorino 02,** pecorino, philip. "Categorical Imperative". *Qcc.Cuny.Edu*, 2002, [**https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences/ppecorino/medical\_ethics\_text/Chapter\_2\_Ethical\_Traditions/Categorical\_Imperative.htm**](https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences/ppecorino/medical_ethics_text/Chapter_2_Ethical_Traditions/Categorical_Imperative.htm). For Kant **the basis for a Theory of the Good lies in the intention** or the will. Those acts are morally praiseworthy that are done out of a sense of duty rather than for the consequences that are expected, particularly the consequences to self. The only thing GOOD about the act is the WILL, the GOOD WILL. That will is to do our DUTY. What is our duty? It is our duty to act in such a manner that we would want everyone else to act in a similar manner in similar circumstances towards all other people. Kant **expressed this as the Categorical Imperative**. Act according to the maxim that you would wish all other rational people to follow, as if it were a universal law. For Kant the GOOD involves the Principle of Universalizability! Kant argues that there can be four formulations of this principle: **The Formula of the Law of Nature: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature."The Formula of the End Itself: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity**, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, **never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."The Formula of Autonomy: "So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxims."The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: "So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends."**

**However, we require an enforcement mechanism for these principles since rights claims can’t exist in the state of nature. What follows is the omnilateral will. Varden** **10, Helga. "A Kantian Conception of Free Speech." Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World, 2010 // AHS RG The first important distinction between Kant and much contemporary liberal thought issues from Kant’s argument that it is not in principle possible for individuals to realize right in the state of nature. Kant explicitly rejects the common assumption in liberal theories of his time as well as today that virtuous private individuals can interact in ways reconcilable both with one another’s right to freedom and their corresponding innate and acquired private rights. All the details of this argument are beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that ideal problems of assurance and indeterminacy regarding the specification, application and enforcement of the principles of private right to actual interactions lead Kant to conclude that rightful interaction is in principle impossible in the state of nature.5 Kant argues that only a public authority can solve these problems in a way reconcilable with everyone’s right to freedom. This is why we find Kant starting his discussion of public right with this claim: however well disposed and right-loving men might be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established individual human beings… can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has her own right to do what seems right and good to her and not be dependent upon another’s opinion about this (6: 312).6 There are no rightful obligations in the state of nature, since in this condition might (‘violence’, or arbitrary judgments and ‘opinion’ about ‘what seems right and good’) rather than right (freedom under law) ultimately governs interactions. According to Kant, therefore, only the establishment of a public authority can enable interaction in ways reconcilable with each person’s innate right to freedom. Moreover, only a public authority can ensure interaction consistent with what Kant argues are our innate rights (to bodily integrity and honor) and our acquired rights (to private property, contract and status relations). The reason is that only the public authority can solve the problems of assurance and indeterminacy without violating anyone’s right to freedom. The public authority can solve these problems because it represents the will of all and yet the will of no one in particular. Because the public authority is representative in this way – by being “united a priori” or by being an “omnilateral” will (6: 263) – it can regulate on behalf of everyone rather than on behalf of anyone in particular. For these reasons, civil society is seen as the only means through which our interactions can become subject to universal laws that restrict everyone’s freedom reciprocally rather than as subject to anyone’s arbitrary choices.**

**Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative as enacted through the omnilateral will.**

**Prefer –**

**1. Motivation – The categorical imperative is intrinsically motivational since it respects the nature of agency, which is the mechanism by which we can set and pursue any end – absent the motivation to pursue ends you would no longer be an agent, which means to be an agent necessitates being motivated to act.**

**And, Only evaluate Intents:**

**1. To account for all foreseen impacts would prevent action because individuals would become morally culpable for all actions and states of affairs not just those that factor into the will**

**2. Otherwise ethical theories hold agents responsible for consequences external to their will which removes any reason to be moral because agents cannot control what they are being punished for**

**3. Aggregation is impossible since there’s no way to quantify different amounts of pain and pleasure – how can 2 headaches equal a migraine**

**4. Induction fails – it’s incoherent to justify the past to justify the future because there’s no logical certainty that what has happened before will happen again**

**5. Since it requires evaluating end-states we can’t know whether the action was good until after it was taken which means the judge cannot determine whether the aff is good**

**6. Consequences empirically impossible to predict. Menand 05, Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005** [**http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//**](http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//) **FSU SS “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.**

**7. Util is evolutionarily disadvantageous which means either A) it will get selected out for in evolution which means extinction is nonunique if it’s the only framework that can prevent it or B) it won’t get selected out in which case the population will fail to continue to reproduce which causes extinction**

Jim **Everett**, David Pizarro, M Crockett, 20**16**, APA, “Inference of Trustworthiness From Intuitive Moral Judgments”, [https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/features/xge-xge0000165.pdf] mc

One approach to explaining why moral intuitions often align with **deontology comes from** mutualistic partner choice models of **the evolution of morality**. These models posit a cooperation market such that **agents** who can be relied upon to act in a mutually beneficial way **are more likely to be chosen as cooperation partners, thus increasing their own fitness** (Alexander, 1987; Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Krebs, 2008; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994; Trivers, 1971). People tend to select the most cooperative individuals as partners, and those who contribute less than others are gradually left out of cooperative exchanges (e.g., Barclay, 2004, 2006; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011). To the extent that individuals who make certain types of moral judgments are favored in a cooperative market because these judgments signal a commitment to cooperation, so, too, will these judgments come to be favored as defaults. In other words, deontological moral intuitions may represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms. Why might deontologists be preferred as social partners? Two features of **deontological intuitions seem important, given their relevance for social exchange: the prohibition of certain acts or behaviors and the expression of socially valued emotional responses. First, deontologists’ prohibition of certain acts or behaviors may serve as a relevant cue for infer**ring **trustworthiness, because** the extent to which someone **claims to follow rule** or action**-based judgments** may be **associate**d **with the reliability of their moral behavior.** One piece of preliminary evidence for this comes from a study showing that agents willing to punish third parties who violate fairness principles are trusted more, and actually are more trustworthy (Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016). Moreover, the typical deontological reason for why specific actions are wrong is that they violate duties to respect persons and honor social obligations—features that are crucial when selecting a social partner. An individual who claims that stealing is always morally wrong and believes themselves morally obligated to act in accordance with this duty seems much less likely to steal from me than an individual who believes that the stealing is sometimes morally acceptable depending on the consequences. **Actors who express characteristically deontological judgments may therefore be preferred to those expressing consequentialist judgments because these judgments may be more reliable indicat**ors **of stable cooperative behavior.** Consistent with this, recent research has shown that, compared with people who make consequentialist arguments, people who make deontological arguments are perceived by others as less self-interested and as expressing more moral views (Kreps & Monin, 2014). And recent theoretical work has demonstrated that “cooperating without looking”—that is, without considering the costs and benefits of cooperation—is a subgame perfect equilibrium (Hoffman, Yoeli, & Nowak, 2015). Therefore, expressing characteristically deontological judgments could constitute a behavior that enhances individual fitness in a cooperation market because these judgments are seen as reliable indicators of a specific valued behavior—cooperation. Second, deontological judgments often align more strongly with socially valued emotional responses, such as empathy and harm aversion, than do consequentialist judgments. As some have argued, making consequentialist judgments generally involves the suppression of prepotent (deontological-leaning) emotional responses in order to reach a more calculated analysis of the consequences to be derived from various actions (Greene, 2014). Research shows that characteristically deontological judgments are positively associated with harm aversion and negatively associated with antisocial personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012; Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015). People who are more likely to endorse the sacrifice of one person to save many others also appear to be those people who are less averse to harming others in everyday contexts in which there is no obvious greater good (Kahane et al., 2015). If prospective partners in the cooperation market intuit this, they may prefer deontologists. **In other words, expressing** a **deontological judgment may communicate that a person has a set of socially valued emotional responses (i.e., an aversion to directly harming others) that make them an attractive social partner.** Consistent with this, **recent studies** have **show**n that **individuals who made deontological decisions in moral dilemmas are rated as being more empathic and having a superior moral character compared with those who make consequentialist decisions (Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum, 2013).** Overview

**Contention**

#### I contend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### 1] Space Exploration is non universalizable - a). Entails that everyone leaves Earth which means that no one would be around to create the means to leave earth b) Assumes all agents have access to the resources to fund a space trip, and is thus exclusionary.

#### 2] Space is not subject to property rights – a). It has no physical manifestation as space is by definition the absence of matter which means it cannot be measured, bordered, or divided, thus it cannot be owned b). Owning unexplored planets/space is incoherent –it can’t be deemed an agents property unless agents have a rational conception of it

#### 3. Means to an end – Corporations justification for appropriation is the possibility of human extinction which explicitly leverages the conditions of life for profit – that uses life as a means to an end since it’s the mechanism by which corporations establish their justification for the monopolization of space

**4. Kingdom of Ends – a] Public good – Outer space is a public good that every self-legislating agent needs equal access to; land in space contains necessary elements for survival which means no agent in the kingdom of ends would agree to allow ownership over those goods b] Deliberation – Private entities are incapable of making omnilateral decisions as privatization entails that they withhold information which limits deliberation over making maxims.**

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**The intrinsic wrong of privatization, I will suggest, rather consists in the creation of an institutional arrangement that, by its very constitution, denies those who are subject to it equal freedom**. I understand freedom as an interpersonal relationship of reciprocal independence. To be free is not to be subordinated to another person’s unilateral will. By building on an analytical reconstruction of **Kant’s Doctrine of Right, I will argue that current forms of privatization reproduce** (to a different degree) within a civil condition the very same defects that Kant attributes to **the state of nature**, or to a pre-civil condition, thereby making a rightful condition of reciprocal independence impossible. Importantly, this is so even if private actors are publicly authorized through contract and subject to regulations, and even if they are committed to reason in accordance with the public good. The reason for this, as I will explain, derives from the fact that **private agents are constitutionally incapable of acting omnilaterally, even if their actions are omnilaterally authorized by government through some delegation mechanism**, e.g. a voluntary contract. Omnilateralness, I will suggest, must be understood as a function of 1) rightful judgment and 2) unity. By rightful judgment I mean the capacity to reason publicly and to make universal rules that are valid for everyone, according to a juridical ideal of right, as necessary to solve the problem of the unilateral imposition of private wills on others. By unity I mean the capacity to make rules and decisions that change the normative situation of others, as a part of a unified system of decision-making. The condition of unity is crucial, as I shall later explain, insofar as there might be multiple interpretations compatible with rightful judgment, which would still problematically leave the definition of people’s rightful entitlements indeterminate. Further, the practical realization of the juridical idea of an omnilateral will, I will contend, requires embeddedness within a shared collective practice of decision-making. In practice, rightful judgment can only obtain when certain shared background frameworks that structure practical reasoning and confer unity to that reasoning are in place. The rules of public administration and the authority structure of bureaucracy should be understood as playing this essential function of giving empirical and practical reality to the omnilateral will, as far as the execution of rules and the concrete definition of entitlements are concerned. Together, these two requirements are necessary, (whether they are also sufficient is a different question), to make an action the omnilateral action of a state, which has the moral power to change the normative situation of citizens, by fixing the content of their rights and duties in accordance with the equal freedom of all. The phenomenon of privatization thus raises the fundamental questions of why we need political institutions to begin with, and what makes an action an action of the state. **Insofar as private agents make decisions that fundamentally alter the normative situation (the rights and duties) of citizens, and insofar as, by definition, private agents are not public officials embedded in that shared collective practice, their decisions, even if well intentioned and authorized through contract, cannot count as omnilateral acts of the state.** They rather and necessarily remain unilateral acts of men. Hence, I will conclude, for the very same reasons that **we have, following Kant, a duty to exit the state of nature** so as to solve the twofold problems of the unilateral imposition of will on others and the indeterminacy of rights, we also have a duty to limit privatization and to support, on normative grounds, a case for the re-bureaucratization of certain functions. Therefore, my paper provides foundational reasons to agree with Richard Rorty’s nonfoundational defense of bureaucracy as stated in the opening epigraph, since only agents who are appropriately embedded within a bureaucratic structure, properly understood, are, in many cases, capable of acting omnilaterally. The “bosses” I am here concerned with are not primarily those who 5 can unilaterally impose Sptheir will on us in their capacity as private employers, but rather any private actor who acts unilaterally while in the garb of the state.

#### 5. Reject property rights/ libertarianism turns, they r incoherent –public good – private ownership is incoherent if our taxes and governmental programs fund private companies to go out and use space.

**Shammas and Holen 19** [(Victor L. Oslo Metropolitan University, Tomas B. Independent scholar) “One giant leap for capitalistkind: private enterprise in outer space,” Palgrave Communications, 1-29-19, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9] TDI

But the entrepreneurial libertarianism of capitalistkind is undermined by the reliance of the entire NewSpace complex on extensive support from the state, ‘a public-private financing model underpinning long-shot start-ups' that in the case of Musk’s three main companies (SpaceX, SolarCity Corp., and Tesla) has been underpinned by $4.9 billion dollars in government subsidies (Hirsch, 2015). In the nascent field of space tourism, Cohen (2017) argues that what began as an almost entirely private venture quickly ground to a halt in the face of insurmountable technical and financial obstacles, only solved by piggybacking on large state-run projects, such as selling trips to the International Space Station, against the objections of NASA scientists. The business model of NewSpace depends on the taxpayer’s dollar while making pretensions to individual self-reliance. The vast majority of present-day clients of private aerospace corporations are government clients, usually military in origin. Furthermore, the bulk of rocket launches in the United States take place on government property, usually operated by the US Air Force or NASA.Footnote13 This inward tension between state dependency and capitalist autonomy is itself a product of neoliberalism’s contradictory demand for a minimal, “slim” state, while simultaneously (and in fact) relying on a state reengineered and retooled for the purposes of capital accumulation (Wacquant, 2012). As Lazzarato writes, ‘To be able to be “laissez-faire”, it is necessary to intervene a great deal' (2017, p. 7). Space libertarianism is libertarian in name only: behind every NewSpace venture looms a thick web of government spending programs, regulatory agencies, public infrastructure, and universities bolstered by research grants from the state. SpaceX would not exist were it not for state-sponsored contracts of satellite launches. Similarly, in 2018, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the famed origin of the World Wide Web—announced that it would launch a ‘responsive launch competition', meaning essentially the reuse of launch vehicles, representing an attempt by the state to ‘harness growing commercial capabilities' and place them in the service of the state’s interest in ensuring ‘national security' (Foust, 2018b).

### IF TIME

#### [1] Permissibility Affirms – A) [Unjust](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust) is defined as not morally right, therefore the negative must prove that the resolution is expressly right or good since neutrality means it’s not necessarily right and the aff would win B) Reciprocity – it’s reciprocal since the neg gets exclusive access to T which gives them a 2-1 advantage on the theoretical layer – granting me permissibility solves since I get a 2-1 substantive advantage

#### [2] Presumption Affirms – A) Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason B) Otherwise we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drink water C) Its Intuitive – If I told you my name was sebastian you’d believe me