## Blue Key R1

### Framework

#### I value morality. Ethical Internalism is true:

#### 1. Epistemology – A) Equality – Externalism incorrectly assumes certain individuals have stronger epistemic access to moral truths which justifies the exclusion of those individuals from the creation of ethics and B) Inaccessibility – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point. Markovits 14, Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. Oxford University Press, 2014.//Scopa Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. We should not assume that some of us have special epistemic access to what matters, especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment. It’s better to start from the assumption, as internalism does, that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit – and correct this assumption only by appealing to standards that are as uncontroversial as possible. According to externalism about reasons, what matters normatively – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – does not depend in any fundamental way on what in fact matters to us – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. Some of us happen to be motivated by what actually matters, and some of us are “wrongly” motivated. But externalists can offer no explanation for this supposed difference in how well we respond to reasons – no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones – that doesn’t itself appeal to the views about what matters that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) A comparison to the epistemic case helps bring out what is unsatisfactory in the externalist position. We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than to others despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right in their beliefs about a certain topic. Chicken-sexing is a popular example of this among philosophers. We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens. But in the case of chicken-sexing, we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right. Externalism seems to tell[s] us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others, but without providing the independent means of determining which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).

#### 2. Linguistics – To decide about the content of my own mind is to deliberate between reasons – only this can prevent the contents of my own mind from being external to me since I may not be able to control the external definitions of my thoughts but I can control the deliberation between them which solves epistemic skep about my ability to have true beliefs.

#### 3. Motivation – A) Externalist notions of ethics collapse to internal since the only reason agents follow external demands is those demands are consistent with their internal account of the good. Motivation is a necessary feature for ethics since normativity only matters insofar as agents follow through on the ethic that’s generated from it B) Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agents’ motivations are unique and there has been no conversion of differing beliefs into a unified ethic.

#### 4. Open Question – A) There is a gap between my ability to claim the truth of a moral belief and my ability to justify its truth. I can always be asked why I ought to follow an externalist principle, but there is no verifiable evidence to justify my claim in a satisfactory manner B) Goodness cannot be a property of an object because it would make moral claims tautological. **Pidgen 07,** Pigden, Charles. “Russell’s Moral Philosophy.” SEP. 2007. //Scopa For any naturalistic or metaphysical ‘X’, if ‘good’ meant ‘X’, then (i) ‘X things are good’ would be a barren tautology, equivalent to (ii) ‘X things are X’ or (iii) ‘Good things are good’. (1.2) For any naturalistic or metaphysical ‘X’, if (i) ‘X things are good’ were a barren tautology, it would not provide a reason for action (i.e. a reason to promote X-ness). (1.3) So for any naturalistic or metaphysical ‘X’, either (i) ‘X things are good’ does not provide a reason for action (i.e. a reason to promote X-ness), or ‘good’ does not mean ‘X’.

#### 5. Moral truths are contextual rather than universal – A) Contradictions – it would be illogical to say that x is always true because there are situations in which we internally judge x to be false, for example to assert “murder is wrong” as an external force would be to say every instance like “self-defense is just” would be a contradiction. Contextual internalism solves because they are merely expressions of disagreements B) Experience – Even the most objective description of another individuals’ experience cannot bridge the epistemic gap between my experience and theirs (for example, I cannot know what cilantro tastes like to a lemur), which means a universal understanding of experience is impossible C) Ethical theories are insular – they define the good and language to describe it in their own terms. Joyce 02, Joyce, Richard. Myth of Morality. Port Chester, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p 45-47. //Scopa This distinction between what is accepted from within an institution, and “stepping out” of that institution and appraising it from an exterior perspective, is close to Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 15 Certain “linguistic frameworks” (as Carnap calls them) bring with them new terms and ways of talking: accepting the language of “things” licenses making assertions like “The shirt is in the cupboard”; accepting mathematics allows one to say “There is a prime number greater than one hundred”; accepting the language of propositions permits saying “Chicago is large is a true proposition,” etc. Internal to the framework in question, confirming or disconfirming the truth of these propositions is a trivial matter. But traditionally philosophers have interested themselves in the external question – the issue of the adequacy of the framework itself: “Do objects exist?”, “Does the world exist?”, “Are there numbers?”, “Are the propositions?”, etc. Carnap’s argument is that the external question, as it has been typically construed, does not make sense. From a perspective that accepts mathematics, the answer to the question “Do numbers exist?” is just trivially “Yes.” From a perspective which has not accepted mathematics, Carnap thinks, the only sensible way of construing the question is not as a theoretical question, but as a practical one: “Shall I accept the framework of mathematics?”, and this pragmatic question is to be answered by consideration of the efficiency, the fruitfulness, the usefulness, etc., of the adoption. But the (traditional) philosopher’s questions – “But is mathematics true?”, “Are there really numbers?” – are pseudo-questions. By turning traditional philosophical questions into practical questions of the form “Shall I adopt...?”, Carnap is offering a noncognitive analysis of metaphysics. Since I am claiming that we can critically inspect morality from an external perspective – that we can ask whether there are any non-institutional reasons accompanying moral injunctions – and that such questioning would not amount to a “Shall we adopt...?” query, Carnap’s position represents a threat. What arguments does Carnap offer to his conclusion? He starts with the example of the “thing language,” which involves reference to objects that exist in time and space. To step out of the thing language and ask “But does the world exist?” is a mistake, Carnap thinks, because the very notion of “existence” is a term which belongs to the thing language, and can be understood only within that framework, “hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” 16 Moving on to the external question “Do numbers exist?” Carnap cannot use the same argument – he cannot say that “existence” is internal to the number language and thus cannot be applied to the system as a whole. Instead he says that philosophers who ask the question do not mean material existence, but have no clear understanding of what other kind of existence might be involved, thus such questions have no cognitive content. It appears that this is the form of argument which he is willing to generalize to all further cases: persons who dispute whether propositions exist, whether properties exist, etc., do not know what they are arguing over, thus they are not arguing over the truth of a proposition, but over the practical value of their respective positions. Carnap adds that this is so because there is nothing that both parties would possibly count as evidence that would sway the debate one way or the other.

#### Thus, agents justify their actions based on individual moral preferences and deal with ethical dilemmas by prioritizing certain beliefs. It’s a constitutive feature of humanity to rationally maximize value under a particular index of the good. Gauthier 98, David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998, ///AHS PB //Recut by Scopa Fortunately, I do not have to defend normative foundationalism. One problem with accepting moral justification as part of our ongoing practice is that, as I have suggested, we no longer accept the world view on which it depends. But perhaps a more immediately pressing problem is that we have, ready to hand, an alternative mode for justifying our choices and actions. In its more austere and, in my view, more defensible form, this is to show that choices and actions maximize the agent ’s expected utility, where utility is a measure of considered preference. In its less austere version, this is to show that choices and actions satisfy, not a subjectively defined requirement such as utility, but meet the agent ’ s objective interests. Since I do not believe that we have objective interests, I shall ignore this latter. But it will not matter. For the idea is clear; we have a mode of justification that does not require the introduction of moral considerations. 11 Let me call this alternative nonmoral mode of justification, neutrally, deliberative justification. Now moral and deliberative justification are directed at the same objects – our choices and actions. What if they conflict? And what do we say to the person who offers a deliberative justification of his choices and actions and refuses to offer any other? We can say, of course, that his behavior lacks moral justification, but this seems to lack any hold, unless he chooses to enter the moral framework. And such entry, he may insist, lacks any deliberative justification, at least for him. If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise, in relation to choice and action, does not perish with it. Rather, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that deliberative justification is more clearly basic, that it cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental. Deliberative justification relates to our deep sense of self. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, and provides the basis for rationality, is the capacity for semantic representation. You can, as your dog on the whole cannot, represent a state of affairs to yourself, and consider in particular whether or not it is the case, and whether or not you would want it to be the case. You can represent to yourself the contents of your beliefs, and your desires or preferences. But in representing them, you bring them into relation with one another. You represent to yourself that the Blue Jays will win the World Series, and that a National League team will win the World Series, and that the Blue Jays are not a National League team. And in recognizing a conflict among those beliefs, you find  rationality thrust upon you. Note that the first two beliefs could be replaced by preferences, with the same effect. Since in representing our preferences we become aware of conflict among them, the step from representation to choice becomes complicated. We must, somehow, bring our conflicting desires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And there is only one plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle. We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and deliberative justification. There is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be. The foundational crisis of morality thus cannot be avoided by pointing to the existence of a practice of justification within the moral framework, and denying that any extramoral foundation is relevant. For an extramoral mode of justification is already present, existing not side by side with moral justification, but in a manner tied to the way in which we unify our beliefs and preferences and so acquire our deep sense of self. We need not suppose that this deliberative justification is itself to be understood foundationally. All that we need suppose is that moral justification does not plausibly survive conflict with it.

**And because agents takes their own ability to act as intrinsically valuable, permissibility is avoided through a system of mutual self restraint where agents refrain from impeding upon the actions of other agents, under the expectation that others will do the same out of rational self interest. This is achieved through a system of contracts which both parties’ consent to in order to regulate behavior. Gauthier 2,** David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998 ///AHS PB //Recut by ScopaI shall not rehearse at length an argument that is now familiar to at least some readers, and, in any event, can be found in that book. But let me sketch briefly those features of deliberative rationality that enable it to constrain maximizing choice. The key idea is that **in many situations, if each person chooses what, given the choices of the others, would maximize her expected utility, then the outcome will be mutually disadvantageous in comparison with some alternative – everyone could do better**. 14 Equilibrium, which obtains when each person ’ s action is a best response to the others ’ actions, is incompatible with (Pareto-) optimality, which obtains when no one could do better without someone else doing worse. Given the ubiquity of such situations, **each person can see the benefit, to herself, of participating with her fellows in practices requiring each to refrain from the direct endeavor to maximize her own utility, when such mutual restraint is mutually advantageous. No one**, of course, **can have reason to accept any unilateral constraint on her maximizing behavior; each benefits from, and only from, the constraint accepted by her fellows**. But if one benefits more from a constraint on others than one loses by being constrained oneself, one may have reason to accept a practice requiring everyone, including oneself, to exhibit such a constraint. We may represent **such a practice** as capable of gaining unanimous agreement among rational persons who were choosing the terms on which they would interact with each other. And this agreement **is the basis of morality**. Consider a simple example of a moral practice that would command rational agreement. Suppose each of us were to assist her fellows only when either she could expect to benefit herself from giving assistance, or she took a direct interest in their well-being. Then, in many situations, persons would not give assistance to others, even though the benefit to the recipient would greatly exceed the cost to the giver, because there would be no provision for the giver to share in the benefit. Everyone would then expect to do better were each to give assistance to her fellows, regardless of her own benefit or interest, whenever the cost of assisting was low and the benefit of receiving assistance considerable. **Each would thereby accept a constraint on the direct pursuit of her own concerns, not unilaterally, but given a like acceptance by others. Reflection leads us to recognize that those who belong to groups whose members adhere to such a practice of mutual assistance enjoy benefits in interaction that are denied to others**. We may then represent such a practice as rationally acceptable to everyone. **This rationale for agreed constraint makes no reference to the content of anyone ’ s preferences**. The argument depends simply on the structure of interaction, on the way in which each person ’ s endeavor to fulfill her own preferences affects the fulfillment of everyone else. **Thus, each person ’ s reason to accept a mutually constraining practice is independent of her particular desires, aims and interests, although not, of course, of the fact that she has such concerns**. The idea of a purely rational agent, moved to act by reason alone, is not, I think, an intelligible one. **Morality is not to be understood as a constraint arising from reason alone on the fulfillment of nonrational preferences. Rather, a rational agent is one who acts to achieve the maximal fulfillment of her preferences, and morality is a constraint on the manner in which she acts, arising from the effects of interaction with other agents**

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with Contractarianism. And, the framework outweighs on actor specificity: States are not physical actors, but derive authority from contracts that allow them to constrain action.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1. Flexibility – Contracts are key to a) Encompassing all other ethical calculus into our decision since we process the consistency of those frameworks with our self interest and b) Value pluralism – recognizing a singular ethic fails to account for the complexity of moral problems and genuine moral disagreement. My framework solves since we can recognize multiple legitimate values while allowing individuals to exclude ones that are bad.

#### 2. Bindingness – A) Arising of Ethics – Every interaction with another agent is mediated by consent to participate in that interaction since otherwise agents could simply leave, which means there is an implicit social contract formed in every ethical interaction and B) Culpability – Only contracts can ensure agents are held to their agreements since there is a verifiable basis for judging their action as wrong as well as a pre-established punishment for breaking it.

#### 3. Regress – A) Reason – Only my framework answers the question “why be moral”, since agents have a reason to restrain their conflict due to self-interest rather than some non-existent transcendental principle B) Debates – When we compare between frameworks we suppose a higher evaluative mechanism, which presupposes a higher one, which means only self-contained rules in contracts are coherent.

#### And, Only evaluate Intents:

#### 1. To account for all foreseen impacts would prevent action because individuals would become morally culpable for all actions and states of affairs not just those that factor into the will

#### 2. Otherwise ethical theories hold agents responsible for consequences external to their will which removes any reason to be moral because agents cannot control what they are being punished for

#### 3. Aggregation is impossible since there’s no way to quantify different amounts of pain and pleasure – how can 2 headaches equal a migraine

#### 4. Induction fails – it’s incoherent to justify the past to justify the future because there’s no logical certainty that what has happened before will happen again

#### 5. Since it requires evaluating end-states we can’t know whether the action was good until after it was taken which means the judge cannot determine whether the aff is good

#### 6. Consequences empirically impossible to predict. Menand 05, Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

### Contention

#### I contend that a just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike

**1. Contractarianism requires parties to be on equal footing when entering agreements, as otherwise the agreement is corrupted by the unequal influence of those in power. Because some inequality is inevitable, ideal solutions can only be found by abstracting away into a hypothetical bargaining situation. Gauthier 3,** David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998, ///AHS PB //Recut by Scopa **What a rational person would agree to in existing circumstances depends in large part on her negotiating position** vis-à-vis her fellows. **But her negotiating position is significantly affected by the existing social institutions**, and so by the currently accepted moral practices embodied in those institutions. **Thus**, although **agreement** may well yield practices differing from those embodied in existing social institutions, yet it **will be influenced by those practices, which are not themselves the product of rational agreement**. And this must call the rationality of the agreed practices into question. **The arbitrariness of existing practices must infect any agreement whose terms are significantly affected by them**. Although rational agreement is in itself a source of stability, yet this stability is undermined by the arbitrariness of the circumstances in which it takes place. **To escape this arbitrariness, rational persons will revert from actual to hypothetical agreement, considering what practices they would have agreed to from an initial position not structured by existing institutions and the practices they embody. The content of a hypothetical agreement is determined by an appeal to the equal rationality of persons.** Rational persons will voluntarily accept an agreement only insofar as they perceive it to be equally advantageous to each. To be sure, each would be happy to accept an agreement more advantageous to herself than to her fellows, but **since no one will accept an agreement perceived to be less advantageous, agents** whose rationality is a matter of common knowledge **will** recognize the futility of aiming at or holding out for more, and minimize their bargaining costs by **coordinating at the point of equal advantage**. Now the extent of advantage is determined in a twofold way. First, there is advantage internal to an agreement. In this respect, **the expectation of equal advantage is assured by procedural fairness**. The step from existing moral practices to those resulting from actual agreement takes rational persons to a procedurally fair situation, **in which each perceives the agreed practices to be ones that it is equally rational for all to accept,** given the circumstances in which agreement is reached. But those circumstances themselves may be called into question insofar as they are perceived to be arbitrary – the result, in part, of compliance with constraining practices that do not themselves ensure the expectation of equal advantage, and so do not reflect the equal rationality of the complying parties. To neutralize this arbitrary element, **moral practices to be fully acceptable must be conceived as constituting a possible outcome of a hypothetical agreement under circumstances that are unaffected by social institutions that themselves lack full acceptability**. Equal rationality demands consideration of external circumstances as well as internal procedures.

#### That affirms – 1) Because employees are dependent upon their employer, employees are subject to a severe power imbalance that constitutes coercion.

Budd and Scoville 05, John W. Budd and James G. Scoville "The Ethics of Human Resources and Industrial Relations.", p.70, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION SERIES, Cornell University Press, October 15, 2005 [http://jbudd.csom.umn.edu/RESEARCH/hrirethics.htm] AHS//NPR Accessed 10/23/21

**The overwhelming number of people need to work to survive**, at least for a large portion of their live. There is a sense in which people are forced to work. **When an assailant says, “Your wallet or your life,**” you technically have a choice. However, for many **this situation is the paradigm of coercion.** How close is the analogy between the assailant and **the requirements of the employer**? Admittedly, in good times the balance of power shifts somewhat, but in hard times the balance of power is with the employer. Most people have to take the terms of employment a they get them (Manning 2003). Someone wanting employment does not negotiate about whether or not to be tested for drugs, for example. If drug testing is the company policy, you either submit to the test or forfeit the job. **If you want a job, you agree to employment** at **will and to layoffs** if management believes that they are necessary. **Survival for yourself and any dependents requires it.** As with the assailant, you technically have a choice, but **most employees argue they have little choice about multiple important terms of employment.** A Kantian, in common with the pluralist school of industrial relations, maintains that **the imbalance between employer and employee ought to be addressed.** Otherwise, industrial relations rests on an unethical foundation.

#### The right to unionize and strike corrects this power imbalance by ensuring an opportunity for organization and collective bargaining.

Bowie 99, Norman E., professor emeritus at the University of Minnesota “Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective” Wiley Blackwell. [https://b-ok.cc/book/2885756/a063b7] AHS//NPR

Accessed 10/24/21

Although I emphasize meaningful work as a means to gain respect and grow as a human being by exercising one’s talents, Ciulla reminds me that there is much in the work environment that undermines negative freedom (freedom from coercion), and that the decision to work itself requires a giving up of freedom in some respects. This latter point does not overly concern me because all choice forecloses other choices. Moreover, **having a job provides income, and income expands choices because it opens up possibilities**. **This is especially true when one has an adequate wage, and that is why I have emphasized the role that an adequate wage plays in meaningful work**. Of course, Ciulla is well aware of all this and in her analysis she points out that **for the unskilled their range of options is extremely limited, that the demise of unions has given much more power to manage- ment, and that there is a correlation between higher-paying jobs and the amount of freedom one has**. All these points are well taken. I especially agree with Ciulla that **unions provide a means for enhancing employee freedom**. In this case I practiced what I now preach. I am a former president of the AAUP union at the University of Delaware. I also point out that the United States is the most anti-union country in the G-20. **Unionization is considered a human right by the United Nations**. **Obviously unions provide an opportunity for participation**, and I think Ciulla and I agree that **participation schemes are one way to limit coercion**. In response to trends over the past twenty years, in this edition of Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective I pay more attention to adequate pay for the middle class, issues of inequality, and economic mobility. However, none of this requires a revision in my original account of meaningful work.

#### 2. The National Labor Relations Act explicitly defends the right to strike

National Labor Relations Board ND, National Labor Relations Board is comprised of a team of professionals who work to assure fair labor practices and workplace democracy nationwide, [https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/your-rights/nlra-and-the-right-to-strike] Accessed 10/25/21 AHS//NPR

The Right to Strike. **Section 7 of the Act states in part, “Employees shall have the right. . . to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”** **Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected for employees by this section**. **Section 13 also** concerns the right to strike. **It reads as follows**: **Nothing in this Act**, except as specifically provided for herein, **shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,** **or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right**. It is clear from a reading of these two provisions that: the law not only guarantees the right of employees to strike, but also places limitations and qualifications on the exercise of that right. Lawful and unlawful strikes. The lawfulness of a strike may depend on the object, or purpose, of the strike, on its timing, or on the conduct of the strikers. The object, or objects, of a strike and whether the objects are lawful are matters that are not always easy to determine. Such issues often have to be decided by the National Labor Relations Board. The consequences can be severe to striking employees and struck employers, involving as they do questions of reinstatement and backpay. Strikes for a lawful object. **Employees who strike for a lawful object fall into two classes: economic strikers and unfair labor practice strikers. Both classes continue as employees, but unfair labor practice strikers have greater rights of reinstatement to their jobs**. Economic strikers defined. If the object of a strike is to obtain from the employer some economic concession such as higher wages, shorter hours, or better working conditions, the striking employees are called economic strikers. **They retain their status as employees and cannot be discharged**, but they can be replaced by their employer. If the employer has hired bona fide permanent replacements who are filling the jobs of the economic strikers when the strikers apply unconditionally to go back to work, the strikers are not entitled to reinstatement at that time. However, **if the strikers do not obtain regular and substantially equivalent employment, they are entitled to be recalled to jobs for which they are qualified when openings in such jobs occur if they, or their bargaining representative, have made an unconditional request for their reinstatement**. Unfair labor practice strikers defined. **Employees who strike to protest an unfair labor practice committed by their employer are called unfair labor practice strikers. Such strikers can be neither discharged nor permanently replaced**. When the strike ends, unfair labor practice strikers, absent serious misconduct on their part, are entitled to have their jobs back even if employees hired to do their work have to be discharged. If the Board finds that economic strikers or unfair labor practice strikers who have made an unconditional request for reinstatement have been unlawfully denied reinstatement by their employer, the Board may award such strikers backpay starting at the time they should have been reinstated.