## 1AC

### Framework

#### I value morality. The Meta-Ethic is Non-Naturalism.

#### [1] The naturalistic fallacy – examples of goodness fail to define the ultimate good. Moore 03,

[Moore, G. E. “Principia Ethica” <http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/>. Published 1903] SHS ZS

Good, then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is **good**, **is incapable of any definition**, in the most important sense of that word. The most important sense of definition is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this sense **good has no definition because it** is simple and **has no parts**. **It is** one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves **incapable of definition**, because they are the ultimate terms of reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be defined. That there must be an indefinite number of such terms is obvious, on reflection; since we cannot define anything except by an analysis, which, when carried as far as it will go, refers us to something, which is simply different from anything else, and which by that ultimate difference explains the peculiarity of the whole which we are defining: for every whole contains some parts which are common to other wholes also. There is, therefore, no intrinsic difficulty in the contention that **good denotes a simple and indefinable quality**. There are many other instances of such qualities. **Consider yellow**, for example. **We may** try to **define it**, **by** describing its physical equivalent; we may state what kind of **light-vibrations** must stimulate the normal eye, in order that we may perceive it. **But** a moment’s reflection is sufficient to shew that those light-vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. **They are not what we perceive**. Indeed, we should never have been able to discover their existence, unless we had first been struck by the patent difference of quality between the different colours. The most we can be entitled to say of those vibrations is that they are what corresponds in space to the yellow which we actually perceive. Yet **a mistake of this** simple **kind has** commonly **been made about good**. **It may be true that all things which are good are also something else**, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. **But** far **too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good**; that these properties, in fact, were simply not other, but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the naturalistic fallacy and of it I shall now endeavour to dispose.

#### [2] The open question argument – Suppose X represents a natural property like pleasure. If X is analytically equivalent to good, then the question “Is it true X is good” becomes “Is it true good is good.” This either means A) Naturalistic frameworks result in a tautology of “Good is good” or b) X is not the same as good in which case non-naturalism is true.

#### [3] Only a priori knowledge is epistemically reliable**. Descartes 41**,

René, 1641. Discourse On Method ; and, Meditations on First Philosophy, NPR

Yet from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there is not something else which does not allow even the slightest occasion for doubt**?** Is there not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts into me the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts**?** In that case am not I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me**.** In that case I too undoubtedly exist**,** if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something**. So** after considering everything very thoroughly**,** I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. ButI do not yet have a sufficient understanding of what this ‘I’ is, that now necessarily exists. So I must be on my guard against carelessly taking something else to be this ‘I’, and so making a mistake in the very item of knowledge that I maintain is the most certain and evident of all. I will therefore go back and meditate on what I originally believed myself to be, before I embarked on this present train of thought. I will then subtract anything capable of being weakened, even minimally, by the arguments now introduced, so that what is left at the end may be exactly and only what is certain and unshakeable.

#### There are three ways to categorize the substance of these non-natural properties: Internally, Externally, or from our Constitutive nature as beings. Internalism and Externalism fail – only constitutivism can be solve their deficiencies. Kastafanas 14, Kastafanas, Paul. "Constitutivism About Practical Reasons". *Philarchive.Org*, 2014, <https://philarchive.org/archive/KATCAP>. // Scopa Consider a perfectly homely normative claim, such as “you have to go to the movies.” If we ask what would render this claim true, the answer seems clear: a fact about the agent’s motives. If the claim is true for Allen but false for Betty, this is due to the fact that Allen desires to see the film and Betty does not. It is natural to think that in just this way, reasons will be tied to facts about agent’s motives. But what about claims such as “you have reason not to murder”? That claim seems different. It purports to be universal, applying to all agents. Moreover, it does not seem to depend on the agent’s motives. Suppose Allen has many motives in favor of murdering his uncle (getting revenge for past slights, collecting an inheritance, etc.), and no motives that count against it (he’s a sociopath with no compunction about harming others, and he thinks he’s clever enough to contrive a plan that leaves him with no risk of getting caught). In this simplified case, all of Allen’s motives count in favor of murdering his uncle; none count against it. Nonetheless, most of us want to say that he has reason not to murder. So we face contrary pressures: in certain cases, the claim that reasons are grounded in motives looks exceedingly plausible, indeed obvious; in others, the same claim looks like it generates unacceptable consequences. And so we get a familiar, well-worn philosophical debate: internalists defend the claim that all normative claims are generated in facts about the agent’s motives, whereas externalists deny this. More precisely: (Internalism) Agent A has reason to φ iff A has, or would have after procedurally rational deliberation, a desire or aim whose fulfillment would be promoted by φ-ing. (Externalism) It can be true both that (i) agent A has reason to φ, and (ii) A does not have, and would not have after procedurally rational deliberation, a desire or aim whose fulfillment would be promoted by φ-ing. Each of these theories faces certain difficulties. Internalism has trouble with apparently universal normative claims, such as “you should not murder.” Externalism is tailor-made to capture universal normative claims. Nonetheless, it faces several challenges, including the much-discussed problems of practicality and queerness. First, consider practicality. Moral claims are supposed to be capable of moving us. Recognizing that φ-ing is wrong is supposed to be capable of motivating the agent not to φ. But we might wonder how a claim that bears no relation to any of our motives could have this motivational grip. As Bernard Williams puts it, “the whole point of external reasons statements is that they can be true independently of an agent’s motivations. But nothing can explain an agent’s (intentional) actions except something that motivates him so to act” (1981, 107). William’s suggestion is that if the fact that murder is wrong is to exert a motivational influence upon the person’s action, then the agent must have some motive that is suitably connected to not murdering. And this pushes us back in the direction of internalism. Second, consider Mackie’s argument from queerness. Motives are familiar things, so it seems easy enough to imagine that claims about reasons are claims about relations between actions and motives. Internalism therefore has little difficulty with Mackie’s argument. But what would the relata in an external reasons statement be? Are we to imagine that a claim about reasons is a claim about a relation between an action and some independently existing value? This would be odd: as Mackie puts it, “if there were objective values then they would be entities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different than anything else in the universe” (1977, 38). For if such values existed, then it would be possible for a certain state of affairs to have “a demand for such-and-such an action somehow built into it” (1977, 40). And this, Mackie concludes, would be a decidedly queer property. In sum: both externalism and internalism have attractive features, yet incur substantial costs. Traditional internalism grounds normative claims in familiar features of our psychologies, yet for that very reason has trouble generating universal normative claims. Externalism generates universal normative claims with ease, yet encounters the problems of practicality and queerness. So we have a pair of unappealing options, and the debate continues. Constitutivism attempts to resolve this dilemma. To put it in an old-fashioned way, constitutivism sublates internalism and externalism, seeing each position as containing a grain of truth, but also as partial and one-sided. The constitutivist agrees with the internalist that the truth of a normative claim depends on the agent’s aims, in the sense that the agent must possess a certain aim in order for the normative claim to be true. However, the constitutivist traces the authority of norms to an aim that has a special status—an aim that is constitutive of being an agent. This constitutive aim is not optional; if you lack the aim, you are not an agent at all. So, while the constitutivist agrees with the internalist that reasons derive from the agent’s aims, the constitutivist holds that there is at least one aim that is intrinsic to being an agent. Accordingly, the constitutivist gets one of the conclusions that the externalist wanted: there are universal reasons for acting.13 Put differently, there are reasons for action that arise merely from the fact that one is an agent. Specifically, these are the reasons grounded in the constitutive aim. So constitutivism can be viewed as an attempt to resolve the dispute between externalists and internalists about practical reason, by showing that there are reasons that arise from non-optional aims.14 In so doing, it generates universal reasons while sidestepping the problems of practicality and queerness.

#### That requires practical reason as the basis for ethics:

#### [1] Regress – Ethical theories must have a basis. We can always ask why we should follow the basis of a theory, so they aren’t morally binding because they don’t have a starting point. Practical reason solves – When we ask why we should follow reason, we demand a reason, which concedes to the authority of reason itself, so it’s the only thing we can follow

#### [2] Inescapability – Every agent intrinsically values practical reason when they go about setting and pursuing an end under a moral theory, as it presupposes that the end they are committing is an intrinsic good. That necessitates practical reason as a necessary means to follow through on any given end.

#### [3] Action Theory – Every action can be broken down to infinite amounts of movements, i.e. me moving my arm can be broken down to the infinite moments of every state my arm is in. Only reason can unify these movements because we use practical reason to achieve our goals, means all actions collapse to reason.

#### That justifies a universal moral law –

#### 1. Absent universal ethics morality becomes arbitrary since it can be meaninglessly applied in different ways without reason. Non-arbitrariness is a side constraint – only non-arbitrary principles can hold agent culpable for their actions since otherwise we could make up ethical rules for different situations to punish people.

#### 2. A priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience. That means to allow one to violate a rule without another would be a contradiction. Contradictions are a side constraint – it’s an inescapable condition that undermines all arguments since something can’t be both true and false simultaneously

#### 3. Every agent is equally morally relevant, which requires equal treatment and equal standards for ethics.

#### Therefore, In order to respect each agent as a practical reasoner, we require a universal set of moral laws for what counts as a violation of the principles of rational reflection.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative as enacted through the omnilateral will.

#### Prefer –

#### 1. Motivation – The categorical imperative is intrinsically motivational since it respects the nature of agency, which is the mechanism by which we can set and pursue any end – absent the motivation to pursue ends you would no longer be an agent, which means to be an agent necessitates being motivated to act.

2. Theoretically prefer – [A] Real World Education – Governments operate in consistency to Kantian conceptions of the state. Empirically proven – legitimate states have deontic side constraints like a bill of rights or constitutional courts, but no state is allowed to violate citizens’ liberties for the purpose of the greater good [B] Resource Disparities – A focus on statistics and evidence rewards the debaters with the most preround prep which just increases the disparity between large schools with huge evidence files and lone wolves without coaches. A Kantian debate can easily be won without any preround prep as all that is need is analytical arguments.

#### And, Only evaluate Intents:

#### 1. To account for all foreseen impacts would prevent action because individuals would become morally culpable for all actions and states of affairs not just those that factor into the will

#### 2. Otherwise ethical theories hold agents responsible for consequences external to their will which removes any reason to be moral because agents cannot control what they are being punished for

#### 3. Aggregation is impossible since there’s no way to quantify different amounts of pain and pleasure – how can 2 headaches equal a migraine

#### 4. Induction fails – it’s incoherent to justify the past to justify the future because there’s no logical certainty that what has happened before will happen again

#### 5. Since it requires evaluating end-states we can’t know whether the action was good until after it was taken which means the judge cannot determine whether the aff is good

## Contention

#### 1] Humans have an obligation to respect potential ET life and their property. They may exist beyond recognition of a rationalist, meaning colonization entails using them as a mere means

Brian Patrick Green 2014, Santa Clara University, "Ethical Approaches to Astrobiology and Space Exploration: Comparing Kant, Mill, and Aristotle," <https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/markkula/5/> // SHSOL // recut ahs ja

More than that, Kant not only allowed that extraterrestrial intelligences might exist, he believed that if they did not yet exist, that someday they would,5 and that some of these ETIs would be inferior and some superior to humans in intelligence.6 One might wonder if the young Kant’s belief in ETIs continued into his older years, when he was writing on ethics. There is good evidence that it does. Writing his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 30 years after his work on the nebular hypothesis, Kant is explicit – he is not just discussing humans, but “all rational beings.” 7 So with respect deontology and extraterrestrial intelligent life, Case 1) on the chart, Kant would extend the same full dignity and respect to ETIs which humans owe to each other, in accord with his categorical imperative, which requires the universalizability of moral norms8 and treating all rational beings as ends in themselves.9 For deontology and non-intelligent life, Case 2), Kant argues that animals, as non-rational beings, are of only relative worth. They are not as ends in themselves, not persons, but things.10 If humans discovered non-intelligent life on other worlds (most likely microbes, but if larger then we would have to carefully evaluate what it means to be intelligent, and make sure the discovered life does not qualify), according to Kant, we could do with it as we pleased. While some contemporary moral philosophers have tried to reinterpret or rehabilitate Kant on animals, these works are developments of Kant’s philosophy; they are not his philosophy itself.11 So while Kantianism might be modifiable into a system which is more friendly towards the rest of the living world, without these modifications it is not. For non-life and Kantian deontology, Case 3), there is likewise a simple answer: nonliving things are just things. Non-living things are not a moral concern, they are merely instrumental, and as such intelligent creatures can treat these things as they wish. However, there is an odd exception to this conclusion which is worth mentioning (and which I note with a star in the table). Kant believed that if other planets were not yet inhabited, they someday would be. If this is the case, then what of planets currently without intelligent life but which may someday have it? Ought we to anticipate these intelligent creatures and therefore respect them proactively by respecting their prospective goods? Kant does not say (perhaps because he was not interested in speculating or because humans were, in his time, far from being in a position to affect the futures of these planets). However, given the importance of rational beings in Kant’s system (rationality, teleology, and morality are the purpose of universe) the answer is possibly, or even probably, yes.

#### 2] Private entities are incapable of making omnilateral decisions as privatization entails that they withhold information which limits deliberation over making maxims.

Chiara Cordelli 2016, University of Chicago, Political Science <https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/What-is-Wrong-With-Privatization_UCB.pdf> //Dulles VN

The intrinsic wrong of privatization, I will suggest, rather consists in the creation of an institutional arrangement that, by its very constitution, denies those who are subject to it equal freedom. I understand freedom as an interpersonal relationship of reciprocal independence. To be free is not to be subordinated to another person’s unilateral will. By building on an analytical reconstruction of Kant’s Doctrine of Right, I will argue that current forms of privatization reproduce (to a different degree) within a civil condition the very same defects that Kant attributes to the state of nature, or to a pre-civil condition, thereby making a rightful condition of reciprocal independence impossible. Importantly, this is so even if private actors are publicly authorized through contract and subject to regulations, and even if they are committed to reason in accordance with the public good. The reason for this, as I will explain, derives from the fact that private agents are constitutionally incapable of acting omnilaterally, even if their actions are omnilaterally authorized by government through some delegation mechanism, e.g. a voluntary contract. Omnilateralness, I will suggest, must be understood as a function of 1) rightful judgment and 2) unity. By rightful judgment I mean the capacity to reason publicly and to make universal rules that are valid for everyone, according to a juridical ideal of right, as necessary to solve the problem of the unilateral imposition of private wills on others. By unity I mean the capacity to make rules and decisions that change the normative situation of others, as a part of a unified system of decision-making. The condition of unity is crucial, as I shall later explain, insofar as there might be multiple interpretations compatible with rightful judgment, which would still problematically leave the definition of people’s rightful entitlements indeterminate. Further, the practical realization of the juridical idea of an omnilateral will, I will contend, requires embeddedness within a shared collective practice of decision-making. In practice, rightful judgment can only obtain when certain shared background frameworks that structure practical reasoning and confer unity to that reasoning are in place. The rules of public administration and the authority structure of bureaucracy should be understood as playing this essential function of giving empirical and practical reality to the omnilateral will, as far as the execution of rules and the concrete definition of entitlements are concerned. Together, these two requirements are necessary, (whether they are also sufficient is a different question), to make an action the omnilateral action of a state, which has the moral power to change the normative situation of citizens, by fixing the content of their rights and duties in accordance with the equal freedom of all. The phenomenon of privatization thus raises the fundamental questions of why we need political institutions to begin with, and what makes an action an action of the state. Insofar as private agents make decisions that fundamentally alter the normative situation (the rights and duties) of citizens, and insofar as, by definition, private agents are not public officials embedded in that shared collective practice, their decisions, even if well intentioned and authorized through contract, cannot count as omnilateral acts of the state. They rather and necessarily remain unilateral acts of men. Hence, I will conclude, for the very same reasons that we have, following Kant, a duty to exit the state of nature so as to solve the twofold problems of the unilateral imposition of will on others and the indeterminacy of rights, we also have a duty to limit privatization and to support, on normative grounds, a case for the re-bureaucratization of certain functions. Therefore, my paper provides foundational reasons to agree with Richard Rorty’s nonfoundational defense of bureaucracy as stated in the opening epigraph, since only agents who are appropriately embedded within a bureaucratic structure, properly understood, are, in many cases, capable of acting omnilaterally. The “bosses” I am here concerned with are not primarily those who 5 can unilaterally impose their will on us in their capacity as private employers, but rather any private actor who acts unilaterally while in the garb of the state.

#### 3] Space Exploration is non universalizable -

#### a). Entails that everyone leaves Earth which means that no one would be around to create the means to leave earth

#### b). Assumes all agents have access to the resources to fund a space trip, and is thus exclusionary.

Benjamin Segobaetso 2018, Project Officer at United Nations Association in Canada “Ethical Implications of the Colonization, Privatization and Commercialization of Outer Space.” https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/38318/1/Benjamin\_Segobaetso\_2018.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2yROoOf\_np9HL97WmBB-xDUGSZnQrRPbvs2Gmo6V5NlyEFBoSLWxQFuV0 //Dulles VN

It can be argued through Kantian ethics that our record here on Earth paints a picture of neoliberal and capitalist policies with tendencies to favour the highest bidder at the exclusion of the under privileged and puts profit first at the expense of the environment. For Kantians, there are two questions that we must ask ourselves whenever we decide to act: (i) Can I rationally will that everyone act as I propose to act? If the answer is no, then we must not perform the action. (ii) Does my action respect the goals of human beings? Again, if the answer is no, then we must not perform the action. Kantian ethicists would argue that extending to space neoliberal and capitalist policies is immoral because these systems create economic disparities and life threatening environmental injustices; therefore, they are set up in a way that we could 16 not rationally will everyone to act the way they act either here on Earth or in space. Also, Kantian ethicists would ask whether the action of extending neoliberal and capitalist policies to space would respect the goals of extra-terrestrial intelligent life if any rather than merely using them for humans’ own purposes? If the answer is no, then the participating agent must not perform the action. Kant wrote on the possible existence of extra-terrestrial intelligent species in the final pages of the last book that he published, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht] (1978). In this publication, Kant hinted that the highest concept of the Alien species may be that of a terrestrial rational being [eines irdischen vernünftigen ]; however, he argued that it will be difficult to describe its characteristics because there is no knowledge available of a non-terrestrial rational being [nicht irdischen Wesen] which could be used as a reference in regards to its properties and ultimately classify that terrestrial being as rational. This dilemma will continue until extraterrestrial intelligent life is discovered because comparing two species of rational beings has to be on the basis of experience, but that experience has not been possible yet (Kant, 237-238).