**Affirming the resolution asks debaters to accept the state and unjust power relations by denying private entities the ability to appropriate space, extending space as the domain of the sovereign. This bolsters state-inflicted notions of national service and discounts debate which is the purpose of this educational activity.**

**The fact that power is less visible than in the days of old does not mean that power is less present in our lives. On the contrary, power is what forms our very being as political subjects and citizens of nation-states. Political theory must move beyond the analysis of power-as-sovereignty to understand the way disciplinary power works on the smallest scales, producing individuals through disciplinary power.**

Hasana **Sharp**, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at McGill University, Spring **2002**, Intertexts, Vol. 6, No. 1

Michel **Foucault scandalized many by suggesting that**, contrary to common sense as well as to much of philosophy and juridical theory, **the decreasingly visible and less physically brutal character of modern power is attributable to its increased effectivity and the tightening rather than softening of its grip over social relations. Foucault demands that we understand power not as an external, alien force to which our souls and consciousness are opposed, but as constitutive of knowledge formations, subjectivity** (i.e., the soul or consciousness), **and most aspects of our being** in the world. **Foucault's provocation**, his dare **for us to think power and ourselves at their very limits, comes** in some sense **from** what appears to be **an "empirical" analysis that power no longer operates according to a model of sovereignty but according to a technology of discipline. Power**, in the form of discipline, **functions at the level of the most quotidian aspects of our existence rather than emanating from a centralized, identifiable, commanding force acting in the form of interdiction**, prohibition, and taboo. **Yet political theory** and models of human consciousness **continue to understand power and human agency through an image of sovereignty: power is conflated with authority and practices of repression, while agency, in order for morality and ethico-political responsibility to be possible, is understood as the transparent sovereign will of the individual** who acts and thinks in spite of, rather than because of, social forces. **Foucault argues** persuasively, **however, that we must surrender our attachment to a thought of sovereignty in all of its guises. In its stead, we might more fruitfully consider power relations**, including those constitutive of subjectivity, **as relations of struggle**, relations of war. **This does not render political engagement impossible, as many contend, but necessary and inescapable**

**The affirmative’s focus on the state as the locus of national service privileges a narrow view of what service is, which causes Americans to disqualify everyday examples of service from their political vocabulary. Instead, we should reject government service in favor of an expansive view of service that includes the things everyday people can do in their everyday lives to serve.**

Alan W. **Dowd**, director of the Hudson Institute where he researches U.S. foreign policy, civil society, and philanthropy, January **2004**, World & I, Vol. 19, No. 1

Yet **after seventy years of federal service programs, proponents of national service still complain that not enough Americans are serving and those who do aren't serving enough. Their solution is not to** pause and **reconsider the slide toward mandated service but to propose newer, larger programs that expand Washington's role in our lives**. Indeed, it seems that **a narrow definition of public service** often **leads to the expansion of government, while an expansive definition of public service helps to limit the size of government and bring about** the **balance** described at the outset of this essay. Think about it: **If public service is something that only people connected to government or politics can do, then the only way to ensure that Americans are serving is for them to contribute more time to the state or for the state to create more opportunities** for public service. **Consider, as evidence**, the embattled **AmeriCorps** program. Whatever your opinion of AmeriCorps, it is difficult to deny that **the program is premised on the notion that government is the critical link between the individual and** his **capacity to serve**. Last summer, for example, some **two hundred corporate leaders published an open letter to the president** and Congress lauding the record of AmeriCorps and warning that its ranks would shrink by thousands in 2004 if the federal government didn't fork over $200 million in new spending. **Without the government's help, the CEOs seemed to argue, Americans can't--or won't--serve their fellow citizens. The CEOs are not alone in viewing service through the prism of government**. In the post--September 11 milieu, Bush created USAFreedomCorps to serve as an umbrella for all national service programs. "As a Coordinating Council housed at the White House and chaired by President George W. Bush," the USAFreedomCorps Web site explains, "we are working to strengthen our culture of service and help find opportunities for every American to start volunteering." In 2001, Sens. Evan Bayh and John McCain coauthored the first Call to Service Act, which would have ballooned the AmeriCorps program more than fivefold--from 40,000 workers in 2001 to 250,000 in 2010. (That bill did not become law, but a newer version of it is now in Congress.) **"Americans again are eager for ways to serve at home and abroad," the senators explained. "Government should make it easier for them to do so**."6 **In other words, before we can help others, Washington needs to help us.**  In 1998, President Bill **Clinton concluded that AmeriCorps "has given 100,000 young people the opportunity to serve their country"--as if no such opportunity existed before the creation of the program**.7 Almost a decade earlier, William Buckley wrote a lengthy defense of what might be called "nearly mandatory" national service in his book Gratitude. He based his argument on the premise that "everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit."8 Buckley was quick to reject "compulsory national service." He argued instead that government could use sanctions and inducements to promote national service without mandating it. For example, Buckley noted that the federal government could withhold financial aid and state governments could withhold or revoke driver's licenses from those who were unwilling to serve, while tax breaks could be offered to those who join up.9 Of course, these sanctions and inducements, it seems, would have the effect of making such service mandatory. What 18-year-old would rather surrender his driver's license than enlist in the "National Service Corps"? What college student would choose to cough up $10,000 in loans or cash if he could save it by joining a nearly mandatory government-service program? The idea of mandated service certainly has currency. Already, some high schools and colleges require students to perform school-approved "volunteer work" prior to graduating. Some employers are mandating the same of employees. When they promoted their supersized AmeriCorps in 2001--2002, Bayh and McCain argued that "national service should one day be a rite of passage for young Americans."10 Given all the blessings and opportunities afforded us as Americans, **one can hardly argue with the goals of** Bush, Bayh, McCain, Buckley, and other **proponents of national service. We do owe our country "a return for the benefit.**" Nor can their motives be called into question. As the grandson of a senator and son of a president, Bush has public service flowing through his veins. McCain, whose father and grandfather were naval officers, flew combat missions in Vietnam and was a POW prior to serving in Washington. The son of a senator, Bayh has been in government service most of his adult life. Buckley was an Army draftee at the end of World War II, a candidate for elective office, and a presidential emissary, but he arguably has done more for his country outside of government, as a writer and thinker--which underscores the broader point here: **One doesn't have to serve the government to serve** his **country**. Moreover, **short of an imminent threat to the nation, a citizen should not be compelled to serve** his country **by anything more than** his **conscience**. If he is, his actions won't have much meaning. As the Roman philosopher Seneca wrote, "To repay gratitude is a most praiseworthy act." However, "it ceases to be praiseworthy if it is made obligatory."11 **For those Americans who believe government is the glue that holds everything else in place, national service is a solution to the problem of apathy. But for those Americans who believe the individual has rights to exercise free from government interference, and responsibilities to fulfill free from government coercion, mandated national service is a solution in search of a problem**.

**National service is more than giving back to the community. Above all else, it is a project of socializing individuals to become docile, governable subjects through the application of disciplinary power.**

Eric B. **Gorham**, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Loyola University, New Orleans, **1992**, National Service, Citizenship, And Political Education, p. 111-112

Service, as in “**national service**,” **is not simply one person serving another for the good of the community. It is a historical practice**, and one **existing by virtue of a particular politicoeconomic arrangement**. I want to examine briefly the genealogy of the concept and analyze institutions that embody this ethic. In doing so, I attempt to demonstrate that **service is not always democratic, public, and grounded in a civic ethic**. Moreover, I hope to show that institutions use the service ethic and the practices of servers to serve private interests. Thus situated **service becomes less a norm of caring and good civics and more an instrument for individual, corporate, and bureaucratic privilege; and as that instrument it violates the civic purposes of the ethic**. When it violates the civic purposes of the service ethic, service loses its force as an ideological and rhetorical justification for a national (or possibly any governmental) program. Historically, **service, and the service professions, have been more than simply institutionalized do-gooding**. The service professions—for example, social work, relief work—were constituted by the five characteristics of service I mention above. As such they became part of the political economy of American society. Moreover, **they were a means of socialization: designed to help people conform to certain values sometimes at the expense of their traditional community practices**. In his now-famous account of social work, Roy Lubove argues that **the profession was established as a middle class response to social dislocation caused by industrialization and increasing urbanization.** In the late nineteenth century **the “truly scientific charity” emerged as an instrument of urban social control. This work depended upon scientific organization: functional specialization, centralized coordination and administration, corporate managerial techniques, and an “application of biological and economic law.” These charity organizations sought “character regeneration” in a rearticulated social sphere. The charity organization ideal was to reestablish the patterns of general social interaction** of the small town or village, **where the primary group exercised powerful social controls**. The charity society was an “artifice,” designed to restore the “natural relations” which the city had destroyed. Moreover, these “natural relations” looked uncommonly like a middle -class utopia. The visitor saw in her client less an equal or a potential equal than an object of character reformation whose unfortunate and lowly condition resulted from ignorance or deviations from middle-class values and patterns of life-organization.”

**Micro-powers and disciplinary techniques are connected to wide-scale regimes of biopolitical population management**

Bruce **Curtis**, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University, Fall **2002**, Canadian Journal Of Sociology, accessed 6/6/06, http://www.cjsonline.ca/articles/foucault.html

**In a wide-ranging** 1976 **interview** with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino, familar to English readers as ‘Truth and Power’(Foucault 1980b, 1994i), **the question of ‘population’ as the link between the micro-powers of discipline and the general administration of social relations was posed explicitly**. The interviewers suggested that **disciplinary techniques did not subsist on their own, but rather were connected to the more general phenomenon of population**, which appeared in the eighteenth century as an object of scientific investigation. They proposed that **disciplinary power was in fact linked to two bodies: population, as an assembled mass of elements, and its component parts, docile bodies. Foucault responded that this was precisely the line of development of his own work**, and proceeded to draw a contrast between feudal powers, based on exactions and levies and tied to rituals, ceremonies, and symbols of loyalty, and new forms of power appearing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries based on social production and productive services. **This shift in the mode of production and appropriation of the social surplus propelled the penetration of techniques of power into bodies and at the same time created a need for power to deal with population**. The same techniques that led to the accumulation of capital, Foucault observed, led to the accumulation of human beings and hence gave rise to the administrative problems of collective health, hygiene, longevity, fertility and demographic phenomena more generally. The political importance of sex was precisely that it was located at the intersection of individual bodies and phenomena of population.

**National service is precisely such a project of managing populations**

Eric B. **Gorham**, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Loyola University, New Orleans, **1992**, National Service, Citizenship, And Political Education, p. 49.

**Regardless of how voluntary or coercive national service is meant to be**, all plans for it involve programs and training sessions that are remarkably similar. A number of **individuals and organizations have begun to propose potential structures for such programs and training**. These structures involve fairly detailed descriptions of the particular institutions and agencies who are to be involved in the program. They also suggest that **a national service program must address three basic issues: (1) improving the moral character of the individual, (2) helping remedy social ills, and (3) contributing service where the nation needs it**. In this way national service programs improve the quality of citizenship in the United States as they improve the quality of life. **These organizational principles have generally been formulated with minimal regard to how many individuals enroll in a national service program. Coercive, compulsory, and voluntary national service plans all have the same basic goals and constituent units**, regardless of which formula is used. **The only difference tends to be in accommodating different numbers of enrollees, and in the enforcement of the program in the cases of coercive and compulsory service**. With the exception of Danzig and Szanton’s proposal, these enforcement policies all involve criminal charges for noncompliance. Nonetheless, the types of services offered and the character of the agencies involved remain very similar whether the program is voluntary or not.

**Biopolitical population-management techniques make genocides inevitable and culminate in human extinction**

Mitchell **Dean**, Professor of Sociology at Macquarie University, **2001**, States Of Imagination, p. 53-54

This allows us, first, to consider what might be thought of as the dark side of biopolitics (Foucault 1979a: 136—37). In Foucault’s account, **biopolitics does not put an end to the practice of war: it provides it with new and more sophisticated killing machines. These machines allow killing itself to be reposed at the level of entire populations. Wars become genocidal in the twentieth century. The same state that takes on the duty to enhance the life of the population also exercises the power of death over whole populations. Atomic weapons are the key weapons of this process of the power to put whole populations to death**. We might also consider here the aptly named biological and chemical weapons that seek an extermination of populations by visiting plagues upon them or polluting the biosphere in which they live to the point at which bare life is no longer sustainable. **Nor does the birth of biopolitics put an end to the killing of one’s own populations**. Rather, **it intensifies that killing—whether by an “ethnic cleansing” that visits holocausts upon whole groups or by the mass slaughters of classes and groups conducted in the name of the utopia to be achieved**.

**The alternative is to not propose that justice should be evaluated using the state as an arbiter in this debate. Prefer this alternative judge because**

**Even if our alternative isn’t perfect, the absence of resistance to power is the worst possible condition. Resistance to power can and does have substantial positive effects on the lives of subjugated individuals, but this resistance requires attuning our political vocabulary to prioritize the marginalized**

**Butin 01**

Dan W. Butin, Assistant Professor of Education at Gettysburg College, June 2001, Educational Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2

Foucault believed that resistance could make a positive and concrete difference in people's lives. It may, of course, make the situation worse. But **to not have the opportunity to attempt to change is the most dangerous of all positions.** It is against this that Foucault railed. **His "hyper- and pessimistic activism" was thus both an enactment of his belief in how relations of power can be struggled against, and an experiment in gauging the potential for transformation**. In this light I would therefore like to offer three methodological correctives for the "Foucauldian fallacies" I outlined previously. First, it must be acknowledged that individuals are neither simply passive nor radically autonomous agents. Foucault forcefully argued that resistance is an inherent aspect of relations of power and thus predicated on the ability to act. Without such a theoretical acknowledgment, Foucault's insights concerning power and domination collapse within a totalizing and static perspective. In a sense, this is a simple acknowledgment based on over one hundred years of pragmatist research grounded in William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. And in fact, some have argued for a more sympathetic relationship between Foucault and pragmatism (Maslan 1988). Second, and predicated on the first point, "**subjugated knowledges" should be heard**. "**Subjugated knowledges" are**, for Foucault, "**a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated"** and include the voices "of the psychiatric patient, of the ill person, of the nurse" (Foucault 1980, 82). For all of the theoretical sophistication of the four articles analyzed previously, none cites the individuals affected by the practices described. Gang members, British academics who "spontaneously" consent, and administrators caught within disciplinary practices are left unheard. Their voices are assumed and spoken for. **I am not suggesting that their voices are the final truth. Neither does Foucault. Rather, they must simply be acknowledged**. Michael Apple makes a similar point when he urges analyses of how subjects make meaning of the technologies of differentiation: "**we should not assume that teachers or students are totally unaware of what is happening.** How do they understand these things? How do they possibly find the holes in these discourses and mechanisms in creative ways so as to allow for spaces of resistance?" (Apple 1998, 424). Qualitative and ethnographic research, or the citation of it, is not a strong point of poststructuralist researchers. It might behoove a closer look at Foucault's constant and consistent political engagement (Felski 1998). Third, educational researchers must be willing to experiment with new truths. One must always bear in mind and grapple with the fact that new "regimes of truth" may replace old authoritarian principles; yet it should be realized that some forms of domination are more dangerous than others. To capitulate to a radical relativism denies any potential to resist and thus precludes any means by which to modify or reverse relations of power. Moreover, the questioning of the criteria of the experimental truth must be seen for what it is: a tactical struggle to maintain a particular truth-claim. This is not to say such a truth-claim is invalid or unhelpful or nonliberating. Rather, it is simply to realize that the **truth-claims of the status quo attempt to ward off resistance in the same manner that new experimental truths attempt to overturn them: by struggling to delegitimize their grounding to truth**.

**Judge, the role of the ballot here is to include people in our frames of reference.**

**Foucault explains how what we think of as “truth” is actually determined by power structures that erect a regime of “truth” to legitimate the existence of such structures. It is the structures, which we must overturn in order to make ethical decisions.**

**Michel Foucault. Power And Knowledge. 1980.**

It seems to me that what must now be taken into account in the intellectual is not the ‘bearer of universal values’. Rather, it’s the person occupying a specific position- but whose specificity is linked, in a society like ours, to the general functioning of an apparatus of truth. In other words, the intellectual has a three-fold specificity: that of his class position (whether as petty-bourgeois in the service of capitalism or “organic” intellectual of the proletariat); that of is conditions of life and work, linked to his condition as an intellectual (his field of research, his place in a laboratory, the political and economic demands to which he submits or against which he rebels, in the university, the hospital, etc.); lastly, the specificity of the politics of truth in our societies. And its with this last factor that his position can take on a general significance and that his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional or sectoral. The intellectual can operate and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth which is so essential to the structure and functioning of our society. **There is a battle ‘for truth’, or at least ‘around truth’- it being understood once again that by truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted’, but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’, it being understood also that it’s not a matter of a battle ‘on behalf’ of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays**. It is necessary to think of the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of ‘’science’ and ‘ideology’, but in terms of ‘truth’ and ‘power’. And thus the question of the professionalisation of intellectuals and the divisions between intellectual and manual labour can be envisaged in a new way. All this must seem very confused and uncertain. Uncertain indeed, and what I am saying here is above all to be taken as a hypothesis. In order for it to be a little less confused, however, I would like to put forward a few ‘propositions’- not firm assertions, but simply suggestions to be further tested and evaluated. **‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power, which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A ‘regime’ of truth.** This regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was condition of the formulation and development of capitalism. And it’s this same regime which, subject to certain modifications, operates in the socialist countries ( I leave open here the question of China, about which I know little). **The essential political problem** for the intellectual **is not to criticize the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensure that his own scientific practice is accompanied by a correct ideology, but that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth.** The problem is not changing people’s consciousnesses- or what’s in their heads- but the political economic, institutional regime of the production of truth. It’s not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. The political question, to sum up, is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology; it is the truth itself. Hence the importance of Nietzsche.

**Moreover, we can never understand the nature of morality unless we first know who we have obligations to. This means that interrogating power structures must come first because it is the power structures that frame whose lives count. Butler explains:**

**Butler, Judith. Frames of War (2009), 138**

**We ask such normative questions as if we know what we mean by the subjects even as we do not always know how best to represent or recognize various subjects. Indeed, the “we” who asks such questions for the most part assumes that the problem is a normative one, namely, how best to arrange political life so that recognition and representation can take place. And though surely this is a crucial, if not the most crucial, normative question to ask, we cannot possibility approach an answer if we do not consider the ontology of the subject whose recognition and representation is at issue. Moreover, any inquiry into that ontology requires that we consider another level at which the normative operates, namely, through norms that produce the idea of the human who is worthy of recognition and representation at all. That is to say, we cannot ask and answer the most commonly understood normative questions, regarding how best to represent or recognize such subjects, if we fail to understand the differential of power at work that distinguishes between those subjects who will be eligible for recognition and those who will not.**

**Solutions are proposed to clean up space debris**

**Sutter 21**

[https://www.space.com/space-junk-growing-problem-complicated-solution]

But besides the **ground-based laser, amusingly nicknamed a "laser broom,"** all of the proposals call for launching new satellites, thus making satellite cleanup uncomfortably expensive. Besides, there's also the fact that any "satellite cleanup" technology automatically becomes a "remove an enemy's satellite from the sky" technology. This means that any proposal quickly moves into the murky waters of defense, international diplomacy and the militarization of space. **For now, our best strategy is to track, monitor and warn, using a network of ground- and satellite-based observatories** — and cross our fingers.

**SpaceX has a plan for**

**this**

**Hirsh 21**

**[https://www.greenmatters.com/p/elon-musk-starship-space-junk]**

Elon Musk’s Teslas are making the car industry greener — and now, he claims that his SpaceX rocket can make outer space greener, too. Elon Musk says that the Starship, which he hopes one day will transport humans to Mars, can clean up space by collecting space junk, aka space debris.

Can Elon Musk’s SpaceX Starship really collect space junk? Keep reading to learn more about how space junk is plaguing low Earth orbit, and Musk’s claims about the Starship being able to combat it.

On July 3, 2021, Elon Musk tweeted an image, captioned, “New SpaceX Starlink cover shows transfer orbit from Earth to Mars.” A Twitter user responded, asking the SpaceX CEO if the company has “thought of any way to try to eventually collect space debris.” Just two minutes later, **Musk responded, writing, “Yes, we can fly Starship around space and chomp up debris with the moving fairing door.”** As explained by the SpaceX Starship Users Guide, **the Starship’s clamshell fairing door can open in outer space, deploy a payload (equipment such as a satellite or spacecraft), and then close before the Starship returns to Earth.** That’s all that Musk shared on the matter for the moment — but the company has commented on it in the past. In October 2020, Gwynne Shotwell, the president and COO of SpaceX, spoke with Time for the magazine’s TIME100 Talks series on YouTube. In the interview, interviewer Patrick Lucas Austin asked Shotwell about the possibility of using Starships to clean up space junk, as pointed out by Space. "[Starship] has the capability of taking cargo and crew at the same time. And so it's quite possible that we could leverage Starship to go to some of these dead rocket bodies — other people's rockets, of course — basically, go pick up some of this junk in outer space,” she told Time in October. “It’s not gonna be easy, but I do believe that Starship offers the possibility of doing that." In the Time interview, Shotwell also noted that SpaceX has made some efforts to reduce its contributions to the space debris situation plaguing outer space. “We’ve requested to bring the entire constellation to a lower altitude, so that the satellites decay much quicker,” she added. “And in fact, we inject into a lower altitude, so if, for whatever reason, right after launch, they’re not working well, they come back to Earth, they break up of course, but they basically leave their orbital positions very quickly.” Space junk is polluting outer space.Space junk, aka space debris or orbital debris, refers to pieces of technology including satellites, spacecrafts, rockets, and batteries that humans sent into space, leaving them to occupy space in low Earth orbit (LEO), as per NASA. LEO is home to millions of pieces of space debris, some of which moves as fast as 18,000 miles per hour, NASA added. Basically, space junk is litter crowding outer space — so it’s imperative that more space agencies and companies join the effort to collect this junk and remove it from orbit. Fortunately, **projects with that goal are finally ramping up. For instance, in 2019, the European Space Agency commissioned the world’s first space mission to remove space debris, which is set to launch in 2025. And in May 2021, a spacecraft called the ELSA-d launched into space from Kazakhstan, on a mission to capture space junk, as reported by NPR.**