## 1

#### The aff’s analysis of COVID and the pandemic itself is fundamentally flawed, one that insists on its own understanding of the totality of the world; X harms lead to Y terminal impacts, and at worst, conclusions are predicated upon risk.

Beauchamp 20

Nothing Comes Easy These Days Scott Beauchamp (Scott Beauchamp is a United States veteran who was deployed twice to Iraq. His work has appeared in The Paris Review, The Atlantic, Rolling Stone, Bookforum, The Washington Post, The Guardian, and The Brooklyn Rail, among others. He lives in Bath, Maine, USA. ) <https://www.splicetoday.com/writing/nothing-comes-easy-these-days> MAR 20, 2020, 06:27AM////(\*ak)

It’s difficult to write an introductory paragraph these days. Nearly everything published is written in the same key, or at least riffs in the same mode. Every piece begins with either boredom or anxiety before fanning out into effluvial waves of tight-knuckled self-pity. Isolation. Dread. Waiting out the storm. Crafting tips to kill time while you self-quarantine. Spreadsheets listing indoor activity suggestions. Poetry written from the perspective of the virus itself so terrible that it makes you want to lick doorknobs. But I think this is normal, just made slightly more lurid by what might be the accelerated collapse of a terminal health care system. Society was already in a chemically-induced coma, awaiting organ shutdown. You were already lonely, even on your cruise. You were already bored with your life. Now, without the frenetic escapism of a strip-mall culture to distract you, you have to stare it in the eyes. Hunker down for the deep trip. This isn’t a time of exception. This is life itself. Or not. The unpleasant dream could end tomorrow, and all the cruises and concerts could be back on. You could be back at brunch before no time, lifting up the hem of your skirt to wade through all the beautiful inanities of everyday life that you’d missed so much. That’s one of the anxiety-inducing qualities of the situation—so much is unknown. And it’s also the most overlooked and underplayed aspect of the pandemic. Civilization has come into contact with an alien entity, and it’s difficult, if not impossible, to predict how things will play out. We won’t ever fully comprehend the virus in its total depth, in the same way and for the same reasons that we won’t fully be able to “apprehend” anything. A useful guide for understanding what I’m saying here are the basic tenets of what’s known was Object-Oriented Ontology, or OOO (pronounced triple oh). “Reality is always radically different from our formulation of it,” writes one of the leading proponents of OOO, philosopher Graham Harman, in his book Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything. What he means, drawing from both Kant and Heidegger, is that objects have an autonomous existence outside of our perceptions or uses of the object, and the identity of that object (called the Real Object in OOO) is constantly retreating from us, always elusive. As Harman explains, “The real orange or lemon is no more accessible to my human perception that it is to a mosquito or dog, whose organs translate the fruits differently into their own types of experience. In this respect, all of the objects we experience are merely fictions: simplified models of the far more complex objects that continue to exist when I turn my head away from them, not to mention when I sleep or die.” And so it is with the virus. And the lemon. And with you and me and the laptop which I’m typing on. We interact with Real Objects through modes of sensuality, using metaphors in which the ineffable nature of our own selves and imagination “stand in” for the deeper identities of the objects we’re considering. I recognize the autonomy of the wine-dark sea because I, in some way, essentialize that autonomy within myself. Or in the words of the Spanish philosopher and writer Ortega y Gassett, “Every objective image, on entering or leaving our consciousness, produces a subjective reaction—just as a bird that lights on or leaves a branch starts it trembling, or turning on or off an electric current instantly produces a new current.” Harman, again, elaborates on that thought: “In other words, even though every image we encounter gives us just an outline or shadow of the inwardness of the thing itself, I myself am fully invested in all these experiences, and inwardly invested rather than just as a shadow or outline myself. I am the sole real object in all experience, encountering any number of sensual things, though the tension between these sensual and real poles becomes explicit only in art and a limited number of cases.” I’d argue that a pandemic is one of the limited numbers of other cases. Another instance, and one useful for spending time during quarantine (add it to your spreadsheet), is the [“Unexplained Sounds”](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unexplained_sounds) page on Wikipedia. Because it’s curated and altered—the sounds are sped up by a factor of 20 to make them audible to the human ear—you might be tempted to argue that it’s a kind of art. Unexplained Sounds themselves are just that. Noises we don’t know the causes of. And so in OOO terminology they’re like sensual objects radically unmoored from both their causes and Real Object sources. The footprints of animals we’ve documented before. There’s the Upsweep, a seasonally-occuring “long train of narrow-band upsweeping sounds of several seconds in duration each ″ which can be detected, with the right equipment throughout the entire Pacific Ocean. And The Hum, a “name often given to widespread reports of a persistent and invasive low-frequency humming, rumbling, or droning noise not audible to all people.” Particularly prevalent in Taos, Bristol, and Windsor, for some reason. And then my favorite and probably the most famous, the Havana Syndrome, in which American embassy staff members heard an odd grinding sound, followed by a series of mysterious ailments such as headaches, nausea, and memory loss. We can, in OOO lingo, undermine the noises by describing their constituent parts and saying “this is what they are,” the way we might define water by its molecular composition. And we can overmine them by defining them totally through their effects. But either method leaves us haunted by the unsettled spirit of the real object, hidden in the folds of the mystery. The virus works the same way. In trying desperately to define it through the boredom or anxiety it causes, we only feed a hungry tautology of emotion. When we try to define it in completely biomedical terms, something vast and important about the virus slips away from us. Harman, I think, would have us come at it obliquely, the same way we’d try to understand a poem or a painting. All the other stuff matters, background and facts and context, but the virus has a life of its own outside of our attempts at literalization. We can’t see that life directly. We can only see it reflected off the unique and autonomous life within ourselves. And this is really what we’re forced to reckon with in our time of isolation. Our own unexplained sounds.

#### Objects like the virus and vaccine are productive of reality, however solipsistic and centralized understandings of subjectivity and human politic generate violence

Shaw and Meehan 13 (Ian and Katharine, Professors at The University of Glasgow and University of Oregon in their Geography Departments. “Force-full: power, politics and object-oriented philosophy”. //lilith)

From aerial drones to border fences, from peace treaties to infectious diseases, objects have always been pivots for political inquiry. In recent years, however, objects have increasingly become the ontological and analytical starting points for a range of scholarly fields: from actornetwork theory (ANT) and science and technology studies (STS) (Latour 2005; Law 2002) to the ‘more-than-human’ (Whatmore 2002) and ‘more-than-representational’ (Lorimer 2005) turns in our own discipline of geography. While these engagements beckon us toward the ‘things themselves’ (Heidegger 2010, 50), they also raise questions as to how and why objects matter politically. If we see the world as ‘a series of negotiations between a motley armada of forces’ (Harman 2009, 13), a world in which humans and nonhumans confront each other in an ontological tussle that is as cosmic as it is banal, then what new insights emerge for understanding power and politics? Our goal in this paper is to explain why objects are both productive of reality and politically important. Drawing on object-oriented philosophy (OOP), and Graham Harman in particular, we explore the political nature of objects by examining how they unleash forces ‘capable of creating, policing, and destroying the very contours of existence’ (Shaw 2012, 613). It may seem odd, even heretical, to place so much faith in objects, especially given their secondary status in philosophy. ‘Things’ too have had a rough time in philosophical inquiry (Bogost 2012, 24). Ever since Plato, objects have been cast down from the heavens. Kant understood their existence only as they appear in transcendental apperception. Even Heidegger, himself critical of the Kantian subject (Heidegger 2010, 194–201), thought that only humans could comprehend being. The problems of such ‘species solipsism’ or ‘correlationism’ (Meillassoux 2008) are legion. Not only does ‘the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter feed human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption’ (Bennett 2010, IX), it restricts political possibilities and occludes battle lines to conscious reflection. Object-oriented philosophy challenges the dominion of human-centred thought by exploring the ‘the metaphysical way in which objects are joined or pieced together’ (Harman 2005, 2). Such an approach is not mere theoretical fancydance: we maintain that redrawing the parameters of an all-too-human metaphysics is a political act and one that inevitably puts pressure on the status quo – those dominant forces such as the ‘state’ vested in defining and defending what the world is (Meehan et al. forthcoming). As such, we define power as the ability to ‘police’ (Rancière 2004a 2004b) the appearance and distribution of objects in a world. The notion that objects are involved in the service of power is increasingly resonant in geography today (Braun and Whatmore 2010; Latham and McCormack 2004). This engagement runs parallel with a political ecology tradition that writes against apolitical explanations of the environment (Robbins 2004). Take, for example, the steam-powered trains that conjured new, industrial apprehensions of time and space to the popular imaginary (Schivelbusch 1986); the pet dogs that disrupt seemingly ‘human’ categories of society, family and citizen (Haraway 2008); the tiny mosquitoes that condition disease governance and vector control (Shaw et al. 2010); or the heavy water molecules that make processes of commodification particularly sticky (Bakker 2005). Y

#### That restriction of ethical possibility and more specifically the subject/object binary creates an epistemic skew resulting in unethical endpoints.

Weston 09

Weston, Anthony. “The Incompleat Ecophilosopher.” SUNY. January 15, 2009. Web. December 10, 2020. <https://www.sunypress.edu/p-4715-the-incompleat-eco-philosopher.aspx>.

If the world is a collection of more or less fixed facts to which we must respond, then the task of ethics is to systematize and unify our responses. This is the expected view, once again so taken for granted as to scarcely even appear as a “view” at all. Epistemology is prior to ethics. Responding to the world follows upon knowing it—and what could be more sensible or responsible than that? If the world is not “given,” though—if the world is what it seems to be in part because we have made it that way, as I have been suggesting, and if therefore the process of inviting its further possibilities into the light is funda- mental to ethics itself—then our very knowledge of the world, of the possibilities of other animals and the land and even ourselves in relation to them, follows upon “invitation,” and ethics must come fi rst. Ethics is prior to epistemology—or, as Cheney and I do not say in the paper but probably should have said, what really emerges is another kind of epistemology—”etiquette,” in our specifi c sense, as epistemology. But then of course we are also speaking of something sharply different from “ethics” as usually understood. We are asked not for a set of well-defended general moral commitments in advance, but rather for something more visceral and instinctual, a mode of comportment more than a mode of commitment, more fleshy and more vulnerable. Etiquette so understood requires us to take risks, to offer trust before we know whether or how the offer will be received, and to move with awareness, civility, and grace in a world we understand to be capable of response. Thus Cheney and I conclude that ethical action itself must be “first and foremost an attempt to open up possibilities, to enrich the world” rather than primarily an attempt to respond to the world as already known. Cheney, true to his nature, also takes the argument on a more strenuous path, exploring indigenous views of ceremony and ritual. Once again the question of epistemology turns out to be central. Euro-Americans, Cheney says, want to know what beliefs are encoded in the utterances of indigenous peoples. We treat their utterances as propositional representations of Indigenous worlds. But what if these utterances function, instead, primarily to produce these worlds? Cheney cites the indigenous scholar Sam Gill on the fundamentally performa- tive function of language.

#### The limiting of object possibility, reduction, and devaluation is the root cause to all forms of violence, the affirmative reifies this through an ethics of things

Introna 09

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In the ethics of hybrids our ethical relationship with things is determined beforehand by us, it is anthropocentric. In this encounter with things we have already chosen, or presumed, the framework of values that will count in determining moral significance. In this ethics, things are always and already ‘things-for-us’ – objects for our use, in our terms, for our purposes. They are always inscribed with our intentionality – they carry it in their flesh, as it were. The defining measure of the ethics of hybrids is the human being – the meaning of the Latin root of ‘man’ is measure. Indeed our concern for things is what they might do to us humans, as was suggested above. Our concern is not our instrumental use of them, the violence of our inscriptions in/on them, but that such scripts may ultimately harm us. As things-for-us, or ‘objects’ as we will refer to them, they have no moral significance as such. In the value hierarchy of the modern ethical mind they are very far down the value line. What could be less morally significant than an inanimate object? Their moral significance is only a derivative of the way they may circulate the network as inscriptions for utility or enrolment. For example, they may become valuable if they can be sold in a market where they are valued, as is the case with works of art. The magnitude and diversity of our projects are mirrored in the magnitude and diversity of the objects that surround us. As things-for-us they are at our disposal – if they fail to be useful, or when our projects drift or shift, we ‘dump’ them. Images of endless ‘scrap’ heaps at the edges of our cities abound. Objects are made/inscribed, used and finally dumped. We can dispose of them because we author-ized them in the first place. Increasingly we design them in such a way that we can dispose of them as effortlessly as possible. Ideally, their demise must be as invisible as possible. Their entire moral claim on our conscience is naught, it seems. One can legitimately ask why should we concern ourselves with things in a world where the ethical landscape is already overcrowded with grave and pressing matters such as untold human suffering, disappearing bio-diversity and ozone layers – to name but a few. It is our argument that our moral indifference to so many supposedly significant beings (humans, animals, nature, etc.) starts with the idea that there are some beings that are less significant or not significant at all. More originally it starts with a metaphysics that has as its centre – the ultimate measure – us human beings – a metaphysics which has been at the heart of Western philosophy ever since Plato (Heidegger, 1977a). Thus, when we start our moral ordering we tend to value more highly things like us (sentient, organic/natural, alive, etc.) and less highly, or not at all, things most alien to us (non-sentient, synthetic/artificial, inanimate, etc.). It is our argument that one of the reasons why this anthropocentric ethics of things fails is because it assumes that we can, both in principle and in practice, draw a definitive boundary between the objects (them) and us. Social studies of science and technology have thrown severe doubt on such a possibility. If it is increasingly difficult to draw the boundary between our objects and us, and if in this entangled network of humans and non-humans objects lack moral significance from the start, then it is rather a small step to take for an ethics to emerge in which all things – human and non-human alike – circulate as objects: ‘things-for-the-purposes-of’ the network. In ordering society as assemblages of humans and objects we ultimately also become ordered as a ‘for-the-purposes-of’. Thus, the irony of an anthropocentric ethics of things is that ultimately we also become ‘objects’ in programmes and scripts, at the disposal of a higher logic (capital, state, community, environment, etc.). In the network, others and our objects ‘objectify’ us. For example, I cannot get my money out from the bank machine because I forgot my PIN number. Until I identify myself in its terms (as a five digit number) I am of no significance to it. Equally, if I cannot prove my identity by presenting inscribed objects (passport, drivers licence) I cannot get a new PIN number. In Heidegger’s (1977b) words we have all become ‘standing reserve’, on ‘stand by’ for the purposes of the network – enframed (Gestell) by the calculative logic of our way of being. Enframed in a global network that has as its logic to control, manipulate and dominate: ‘Enframing is the gathering together which belongs to that setting-upon which challenges [hu]man and puts him in position to reveal the actual, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve’ (Heidegger, 1977a: 305). The value hierarchy presumed in an anthropocentric ethics is in fact a dynamic network of values and interests – there never was a hierarchy. The fate of our objects becomes our fate. In the ethics of hybrids we are also already objects – indeed everything is already object. Instead of a hierarchy of values we find a complete nihilism in which everything is leveled out, everything is potentially equally valuable/valueless; a nihilistic network in which ‘the highest values devaluate themselves’ (Nietzsche, 1967: 9). If this is so, then we would argue that we should not ‘extend’ our moral consideration to other things, such as inanimate objects – in a similar manner that we have done for animals and other living things, in environmental ethics for example. In other words we should not simply extend the reach of what is considered morally significant to include more things. Rather, we should abandon all systems of moral valuing and admit, with Heidegger, that in ‘the characterisation of something as “a value” what is so valued is robbed of its worth’ and admit that ‘what a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form of value’, furthermore, that ‘every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivising’ (Heidegger, 1977a: 228). We must abandon ethics for a clearing beyond ethics – to let beings be in their own terms. We must admit that any attempt at humanistic moral ordering – be it egocentric, anthropocentric, biocentric (Goodpaster, 1978; Singer, 1975) or even ecocentric (Leopold, 1966; Naess, 1995) – will fail. Any ethics based on us will eventually turn everything into our image, pure will to power (Heidegger, 1977a, 1977b). As Lingis (1994: 9) suggests: ‘The man-made species we are, which produces its own nature in an environment it produces, finds nothing within itself that is alien to itself, opaque and impervious to its own understanding’ (emphasis added). Instead of creating value systems in our own image, the absolute otherness of every other should be the only moral imperative. We need an ethics of things that is beyond the self-identical-ness of human beings. Such an ethics beyond metaphysics needs as its ‘ground’ not a system for comparison, but rather a recognition of the impossibility of any comparison – every comparison is already violent in its attempt to render equal what could never be equal (Levinas, 1991 [1974]). How might we encounter the other in its otherness? Levinas (1991 [1974], 1996, 1999) has argued for the radical singularity of our fellow human beings. But what about all other others? In the next section we will argue that Heidegger, especially as presented in the work of Harman (2002, 2005), might provide us with some hints towards the overcoming of ethics, towards an ethos of letting-be of all beings.

#### The alternative is embracing an object oriented philosophy that reorients our examination of objects and the world itself

Iovino 20

Hyperobject COVID-19 http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2020/05/hyperobject-covid-19/ Written by: Serenella Iovino (Serenella Iovino is an Italian cultural and literary theorist, and a professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She is considered one of the main environmental philosophers of Italy. ) | May 14th, 2020 ///(\*ak)

The coronavirus has enormous revelatory power. All at once, it has disclosed issues of social justice and biopolitics, biodiversity and violence, scientific research and global economy. This power, however, involves a risk: focusing exclusively on the virus, people (and governments) might end up neglecting other key issues, first of all climate change. This is a risk that we cannot afford: the coronavirus, in fact, is not the ultimate catastrophe but one chapter in a bigger narrative of interconnected phenomena. It’s crucial to find a way to see the current emergency while also minding the future calamities that are incubating in our present. The environmental humanities offer several ways to respond to this challenge. My proposal is to think the pandemic as a very particular object: a hyperobject. In this, I follow an ontological theory elaborated a few years ago by philosopher Timothy Morton in one of his numerous books. What are hyperobjects? Unlike the objects of rationalist ontology that we usually picture as existing in a precise space and time (e.g. the tree outside my window now), hyperobjects are “things that are massively distributed in time and space relative to humans.” Take, for example, the solar system, the biosphere, or the sum total of all the planet’s nuclear materials: to tell exactly where and when they are located is as problematic as to define what we mean by “they.” “Massively distributed” does not necessarily mean gigantic: even a polystyrene cup, according to Morton, is a hyperobject. It might be on our table now; yet, it is also “massively distributed” in the future and across the planet in the shape of the myriads of microplastics transiting through our dumping sites, oceans, and bodies. Polystyrene cups aside, the most iconic hyperobject is global warming. Melting glaciers, rising seas, atmospheric currents, extreme weather events, droughts, fires, ocean acidification… they are not single phenomena but rather an “object” that is “massively distributed” in time (stretching from the industrial revolution to the next centuries) and space (infiltrating every corner of the earth). And this hyperobject is of course interlaced with all of its causes and effects: greenhouse gases, polluting emissions, rampant capitalism, unsustainable lifestyles, poverty, illnesses, migrations… Seen in this light, the COVID-19 pandemic is a hyperobject, too. It is a “massive thing” constituted by the sum total of all the coronaviruses hidden in the body of each individual person, bat, pangolin, or wild animal. It dwells in the globe’s forests and hospitals, Asian wet markets and scientific labs, saliva droplets and particulate matter that act as viral carriers. Its temporality is also multiple: it’s the slow time of evolution and the fast time of multiplying cells, the time of quiescence and the time of contagion, the time of illness and that of immunity. Finally, this hyperobject also contains its causes and effects: destroyed habitats, shrinking biodiversity, decades of neoliberal economy, the industrial, commercial, and biopolitical maps of globalization, locked-down cities, solitary deaths, billions of irretrievably lost hugs. In this entangled web, “here” and “there” are closer than they appear, and the present always already overlaps with the future. From this perspective, a medical mask, too, is a hyperobject. One of the features of hyperobjects is that they are viscous. They are attached to one another and are not easy to separate. It is for this reason that the pandemic hyperobject is powerfully connected to the climate change hyperobject. These two massive entities have many features in common: for example, their relationships to the impact of human activities on ecosystems and the planetary cycles, their proximity to political discourses and their material effects on people and nonhuman life. Combined, they can be scary: scientists believe that rising temperatures might free pathogens that have been trapped in the permafrost for millennia. Many tropical viruses are already thriving and spreading due to warmer climates. Perhaps this theory is just a mind game, or perhaps it isn’t. Still, its approach is telling us something important: we cannot face the coronavirus crisis while keeping the planetary ecological crises out of the picture. When the COVID-19 emergency is over, there will be no excuses for tackling those crises. If we can see the pandemic as a hyperobject, we can also see everything else.

## 2

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must disclose the AC Opensource (tags, citations, full text evidence, analytics). The disclosure must occur within 30 minutes of the round through email or wiki.

#### Violation: We asked you for the aff and you said it’s new but didn’t opensource the UV or the actual aff itself

Text

Description automatically generated

#### Net Benefits/Standards:

#### 1] Accessibility: Literature bases are blanketed by paywall, i.e. JSTOR and WSJ. Open source means debaters grap the crux of arguments that first three last three disclosure can never allow. Also small schools can see how circuit debate operates as opposed to being massively outclassed by prep scouts and increasingly unfamiliar strategies.

#### 2] Argument quality: plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot affs with fringe authors and shoddy solvency. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, the case should lose. They had a month to prep – the neg is entitled to some research time to make sure the AFF is inherent, topical, and controversial. Otherwise bad AFF’s can win on purely surprise factor, which is a bad model b/c it encourages finding the most fringe surprising case possible instead of a well researched and defensible aff.

#### 3] Nuanced Clash: they pigeonhole the neg into generics like Theory and Ks every single round since I don’t have any other prep that can apply to hyperspecfic affs. That leads to shallow repetitive debates: in a world where I have an hour to look at the solvency advocate, I can think out a case-specific strategy, cut some case answers, and read your articles to understand the warrants more thoroughly, which leads to more nuanced, in-depth debates.

#### 4] Prep skew: Unbroken advocacies are unpredictable because they can spec a small part of the resolution or run a K aff making it impossible to know what to prep, the neg has to prep every single advocacy to have a shot at engaging whereas the aff only has to prep one, creating a massive prep skew. Turns aff flex, even if affirming is harder, you shouldn’t be able to eliminate 99 percent of neg prep.

#### 1. Fairness is a voter: A] unfair debate prevents us from fully evaluating the integrity of an argument, that stops check backs against things like subtle racism B] it’s the i/l to every other voter because fairness is a meta constraint on our ability to evaluate any truth claims, therefore it comes first.

#### 2. Education is a voter: A] it’s the sole focus of the activity and only inherent benefit B] it’s the reason schools fund debate, no education means no debate

#### 3. Accessibility is a voter: A] performative skews o/w on lexicality since inaccessible methods prevent debaters from debating their best or at all B] Access is a prerequisite, we can’t evaluate which arguments are actually true if we limit who can argue against them, that leads to things like ableism going unquestioned in the space

#### DTD- 1) theory can’t be solely defense otherwise the incentive structure makes abuse inevitable because theres little to no risk 2) debaters already kick arguments 3) Their lack of disclosure makes substance irreparable b/c our entire argument is that we did not have a basis to engage the aff to begin with 4) Drop the arg means they lose since they lose their entire advocacy and cannot have offense.

#### NC theory first—AC skewed NC first so it o/w on lexicality

#### Reject Aff Fairness Concerns- They have/had infinite prep to stake out their model of debate, warping how their model ought to be evaluated skews accountability measures and is shifty, consider them incoherent at best

#### Neg Flex- we have to be reactive so an aff that stifles our ability to formulate a NC strategy worsens the infinite prep vs 30 minute prep skew. Thus,

#### No aff RVIs because (a) Baiting—they’ll just bait theory and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse and results in a chilling effect (b) they’re illogical because fairness is a burden- logic first because it allows for evaluation c) 1AR all-outs—they’ll collapse entirely to theory which crowds out substance and kills education

#### If they win aff RVIs, no 1ar theory, but if so, reasonability on all aff theory—otherwise they bait theory and split the 2nr to collapse on the most undercovered point, destroys fairness and nuanced clash because just 2 shells create a 3-3 response split for 2nr which is lets the aff autowin off prewritten extensions and skewing the neg already.

#### 2n responses and shells to theory and spikes—deters aff blipstorm and 2ar explosion which destroys nuanced clash and 1NC coverage ability.

## 3

#### Dollar centrality high now

Watts 6/21

Watts, William. “Why the U.S. Dollar Is Soaring - and What's next - AFTER Fed's Change in Tone.” MarketWatch, MarketWatch, 17 June 2021, [www.marketwatch.com/story/soaring-u-s-dollar-sparks-forex-market-rethink-after-fed-shifts-tone-11623955943. //](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/soaring-u-s-dollar-sparks-forex-market-rethink-after-fed-shifts-tone-11623955943.%20//) Phoenix

The U.S. dollar was on fire Thursday, extending gains a day after an unexpected shift in the Federal Reserve’s inflation and interest-rate outlook and raising doubts about the consensus view for a weaker currency in 2021.

“Up until yesterday the market consensus was pointing to a moderately softer value of the DXY dollar index over the course of the coming 2 quarters,” said Jane Foley, senior FX strategist at Rabobank, in a note. “The price activity in the USD (U.S. dollar) crosses today suggests that a revaluation of positioning is currently taking place.”

The ICE U.S. Dollar Index [DXY, 0.03%](https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/index/DXY?mod=MW_story_quote), a measure of the currency against a basket of six major rivals, was up 0.9% at 91.94 Thursday afternoon, after trading at its highest since April 13. The dollar is building on a surge versus major rivals scored on Wednesday, after Fed policy makers penciled in [two rate hikes by the end of 2023](https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-now-sees-two-interes-trate-hikes-in-2023-11623866824?mod=mw_latestnews) and discussed the eventual tapering of the central bank’s asset buying program.

#### IPR is key for U.S Dollar Centrality – it allows US firms near if not complete monopolies pushing dollars into international markets and stabilizing US financial influence

Schwartz ‘19

Schwartz, Herman Mark (2019). American hegemony: intellectual property rights, dollar centrality, and infrastructural power. Review of International Political Economy, (), 1–30. doi:10.1080/09692290.2019.1597754 // Phoenix

Mechanism one relates to Strange’s (1989) financial power: US current account deficits generate the dollar centrality that network analyses reveal through self-reinforcing dynamics prior to the network. US current account deficits result from deep seated domestic institutional arrangements in current account surplus economies that produce chronic domestic demand shortfalls. The more those export-led economies run surpluses with the United States, the more dollars they accumulate; the more dollars they accumulate, the more dollars flow through their banking systems back into dollar assets and liabilities; the more dollar assets and liabilities those banks hold on their balance sheets, the more those banks both rely on the Federal Reserve Bank (FED) as a lender of last resort or a supplier of outside money during (the inevitable) crises, and the more their staff develop habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) or the routinized behaviors at the heart of infrastructural power (Mann, 1986) that support continued use of the dollar in non-crisis times; the more those banks lend in dollars, the more counterparty debtor economies are drawn into use of the dollar; a parallel habitus emerges among export firms that reinforces use of the dollar in a Hirschman (1945)-like dynamic. If suppliers (or debtors) are borrowing those recycled dollars, they will demand payment in dollars to meet their liabilities. Contemporary late developers similarly need export markets to grow, and the United States constitutes both the biggest import market and biggest net importer in the global economy (netting intra-EU trade). This mechanism originates from institutional responses to the problem of late development and not, via lower transaction costs, the emergent network of dollar claims and liabilities itself. That said, surely dollar acceptability faces limits set by persistent US current account deficits? Prudent actors might well balk at accepting more assets denominated in a currency at risk of sustained depreciation (Bergsten & Williamson, 2004). Indeed, the 1960s Triffin dilemma pitted declining confidence about the dollar as a store of value given rising US inflation rates and a declining productivity gap between the United States and its main competitors against the need for global liquidity supplied by a US current account deficit. Today, as Eichengreen (2010) has argued, centrality for the dollar faces a similar collective action problem among holders of dollar-denominated assets – why do US current account deficits not motivate individual countries with relatively smaller dollar holdings to defect for fear of depreciation or capital losses? In today’s flexible exchange rate world, only above average US economic growth and/or profits for the firms constituting the bulk of equity market capitalization validates confidence in dollar assets. Because economic activity is organized through capitalist markets, the critical issue for differential growth (Nitzan, 1998) and asset validation is always: ‘who gets the profits and in what proportion’? Mechanism two is thus about profits, which corresponds to Strange’s (1989) productive power. US firms capture a disproportionate share of global profits, and within this firms with robust intellectual property rights (IPRs – patent, copyright brand and trademark) capture a disproportionate share of US and global profits. Here compliance with international trade treaties protecting IPRs is the focal point or center of gravity for this disproportionality. IPRs give some US firms monopoly or near monopoly power in the global (and local) commodity chains they construct. The extension of US IPR law through various trade treaties (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2003; Sell, 2003; Sell & Prakash, 2004) allows US IPR firms to capture a disproportionate share of global profits via that monopoly power. This shifts claims on value added towards those firms, concentrating profits into a small number of US firms. Though we explore this below in more depth, US firms account for a disproportionate 33.9% of cumulative profits generated by any firm appearing on the Forbes Global 2000 list from 2006 to 2018 and firms in sectors characterized by robust IPRs account for a disproportionate 26.6% of those profits. Profitability thus also rests on infrastructural power, via compliance with trade treaties and enmeshment in global value chains orchestrated by US firms. As with bank behavior, this compliance is not purely voluntary (Gruber, 2000), but rather reflects a gradient in which mutually beneficial cooperation shades into coercion as the proportion of local firms benefiting from those treaties declines. US firms are not the only ones that possess marketable intellectual property. Non-US firms that also benefit from robust global IPRs broaden the global political coalition for creating and expanding those IPRs. Yet US firms tend to control the commodity chains in which those foreign firms participate. These two mechanisms are connected: the first explains why non-US actors receive dollars (more precisely, dollar-denominated assets) and the second explains why they opt to hold those assets; put differently, the supply of and demand for dollars. The two mechanisms transform the exorbitant burden – current account deficits associated with use of the dollar as the international reserve currency – back into an exorbitant privilege. They represent a transfer of real resources back to the US economy in exchange for promises to pay back something in the future. Finally, though we will not explore this in depth, these two mechanisms are also linked to the military side of US power, where a similar logic of dominance over potential peer rivals has driven science policy and technological innovation. Put bluntly, a military-innovation complex (c.f. Eisenhower’s military-industrial complex (Hozic, 1999; Hurt, 2010; Mazzucato, 2015; Weiss, 2014)) is the research foundation for the high profit US IPR firms that in turn feed a substantial portion of cash back into the IMS. As with all such systems of power, these structural strengths contain endogenously generated weaknesses and face on-going challenges from the less powerful. Financialization and profit strategies built on IPRs endogenously produce income inequality among firms and people, which erodes compliance, potentially slows growth and destabilizes the global financial system. Domestically, the current account deficits necessary for a dollar-centric IMS (Germain & Schwartz, 2014) generated part of the anger motivating the populist voting bloc that elected Trump. In turn, the Trump Administration’s erratic trade policy, its assaults on parts of the military-innovation complex, and, most significantly, its efforts to eviscerate financial regulation simultaneously threaten the dollar’s role in the IMS and US firms’ ability to capture global profits.3 The Trump administration is one logical consequence of current account deficits that have hollowed out manufacturing employment and limited upward mobility to a narrow slice of the US population. The paper thus has four sections corresponding to the issues: Why does infrastructural power matter? Why the IMS? Why IPRs? The conclusion considers critical endogenous sources of decay.

#### Dollar centrality is the backbone of heg – it creates dependency, allows the U.S to fund the military and bypasses policy trade offs

Costigan ‘17

Thomas Costigan, Drew Cottle, & Angela Keys. (2017). The US Dollar as the Global Reserve Currency: Implications for US Hegemony. World Review of Political Economy, 8(1), 104. doi:10.13169/worlrevipoliecon.8.1.0104 Lindale PP

This article contends that the dollar as the global reserve currency has been crucial to the operations of US hegemony during the post-World War II period. To investigate this issue, the theoretical perspective of World-Systems Analysis expounded by Immanuel Wallerstein (2011) is employed. The article also draws upon the theoretical work of Henry C.K. Liu who developed the term “US dollar hegemony” (Liu 2002). In this article, we argue that US planners from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in conjunction with State Department officials pursued a deliberate plan to make the United States a global hegemonic power (Shoup and Minter 1977) and the dollar was the central currency of that hegemony (Engdahl 2008, 213). We demonstrate how the dollar evolved into a petro-currency through Nixon’s Saudi decision of 1973. The dollar was placed on the trajectory that it would follow for decades and became the source of conflict against the United States by its geo-political competitors (Durden 2014). We conclude by arguing that newly emerging strategic competitors to US hegemony such as China, Russia and Iran are growing dissatisfied with the current oil trading arrangements. We do not argue that any of these nations are remotely in contention to replace the United States as world hegemon. However, we suggest that a significant blow could be dealt to the ability of the United States to maintain its hegemonic status should oil trading be carried out in currencies other than the dollar (Koenig 2015). If this were to occur to a large enough extent, the ability of the United States to exercise its foreign policy would be severely curtailed (National Intelligence Council [NIC] 2012). It would also demonstrate the critical importance of the US dollar in the exercise of US hegemony. In this article, we would like to move the dollar to the forefront of debate in understating how US hegemony in the postWorld War II period is constructed and maintained and its critical importance in a hegemonic US global agenda. The post-World War II era represented a radical paradigm shift in US foreign policy. This policy shift was defined by the “Grand Area” concept developed by the CFR in conjunction with planners from the US State Department. This programme saw the United States pursue a global hegemonic project (Shoup 1975). This pursuit was economic in nature; it would require binding together disparate regions of the world into a financial system that would centre upon, and serve the interests of, the US economy (Shoup and Minter 1977). US imperialism was the result of extensive planning on the part of the US government (Panitch and Gindin 2012, 72). The Bretton Woods Conference held in 1944 was the forum where a US-centric world system was instituted. The systems, institutions and arrangements that facilitate US hegemony were established at the Bretton Woods Conference. The most critical of these components for the functioning of US hegemony were the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the adoption of the US dollar as the global reserve currency, and the “pegging” of the US dollar to the gold standard (Vasudevan 2008, 35). The Bretton Woods Conference instituted a world system where the US dollar was at the centre of the global economy; the value of a nation’s currency was determined in relation to the US dollar, and “most international transactions were denominated in dollars” (Engdahl 2008). The Grand Area strategy pursued by the United States was intended to defend US national interests in the aftermath of World War II. Those national interests were, in fact, US elite and corporate interests (Shoup and Minter 1977). After World War II, the United States designed a liberal international system in which it would be the primary beneficiary (Mastanduno 2009). Economics and security became inseparably linked for the United States, and the dollar was the core of this new paradigm. According to Mastanduno, as the global reserve currency, the US dollar became the “lynchpin” of Trans-Atlantic and TransPacific trade: This critical role for the dollar granted a well-understood privilege to U.S. policymakers. As long as other governments proved willing to hold dollars, U.S. external deficits could be financed essentially by printing money and lending it abroad, enabling the United States to pursue a variety of foreign and domestic policy objectives without necessarily confronting difficult trade-offs in the short term.

#### Hegemony is a sustainable method to disincentivize great power war and escalation -- absent that, power vacuums cause nuclear prolif, arms races and extinction.

Brands, 15 [Hal Brands, on the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University, “The Elliott School of International Affairs,” The Washington Quarterly Summer, 2015, 38:2 pp. 7–28] rc//Townes rc again// Phoenix

The fundamental reason is that both U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly interwoven with a robust U.S. forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies’ policies.43 During the Cold War and after, for instance, the United States has used the influence provided by its security posture to veto allies’ pursuit of nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in financial and trade agreements, and even to affect the composition of allied nations’ governments.44 More broadly, it has used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas in key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear, this influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable standard of comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war order. As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent decades is not something that has occurred naturally. It has occurred because the “American pacifier” has suppressed precisely the dynamics that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited arms races and security competitions by providing the protection that allows other countries to under-build their militaries. It has soothed historical rivalries by affording a climate of security in which powerful countries like Germany and Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving and fairly cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and dissuading other destabilizing behavior. As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United States “effectively acts as a night watchman,” lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.45 What would happen if Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence and global stability would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively be surrendering the most powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing the position of leadership it has used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The consequences would seem no less damaging where stability is concerned. As offshore balancers have argued, it may be that U.S. retrenchment would force local powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries that feel threatened or encircled by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that removing the American pacifier would liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled. Long-dormant security competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously; historical antagonisms between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust U.S. presence and the reassurance it provides. Moreover, countries that seek to revise existing regional orders in their favor—think Russia in Europe, or China in Asia—might indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they might just as plausibly feel empowered to more assertively press their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges, then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble.”46 Scanning the global horizon today, one can easily see where such trouble might arise. In Europe, a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East, the threat of Iranian ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of an incipient arms race, even as that region also contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of the Islamic State. In East Asia, a rising China is challenging the regional status quo in numerous ways, sounding alarms among its neighbors—many of whom also have historical grievances against each other. In these circumstances, removing the American pacifier would likely yield not low-cost stability, but increased conflict and upheaval. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, would be quite damaging to U.S. interests even if it did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that increased instability and acrimony would produce the robust multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with transnational threats from pandemics to piracy. More problematic still might be the economic consequences. As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous progress toward global prosperity and integration that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold War) has come in the climate of relative stability and security provided largely by the United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical competition in regions of enormous importance to the world economy. Perhaps the greatest risk that a strategy of offshore balancing would run, of course, is that a key region might not be able to maintain its own balance following U.S. retrenchment. That prospect might have seemed far-fetched in the early post-Cold War era, and it remains unlikely in the immediate future. But in East Asia particularly, the rise and growing assertiveness of China has highlighted the medium- to long-term danger that a hostile power could in fact gain regional primacy. If China’s economy continues to grow rapidly, and if Beijing continues to increase military spending by 10 percent or more each year, then its neighbors will ultimately face grave challenges in containing Chinese power even if they join forces in that endeavor. This possibility, ironically, is one to which leading advocates of retrenchment have been attuned. “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China,” Mearshimer writes, “because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”48 If this is true, however, then offshore balancing becomes a dangerous and potentially self-defeating strategy. As mentioned above, it could lead countries like Japan and South Korea to seek nuclear weapons, thereby stoking arms races and elevating regional tensions. Alternatively, and perhaps more worryingly, it might encourage the scenario that offshore balancers seek to avoid, by easing China’s ascent to regional hegemony. As Robert Gilpin has written, “Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on relations with allies and rivals.”49 In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.50 In the same vein, retrenchment would compromise alliance relationships, basing agreements, and other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first place—and that would allow the United States to surge additional forces into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will be unable to counter China themselves, then reducing U.S. influence and leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might promise to preserve a stable and advantageous environment while reducing U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the probable outcomes of the strategy seem more perilous and destabilizing than its proponents acknowledge.

# Case

#### Condologic or 4 point in the trix section promotes violation of consent i.e. yes = no rhetoric is traumatic for debaters and pushes them out of the space and enacts psychological violence, independent voter on safety which is highest layer because absent debate about it, we know violation of things like sexual consent are bad.

#### Overview

**1] Reject spikes that aren’t on top- it means I have to wait for the 1ac to finish to formulate a strategy since I don’t know what your going to read which moots 6 min of prep**

**2] Reject Spikes that weren’t disclosed- prevents us from rigorously testing your norm and incentivizes surprise tactics**

**3] Reject under views—one small theory analytic can take out huge chunks of the 1nc which kills substantive clash**

**4] New 2NR Responses- A] none of the spikes have a clear implication in the 1ac B] It’s key to robustly contest their norm**

**5] Negating is harder so auto reject aff fairness claims- a] first and last speech, b] 2ar judge psych adv, c] infinite prep, d] 1ar uplayering ability splitting the 2nr. Preempt to the 1ar – nc reactivity doesn’t apply to underviews since it wasn’t disclosed and 2nr sandbagging isn’t possible with 1ar layering**

**6] RVI’s on each spike- otherwise they can read the most absurd paradigm issues for 6 min and are never held accountable**

On c

On d

On 3 point bidirectional stuff

Scroll down solves

Spikes =/= disclosed

Critical thinking good -> education

Reject UVs, no reason aff fairness

Negating isn’t harder, more time

Judge psych =/= real

Infinite neg prep

Don’t split 2nr because more time

Internal sandbagging

No spikes = normal arguments no qualification