## 1

### ROB

#### 1] The role of the ballot is to determine if the aff’s a good idea—anything else is self-serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate. Evaluate consequences

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### 2] There are infinite epistemologies the aff can tack on that uniquely brackets out neg offense and I can’t prepare for, which controls the internal link to engagement in their discourse

#### 3] Extinction forecloses possibility of future improvement and causes mass suffering and irreversible and death to every person on the planet—even if they think life isn’t valuable, they shouldn’t get to make that choice for billions who find value in the world.

#### 4] Reps -- It doesn’t matter how could your ideology or intentions are if you use that for violence--Ideology and discourse is only good insofar as resolves material violence.

#### 5] Apocalyptic images challenge dominant power structures – they contest the implausibility of inequitable structures producing catastrophe and generate imagination of futures of social justice outside of current narratives

Jessica Hurley 17, Assistant Professor in the Humanities at the University of Chicago, “Impossible Futures: Fictions of Risk in the Longue Durée”, Duke University Press, <https://read.dukeupress.edu/american-literature/article/89/4/761/132823/Impossible-Futures-Fictions-of-Risk-in-the-Longue>

* Squo power structures (i.e. what the K criticizes) paint themselves as stable/inevitable to project their power and maintain dominance
* Questioning that stability thru extinction narratives questions squo world orders bc it calls into ques the idea of squo world stability which allows us to envision alternative worlds/future i.e. one where it fails and causes extinction
* Justifies extinction focus and preventing extinction in the name of changing those squo structures

If contemporary ecocriticism has a shared premise about environmental risk it is that genre is the key to both perceiving and, possibly, correcting ecological crisis. Frederick Buell’s 2003 From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century has established one of the most central oppositions of this paradigm. As his title suggests, Buell tells the story of a discourse that began in the apocalyptic mode in the 1960s and 70s, when discussions of “the immanent end of nature” most commonly took the form of “prophecy, revelation, climax, and extermination” before turning away from apocalypse when the prophesied ends failed to arrive (112, 78). Buell offers his suggestion for the appropriate literary mode for life lived within a crisis that is both unceasing and inescapable: new voices, “if wise enough….will abandon apocalypse for a sadder realism that looks closely at social and environmental changes in process and recognizes crisis as a place where people dwell” (202-3). In a world of threat, Buell demands a realism that might help us see risks more clearly and aid our survival.¶ Buell’s argument has become a broadly held view in contemporary risk theory and ecocriticism, overlapping fields in the social sciences and humanities that address the foundational question of second modernity: “how do you live when you are at such risk?” (Woodward 2009, 205).1 Such an assertion, however, assumes both that realism is a neutral descriptive practice and that apocalypse is not something that is happening now in places that we might not see, or cannot hear. This essay argues for the continuing importance of apocalyptic narrative forms in representations of environmental risk to disrupt conservative realisms that maintain the statusquo. Taking the ecological disaster of nuclear waste as my case study, I examine two fictional treatments of nuclear waste dumps that create different temporal structures within which the colonial history of the United States plays out. The first, a set of Department of Energy documents that use statistical modeling and fictional description to predict a set of realistic futures for the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico (1991), creates a present that is fully knowable and a future that is fully predictable. Such an approach, I suggest, perpetuates the state logics of implausibility that have long undergirded settler colonialism in the United States. In contrast, Leslie Marmon Silko’s contemporaneous novel Almanac of the Dead (1991) uses its apocalyptic form to deconstruct the claims to verisimilitude that undergird state realism, transforming nuclear waste into a prophecy of the end of the United States rather than a means for imagining its continuation. In Almanac of the Dead, the presence of nuclear waste introjects a deep-time perspective into contemporary America, transforming the present into a speculative space where environmental catastrophe produces not only unevenly distributed damage but also revolutionary forms of social justice that insist on a truth that probability modeling cannot contain: that the future will be unimaginably different from the present, while the present, too, might yet be utterly different from the real that we think we know.¶ Nuclear waste is rarely treated in ecocriticism or risk theory, for several reasons: it is too manmade to be ecological; its catastrophes are ongoing, intentionally produced situations rather than sudden disasters; and it does not support the narrative that subtends ecocritical accounts of risk perception in which the nuclear threat gives rise to an awareness of other kinds of threat before reaching the end of its relevance at the end of the Cold War.2 In what follows, I argue that the failure of nuclear waste to fit into the critical frames created by ecocriticism and risk theory to date offers an opportunity to expand those frames and overcome some of their limitations, especially the impulse towards a paranoid, totalizing realism that Peter van Wyck (2005) has described as central to ecocriticism in the risk society. Nuclear waste has durational forms that dwarf the human. It therefore dwells less in the economy of risk as it is currently conceptualized and more in the blown-out realm of deep time. Inhabiting the temporal scale that has recently been christened the Anthropocene, the geological era defined by the impact of human activities on the world’s geology and climate, nuclear waste unsettles any attempt at realist description, unveiling the limits of human imagination at every turn.3 By analyzing risk society through a heuristic of nuclear waste, this essay offers a critique of nuclear colonialism and environmental racism. At the same time, it shows how the apocalyptic mode in deep time allows narratives of environmental harm and danger to move beyond the paranoid logic of risk. In the world of deep time, all that might come to pass will come to pass, sooner or later. The endless maybes of risk become certainties. The impossibilities of our own deaths and the deaths of everything else will come. But so too will other impossibilities: talking macaws and alien visitors; the end of the colonial occupation of North America, perhaps, or a sudden human determination to let the world live. The end of capitalism may yet become more thinkable than the end of the world. Just wait long enough. Stranger things will happen.¶

#### 6] Assuming there’s a universal truth about international relations is homogenizing and erases difference. Winning overarching general claims about the world is irrelevant if that can’t contextualize it to the specificity of our scenarios.

Browning & McDonald 13 (Christopher S., University of Queensland, c/o Political Science and International Studies and Matt, University of Queensland, “The future of critical security studies: Ethics and the politics of security,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2, pg. 248-251)

If the critical security studies project is deficient in providing us with a sophisticated and convincing understanding of either the politics or ethics of security — two core animat - ing themes of its research agenda — where does this leave such a project? Does the contribution of critical security studies extend no further than a compelling critique of traditional approaches to security on a range of analytical and normative grounds? We would argue that there is a future in critical security studies. This future will ulti - mately be determined by the extent to which scholars recognize the limits and tensions of existing approaches (especially ‘Schools’) and take up the challenge of moving beyond first principles or universalized assumptions about security to engage in nuanced, reflexive and context-specific analyses of the politics and ethics of security. Indeed, we make such a case using the critical theoretical tool of immanent critique, defined here as a method of critique concerned with locating possibilities for progressive change in existing social and political orders. 6 In this context, we note in particular the possibility for building upon the tensions and limits in existing critical security studies scholarship to move this research project forward. We identify two key imperatives for this project by way of conclusion. The first of these imperatives concerns the need to develop understandings of the poli - tics of security that are context-specific; that recognize and interrogate the role of differ - ent security discourses and their effects in different settings; and that come to terms with sedimented meanings and logics without endorsing these as timeless and inevitable. In terms of context-specificity, the Western-centric nature of (critical) security studies has ultimately encouraged a focus on how security ‘works’ in liberal democratic settings. This is particularly applicable to the Copenhagen School framework, whose dichotomy between ‘panic politics’ and ‘normal politics’ ultimately suggests a conception of politics parasitic on a liberal democratic political context (see McDonald, 2008; Williams, 2003). While some have attempted to explore securitization dynamics outside these settings (e.g. Wilkinson, 2007), the framework itself continues to work with a security–politics dichotomy that may be wholly unfamiliar to those outside liberal democratic states. In a fundamentally illiberal state regime such as Burma or North Korea, for example, what does the language of security do and what does ‘normal politics’ mean? In what ways do different cultural, social and historical contexts determine different security logics, and how do these dynamics look in terms of communities above and below the state? And can we accept the claim that there is no difference in the logic or effects of securitization if security is understood as referring to the welfare of the most vulnerable in global soci - ety, for example, rather than the territorial preservation of the nation-state? Here, the failure to differentiate between logics of security on the basis of what understanding of security inheres in a particular discourse potentially blinds Copenhagen School and post- structural theorists of security to (the possibility of) difference in security dynamics and logics in different places, for different actors and at different times. In the case of the Copenhagen School, such parsimony might be in part a response to the desire to provide analytical boundaries around the study of security rather than ‘descend’ into contextual analysis (see Williams, 2010: 213–216), but it nonetheless results in a partial and (we would argue) Western-centric image of the politics of security. at University of Kansas Libraries on February 25, 2016 ejt.sagepub.com Downloaded from Browning and McDonald 249 Ultimately, these points suggest the need for far more nuance than is currently evident in critical security studies scholarship. As noted earlier, the critical security studies pro - ject appears bifurcated between opposing logics of security that position the logic of security as inherently pernicious (Copenhagen School, post-structuralism) or inherently progressive (Welsh School). In a sense, these ‘Schools’ correct the limits and tendencies of each other in important ways, suggesting (immanent) possibilities for a more nuanced understanding of the politics of security in the critical security studies project as a whole. Copenhagen School and post-structural theorists explore the logic of security that fol - lows from the dominant discourse of security in contemporary world politics, rightly cautioning against any assumed linkage between security and progress and pointing to the ways in which the promise of security can be used to justify illiberal practices. The Welsh School framework, meanwhile, recognizes that this dominant discourse of secu - rity does not necessarily capture the essence of security across time and space, in the process pointing to possibilities for progressive change in security dynamics and prac - tices. In a sense, these different approaches to the logic of security broadly reflect struc - tural and agential tendencies in International Relations more generally. We would argue that they suggest the need to take seriously the political limitations associated with domi - nant security discourses while recognizing and exploring the possibility for security to mean and do something different. A brief analysis of the different constitutive security logics underlying various secu - rity communities around the world provides ample evidence of the problems of univer - salizing claims about the politics of security. As Rumelili (2008) has noted, an instructive comparison can be drawn between the EU and ASEAN, in particular in terms of how these organizations’ conception of self-identity results in them relating themselves to otherness very differently. Propounding an inherently inclusive (i.e. democratic) identity and normative agenda, the EU is liable to locate otherness in an inferior position to itself, as something to transform and render acceptable/normal. Otherness is therefore something to be eradicated and to the extent to which it rejects transformation, it becomes destabilizing and potentially threatening. Such processes are, for example, clearly evident in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Browning and Pertti, 2008). In contrast, ASEAN operates with a largely exclusivist (i.e. civili - zational, geographic, ethnic) identity where norms of sovereignty and non-interfer - ence dominate. This, Rumelili suggests, facilitates more equitable relationships with otherness since the goal in such relationships is not one of conversion to the cause. In terms of the politics of security, what becomes evident here is how concepts of security and subjectivity are intimately connected to conceptions of identity and the limits of political community in different contexts. The second imperative for the future of the critical security studies project concerns the ethics of security. We advanced the claim that a shared concern with expanding the realm of dialogue underpins much of the critical security studies project, albeit to differ - ent degrees and in different ways. But to the extent that an ethics of security — a concep - tion of the good or progress regarding security — orients around a concern with such a position, this commitment needs to be acknowledged and defended. A range of pressing questions suggest themselves here, including the bases for prioritizing open dialogue; the relationship between spheres of deliberation and material conditions of existence; the at University of Kansas Libraries on February 25, 2016 ejt.sagepub.com Downloaded from 250 European Journal of International Relations 19(2) possibilities for and limitations to the establishment of open dialogue; and the broader relationship between dialogue and outcomes. Elaborating on these commitments would also entail engaging with the argument that movements towards greater dialogue could potentially encourage the desire to exclude power, identity, emotion and other central features of global politics (see Price, 2008). Where difficult questions emerge about this and other dimensions of an ‘ethical’ engagement with security — such as the role of violence in the Welsh School framework, for example (Peoples, 2011) — these need to be confronted. If there is a consistency across critical security studies scholarship in this sense, it is that ethical commitments are evident (in commitments to resistance, desecuritization or emancipation, for example) but are insufficiently developed to provide a genuine account of what constitutes ethical action regarding security. Indeed, immanent possibilities for the development of the criti - cal security studies project arise from these (often implied) commitments that need draw - ing out and examining in the context of difficult dilemmas in world politics. This process of drawing out ethical commitments should be viewed as a reflexive movement towards recognizing the assumptions and potential implications of one’s own theorizing, a posi - tion central to both broader definitions of Critical Theory (see Cox, 1981) and to the compelling critique of traditional security studies as insufficiently engaged with the eth - ics and effects of its own theorizing about world politics. And it needs also to be matched up with the preceding understanding of the politics of security. Is the expansion of delib - eration and movement away from violence, for example, always progressive, and does it require the rejection of security as a political category or its reform? The example of Australian debates around the arrival by boat of asylum-seekers in 2010 illustrates tensions and ambiguities at work regarding the ethics of security, particu - larly as understood in key critical approaches to the study of security. In that context, Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s call for ‘a frank, open, honest national conversation’ about asylum and border security particularly encouraged the articulation of negative and exclusionary views of asylum-seekers, paradoxically rendering the (re)securitization of asylum in the Australian context more likely (see McDonald, 2011). Particularly strik - ing here was the Prime Minister’s suggestion that this national conversation should take place outside the limits imposed by political correctness that would otherwise discourage the articulation of right-wing or racist sentiments towards asylum-seekers. In this exam - ple, the apparent opening of dialogic space encouraged by the Prime Minister was inti - mately related to the movement towards exclusionary security logics and practices orienting around the imperatives of ‘border security’. The point of this example is not to illustrate the limits of open dialogue per se, but rather to illustrate two broader claims regarding the relationship between security and ethics in the critical security studies project that we make here. First, while normative preferences are evident, these are often insufficiently developed or robust to enable the ethical adjudication between different practices or outcomes. The normative preference for deliberation evident in the commitment to desecuritization, for example, is not suf - ficiently robust to enable us to engage with difficult questions concerning the forms of deliberation that should be encouraged or even the circumstances in which ‘hate speech’, for example, might be curtailed (on this, see Gelber, 2010). Second, and to return to the central argument of the article, the Australian example reminds us of the need to explore the implications of security conceptions and practices in particular contexts, rather than at University of Kansas Libraries on February 25, 2016 ejt.sagepub.com Downloaded from Browning and McDonald 251 assume that a particular security logic will inhere — or outcomes will follow — from the use of the term ‘security’ or a stated political commitment to ‘dialogue’. The core challenge for the critical security studies project is ultimately moving beyond critique and agenda-setting and towards a contextual analysis of security dynamics and practices in global politics. There is no question that a focus on the politics of security and the ethics of security are crucial intellectual endeavours too readily elided or ignored in traditional approaches to the study of security. For this reason alone we need a ‘criti - cal security studies project’. However, universalizing claims concerning the politics of security — found in the securitization framework and much post-structural engagement with security — must ultimately give way to nuanced analyses of the ways in which security is constructed and challenged in particular social, historical and political con - texts. A range of theorists have — in different ways — sought to engage with precisely this question, illustrating the various ways in which security dynamics ‘play out’ in dif - ferent settings in terms of constructing community (e.g. Bubandt, 2005), challenging identity binaries (e.g. Avant, 2007) or enabling space for different forms of political response (e.g. Doty, 1998/9). Yet these insights ultimately remain marginal to key ‘Schools’ and conceptual frameworks of security, and are too often forgotten in our search for the universal in a complex world. Beyond the development of nuance in our understanding of the ‘politics of security’, the critical security studies project urgently needs to move beyond normative ‘leaps of faith’ concerning the ethics of security. This particularly applies to the Copenhagen and Welsh School preference for dialogue as a progressive means of escaping exclusive and illiberal security logics and practices. While genuinely open dialogue regarding the construction of security and threat has much to recommend it, crucial here is the need for advocates to reflect upon and lay bare the bases upon which these claims are made in philosophical terms, and to reflexively examine the implications of alternative security conceptions and practices in analytical terms rather than assume particular dynamics to be progressive. This too suggests the need to move towards a focus on the particular social, historical and politi - cal contexts in which security is constructed and practised in global politics.

## 2

### CP

#### CP: We endorse the entirety of aff except for the resolution.

## 3

### US-China DA

#### Despite growing rivalry, US-China economic interdependence strong now. Exchange of tech know-how, collaboration science research, and massive US-China STEM pipeline improving relations – but it can easily collapse.

Hass 8/12 [Ryan Hass (Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center The Michael H. Armacost Chair Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies Nonresident Fellow, Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School), 8-12-2021, "The “new normal” in US-China relations: Hardening competition and deep interdependence," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/12/the-new-normal-in-us-china-relations-hardening-competition-and-deep-interdependence/> // belle]

The intensification of U.S.-China competition has captured significant attention in recent years. American attitudes toward China have become more negative during this period, as anger has built over disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing’s trampling of Hong Kong’s autonomy, human rights violations in Xinjiang, and job losses to China.

Amidst this focus on great power competition, two broader trends in the U.S.-China relationship have commanded relatively less attention. The first has been the widening gap in America’s and China’s overall national power relative to every other country in the world. The second has been the continuing thick interdependence between the United States and China, even amidst their growing rivalry. Even on economic issues, where rhetoric and actions around decoupling command the most attention, trade and investment data continue to point stubbornly in the direction of deep interdependence. These trends will impact how competition is conducted between the U.S. and China in the coming years.

SEPARATING FROM THE PACK

As America’s unipolarity in the international system has waned, there has been renewed focus on the role of major powers in the international system, including the European Union, Russia, India, and Japan. Each of these powers has a major population and substantial economic weight or military heft, but as my Brookings colleague Bruce Jones has observed, none have all. Only the United States and China possess all these attributes.

The U.S. and China are likely to continue amassing disproportionate weight in the international system going forward. Their growing role in the global economy is fueled largely by both countries’ technology sectors. These two countries have unique traits. These include world-class research expertise, deep capital pools, data abundance, and highly competitive innovation ecosystems. Both are benefitting disproportionately from a clustering effect around technology hubs. For example, of the roughly 4,500 artificial intelligence-involved companies in the world, about half operate in the U.S. and one-third operate in China. According to a widely cited study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, the U.S. and China are set to capture 70% of the $15.7 trillion windfall that AI is expected to add to the global economy by 2030.

The United States and China have been reinvesting their economic gains to varying degrees into research and development for new and emerging technologies that will continue to propel them forward. While it is not foregone that the U.S. and China will remain at the frontier of innovation indefinitely, it also is not clear which other countries might displace them or on what timeline. Overall, China’s economy likely will cool in the coming years relative to its blistering pace of growth in recent decades, but it is not likely to collapse.

DEEP INTERDEPENDENCE

At the same time, bilateral competition between the United States and China also is intensifying. Even so, rising bilateral friction has not – at least not yet – undone the deep interdependencies that have built up between the two powers over decades.

In the economic realm, trade and investment ties remain significant, even as both countries continue to take steps to limit vulnerabilities from the other. For example, Chinese regulators have been asserting greater control over when and where Chinese companies raise capital; Beijing’s recent probe of ride-hailing app Didi Chuxing provides but the latest example. China’s top leaders have been emphasizing the need for greater technology “self-sufficiency” and have been pouring billions of dollars of state capital into this drive. Meanwhile, U.S. officials have been seeking to limit American investments from going to Chinese companies linked to the military or surveillance sectors. The Security and Exchange Commission’s scrutiny of initial public offerings for Chinese companies and its focus on ensuring Chinese companies meet American accounting standards could result in some currently listed Chinese companies being removed from U.S. exchanges. Both countries have sought to disentangle supply chains around sensitive technologies with national security, and in the American case, human rights dimensions. U.S. officials have sought to raise awareness of the risks for American firms of doing business in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

Even so, U.S.-China trade and investment ties remain robust. In 2020, China was America’s largest goods trading partner, third largest export market, and largest source of imports. Exports to China supported an estimated 1.2 million jobs in the United States in 2019. Most U.S. companies operating in China report being committed to the China market for the long term.

U.S. investment firms have been increasing their positions in China, following a global trend. BlackRock, J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley have all increased their exposure in China, matching similar efforts by UBS, Nomura Holdings, Credit Suisse, and AXA. The Rhodium Group estimates that U.S. investors held $1.1 trillion in equities issued by Chinese companies, and that there was as much as $3.3 trillion in U.S.-China two-way equity and bond holdings at the end of 2020.

One leg of the U.S.-China economic relationship that has atrophied in recent years has been China’s flow of investment into the United States. This has largely been a product of tightened capital controls in China, growing Chinese government scrutiny of its companies’ offshore investments, and enhanced U.S. screening of Chinese investments for national security concerns.

Another area of U.S.-China interdependence has been knowledge production. As U.S.-China technology expert Matt Sheehan has observed, “With the rise of Chinese talent and capital, the exchange of technological know-how between the United States and China now takes place among private businesses and between individuals.” Leading technology companies in both countries have been building research centers in the other. Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent have all opened research centers in the United States, just as Apple, Microsoft, Tesla, and other major American technology companies rely upon engineering talent in China.

In science collaboration, The Nature Index ranks the joint research between the two countries as the world’s most academically fertile. U.S.-China scientific collaboration grew by more than 10% each year on average between 2015 and 2019. Even following the global spread of COVID-19, American and Chinese experts collaborated more during the past year than over the previous five years combined. This has led to over 100 co-authored articles in leading scientific journals and frequent joint appearances in science-focused workshops and webinars.

China also is the largest source of international students in the United States. In the 2019-20 year, there were over 370,000 Chinese students in the U.S., representing 34% of international students in colleges and universities. Up until now, many of the top Chinese students have stayed in the United States following graduation and contributed to America’s scientific, technological, and economic development. It remains to be seen whether this trend will continue.

COMPETITIVE INTERDEPENDENCE

The scale of American and Chinese interests implicated will likely induce sobriety over time in Washington and Beijing as to how the relationship is managed. The U.S. policy focus for the foreseeable future is not likely to be seeking to “defeat” China or compel the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party. Rather, the focus will be on taking steps at home and with partners abroad to strengthen America’s long-term competitiveness vis-à-vis China. At the same time, American leaders will continue to push their Chinese counterparts to improve the treatment of their citizens. Such efforts are definitional to America’s self-identity as a champion of values.

The dense webs formed by trade, financial, scientific, and academic links between the United States and China will make it difficult for one side to inflict harm on the other without hurting itself in the process. As Joe Nye has written, “America can decouple security risks like Huawei from its 5G telecommunications network, but trying to curtail all trade with China would be too costly. And even if breaking apart economic interdependence were possible, we cannot decouple the ecological interdependence that obeys the laws of biology and physics, not politics.”

President Joe Biden likely will use the challenges posed by China as a spur for his domestic resilience agenda. He is not an ideologue, though, and is unlikely to limit his own flexibility by painting the world with permanent black and white dividing lines. The Biden team knows it will be harder to realize progress on serious global challenges like climate change, pandemics, and inclusive global economic recovery without pragmatic dealings with non-democratic states.

Major near-term improvements to the U.S.-China relationship are unlikely, barring an unexpected moderation in Beijing’s behavior. At the same time, the relationship is also unlikely to tip into outright hostility, barring an unforeseen dramatic event, such as a Chinese act of aggression against an American security partner.

U.S.-China relations are going to be hard-nosed and tense. Neither side is likely to offer concessions in service of smoother relations. At the same time, the balance of interests on both sides likely will control hostile impulses, placing the relationship in a state of hardening competition that coexists alongside a mutual awareness that both sides will be impacted — for good or ill — by their capacity to address common challenges.

#### Plan hurts US-China relations – means China goes back on it’s promise to regulate IP violations and draws in U.S. crackdown.

Shape 2/19 [Steven M. Shape; registered patent attorney and electrical engineer who has represented preeminent technology companies in complex, high-stakes Intellectual Property litigation; 2-19-2021, "IP Law Looms Large Over U.S.-China Relations," No Publication, [https://www.mondaq.com/trademark/1038030/ip-law-looms-large-over-us-china-relations //](https://www.mondaq.com/trademark/1038030/ip-law-looms-large-over-us-china-relations%20//) belle]

The U.S. and China were indisputably the two largest parties in the global trade war that consumed much of the last several years. Particularly between early 2018 and late 2019, it seemed as if one could hardly go a week, if that, without hearing something about tariffs, exports, imports, steel, soybeans, then-President Donald Trump, President Xi Jinping and the like. Accusations regarding violations of Intellectual Property law were among the biggest flashpoints, and ultimately, China announced new regulations concerning IP protection in November 2019 as a conciliatory move. Nearly 14 months later, newly inaugurated President Joe Biden has yet to fully clarify his administration's stance toward China. However, it is inevitable that IP rights and their preservation will factor into negotiations between the two economic giants. A look back at the proposed reforms (and their effects) Reports from CNN at the time claimed that China's prospective IP law reforms focused on making the penalties for IP infringement more strict. It would also put the government's increasingly modernized tech infrastructure to use in the discovery and prosecution of such crimes. Beyond that, the proposal carried few specifics. Although it is unclear whether Beijing's gambit worked as the deciding factor for Washington, it certainly did not fail. The two nations agreed in principle on "Phase One" of a new trade agreement December 12, 2019, per The Washington Post, and formalized the deal about a month later. The U.S. pledged not to impose further tariffs and roll back existing import taxes in return for China's IP reforms and agreement to buy American goods. In the 14 months that followed, so much changed. COVID-19's devastating impact on human life and the global economy made it difficult to gauge the positive effects of the tariff relief or IP reform. A report by the South China Morning Post found that China did not meet its import goal for 2020, with some analysts concluding the Phase One target was unrealistic. On the IP front, a Hong Kong news provider noted that Beijing had drafted some specific guidance to protect pharmaceutical patents, trade secrets and copyrights, but it was unclear how well they were being implemented. Additionally, a January 2021 report by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) found that Chinese policies which offered subsidies for certain trademark and patent applications helped motivate a glut of fraudulent and bad-faith filings in the last few years. The bigger picture of China's IP law A casual observer or someone just learning of this issue might assume that until recently, China had little or no IP laws on the books. Of course, that is not true. However, there are many factors at play complicating the matter of Chinese IP protection policies. As noted in Harvard Business Review, China is quite strict in certain aspects of IP protection: Beijing allows (and encourages) all businesses to impose non-compete agreements to help protect trade secrets and other IP assets. In addition, according to the National Law Review, two new measures were passed in 2020 specifically to combat bad-faith trademark applications, in addition to the other new guidelines being imposed by the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) in accordance with the Phase One agreement. All that said, it would be inaccurate to describe Chinese IP law as thoroughly protective for either domestic or foreign innovators. Along with the aforementioned trademark and patent subsidies, considerable controversy stems from "forced technology transfer" policies. According to the University of Oxford's Business Law Blog, foreign companies looking to do business in China must turn over their technology to local firms or be denied the right to operate within China. This effectively means turning over the blueprints (literal or otherwise) to such technology - which is all but equivalent to surrendering the IP. It creates considerable opportunities for infringement, fraud and corruption. Also, in disputes with foreign firms, some local IP courts still markedly favor domestic organizations. Chinese government representatives often resent such accusations of bias or corruption. In their view, the deals represent friendly agreements between businesses, and courts' decisions are not politically motivated. While Oxford noted that FTT guidelines are not as pervasive now as they were a few years ago, they have yet to disappear altogether. The Biden approach: Not dissimilar, but multilateral If the new U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen, is to be believed, the Biden administration will not tolerate any signs of lapses in China's IP protections. "We need to take on China's abusive, unfair and illegal practices," Yellen said to the Senate Finance Committee at her confirmation hearings. As reported by Bloomberg, she added, "[China has] been stealing intellectual property and engaging practices that give it an unfair technological advantage, including forced technology transfers. And these . are practices that we're prepared to use the full array of tools to address." Biden had expressed similar sentiments during a December interview with The New York Times. However, he also said that they would work with ally nations to "develop a coherent strategy" for addressing cases of IP infringement and other issues - a stance Yellen echoed before the Senate - instead of taking China on in a unilateral and bellicose manner. This more nuanced approach could yield greater cooperation from Beijing and help repair U.S.-China trade relations, but we will likely not know one way or the other for some time. As we saw with the trade war, conflicts between the U.S. and China can quickly escalate and have ripple effects throughout the world. It would thus be wise for all organizations doing business in China to keep themselves abreast of the country's evolving IP regulations and work with a reliable IP services provider to help establish strong protection for their intangible assets.

#### Maintaining US-China relations key to confidence building, dialogue measures, and address mutual anxieties about nukes -- that prevents nuke war.

CSIS ’13 [CSIS (CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full- time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change), March 2013, " Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations a way forward," Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf> // belle]

The United States has long seen China as a central factor in its strategy in Asia. Since the 1970s, U.S. policy has sought to encourage China’s economic reforms and development and to integrate China into the existing international political and economic order. While hopeful that China will develop into a constructive stakeholder, the United States and much of the Asia-Pacific region share continuing concerns about some aspects of China’s behavior that, it is feared, could undermine regional stability and U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific.

Unfortunately, significant sources of tension and disagreement between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and China, on the other, remain. These sources of discord could, in the worst case, lead to conflict. Needless to say, a large-scale conventional war between the United States and China would be incredibly dangerous and likely tremendously damaging. Nuclear war between the two would be devastating for all involved. Even though a conventional war between the two nations currently seems unlikely and nuclear war even more so, the possibility that war could break out, posing dramatic dangers and damage, clearly indicates that active steps should be taken to avoid conflict and successfully manage U.S.-China nuclear dynamics.

Significance and Objectives of U.S.-China Nuclear Relations

Maintaining stability in U.S.-China nuclear relations will be critical to the interests of the United States and those of its allies and security partners in the coming years. The Working Group judges that the nuclear dynamics between the United States and China are relatively stable at this time, primarily because both sides have or will soon have a nuclear deterrent of the size and scope they determine they need, and China appears committed to a relatively restrained posture oriented around a “lean and effective” nuclear force and its no-first-use policy. Yet the Working Group is concerned that the changing conventional military balance of power in the region, the current sources of tension and possible conflict, and the expansion of the quality and quantity of China’s nuclear arsenal raise serious questions about the future stability of U.S-China nuclear relations. The recommendations contained in this report are therefore focused on enhancing nuclear stabil- ity between the United States and China, primarily by advocating a series of both bilateral and unilat- eral policy and posture adjustments that would enhance crisis stability and arms race stability, while also laying the groundwork for future bilateral and multilateral nuclear engagement.

Because the current nuclear dynamics are broadly stabilizing and should be sustained, the Working Group recommends that U.S.-China nuclear relations be oriented toward sustaining these dynamics and avoiding decisions by either side that could erode stability. We therefore recommend a robust but realistically tailored program of engagement and dialogue on nuclear issues that reinforce China’s nuclear restraint and advance U.S. interests in stability, dialogue, transparency, and prog- ress toward arms control. The Working Group recognizes, however, the limited success attempts at dialogue and cooperation have thus far yielded. The Group’s recommendations are therefore de- signed to be ambitious but realistic, and are structured in such a way that, in the event that Beijing is unwilling to engage in earnest along the lines the Group advocates, the United States would be left with a powerful strategic capability and in the strong political position of having proffered a serious, fair-minded path forward in bilateral nuclear weapons relations that China had rebuffed.

The Working Group also recommends that the United States adopt a policy of accepting China’s possession of an assured second-strike nuclear capability, and thus avoid attempting to acquire the capability to negate China’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities. This judgment relies on the fundamental determination that the United States cannot realistically hope to deny China’s second-strike capability, that a failed attempt to deny it would be costly and counterproductive, and that Beijing’s possession of a reliable retaliatory capability promotes stability rather than detracts from it. In addition, this approach could reinforce China’s nuclear restraint. The Working Group is, however, divided on whether the United States should publicly and formally announce this acceptance.

The Working Group believes that some of the concepts associated with the idea of “strategic stability” provide an appropriate framework for U.S.-China engagement on nuclear weapons is- sues, although the specific meaning of the term is the subject of a long-running debate that has never been definitively settled. In order to gain the benefits of strategic stability, the Working Group believes that nuclear relations between the United States and China should emphasize two complementary approaches: crisis stability and arms race stability.

Stability can emerge between the United States and China if each fields forces that are capable of surviving a first strike and if each is able to credibly demonstrate to the other side that its cur- rent and future capabilities are not capable of denying the other side a viable strategic deterrent. As a result, fear of preemption and the need to launch weapons early become irrelevant, either as irri- tants in crisis or as dangers in conflict. In this way, the benefits of deterrence can be retained, while minimizing the chances of nuclear escalation and avoiding a competition in the development of offensive and defensive strategic arms that would intensify uncertainties for both sides.

Both sides could derive value from cooperation on nuclear weapons issues grounded in the stability concept. The United States worries about the composition of China’s nuclear force, China’s views on escalation and plans for nuclear use, and the future trajectory of China’s strategic posture. China, meanwhile, worries about the ability of the United States to deny it a second-strike capa- bility; the scope and sophistication of future U.S. nuclear, conventional prompt global strike, and missile defense programs; and U.S. unwillingness to acknowledge a condition of mutual vulner- ability between the two nations. A stability-grounded model could help address these anxiet- ies—on the U.S. side by providing greater insight into China’s current and future force structure and deeper insight into China’s ways of thinking about nuclear strategy, and on the Chinese side by providing similar insight into U.S. developments and a greater degree of assurance about U.S. acknowledgment of the survivability of the Chinese force. Concurrently, such an approach would have the added benefit of building confidence on both sides, thereby enhancing strategic trust more broadly. Finally, such a model could also provide a satisfactory way in which both nations could see something approximating their current force size, posture, and doctrine as satisfactory and compatible with stability.

#### US-China war goes nuclear

Talmadge 18, Caitlin [**PoliSci PhD from MIT**, Government BA from Harvard, Prof of Security Studies at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.] “Beijing’s Nuclear Option.” Foreign Affairs. October 15, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option> TG

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.

Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”

This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.

China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.

As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

## 4

### Innovation DA

#### Biotech industry strong now – new innovation and R&D coming

Cancherini et al. 4/30 [Laura, Engagement Manager @ McKinsey & Company, Joseph Lydon, Associate Partner @ McKinsey & Company, Jorge Santos Da Silva, Senior Partner at McKinsey & Company, and Alexandra Zemp, Partner at McKinsey & Company] “What’s ahead for biotech: Another wave or low tide?“, McKinsey & Company, 4-30-2021, <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/whats-ahead-for-biotech-another-wave-or-low-tide> //ajs

As the pandemic spread across the globe in early 2020, biotech leaders were initially pessimistic, reassessing their cash position and financing constraints. When McKinsey and BioCentury interviewed representatives from 106 biotech companies in May 2020,4 half of those interviewed were expecting delays in financing, and about 80 percent were tight on cash for the next two years and considering trade-offs such as deferring IPOs and acquisitions. Executives feared that valuations would decline because of lower revenue projections and concerns about clinical-trial delays, salesforce-effectiveness gaps, and other operational issues.

Belying this downbeat mood, biotech has in fact had one of its best years so far. By January 2021, venture capitalists had invested some 60 percent more than they had in January 2020, with more than $3 billion invested worldwide in January 2021 alone.5 IPO activity grew strongly: there were 19 more closures than in the same period in 2020, with an average of $150 million per raise, 17 percent more than in 2020. Other deals have also had a bumper start to 2021, with the average deal size reaching more than $500 million, up by more than 66 percent on the 2020 average (Exhibit 3).6

What about SPACs?

The analysis above does not include special-purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), which have recently become significant in IPOs in several industries. Some biotech investors we interviewed believe that SPACs represent a route to an IPO. How SPACs will evolve remains to be seen, but biotechs may be part of their story.

Fundamentals continue strong

When we asked executives and investors why the biotech sector had stayed so resilient during the worst economic crisis in decades, they cited innovation as the main reason. The number of assets transitioning to clinical phases is still rising, and further waves of innovation are on the horizon, driven by the convergence of biological and technological advances.

In the present day, many biotechs, along with the wider pharmaceutical industry, are taking steps to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Together, biotechs and pharma companies have [more than 250 vaccine candidates in their pipelines](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/on-pins-and-needles-will-covid-19-vaccines-save-the-world), along with a similar number of therapeutics. What’s more, the crisis has shone a spotlight on pharma as the public seeks to understand the roadblocks involved in delivering a vaccine at speed and the measures needed to maintain safety and efficacy standards. To that extent, the world has been living through a time of mass education in science research and development.

Biotech has also benefited from its innate financial resilience. Healthcare as a whole is less dependent on economic cycles than most other industries. Biotech is an innovator, actively identifying and addressing patients’ unmet needs. In addition, biotechs’ top-line revenues have been less affected by lockdowns than is the case in most other industries.

Another factor acting in the sector’s favor is that larger pharmaceutical companies still rely on biotechs as a source of innovation. With the [top dozen pharma companies](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/m-and-a/our-insights/a-new-prescription-for-m-and-a-in-pharma) having more than $170 billion in excess reserves that could be available for spending on M&A, the prospects for further financing and deal making look promising.

For these and other reasons, many investors regard biotech as a safe haven. One interviewee felt it had benefited from a halo effect during the pandemic.

More innovation on the horizon

The investors and executives we interviewed agreed that biotech innovation continues to increase in quality and quantity despite the macroeconomic environment. Evidence can be seen in the accelerating pace of assets transitioning across the development lifecycle. When we tracked the number of assets transitioning to Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III clinical trials, we found that Phase I and Phase II assets have transitioned 50 percent faster since 2018 than between 2013 and 2018, whereas Phase III assets have maintained much the same pace. There could be many reasons for this, but it is worth noting that biotechs with Phase I and Phase II assets as their lead assets have accounted for more than half of biotech IPOs. Having an early IPO gives a biotech earlier access to capital and leaves it with more scope to concentrate on science.

Looking forward, the combination of advances in biological science and accelerating developments in technology and artificial intelligence has the potential to take innovation to a new level. A [recent report](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/the-bio-revolution-innovations-transforming-economies-societies-and-our-lives) from the McKinsey Global Institute analyzed the profound economic and social impact of biological innovation and found that biomolecules, biosystems, biomachines, and biocomputing could collectively produce up to 60 percent of the physical inputs to the global economy. The applications of this “Bio Revolution” range from agriculture (such as the production of nonanimal meat) to energy and materials, and from consumer goods (such as multi-omics tailored diets) to a multitude of health applications.

#### Strong IPR is key to innovation – empirics and FDI

Ezell and Cory 19 [Stephen Ezell, BS from School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, VP of global innovation policy at Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. Nigel Cory, MA in public policy from Georgetown, BA in international business from Griffith University, Associate Director of trade policy at Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, former researcher in the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.] “The Way Forward for Intellectual Property Internationally,” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, April 25, 2019, <https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/25/way-forward-intellectual-property-internationally> TG

* FDI – foreign direct investment

IPRs Strengthen Innovation

Intellectual property rights power innovation. For instance, analyzing the level of intellectual property protections (via the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness reports) and creative outputs (via the Global Innovation Index) shows that countries with stronger IP protection have more creative outputs (in terms of intangible assets and creative goods and services in a nation’s media, printing and publishing, and entertainment industries, including online), even at varying levels of development.46

IPR reforms also introduce strong incentives for domestic innovation. Sherwood, using case studies from 18 developing countries, concluded that poor provision of intellectual property rights deters local innovation and risk-taking.47 In contrast, IPR reform has been associated with increased innovative activity, as measured by domestic patent filings, albeit with some variation across countries and sectors.48 For example, Ryan, in a study of biomedical innovations and patent reform in Brazil, found that patents provided incentives for innovation investments and facilitated the functioning of technology markets.49 Park and Lippoldt also observed that the provision of adequate protection for IPRs can help to stimulate local innovation, in some cases building on the transfer of technologies that provide inputs and spillovers.50 In other words, local innovators are introduced to technologies first through the technology transfer that takes place in an environment wherein protection of IPRs is assured; then, they may build on those ideas to create an evolved product or develop alternate approaches (i.e., to innovate). Related research finds that trade in technology—through channels including imports, foreign direct investment, and technology licensing—improves the quality of developing-country innovation by increasing the pool of ideas and efficiency of innovation by encouraging the division of innovative labor and specialization.51 However, Maskus notes that without protection from potential abuse of their newly developed technologies, foreign enterprises may be less willing to reveal technical information associated with their innovations.52 The protection of patents and trade secrets provides necessary legal assurances for firms wishing to reveal proprietary characteristics of technologies to subsidiaries and licensees via contracts.

The relationship between IPR rights and innovation can also be seen in studies of how the introduction of stronger IPR laws, with regard to patents, copyrights, and trademarks, affect R&D activity in an economy. Studies by Varsakelis and by Kanwar and Evenson found that R&D to GDP ratios are positively related to the strength of patent rights, and are conditional on other factors.53 Cavazos Cepeda et al. found a positive influence of IPRs on the level of R&D in an economy, with each 1 percent increase in the level of protection of IPRs in an economy (as measured by improvements to a country’s score in the Patent Rights Index) equating to, on average, a 0.7 percent increase in the domestic level of R&D.54 Likewise, a 1 percent increase in copyright protection was associated with a 3.3 percent increase in domestic R&D. Similarly, when trademark protection increased by 1 percent, there was an associated R&D increase of 1.4 percent. As the authors concluded, “Increases in the protection of the IPRs carried economic benefits in the form of higher inflows of FDI, and increases in the levels of both domestically conducted R&D and service imports as measured by licensing fees.”55 As Jackson summarized, regarding the relationship between IPR reform and both innovation and R&D, and FDI, “In addition to spurring domestic innovation, strong intellectual property rights can increase incentives for foreign direct investment which in turn also leads to economic growth.”56

#### Biopharmaceutical innovation is key to prevent future pandemics and bioterror – turns case

Marjanovic and Feijao 20 [(Sonja Marjanovic, Ph.D., Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Carolina Feijao, Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Cambridge; M.Sc. in quantitative biology, Imperial College London; B.Sc. in biology, University of Lisbon.) "How to Best Enable Pharma Innovation Beyond the COVID-19 Crisis," RAND Corporation, 05-2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA407-1.html] TDI

As key actors in the healthcare innovation landscape, pharmaceutical and life sciences companies have been called on to develop medicines, vaccines and diagnostics for pressing public health challenges. The COVID-19 crisis is one such challenge, but there are many others. For example, MERS, SARS, Ebola, Zika and avian and swine flu are also infectious diseases that represent public health threats. Infectious agents such as anthrax, smallpox and tularemia could present threats in a bioterrorism context.1 The general threat to public health that is posed by antimicrobial resistance is also well-recognised as an area in need of pharmaceutical innovation. Innovating in response to these challenges does not always align well with pharmaceutical industry commercial models, shareholder expectations and competition within the industry. However, the expertise, networks and infrastructure that industry has within its reach, as well as public expectations and the moral imperative, make pharmaceutical companies and the wider life sciences sector an indispensable partner in the search for solutions that save lives. This perspective argues for the need to establish more sustainable and scalable ways of incentivising pharmaceutical innovation in response to infectious disease threats to public health. It considers both past and current examples of efforts to mobilise pharmaceutical innovation in high commercial risk areas, including in the context of current efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. In global pandemic crises like COVID-19, the urgency and scale of the crisis – as well as the spotlight placed on pharmaceutical companies – mean that contributing to the search for effective medicines, vaccines or diagnostics is essential for socially responsible companies in the sector. 2 It is therefore unsurprising that we are seeing industry-wide efforts unfold at unprecedented scale and pace. Whereas there is always scope for more activity, industry is currently contributing in a variety of ways. Examples include pharmaceutical companies donating existing compounds to assess their utility in the fight against COVID19; screening existing compound libraries in-house or with partners to see if they can be repurposed; accelerating trials for potentially effective medicine or vaccine candidates; and in some cases rapidly accelerating in-house research and development to discover new treatments or vaccine agents and develop diagnostics tests.3,4 Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating with each other in some of these efforts and participating in global R&D partnerships (such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative effort to accelerate the development of potential therapies for COVID-19) and supporting national efforts to expand diagnosis and testing capacity and ensure affordable and ready access to potential solutions.3,5,6 The primary purpose of such innovation is to benefit patients and wider population health. Although there are also reputational benefits from involvement that can be realised across the industry, there are likely to be relatively few companies that are ‘commercial’ winners. Those who might gain substantial revenues will be under pressure not to be seen as profiting from the pandemic. In the United Kingdom for example, GSK has stated that it does not expect to profit from its COVID-19 related activities and that any gains will be invested in supporting research and long-term pandemic preparedness, as well as in developing products that would be affordable in the world’s poorest countries.7 Similarly, in the United States AbbVie has waived intellectual property rights for an existing combination product that is being tested for therapeutic potential against COVID-19, which would support affordability and allow for a supply of generics.8,9 Johnson & Johnson has stated that its potential vaccine – which is expected to begin trials – will be available on a not-for-profit basis during the pandemic.10 Pharma is mobilising substantial efforts to rise to the COVID-19 challenge at hand. However, we need to consider how pharmaceutical innovation for responding to emerging infectious diseases can best be enabled beyond the current crisis. Many public health threats (including those associated with other infectious diseases, bioterrorism agents and antimicrobial resistance) are urgently in need of pharmaceutical innovation, even if their impacts are not as visible to society as COVID-19 is in the immediate term. The pharmaceutical industry has responded to previous public health emergencies associated with infectious disease in recent times – for example those associated with Ebola and Zika outbreaks.11 However, it has done so to a lesser scale than for COVID-19 and with contributions from fewer companies. Similarly, levels of activity in response to the threat of antimicrobial resistance are still low.12 There are important policy questions as to whether – and how – industry could engage with such public health threats to an even greater extent under improved innovation conditions.

#### COVID incentivizes engineered bioterror- extinction

Walsh, 20 -- Axios Future correspondent [Bryan Walsh, "The coronavirus pandemic reawakens bioweapon fears," Axios, 5-14-2020, https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-pandemic-pathogen-bioweapon-45417c86-52aa-41b1-8a99-44a6e597d3a8.html, accessed 9-7-2020]

The coronavirus pandemic reawakens bioweapon fears

The immense human and economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic only underscores the threat posed by pathogens that could be deliberately engineered and released.

Why it matters: New technology like gene editing and DNA synthesis has made the creation of more virulent pathogens easier. Yet security and regulation efforts haven't kept pace with the science.

What's happening: Despite some claims by the White House, overwhelming scientific evidence indicates that the novel coronavirus was not accidentally released from a lab or deliberately engineered, but naturally spilled over from an animal source.

That doesn't mean the threat from bioweapons isn't dire. Along with AI, engineered pandemics are widely considered the biggest existential risk facing humanity.

That's in part because a pathogen could be engineered in a lab for maximum contagiousness and virulence, well beyond what would arise through natural selection.

Case in point: a 2018 pandemic simulation put on by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security featured a fictional engineered virus called Clade X that combined the contagiousness of the common cold with the virulence of the real-life Nipah virus, which has a mortality rate of 40-75%. The resulting simulated global outbreak killed 150 million people.

COVID-19 isn't anywhere near that fatal, but the pandemic has shown the vulnerability of the U.S. and the world to biological threats both natural and manmade.

"Potential adversaries are of course seeing the same things we’re seeing," says Richard Pilch of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. "Anyone looking for a radical leveling approach — whether a state actor like North Korea or a motivated terrorist organization — may be influenced by COVID-19 to consider pursuing a biological weapons capability."

Background: Bioweapons were officially banned by the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975, though North Korea is suspected of maintaining an offensive bioweapons program.

A particular concern about biowarfare and bioterror, though, is that many of the tools and methods that could be used to create a weaponized virus are largely indistinguishable from those used in the course of legitimate scientific research. This makes biotechnology "dual-use" — and that much more difficult to safely regulate without cutting off research that could be vitally important.

While earlier bioweapons fears focused on the possibility that a state or terror group could try to weaponize a known dangerous agent like smallpox — which would require somehow obtaining restricted pathogens — new technology means that someone could obtain the genetic sequence of a germ online and synthesize it in the lab.

"If you've been trained in a relevant technical discipline, that means you can make almost any potentially harmful agent that you're aware of," says Kevin Esvelt, a biologist at the MIT Media Lab and a member of the CDC's Biological Agent Containment Working Group. That would include the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19, which was recently synthesized from its genetic sequence in a study published in Nature.

How it works: Currently, synthetic DNA is ordered through commercial suppliers. But while most suppliers screen DNA orders for the sequences of dangerous pathogens, they're not required to — and not all do, which means safety efforts are "incomplete, inaccurate, and insecure," says Esvelt.

Screening efforts that look for the genetic sequences of known pathogens also wouldn't necessarily be able to detect when synthetic DNA was being used to make something entirely novel and dangerous.

In the near future, desktop DNA synthesizers may be able to generate synthetic DNA in the lab, cutting out the need for commercial suppliers — and potential security screenings.

The democratization of biotechnology could unleash a wave of creativity and innovation, just as the democratization of personal computing did. But it also increases the number of people who could potentially make a dangerous engineered virus, whether deliberately or by accident.

## 5

### Extra t

#### Interp: The 1AC must only garner offense off the hypothetical enactment of the resolution.

#### Violation: They said in CX they gain offense off of reading the aff

#### Vote neg for limits and ground -- a] infinte possible planks they could tack on to get out of neg args means we're never prepared to engage -- pre round prep controls the internal link to fairness and advocacy skills b] ground - they can pick something unnegatably good like "and end racism" that makes it impossible to negate against.

#### Drop the debater –

#### a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to,

#### b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.

#### Use competing interps –

#### a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter,

#### b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.

#### No RVIs –

#### a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance,

#### b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms,

#### c) baiting – incentivizes good debaters to be abusive, bait theory, then collapse to the 1AR RVI,

#### d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory

#### Evaluate disclosure before 1AR theory – a) scope of norming – it affects more round across more topics, b) magnitude – the aff advocacy and disclosure affects a larger portion of the debate since it determines every speech after it and pre round neg prep

## Case

#### 1] Alt causes – other instances of than IPR – 99% of policies, huge alt causes that aff doesn’t solve

#### 2] abstraction inevitable – automation still happens, don’t solve capitalism, monopolies stilll exist – tons of alt causes, scientists and medical industry still elistist

#### 3] people becoming numbers inevitable – capitalistic structure/don’t spill up outside debate round