## 1

#### Presumption and permissibility negates –

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa  
But justice**,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which** must not wait**.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a **just** decision is **always** required immediately**, "right away."** It cannot furnish itself with infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions**,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And even if it did have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, the moment of decision**,** as such, **always** remains a **finite** moment of urgency and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, since it **always** marks **the** interruption of **the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive** deliberation that precedes it**,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule.** Not of the absence of rules and knowledge but of a reinstitution of rules which by definition is not preceded by any knowledge or by any guarantee as such. If we were to trust in a massive and decisive distinction between performative and constative – a problem I can’t get involved in here – we would have to attribute this irreducibility of precipitate urgency, at the bottom this irreducibility of thoughtlessness and unconsciousness, however intelligent it may be, to the performative structure of speech act and acts in general as acts of justice or law, whether they be performatives that institute something or derived performatives supposing anterior conventions. A constative can be juste (right), in the sense of justesse, never in the sense of justice, except by founding itself on conventions and so on other anterior performatives, buried or not, it always maintains within itself some irruptive violence, it no longer responds to the demands of theoretical rationality. Since every constative utterance itself relies, at least implicitly, on a performative structure (“I tell you that, I speak to you, I address myself to you to tell you that this is true, that things are like this, I promise you or renew my promise to you to make a sentence and to sign what I say when I say that, tell you, or try to tell you the truth,” and so forth), the dimension of justesse or truth of the theoretico-constatie utterances (in all domains, particularly in the deoman of the theory of law) always thus presupposes the dimension of justice of the performative utterances, that is to say their essential precipitation, which never proceeds without a certain dissymmetry and some quality of violence. That’s how I would be tempted to understand the proposition of Levinas, who, in a whole other language and following an entirely different discursive procedure, declares that “La Verite suppose la justice” (“Truth supposes justice”) (“Verite et justice, in Totalite et infini 3, p. 62). Dangerously parodying the French idiom, we could end up saying: “La justice, y a qu’ca de vrai.” This is not without consequence, needless to say, for the status, if we still can call it that, of truth.

#### External world skep is true.

Neta 14, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, 2014, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa

You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, if you **do** have hands, then you are not **merely** a brain floating in a vat **of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences** that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. But how could you know **that** you are not **such a brain? If you were such a brain,** everything would seem exactly as it does now; you would (by hypothesis) have **all** the same sensory experiences that you’re having **right** now. Since your empirical knowledge of the world around you must **somehow** be based upon **your** sensory experiences**, how could these experiences**—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—**furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.**

#### Even if it was possible to form sufficient reasons, those reasons are epistemically bankrupt in terms of their truth value because of the Gettier problem.

Chapman 18, Andrew. “The Gettier Problem.” 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, 25 July 2018, 1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem //Massa  
First, the thought is that a person must believe something to in order to know it. It would seem contradictory to claim that Max knows, but that Max doesn’t believe, that his tennis racquet is in the closet. Second, it would seem contradictory to claim to Max knows that his tennis racquet is in the closet while his racquet is actually back at the court. Max might believe that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might believe that he knows that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might even have good evidence that his racquet is in the closet and nonetheless be wrong. In none of these cases would we say that Max knows where his racquet is, since what he believes is false. Finally, it seems as though Max needs some justification, evidence, or good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet in order for him to know that it is.3 Suppose that Max has no good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet. If Max just guesses that it’s in the closet, even if he serendipitously gets things right, it seems as though Max, while having a true belief, has an unjustified true belief, and hence, does not have knowledge.4

## 2

#### A. Interpretation: all theoretical paradigm issues must be contextual to their corresponding interpretations. To clarify, arguments that frame the evaluation of a particular shell should have particular framing arguments. //Massa

#### B. Violation: they don’t –

#### Prefer on Norming –

#### Framing: Generic paradigm issues can’t answer the shell – it claims that form of warranting is bad so winning the counter interp is a necessary condition.

#### D. Voters:

#### Norming is a voter – //Massa

#### Drop the debater –

#### Competing Interps –

#### No RVIs –

## 3

#### A. Interpretation: The aff may not defend that a member nations ought to reduce a subset of medicines or a single medicine.

#### “States” is a generic bare plural.

Nebel 19 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution.” Vbriefly. August 12, 2019. <https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO_avWCNzi14> TG

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the [upward-entailment test](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#IsolGeneInte) for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution.

#### It applies to “medicines” –

#### C. Standards –

#### 1. Precision

#### 2. Limits and Ground –

#### 3. TVA –

#### D. Voters:

# Accessibility

## 1

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida**

justice must not wait a decision is required immediately It cannot furnish itself with unlimited knowledge of conditions even if it did the moment of decision remains a moment of urgency since it marks interruption of deliberation that precedes it

#### External world skep is true.

Neta 14

if you have hands, then you are not a brain floating in a vat But how could you know you are not everything would seem exactly as it does now; you would have the same sensory experiences that you’re having now. empirical knowledge of the world must be based upon sensory experiences

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Chapman 18

it would seem contradictory to claim Max knows his racquet is in the closet while his racquet is back at the court. Max might believe his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. even have good evidence that his racquet is in the closet and nonetheless be wrong. In none of these would we say Max knows where his racquet is Suppose If Max just guesses that it’s in the closet, even if he gets things right Max, while having a true belief, has an unjustified true belief, and does not have knowledge.

## 3

#### “Medicines” is a generic bare plural.

Nebel 19

Generic can’t be affirmed by particular instances “colleges fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals Colleges ought not consider the SAT.” does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. “colleges fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals Dogs are barking outside my window expresses an existential true just in case there are some dogs barking inserting any adverb of quantification cannot add meaning