# TOC – R3 – 1NC

## 1

#### The 1AC reifies Western understandings of death as a biological phenomenon which violently denies the affective nature of life itself and ensures the perpetual continuation of violence.

Michelsen 17 [Nicholas Michelsen, BA International Relations and Philosophy, MA International Conflict and War Studies, King’s College, London, - “Politics and Suicide: The Philosophy of Self-destruction”, Chapter 3: Hunger Striking – Exchange, Pages 107-112, Published October 13, 2017 – Routledge, Taylor and Francis Publishing – <https://www.routledge.com/Politics-and-Suicide-The-philosophy-of-political-self-destruction/Michelsen/p/book/9780815377535?utm_source=cjaffiliates&utm_medium=affiliates&cjevent=76a90231b22811ec806b03cb0a82b838>] Brackets in original //ACCS JM

Jean Baudrillard’s Symbolic Exchange and Death (published in 1976) may be read as a direct response to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (published in 1971).101 Baudrillard writes a genealogy of death’s exclusion from modern society,102 which paradoxically ensures that, under capitalism, its symptomatic mark is to be found everywhere.103 Just like Deleuze and Guattari, for Baudrillard all societies are defined by their distinctive thanatopraxes.104 Where, however, Anti-Oedipus saw coding death as a central action of precapitalist societies in the face of the socially revolutionary implications of mortality, Baudrillard’s conceives of death as calling up semiurgic practices to escape the loss of signification associated with the putrefying body, which must be coded for any social order to exist.105 Baudrillard thus reintroduces the lack which Deleuze and Guattari had been careful to excise from the analytic of mortality.106 Death, for Baudrillard, is a principally an absence of meaning: a pure negation.107 For Deleuze and Guattari, death is the effusion of sense and affect. As such, whilst for both theories coding death is the foundation of social life, their implications regarding the politics of suicide are very different. For Baudrillard, primitive society108 had little fear of death because through rituals of initiation it was fully integrated into social life.109 For Deleuze and Guattari such initiation rites established codes of communality by marking death on the body of the initiate, forming thereupon a milieu for the circulation of mortal flows now coded in the form of a debt to the ancestors. For Baudrillard, by contrast, initiation is the crucial moment, the social nexus, the darkroom where birth and death stop being the terms of life and twist into one another again; not towards some mystical fusion, but in this instance to turn the initiate into a real social being.110 The initiatory rite is a symbolic death after which the initiate is able to undergo a second birth as member of the collectivity. This is not about the eclipse of the biological fact of death. The function of the initiation is to conjure away ‘the splitting of life and death’. Death for the primitive is recognised as socially defined, as having no natural significance or connotation.111 Primitive initiation rites thus resolve the separation of life and death in a ‘social act of exchange’.112 Far from entailing a regime of coding that follows from physical rites of inscription to achieve a determinant political function,113 the symbolic is the primary milieu of the gift/counter-gift exchange, a register within which life and death are able to circulate freely.114 History has witnessed an inexorable process by which practices of symbolic integration have been ejected from social life.115 A gradual extradition of the dead now constitutes the modern meaning of life. Life has become the survival of death,116 as the constitutive boundary dividing the dead from the alive. Modern life assumes this constitutive disjunction; in other words, for we moderns, ‘defined as living beings, death is our imaginary’.117 Baudrillard argues that the exclusion of the dead underpins all the other binary divisions of modernity, madness being ‘only ever the dividing line between mad and sane’ and humanity being a constitutive product of inhumanity’s exclusion.118 Foucault’s genealogies of discrimination must all be rooted in the primary extradition by which death becomes pure ‘delinquency . . . an incurable deviancy’. This supplies the function of all universalising programs as the foundational source of modern exclusionary rationality. Modernity’s binaries – mad/sane, human/ inhuman, even man/woman – are all rooted in a primary real/imaginary disjunction of life/death. Death and power are thus intimately related. All power is directly based on ‘the management of the imaginary sphere of death’. All power (over life) is at root a management of the imaginary sphere of death.119 Social control begins with control over the dead, and law originates from that guardianship of real/ imaginary distinction.120 Inasmuch as this process is unidirectional it involves the steady alienation of the dead, a democratisation of access to immortality after death, and a movement towards ever more ‘deathless’ societies. The ‘prohibition of death’ in everyday life acts as the ‘primary source of social control’ today.121 It is striking that Baudrillard’s account lacks a clear articulation of why modernity is an irreversible evolution defined by this disjunction. Baudrillard seems, at times, to adopt an explanatory conception of modern power defined by the occlusion of the symbolic by the semiotic.122 Deleuze and Guattari’s account of death as the nightmare of decoding haunting all social diagrams from the limit of Universal History is replaced by an evolutionary narrative. For Baudrillard capitalist (semiotic) production is the farthest departure from primitive (symbolic) exchange.123 Capitalism is defined by its decoding and an axiomatic mode of function.124 But its reliance on the extradition of death means for Baudrillard that capitalism is uniquely vulnerable. Capitalist economic power is literally ‘life taking death hostage’. Labour is the form of a deferred death, a pure gift of capital: ‘Labour is not exploitation, it is given by capital.’ For this reason, capitalist production is a matter of ‘dead labour’.125 For Baudrillard, ‘whoever works has not been put to death . . . labour is first of all the sign of being judged worthy only of life.’ As a consequence of his indebtedness to capital, labour is left with no capacity for authentic resistance barring the refusal of work which is both literally and symbolically an act of suicide.126 Indeed, for Baudrillard only an act which ‘takes the form of death’ can challenge the unilateral operation of power as capital; ‘only in the sacrifice of death can the slowly administered death that is labour be disrupted or annulled’. The extraordinary positivity of capitalism can call up only one response; a symbolic negation constituting a revolutionary ‘trans’ politics of suicide: To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death . . . The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide.127 Labour, as the gift of life by capital, can only resist by entering into a symbolic exchange whereby a collapse of the regime of pure positivity of the capitalist imaginary/real occurs.128 The worker must mobilise ‘death as rupture, contagious dissolution and negation’.129 We see here very strong resonances with Walter Benjamin’s account of the general strike that, as an articulation of divine violence, acts only through a pure negation. The revolutionary act is a symbolic gift.130 Revolutionary politics = symbolic suicide. For Baudrillard, as for Deleuze and Guattari, Freud’s theory of the death instinct is a myth which sanctions some of the fundamental processes of our culture.131 Also like Deleuze and Guattari, Baudrillard seeks to ‘retain its radicality’ by turning the concept against psychoanalysis whilst identifying the ‘insufficiencies of its vision’.132 But, for Baudrillard, the function of death is ‘beyond the unconscious’.133 Categorically, death’s contemporary significance has nothing to do with desire. This is an explicit rejection of Deleuze and Guattari’s account in Anti-Oedipus. Baudrillard claims that Bataille’s account of death ‘as the paroxysm of exchanges, superabundance and excess’134 is a massive improvement on the Freudian account which, for all its radicality, sees death as a function of equilibrium and repetition.135 Baudrillard reads Bataille’s as viewing ‘death as excess, always already there’, implying that ‘life is only defective when death has taken it hostage, that life only exists in bursts and exchanges with death.’ Bataille thus apparently counters Freud’s account of sexuality and death with the idea that they are ‘exchanged in the same cycle’.136 Bataille’s ‘luxurious’ vision of death as continuity, for Baudrillard, suggest a problematic which ‘can never be confused with either the real or with science’.137 Baudrillard claims that Bataille is in error only inasmuch as he identifies this sphere of excess with reproduction and desire rather than the symbolic. Reproduction is too functional, too naturalistic, it has no real excess; the only example of a truly excessive operation is symbolic sacrifice.138 Bataille naturalised ‘a tendency to discontinuity’ leading him to an unfortunate (for Baudrillard) subjectivist metaphysics of prohibition and transgression. Bataille’s naturalism can, however, be jettisoned, allowing us to draw on his pre- monitions to see ‘the challenge posed by death to economic organisation’.139 What Baudrillard critiques in Bataille is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari affirm: the unconscious repetition of difference which relies on positing the natural immanence of death and the productive. This takes us to the rub of Baudrillard’s acerbic critique of Deleuze and Guattari,140 that what haunts ‘schizo-nomadic imaginations’ of death is an ‘idealism of desire’, in the belief that we can rediscover some miraculous innocence where the flows of ‘desire’ roam freely and the primary processes are realised without prohibition . . . In Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, [Desire] remains the promise of a savage naturality, the phantasm of an objective, liberatory pulsional energy to be liberated – a force of desire inherited from the mobile field of revolutions.141 This image of desire as ‘purged of all negativity, a network, a rhizome, a contiguity diffracted ad infinitum’ strikes Baudrillard as a suspicious collusion with the diffused character of contemporary power.142 Deleuze and Guattari’s unconscious is literally ‘the psychic metaphor of capital’, which ‘glories the axiomatic of desire and the unconscious in its purest form’.143 Something similar has been suggested by both Zizek144 and Badiou.145 In Forget Foucault, Baudrillard accuses Deleuze of establishing ‘a notion of desire along the lines of future forms of power’.146 Indeed, power and desire are often indifferentiable in Deleuze and Guattari’s work.147 Deleuze and Guattari simply multiply ad infinitum the real/imaginary bar between life and death ‘in cellular and molecular succession’ according to the power-dream of the semiotizing capitalist machine.148 This is a disturbing critique. Indeed, it is astonishing that it elicited no explicit response.149 A response can nonetheless be read in Deleuze and Guattari’s contrasting articulation of the primitive regime. For Deleuze and Guattari, the melancholic primitive regime cannot deter the nightmare of absolutely decoded flows whilst also deterring a state of overcoding. This is why it is doomed. For Baudrillard the primitive regime is simply defined by symbolic exchange. In this way, the symbolic forms not a structure, category or agency, but a kind of primary social relation which resolves the real/imaginary distinction itself.150 Why, then, does it increasingly disappear from social life? Unlike Lacan, for whom the symbolic ‘plays a balancing act between the demands of a lost imaginary and a lost real’, for Baudrillard, the symbolic is precisely a social act of exchange which is irreducible to the imaginary/real distinction, both of which are effects (rather than causes) of consciousness.151 Very simply, the real, for Baudrillard, is already imaginary, and symbolic exchange unconceals this. Given the primary status of the symbolic, it is therefore curious that Baudrillard provides no answers to why there is such an ‘irreversible evolution from savage societies to our own’ defined by its loss. This marks what Pawlett terms the ‘temporal problem of which comes first, the symbolic order or the real/imaginary opposition’152 The symbolic exchange takes on the characteristics of a state of grace prior to modern rationality. For Deleuze and Guattari, by contrast, the cruelty of primitive rites of passage is a ‘theft that prevents the gift and the counter-gift from entering into an exchangist relation’; it sets up a register of ancestral debt from which primitive social production derives. For Baudrillard, the gift and counter-gift integrate life and death precisely by accessing a primary milieu of reciprocity between them. Is not, then, the symbolic exchange a semi-transcendent ‘real of death in itself’ for Baudrillard?153 It is clear that, for Deleuze and Guattari, primitive inscription is a way of coding death as a primary milieu of revolutionary decoded flows, death understood as contingency and mortal rupture in and of itself. For Baudrillard, primitive initiation accesses not the real as such, but a symbolic-real of gift exchange. Baudrillard’s use of the term counter-gift is thus insufficient to ward off the charge that his is a semitran- scendental characterisation of the symbolic.154 Baudrillard refuses Deleuze and Guattari’s naturalism, but flirts with a symbolic idealism instead. The exchange of death has to come first, as the ideal displaced origin of all human experience. For Deleuze and Guattari there is simply no ‘question of returning to the pre-signifying and pre-subjective semiotics of primitive peoples’.155 Baudrillard’s error is that of nostalgia; his symbolic exchange is the dream of an ‘impossible return’ to an imagined condition of ideal symbolic equanimity.156 Symbolic exchange with their ancestors results from the effort the primitives have gone to code their night- mare; it is not a prior state but a practice. Inasmuch as the symbolic exchange takes on an ideal function, Baudrillard cannot recognise the pragmatic and political function of initiation in primitive societies.157 The primitive circulation of desire under ancestral debt, in other words, mediated via myth, has discrete functions as part of the primitive anticipation-prevention machine seeking to code death’s promise of a revolutionary disorder. Baudrillard moves in the opposite direction, theorising an ideal primitive equilibrium of death as gift exchange beyond the unconscious, which is tragically occluded by the onset of modernity.158 This is not to deny that Deleuze and Guattari’s account is naturalistic; clearly it is, as Baudrillard claims, rooted in a categorical reading of the relationship between death and creativity. When Baudrillard points out that what bothers him ‘about desire is the idea of an energy at the source of all these fluxes’,159 he raises a cogent point: Deleuze and Guattari are engaged in an explicitly vitalist project.160 For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is the pure continuity of revolutionary deterritorialisation.161 Desire is neither essentially human nor even biological; the unconscious is a machine of machines breaking the primary disintegrating flow of desires/intensities. Desire is the flux of intensity in the movement between affective states which is assembled or cut into by machines of any type or genus. Not only do animals have revolutionary desires, but so do plants, industrial machines, and ecological processes: Revolutionary desire is simply the deterritorialising movement of matter itself.162 Desire’s deterritorialisation is the expression of the primacy of a vital tendency to creative disintegration in all assemblages.163 Naturalism defines Deleuze and Guattari’s Universal History.164 For the same reason, revolutionising capitalism is unfolding it to nature. Much as Badiou‘s work emerges out of fidelity to Cantor’s mathematics, Deleuze and Guattari’s work operates out of a fidelity to a natural movement that is generically creative: an anarchist materialism.

#### Vote negative to mark death as productive – this shatters their violent conceptualization of life and instead understands the death as merely an inevitable deterritorialization which does not only mark the end of one relation but the beginning of another.

Michelsen 2 [Nicholas Michelsen, BA International Relations and Philosophy, MA International Conflict and War Studies, King’s College, London, - “Politics and Suicide: The Philosophy of Self-destruction”, Chapter 2: Self-Burning – Death and Desire, Pages 66-70, Published October 13, 2017 – Routledge, Taylor and Francis Publishing – <https://www.routledge.com/Politics-and-Suicide-The-philosophy-of-political-self-destruction/Michelsen/p/book/9780815377535?utm_source=cjaffiliates&utm_medium=affiliates&cjevent=76a90231b22811ec806b03cb0a82b838>] BRACKETED FOR POTENTIALLY TRIGGERING LANGUAGE //ACCS JM

Each body has its own model of death, which determines the productivity of its lived experience. This is simply to recognize that individuals think about their deaths in diverse ways. Our mortality, the fact that we die, and individual finitude are not the same thing, but rather interact to singularize us. We are circumscribed in countless ways, by time, talent, experience, understanding, intelligence, passion, and perseverance and in all else. The ubiquity of our finitudes is the definitive feature of being; it defines the particular assemblage of affective capacity which is a life. Our model of death is as singular as the assemblage of affects that defines each body: The meanings that men give to death hinge on the meanings they give to their lives. The conceptions of death are as variegated and complex as those of life. Death has no essence. It has no core of its own. Its substance is all borrowed, is wholly circumstance. Its shape is utterly determined by what manner of life it ends. To say each body has its own model of death is simply to recognize that a body is defined by what it can do. A body’s affects are the condition for its relations with other bodies; racehorse-rider-bet, oxen-farmer-cart, flea-dog.77 The model of death is, very simply, what it means for a body to be dead; no more biting, no more running, no more loving, no more writing, no more eating. Bodily intensity = zero. The machine stops. A model of death is thus singular; each body has its own. The model is not an object or different understanding of the body; rather it allows us to think what a body can do as the recording surface upon which any particular assemblage of affects (desiring-machines) that makes up a body takes place. It is not a place for assemblage, rather it occupies space as an immanent matrix of intensities, upon which the stratifications or materialisation that organise or disorganise a body can occur.78 The model ‘can be occupied, populated only by intensities’, because it is the unformed, nonstratified field for those intensities to pass by and into each other, to pulse or intensify.79 The model of death is the body in its most reified state of potentiality, prior to affect, and so defines the body’s assembled finitudes.80 The model of death is the positive limit of what a body is capable of as the source-point of all intensities.81 Badiou argues in Logics of Worlds82 that ‘death is not a category of being’ but of appearing; a logical and not an ontological matter, and so cannot be spoken of in itself.83 Beings are not integrally mortal, but rather simply have death as one of their possibilities; as the contingent ‘minimisation of its identity, and thus of its degree of existence’.84 Deleuze and Guattari agree that the model of death is the minimisation of the body’s affects.85 What they dispute is any claim that this implies a primary identity or preorganisation. Organisation or disorganisation, they argue, can only occur on the model. The model is a fully ontological matter in this sense: It is the positive matrix for all that a body can be. The model of death is the register of possibility. Desiring-machines distribute themselves on the model of death, and determine the capacity for a body (individual or collective) to add to its affects: arm for grabbing, mouth for speaking.86 The model of death thus conditions the possibility of affective recombination and proliferation.87 It is the matrix for the construction of new relations on a body. This implies, as Badiou notes,88 the self-organisation of an intrinsically surging body by way of its free assemblage, but it is decidedly not a derivation from negative totality. The model resists any and all preorganisation, and only as such, is it the motor for bodily autopoesis.89 The model of death = all affects at zero. The model provides the contingent surface on which affects are attracted to each other in new formations. That explosion of self is the ‘experience of death’.90 Every deterritorialisation involves such an experience, involving the transformation of our model of death.91 By allowing the model to disorganise the body, it is released for its productive reassemblage.92 Desiring-production is this break-flow process, crossing affective states.93 This is not a vision of endless departure: A body moves from affective limits to the redefinition of those limits.94 Life is the oscillation from model to experience and back again. Creation always takes place from the architecture of death.95 In Anti-Oedipus, Freud’s account of death has been radically reconfigured as the perpetually remodelled condition for the possibility of life as a creative experience of dying.96 This implies we need not live in ontological dread of death as the liminal condition of our freedom, but rather actively transform what it means to die. Fear is simply one way in which mortality may be experienced.97 Play with our experience of death is the practice of life, and requires self-knowledge to the degree that modelling death is the substance of practical embodiment (it defines what a body can do). Put simply, dying takes effort. The becoming of desire is inseparable from a concept of death as self-created.98 This is not a matter of simply choosing death. Indeed, for Deleuze as Guattari, it is not so much that we can choose death as that the experience of death is the only process.99 When Deleuze and Guattari state that the model can’t ever truly be reached because it is a limit, they make it clear that this is not about the actual reduction of affects; the point is not that we should simply destroy ourselves, but the experience of dying is nonetheless what is at stake.100 The experience of death may or may not be about the enlargement of affective capacities – the enlargement, in other words, of our model. There is no such thing as death per se.101 Where is the human subject in this account? If the model of death is a motor for the proliferation and mutative transformation of our desiring machines, there surely seems little space for human subjectivity.102 Surely, as Land claimed, humanity can only surrender its place to a machine function.103 Freud is certainly indicted for insisting that ‘you will be a subject’ and inventing the conceptual tools to ‘nail us down as one’.104 Subjectivity appears almost exclusively as a target for machinic disarticulation.105 Creative subjectivity is the art of becoming the residuum of our death; this is precisely a question of ~~suicide~~. It is only in the play of our subjective masks that life becomes productive. Death is differencing, machinically assembling novel chains on the model we have constructed for our- selves.106 The subject is an ambulant activity on the recording surface.107 The human subject here is defined only by the inevitability of its becoming-other.108 All firm representations of the self are illegitimate enclosures of desiring-production into territorial forms. Whilst this subject is perhaps a leftover, it does not lack.109 The residual subject is full of affects-realising as a recombinatory multiplicity.110 Through its operationalisation of death, desiring-production enacts a subject scattered ‘around the entire compass of its cycle, a subject that passes by way of all becomings correspondent to the included disjunctions’.111 Subjectivity dwells in possibility,112 as ‘an intense feeling of transition’.113 It is constantly productive and, as such, becoming-revolutionary: Lines of subjectivization are ‘lines of fissure, lines of life-death which, when they fold over and re-divide, form at the interior an outside’.114 This is a condition in which death changes nothing; that is to say, it is already there.115 The experience of death thus implies a kind of extra-being, already there as the nascent and all-pervasive matrix of desiring-production.116 Revolutionary lines of flight are expressions of continuity precisely inasmuch as they are the expression of discontinuity with the body (experiences of death). Subjectivity is always ~~suicidal~~, it seems. The problem of ~~suicide~~ which A Thousand Plateaus makes explicit is thus already explicitly at issue in Anti-Oedipus. A creative subject is necessarily one step away from [death] ~~a suicidal one~~, because it is by definition dissolving. Subjectivization is autodissolution. When Deleuze and Guattari argue in A Thousand Plateaus that ‘in dismantling the organism there are times one courts death,’ they directly extend their account of subjectivity as a machinic oscillation between model and experience of death.117 This is why Deleuze and Guattari raise in that later text the need for an ‘art of dosages’. It is all too easy to overdose on death. You don’t do it with a sledgehammer; you use a very fine file. You invent self destructions that have nothing to do with the death drive. Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor.118 Furthermore: You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small supplies of significance and subjectification, if only to turn themselves against their own systems when the circumstances demand it . . . and you need to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to dominant reality.119 Building oneself a model of death and deterritorialising requires caution, for reasons integral to the process itself. Some machines are more productive than others; plainly not all models of death are productive. One can, obviously, live in permanent despairing dread of death or live life as a morbid absurdity; the question is how productive will you be. Anti-Oedipus makes it clear that you can’t deterritorialise without making a model of death, A Thousand Plateaus is concerned to demonstrate that it is entirely possible to botch it, creating fruitless or barren experiences of death. A botched model seeks to reduce the body’s affects rather than expanding them.120 Rather than attracting desiring-machines to circulate anew on its matrix of intensity, an ‘Empty’ model repels them along with the organism, destroying the organism with so ‘violent an action’ that ‘you blow apart the strata’ entirely. The consequence is that ‘instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunging into a black hole, or even dragged towards catastrophe.’ The empty body is a too ‘organised death’, a life that is closed to novelty and refounded in suicidal identity.121 The model of death obviously sets out criterion for a breakdown of the body as well as the organism. We can become anorexic,122 masochistic123 or alcoholic, and in the process set about the reduction of bodily affects to nil. The other way of botching it is going fully cancerous and fascistic; a death-machine sending its tanks outwards under a Promethean promise.124 There are many ways to botch the model. We can only take care always to add to our affects rather than embrace the purity of subtraction; a condition of too heavy deterritorialisation. To reach a point where ‘there is no longer an I,’ accessing the model of death so as to release the proliferating desiring machines, cannot be achieved through an ethic of purification. Accelerating too fast may lead to a ‘body of nothingness, pure self-destruction whose only outcome is death’.125 Experienced as uncertainty and self-critique, the paranoid organism is constantly battling to keep its underlying disorganisation under wraps. Some models drive reactive stratification, as the fear of disorder materialised. Organisation is a reaction to the primary risk of violent deterritorialisation; this applies at both the individual and social levels. The danger represented by the seductive purity of a full subtraction of affects is irrevocable. The appeal of submitting to disintegration is integral to being, but not because it is an unconscious drive.126 All creative experiences skirt real abolition: the demented reduction of a body’s affects to zero or the unrestrained pursuit of a desire’s line of flight into a black hole. Each subject is a residuum of their death.

## 2

#### The affirmatives investment in the future is a product of neoliberal biocapitalism and operates through enhancing certain bodies at the expense of disabling others which sustains a reproductive order geared towards the future in the image of a better than able-bodied subject. In reality, this figure is impossible to satisfy and requires the simultaneous death and enhancement of disability.

Fritsch 15 The Neoliberal Biopolitics of Disability: Towards Emergent Intracorporeal Practices by Kelly Fritsch June 2015 pg. 145-146 //ACCS JM

Thus, while Edelman (2004) is correct in asserting that the contemporary political order favours heteronormativity in the ways in which it incites the Child as the image of the future, this image of the Child of the future also continuously incites compulsory enhanced-bodiediness as the child of reproductive futurity is not only not to be disabled, but must be better than able-bodied. McRuer, in the context of Edelman’s work comments: “‘everybody,’ after all, or so the saying goes, ‘wants a healthy baby.’ At the same time, despite this commonplace desire, the imagined future is actually inescapably inaccessible; no real, flesh-and-blood child can ever embody the innocence, health, and ability associated with the sacred Child” (2008). I agree with Edelman’s sharp and scathing critique of reproductive futurity, and while I also agree with McRuer that Edelman’s Child is able- bodied, what neither Edelman or McRuer elucidate is how reproductive futurity relies on both a capacitated and bodily enhanced Child that shapes the ways the political gets mobilized in the name of the future, and for some disabled children to grow up at the expense of others who are never intended to grow up. Edelman is right, then, about the ways in which the figure of the Child re-inforces heteronormativity but he fails to take stock of the ways in which the Child is also always, already able-bodied, or how the Child is capacitated and enhanced. While McRuer is right to point out that no child can fully embody the desirable able-bodied child, and, thus, sets up disability as the impediment to a desirable future, I am interested in how the better-than-able-bodied Child requires some disabled children to grow up at the expense of other disabled children in order to give the Child meaning. Thus, the disabled child is the figure of no future, as will be demonstrated in the case of Emily Rapp (2013) desiring to terminate pregnancy on the basis of disability, and in the case of infanticide and filicide on the basis of disability. However, the disabled child is also the figure of the future in that the suffering child creates particular neoliberal futures through the mobilization of biocapital, cure, and enhancement. Therefore, as I will go on to show, we are deeply invested in narratives of suffering children, but some of those children are always supposed to remain children, never growing up, while others are celebrated, enhanced, and capacitated precisely because they can be made to slide into the neoliberal promise of the future. As I will argue, it is precisely in sliding into neoliberalism’s forms of capacitation and enhancement that incapacitates and disables others. The ‘end of suffering’ and ‘no hope for the future’ That disabled children have no future and are the denial of the future as McRuer (2008) argues is perhaps most evidenced in instances of parents “mercifully” killing their disabled children to end their suffering. Stories of such incidences litter news and blog sites in which parents undergoing significant stress and hardship in trying to raise disabled children come to believe that there is “no hope for a future” (S.E. Smith 2013). For example, in New Malden, south-west of London, England, on April 22 2014 between midnight and 5 am, Tania Clarence suffocated to death her three year-old twin sons, Max and Ben, and her four year-old daughter, Olivia in a move “to end their suffering” (Davies 2014). The nanny of the children, Jadna Coelho, found them dead in their bedrooms of their £2 million family home (BBC 2014). Away on holiday at the time was Tania Clarence’s husband, Gary, an investment banker, along with their able-bodied eldest daughter. In October 2014, murder charges against Tania Clarence were dropped after she entered a plea of “manslaughter by diminished responsibility.” The Crown Prosecution Service found Clarence to be “suffering from a major depressive episode at the time of the killings which amounted to an ‘abnormality of mind’” (Davies 2014). All three children had Spinal Muscular Atrophy (SMA) Type 2, which falls under the large umbrella of variations of genetic and neuromuscular disorders of Muscular Dystrophy. SMA Type 2 is described by the media as “a life-limiting progressive disease” that can “cause fatal respiratory problems” (Davies 2014). Zoe Johnson, the Prosecutor in charge of the case, describes Tania Clarence as holding the “firm belief that the quality of her children’s lives was more important than their longevity” (Davies 2014). This belief, the Prosecutor says, is “entirely understandable” (Davies 2014). Defence attorney Jim Sturman remarked that Tania Clarence “was manifesting stress throughout the life of the children by their suffering, and caring for three children with this condition was exhausting, distressing, debilitating and turned out to be overwhelming” (Davies 2014). As a result, it is understandable that Tania Clarence did what she did because she “had no hope for the future” (Smith 2014). Tania Clarence’s distress and lack of a hope for the future for herself and the future of her children also seems understandable despite the Clarence’s financial affluence that allowed them to fully renovate their expensive home, hire both a nanny and a maid, and allowed Tania Clarence to leave her job as a graphic designer to stay home to help care for the children. Indeed, despite Tania Clarence’s financial comfort, in a letter she wrote her husband two days before the killings she noted that “I cannot face going down this path watching Liv and the boys continue to get weaker... I am tired of it all. No matter what we overcome, no matter what we do, it will never be enough” (Wilkes 2014). Later, in another letter addressed to her husband, written after killing her two sons but before killing her daughter, Clarence wrote: Gary, I need to tell you how difficult it is for me to take Liv’s life... If I could take my own life and leave her to wait for you I would... My only solace is the pain and future suffering I am saving her from. I am so sorry... The only thing giving me the motivation to continue is the belief that the boys are already playing up in heaven like they could never play here. (Wilkes 2014) Only through death can a future be imagined for disabled children. And in killing disabled children, Tania Clarence produces a future without disability and, thus, one way of fulfilling the thinking that disability has no future.

#### Happiness without an analysis of affect ignores that the objects we encounter are never neutral. The figure of the better than able-bodied Child circulates happy affects of pride, hope, cure, and progress, which sustains the promise of happiness and shapes our affective dispositions. This affective economy determines the projected value and circulation of social goods and allows biocapitalism to frame disability through a narrative of overcoming suffering, producing disability as tragedy, pity, and disgust.

Fritsch 2 The Neoliberal Biopolitics of Disability: Towards Emergent Intracorporeal Practices by Kelly Fritsch June 2015 pg. 82-84 //ACCS JM

Indebted to the work of Henri- Bergson, Baruch Spinoza, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guarttari, affect can be conceptualized as pre-individual forces that augment or diminish a body’s capacity to act, engage, or connect. For Ahmed (2010), happiness involves affects in order for the objects of happiness to become social goods. That is, she argues that feelings do not reside within individual subjects and then move outwards towards particular objects but rather, she contends, objects create impressions through feelings (14). To feel happiness “is to recognize that happiness starts from somewhere other than the subject who may use the word to describe a situation” (21). And, as Ahmed continues, “If happiness creates its objects, then such objects are passed around, accumulating positive affective value as social goods” (21). Through the production of happiness, objects become social goods that have positive affective qualities. “To be affected ‘in a good way’ thus involves an orientation to something as being good” (24). Happiness is an affective economy that allows us to have contact with good objects. Since “we move toward and away from objects through how we are affected by them” (24), happiness orients what objects we come into contact with. That objects are considered happy or are considered the cause of happiness “means they already circulate as social goods before we ‘happen’ upon them, which is why we might happen upon them in the first place” (28). That is to say, the objects we encounter are never neutral. In order to happen upon an object, its affective value is already in place; the object is already invested with positive and negative value (34). As happiness is a shared social orientation toward what is good (56), going along “with happiness scripts” is a way of getting along; “to get along is to be willing and able to express happiness in proximity to the right things” (59). The ISA is, I argue, a site of affective happiness within neoliberalism and functions in such a way as to hamper the conditions necessary to dismantle ableism and compulsory able-bodiedness. In what follows, I trace the ways in which the production of disability has been built upon positive affects, and in turn, how the ISA is imbued with happy affects that capacitate certain forms of disability inclusion. I conclude by considering where the “cruel optimism” (Berlant 2010) of the ISA leaves disability scholars and activists who seek disability justice. The contemporary production of disability has been built on positive affects. The circulation of positive affects in the production of disability does not replace other modes of producing disability, but rather is layered within them. This is to say, the ways in which disability is produced through tragedy, pity, or disgust, are all tangled up with positive affects; all these forms of producing disability work together and re-enforce one another. From the demand to overcome shame and embody pride (Kolarova 2012), to the medically driven imperative to overcome suffering and embody an expression of hope (Fritsch 2013), the disabled have been positioned as the inspiring and courageous crip, the ones who will be cured through positive thinking, and as an individualized problem that is solvable. Disability is caught up in the ableist turn towards healthism and the imperative for everyone to have intensively enhanced bodies (see Chapter 3). From the oft-cited “Jerry’s Kids” (see Chapter 5), to the culturally ubiquitous inspirational quotes that mark disability as something to conquer and fight, happy affects of cure, overcoming, and progress are embedded in dominant conceptions of disability. Happy affects drive what McRuer (2006) has termed “compulsory able-bodiedness,” not only because people are invested in the “happiness scripts” of biological cures, narratives of overcoming, and the allure of technological advances, but because compulsory able-bodiedness is always, already, a social good in neoliberal capitalism. As such, the happy affects circulating by way of pride, hope, cure, or progress, end up retrofitting disability as “a vector of neoliberal governance” (Kolarova 2012, 268). Disability as thing, or disability as contained by the International Symbol of Access is not only knowable and profitable, but it is also the site of happy affects. By having the wheelchair symbol adorn a bus or a building, the problem and uncomfortableness of the difference of disability appears to be taken care of. With the appearance of the ISA, happy affects of having “done our duty for the disabled” circulate, even in the face of contested understandings of disability or accessibility.

#### Their framing is inextricably tied to ableism and proves try or die flips neg.

Colebrook 17 Claire Colebrook, 2017. Acclaimed Australian cultural theorist, currently appointed Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English at Pennsylvania State University, “Lives Worth Living: Extinction, Persons, Disability,” <https://www.academia.edu/19843360/Lives_Worth_Living> //ACCS JM

What is the relationship between extinction and disability? One of the ways in which we might think about disability and disability studies is as requiring an expansion of conditions of justice; this is how Martha Nussbaum has criticized the liberal tradition of fairness and personhood. We should, she argues, extend considerations of fairness to include those who care for others. If we think about a world that enables human capacities and flourishing, then we need to look be-yond autonomous and self-defining individuals. Disability considerations would both enhance and extend the range of political compassion, enabling a notion of persons that is not merely that of the abstract political subject, but a being with capacities and dignity; capacities are richer and more varied than our narrow notion of person currently allows (2006). For Nussbaum we will live in a better world if we expand our notion of capacity and what counts as a flourishing human life. In what follows I want to reverse this relation, and rather than expand capacities and justice to allow for disability (with disability being the secondary consideration), I want to see disability as the primary or transcendental condition from which the supposedly “normal” person derives, and further to see the long history of the “normal” subject as directly intertwined with the accelerated extinction of humans and non-humans. If one considers the subject of capacities from which Nussbaum begins her critique – the liberal person, blessed with reason, autonomy, “favorable” social conditions and an enlightened milieu of political deliberation – one would need to recognize the long history of enslavement (of humans and non-humans), exploitation, appropriation and colonization that made even the thought of the just society possible. Disability is not an add-ed on concern but is precisely what orients, if silently, the problem of extinction. One might say, that “human” existence is constitutively disabled (or, to follow Bernard Stiegler, that its default condition is dependence upon a broad network of technologies and archives that have never been equally distributed (Stiegler 1998, 122). Further, the capacities that enable the “able” person have cost, and continue to cost, the earth. Those lives that are (to borrow from Nick Bostrom [2013]) “technologically immature”, may perhaps not be lamentable and to be avoided at all costs, but perhaps offer a trajectory for life that is not necessarily that of extinction. Even though the specific concepts of extinction and disability are rarely explicitly linked the two concepts are inextricably intertwined in discussions of what counts as a life worth living. Indeed, the grand Socratic notion that the unexamined life is not worth living, is not only normative (which is almost unavoidable) but normalizing: to privilege the life of examination is to open up a history that will generate the individual, reflective, deliberative and rational subject, but to make a claim about a life not worth living is to hint at the long history that will extinguish, eliminate, harness and evaluate unworthy lives, and will do so precisely by way of capacity. Outside explicit work on extinction and outside the rich field of disability studies it is possible to find constant and complex linkages between the question of the worth of life (its capacity or ability) and whether such a life ought to exist. Many such arguments are utilitarian; and while utilitarianism might seem to be but one branch of (analytic) philosophy, part of my argument will be that as a conception of the liberal subject of capacity gains ascendency and takes on increasing value in neo-liberal arguments for autonomy, and as the planet faces accelerated and mass extinction, a utilitarian logic be-comes increasingly dominant. Utilitarianism is a motif that will necessarily haunt questions of extinction and capacity: as re-sources and the capacity to survive become threatened decisions will need to be made regarding the worth of life. Precisely in this respect it is utilitarianism that has also articulated the most offensive position on disability. By offensive, here, I am not referring to an affect or emotion, but rather – as in the manner of a military offensive – a direct and forthright targeting of what has been set aside as “disabled. Here, it might seem that a utilitarian approach is partial, and that there are other ethical paradigms, which of course there are; but I want to argue that the extreme positions that utilitarianism has yielded, bring to the fore what is implicit in a broader history of ethics focused on personhood and a life worth living. One of the objections to calculations of utility would be by way of a deeper or inviolable conception of the person, but this too relies upon distinguishing between what counts as “utility” and what would warrant a mode of “dignity” beyond calculation. For Nussbaum, the key stakes of justice lie in considering what counts as a dignified life, where dignity includes capacities that extend beyond social utility and mutual advantage. Her claim is that dignity should be the basis for social entitlements, and that we attribute dignity not for rational and active powers, but for “our” animal fragility: “bodily need, including the need for care, is a feature of our rationality and our sociability; it is one aspect of our dignity, then, rather than something to be contrasted with it” (2006, 160). This is perhaps why Nussbaum’s title refers to “species membership,” as though feeling and caring for one’s kind (which would, in part, include non-human animals) is not only a recognition of dignity, but dignifies one’s own life. To suffer, to be fragile is to possess a life worth living. Here, Nussbaum refers to the value and enhancement (beyond strict utility) of caring for others, and of having social relationships with those whose capacities are not those of the classic rational individual; her approach on capacities “includes the advantage of respecting the dignity of people with mental disabilities and developing their human potential, whether or not this potential is socially “useful” in the narrower sense. It includes, as well, the advantage of understanding humanity and its diversity that comes from associating with mentally disabled people on terms of mutual respect and reciprocity” (2006,147). Nussbaum presents her account as a broadening of theories of human justice by way of a more classical conception of the life worth living, one not reduced to narrow notions of mutual advantage. Even though her discourse and disciplinary terrain might appear to be strictly philosophical, the very mode of posing the question of what we owe to a life is really (ultimately) the question that presses itself upon human civilization now, and always. As “we” look to the future and the sixth great extinction event the question of who and what survives will be imposed upon us. Utilitarian approaches to this question are, as I have already suggested, offensive, but they are because they disclose something offensive – or combative, violent, conquering – in the philosophical tradition of dignified humanity and the life worth living. In this respect, disability is neither a recent nor a local concern: the very formation of the Greek polity is based on the exclusion of those with lesser capacities. Even though, as Lennard Davis (2013) has argued, the notion of the “normal” body is very recent and is quite different from earlier cultures’ conception of an ideal body that no actual member of the species achieves, the exclusion of those who do not possess the proper potentiality of political humanity has been at the basis of the history of the Western polity. When Nussbaum argues for an expanded sense of capacities she nevertheless, and necessarily, maintains the question of the life worth living. This classic philosophical question always and necessarily invokes ability, or, more accurately, disability, and this in two respects. Not only are subjects defined by way of powers (of reason, deliberation and empathy), those capacities in turn are enabled by a history of technologies and archives upon which “able” subjects are increasingly dependent. At the very least, definitions of proper political persons rely upon quite specific capacities that, even in expanded scenarios are not all-inclusive. More importantly, the quite specific concept of the liberal, deliberative, rational and empathetic subject depends upon a history of “enlightenment” that disabled many lives, either by way of exclusion, colonial-ism, resource depletion, or expropriation. In a world where not all lives matter to the same extent, the concept of disability is precisely what enables political inclusion, privilege and person-hood. When Peter Singer argues, in a manner that appears to be exceptional, and exceptionally offensive that rationality and autonomy (and not species membership) are the capacities that would preclude us from being right in killing another humaon being, he is taking part in a far broader offensive that is definitive of the philosophical epoch oriented around the question of the life worth living. Not only is the question of the life worth living offensive (in its implicit generation of an unworthy life), the life worth living is a life of dependence and incapacity, generated through a history of enlightenment that is a history of appropriation, plundering, brigandry, excessive consumption and energy profligacy. Could we have the able political subject of deliberation and reason without the planet-destructive history of industrialism and globalism that at once enables and disables what has come to be known as humanity? Could there have been a tradition of “the life worth living” without a global industry that generated unworthy and dis-abled lives? And is not the question of the life worth living, the capable life, intertwined essentially with dependence and incapacity? What I want to question here is whether such a question can have any coherence at all in an epoch of extinction: to ask about lives worth living is necessarily to be offensive, asserting some lives over others, and thereby waging violence (however slow) against some forms of life. If, as I would also argue, any epoch of thriving and fecundity takes place at the expense of some lives, then all ages are ages of extinction. What makes our time – the sixth mass extinction – more intense is that questions that have always haunted political personhood are now becoming more explicit. The interrelated problem of capacity and extinction has not only determined the human lives that are deemed to be worth living, but has also generated the liberal political person whose autonomy, productivity, super-intelligence and heightened capacity for urbanity is the “Anthropos” of the Anthropocene, the “man” whose cost to the planet is too exorbitant to reckon (Luke 2015). When (today) utilitarian arguments are explicitly offensive, or make the claim that some lives ought not be lived, they reveal the offensive (combative, polemical, violent, barbaric, sacrificial) nature of what has called itself civilization. If this civilization, today, is facing extinction and therefore pressed – more than ever – to consider ways of “weighing lives,” it may either continue with ever more nuanced and expanded conceptions of the worth of life, or it may regard this question itself as an indictment of the very rationality it seeks to save. Phrased differently, we might say that the problem of disability runs to the very heart of the extinction-logic that enables the political tradition of the person. Both those who assume that the human species – because of certain capacities – has a prima facie right to survive, and those who calculate that human life as such is not worth living (for all their seeming extremity) are expressions of a broader logic of the proper potentiality of a highly normative conception of human flourishing. As an example of the prima facie “right to humanity,” I would cite Rebecca Newberger Goldstein’s defense of Sellars and philosophical progress. The rational image we have of ourselves, even when at odds with scientific evidence about the irrational causes of our behavior, will generate on ongoing history of coherence and inclusion, where the rational “we” extends itself to value others: Gregarious creatures that we are, our framework of making ourselves coherent to ourselves commits us to making ourselves coherent to others. Having reasons means being prepared to share them—though not necessarily with everyone. The progress in our moral reasoning has worked to widen both the kinds of reasons we offer and the group to whom we offer them. There can’t be a widening of the reasons we give in justifying our actions without a corresponding widening of the audience to which we’re prepared to give our reasons. Plato gave arguments for why Greeks, under the pressures of war, couldn’t treat other Greeks in abominable ways, pillaging and razing their cities and taking the vanquished as slaves. But his reasons didn’t, in principle, generalize to non-Greeks, which is tantamount to denying that non-Greeks were owed any reasons. Every increase in our moral coherence—recognizing the rights of the enslaved, the colonialized, the impoverished, the imprisoned, women, children, LGBTs, the handicapped ...—is simultaneously an expansion of those to whom we are prepared to offer reasons accounting for our behavior. The reasons by which we make our behavior coherent to ourselves changes together with our view of who has reasons coming to them. And this is progress, progress in increasing our coherence, which is philosophy’s special domain. In the case of manumission, women’s rights, children’s rights, gay rights, criminals’ rights, animal rights, the abolition of cruel and unusual punishment, the conduct of war—in fact, almost every progressive movement one can name—it was reasoned argument that first laid out the incoherence, demonstrating that the same logic underlying reasons to which we were already committed applied in a wider context. The project of rendering ourselves less inconsistent, initiated by the ancient Greeks, has left those ancient Greeks, even the best and brightest of them, far behind, just as our science has left their scientists far behind. This kind of progress, unlike scientific progress, tends to erase its own tracks as it is integrated into our manifest image and so becomes subsumed in the framework by which we conceive of ourselves (Newberger Goldstein 2014). For all its manifest worthiness the notion of a progressive “self-image” that gains in progressive global coherence, alongside scientific progress, sees its path of self-correction as improving with more and more human life taking part in the journey of development. One could make the rather obvious point that such a notion of “progress” by way of inclusion and ongoing “self-image” precludes other ways of thinking about human and non-human life that do not involve self-image (or some shared normative conception of “the human”); but in addition to the colonialist mentality of self-justification, one might ask about the price paid for such a history of philosophical progress. Would not other modes of life – such as those without an over-investment in “self-image” or “the” human – have generated a quite different history of the planet? Such a question cannot be asked if a certain mode of human reason is an unquestioned good. But just as the inflation of human personhood precludes asking the question of the loss and extinction of other lives with other capacities, certain arguments for the extinction and annihilation of part or all of humanity also assume the value of the person – a single life with its specific coherence, value and meaning. (Not only is such a notion historically and culturally specific, and tied to a highly normative conception of human self-awareness; it is also this self with an unquestioned right to the “good life” of reflection, reason and self-determination that has generated the Anthropocene.) When this prima facie right to life has been questioned it has, more often than not, been by way of the same norms of capacity, will, autonomy and personhood that supposedly make life worth living. David Benatar has argued that the human species as such should – after rational consideration -- decide that it ought not exist. If we were to calculate the pleasures and pains of human existence, then not only would we decide on non-existence as the best way to ensure the reduction of suffering; we would also realize that while there is an imperative to eliminate suffering there is no symmetrical imperative to bring persons into being to generate pleasures or well being. Benatar does not see a performative contradiction in being a will who decides that it is better not to exist as a willing being; once we come into being there is a rational reason to persist in our being and live as well as possible, but that does not entail that we should will other lives to come into being. Benatar’s argument is an intensified form of an argument that has profound implications for disability (Benatar 2006). Peter Singer has argued that being human is not sufficient to justify a life worth living, and that the calculus of pain, suffering and living well should prompt us to choose the life of some animals -- who could enjoy lives free of suffering -- over the lives of some humans, whose quality of life would not count as living well. It is for this reason that Singer can at once argue that animals ought not be killed for human consumption, and that some forms of infanticide are legitimate. For Singer, it is the lack of rationality, autonomy and a certain appreciation of life (rather than being human) that renders life not worth living: “the fact that a being is a human being, in the sense of a member of the species Homo sapiens, is not relevant to the wrongness of killing it; it is, rather, characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness that make a difference. Infants lack these characteristics. Killing them, therefore, cannot be equated with killing normal human beings, or any other self-conscious beings” (Singer 1993, 182). Singer expands on this point by considering a specific type of disability and what it precludes: “to have a child with Down syndrome is to have a very different experience from having a normal child. It can still be a warm and loving experience, but we must have lowered expectations of our child’s ability. We cannot expect a child with Down syndrome to play the guitar, to develop an appreciation of science fiction, to learn a foreign language, to chat with us about the latest Woody Allen movie, or to be a respectable athlete, basketballer or tennis player’’ (Singer 1994, 213). This degree of disability does not necessarily warrant infanticide or abortion, but what does count is development; the more capacity a being develops the less ethical it is to terminate a life. If parents choose to abort an “abnormal” fetus, then they do so at a stage prior to the development of the capacities that would make killing unethical; the same applies to infanticide. It is not species membership but capacity that counts. Both Benatar and Singer rely upon a strict utilitarianism; species and sentiment aside, one should decide on whether a life is worth living in general, where worthiness can (at the very least) be determined by an absence of suffering. In contrast with arguments that begin from the sanctity of the person, one begins with a calculus: a good life is a free self-determining life. If one accepts the premise of a life worth living then certain lives become candidates for non-being (for Singer this is the profoundly disabled, while for Benatar it is humanity as such). It seems that questions of utility, or of what counts as a life with a sufficient degree of pleasure (or meaningfulness, or autonomy) lead inevitably to questions of human non-being: are there some lives that simply should not be? One might respond to this by objecting that the calculus of decision presupposes that which it claims to have justified; the subject who is doing the calculating, who is deciding on what ought to survive and how lives ought to be weighed is – needless to say – a certain type of subject. This subject has the following capacities: a sense of ‘a’ life, a sense of capacity (with rationality and autonomy being of significant importance), a sense of ‘humanity’ as a global whole of which one is a member, and a manner of looking at life in terms of worthiness. One should not need too much training in anthropology, history or critical race studies to discern the highly specific nature of these capacities. This is not just to make a point about the poverty and brutality of Western reason and its normalizing gestures; it is also to say that many of the critiques of that same universal subject – such as those who argue for the worth of other lives, or those who value life as such for whatever reason – nevertheless take part in a rationing of life that is offensive. Here, I draw again on the necessarily offensive/combative character of any assessment of the worth of life. Even if the worth of life is defined by less strictly utilitarian categories such as “meaning” or “dignity” a certain capacity for calculus, for considering something like human life as such, and then the value of “a” life, allows for the claim that certain lives being extinguished, and enables a life of high-capacity (high-production, high reason, high technology) that has precipitated the sixth mass extinction. The calculations of Singer and Benatar are different in important ways and related in important ways. For Benatar, a lot depends on pleasure and pain not being symmetrical: even if most of my life were one of enjoyment, the non-being of enjoyment is not a loss, whereas the being of suffering is a loss. Not existing, and therefore the absence of pleasure is not a straightforward negative in the way that suffering is: when one is suffering it makes sense to want to eliminate suffering, to will suffering away. But it does not make the same sense, in a state of non-being, to will pleasure (and the existence it would require) into being. Singer, by contrast, is concerned with non-being not because he deems human life to be worthless but because – quite the contrary -- he accepts a certain worthiness of some modes of existence. There are some forms of human life that are so impoverished or incapacitated that “we” who exist and have developed reason are permitted not to bring them into being: “Shakespeare’s image of life as a voyage is consistent with the idea that the seriousness of taking life increases gradually, parallel with the gradual development of the child’s capacities that culminate in its life as a full person” (Singer 1996, 216). The unit of life by which we calculate who lives and who dies (what counts as suffering) begs the question: should we really be able to decide that some lives (ranging from all human life to disabled human lives) ought not exist? One could say, following Kant, that being able to make such a calculus -- being able to ask about what life ought to be -- destroys any unit that would allow lives to be weighed in relation to each other. Rather than have a measure that would negotiate who lives, one would value life precisely because it is without measure. Indeed, our lament or preliminary mourning for the possible extinction of humans would lie in the anticipated loss not of our species being but of the intelligence that enabled the thought of our species being. Even a cursory glance at “end of world” narratives reveals that what presents itself as the end of “the” world is really the end of the “rational” world of capable persons. Post-apocalyptic scenarios present humans wandering aimlessly in resource-deprived landscapes, subjected (once again) to tribalism, despotism and the loss of all “reason.” (As one recent example one might think of Mad Max: Fury Road [2015] where the remaining populace has become nothing more than a multitude focused on mere survival. One feature of “post”-apocalyptic cultural production is that there is a world after the end of the world, but it is no longer the world of liberal affluent personhood; “we” are suddenly “all” living in third world conditions.) One might say that what would be lost in the end of the world – or that what we fear when we contemplate human extinction – is not the loss of the world, or of life (for both would continue) but the loss of what has come to count as “rational” or “intelligent” life. It is not so much calculated as calculating life that is worthy of living on, and while there are some general preliminary mourning rituals for the sixth mass extinction, cultural production seems to be more concerned with the extinction of Western middle-class urban capitalist life. One can think here of the large number of “end of world” narratives that are really “end of Manhattan” plots, from The Day After Tomorrow (2004) and Cloverfield (2008) to the book and documentary The World Without Us (2007) that begins by describing New York going through a slow decay after humans are no longer there to maintain the altered land-scape. So, yes, there is a broad perception of the looming extinction of more than human life, but it occurs in a context of an increasing focus on the loss of the only life worth saving, a life that is not calculable precisely because it is the life of the point of view of reason, where reason – in turn – is a highly specific (or species-defining) range of capacities. For Nick Bostrom (director of the “Future of Humanity Institute” at Oxford University) it is obvious, upon rational reflection, that the loss of intellectual life as such would be of a catastrophic order that far outweighs the tragedy of losing some or many humans. Bostrom follows Derek Parfitt in “demonstrating” that a loss of all rational human life, despite first assumptions, would be far far worse than losing nearly all rational life. Despite our first intuitions, events that appear to be profoundly catastrophic (like the Holocaust) are – ultimately – events from which “we” recover. What would be truly disastrous is a loss of rationality, rather than the loss of a very large number of humans. Bostrom calculates that all most of our efforts ought to be directed at the reduction of existential risk; minimizing the risk of the catastrophic loss of intelligence in general is a far greater priority (or ought to be) than - say -- reducing the risk of local catastrophes (such as the genocidal losses that humans have already sustained but which, on reflection, do not amount to that much of a loss in the scheme of things). So we might say that both for Benatar and for Bostrom, despite the seemingly opposed claims for human extinction (Benatar) or human survival at all costs (Bostrom), there is a prima facie value placed on human capacity defined as rationality of a certain mode: If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least 1016 human lives of normal duration. These lives could also be considerably better than the average contemporary human life, which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice, and various biological limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress. However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 1034 years. Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1071 basic computational operations) … If we make the less conservative assumption that future civilisations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher estimates of the amount of computation and memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be realised. Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonisation and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 1016 human lives (Bostrom 2013, 18). This is what connects Bostrom’s work on avoiding existential risk with his work on the importance of technological and cognitive enhancement: life is valuable because it is intelligent, and a maximally intelligent life is one that is pain-free, stupidity-free and death-free. If human life is worthy of existence only if it is pain-free or at least pain-free for the most part, then it follows that -- as Benatar argues -- the life that we have now is not worth living. Where Benatar and Bostrom differ is not over value -- both value life only in its maximally capable mode, as does Singer -- but in prediction: Bostrom sees human life at present as incapacitated, not yet technologically mature, and tragically subjected to a death and suffering that it ought -- rationally and upon reflection -- avoid. An extreme position, such as Benatar’s, that argues for willed extinction of the human species does at least follow from his premise that only a certain type of life is worth living. We might respond to such “reasoning” that we can, and should, avoid willed extinction (of ourselves, or of a version of ourselves, or others) by shifting ethical terrain. Liberalism in its best mode would not determine in advance what counts as a life worth living, and would therefore go so far as to include lives that were not only not super intelligent but also worthy, even if not capable of the high levels of reasoning that are demanded of autonomous political subjects. As we have already seen, Martha Nussbaum has argued that we ought to include those whose lives involve different capacities and needs, and accommodate those who must care for persons who would not meet the demands of traditional political subjects. One might even formulate a more nuanced mode of utilitarianism from such considerations: would a world in which “we” cared for those not able to care for themselves not be a more enjoyable world? Or would it not - at least -- suggest values other than those of enjoyment, such as the value of experiencing human dignity, love, compassion and care? If utilitarianism pushes us towards calculations of who ought to live, of whether life ought to be extinguished, and of weighing lives, then an expanded liberal conception of personhood would say that the very possibility of asking that question -- who should live? -- necessarily destroys calculus and pushes us to the question of how one ought to live, which in turn precludes the possibility of anyone having the expertise or measure of deciding on the being or non-being of other humans. What a relief. We have done away with the awful weighing of lives. We allow every person to decide what counts as being human. And for those not blessed with the power to decide, we also allow for those who must care for humans who don't quite meet the conditions of liberal personhood. Get rid of blindly rationalized utilitarianism and you get rid of the specter of extinction. Unfortunately, if some forms of rational calculus seem to foist the problem of human non-being before us, the problem of human non-being (or imminent extinction) drags us back into utilitarianism. This is very clear in more applied versions of utilitarianism and especially the discourse of health economics where distributions and doing good can be determined by calculating “qalys” (quality adjusted life years) or “dalys” (disability adjusted life years) [Murray 1996]; we might want to reject utilitarianism and health economics’ rationalizations, but I would suggest that luxury of refusing calculus has always been a luxury for some. Tim Mulgan (2011), in a thought experiment that writes the history of philosophy from the “broken world” of the future, argues that just as we look back with horror and puzzlement on Ancient Greece and its notions of philosopher kings and natural slaves, so the future “broken world” of resource depletion will look back with wonder at the world of free liberal personhood that could proceed without calculation or “survival lotteries.” This world (of ours, today) will appear as a bizarre exception to a future world that inevitably confronts questions of who ought to survive. Not everyone can live, and not all lives are viable. If we are faced with a world of limited resources, where the life of the liberal person and favorable conditions is simply not sustainable, then however we might want to avoid it, we will be forced to ask about what counts as a viable life. Mulgan's future broken world of survival lotteries, or a world in which some humans -- because of the sheer luck of the draw -- do not survive has not only already arrived: it has always been present. Was there ever a time when the world came even vaguely close to John Rawls’s “favorable conditions” where justice was the same for all? I would suggest, in a manner that differs from that of Benatar, that what has emerged as human, as man, is constitutively disabled, and that if there is anything like a sustainable life it is precisely the life that has been extinguished in the name of the valuably and capably (or super-intelligent) human. Rather, then, than reject utility and calculus because of the offensive it directs to those lives it deems to be incapable, disabled or unworthy, I would suggest that by its own calculus the “man” of liberal reason who both generates and refuses utility is maximally self-disabling. By the same token the figures of life that seem to demand non-being are perhaps the only forms of humanity that do not, by their own calculation, generate a calculus that leads inexorably to extinction. As a case study I would like to consider a case of extinction or genocide, where one group of humans decided that the human species could - possibly - benefit by eliminating one of its kind who was not quite of its kind. The use of the term genocide, or talking about the extinction of a race, has a recent and problematic history. One has to accept the concept of a genus of the human species in order to target distinct kinds of humans. A certain racial logic pertains both to targeted genocides, but also in more well-meaning claims that certain events of colonial violence are best thought of as events of genocide. In the case of the “last Tasmanian Aborigine,” there might seem to be some political value in identifying British colonialist strategy as a genocidal re-gime aiming to “breed out the color” of the Australian Aboriginal peoples. Mourning the loss of a people, and focusing on irrevocable loss might go some way to forcing contemporary Australians to realizing that the past is not the past, that the drive towards the extinction of a people is not extinct. In the conclusion of this chapter I want to question the genocidal logic that lies behind claims for lives worth living, and for human capacities that are distinct from species membership, while at the same time recognizing that the use of the term “genocide” for all its assumptions that humans can be grouped into species and genus, is always an offensive (agonistic) strategy. One thing that one has to deal with, or deal with to set aside in the discussion of genocide in Aus-tralia, is the kerfuffle that became known as the history wars. If you research online about the genocide or breeding out of the Aboriginal peoples, you will come across the highly informative website of Keith Windshuttle whose work is motivated by the desire to rid the Australian collective psyche of what he deems to be a pathological guilt and mourning (Windshuttle 2010). One of the motivating contexts for his work was the government report on the stolen generation, which de-tailed the ongoing strategy of removing Aboriginal children from their families. One way in which this strategy was understood was as an attempt to breed out color, and it is this notion that Windshuttle rejects: what occurred may have been lamentable and part of a broad strategy of colonialism but not genocide. If one wants to challenge Windshuttle’s account it would make sense to emphasize race, and not to say that deep down we are all human and therefore what took place was “merely” colonization. If one does not recognize race one is blind to racial strategy, and if one does not recognize genocidal strategy then one does not recognize the ongoing specter of a particular type of assimilationist violence. However, one further problem attends the strategy of claiming that genocidal intent was directed against Australian Aboriginal peoples: the mourning (by way of a highly languid television documentary) of the last Tasmanian not only dis-places colonial violence to a different time and place, it also maintains the notion of “a” race that could be isolated and extinguished, and implicitly claims that there are now no persons who might claim land rights on the basis of being tied to the land. The “extinction” of “the” Tasmanian Aborigine is at once a cultural fantasy about a violent colonization that is well and truly in the past, and an erasure of other modalities of being human that “we” mourn as lost. On the one hand, non-indigenous Australians need the notion of Aboriginals who are tied to land by way of a timeless dreaming, rather than ownership or filiation: there must be, somewhere, a sense of space and time that is not that of managerial capitalism. And yet, it is precisely that thought of another humanity -- one that was sufficiently other to the point that it could be extinguished -- that allowed claims that Tasmanian Aborigines were extinct (and therefore no longer a burden for land rights claims). Once again it is a certain type or form of subject that can look at the array of human lives and claim that “a” race has become extinct; this purveying eye that has a com-mand of history, anthropology, life and time both requires and erases any mode of “the human” other than its own capable kind. We seem to be poised, as liberal multiculturalism often is, between post-racial claims for a general humanity that does not need to be marked or set apart to achieve a right, and a politically astute account of the ways in which white colonizing capitalism achieved its universality by erasing and exterminating others, and creating them as other by way of strategies of cultural erasure. But I want to suggest that this seemingly intractable and universal problem is a problem for a portion of humanity, and a portion that has the logic of extinction at its heart. Let us go back to the first problem of who ought to live and why, or the question of how one ought to live, and what counts as a good life, or a life worth living. As I suggested, problems of extinction bring in, it seems, a form of utilitarianism: how do we manage the survival of life, maximizing life, and maximizing good life? At the same time, questions of utility seem to raise the specter of extinction: some lives might just not be worth living. But perhaps these questions are already racial, bound up with the “man” of Western reason who is not a species. From the Socratic elevation of the examined life, to the various forms of post-humanism that range from assuming that there is a prima facie value attached to the ongoing survival of thinking to the inclusion of non-humans as persons, White Western man does not have a race: but he does not have a race because he asks the question of the value of life, of what it means to live. He is at once the only man to face extinction -- for when we view contemporary cinema and television about the end of the world it is the end of this man (the man of libraries, familial man, post-racial man, the man of reason) who is threatened with extinction, or the world’s end. What we witness is not genocide, but the end of the world. It is because this man has always asked about “the good life” -- even if that is a liberal life that has no good other than the asking of the question -- that he can be the victim of extinction. Asking the question of the good life, of how “one” ought to live is both genocidal and extinction-generating. Since its invasion Australia was deemed to be terra nullius partly on the basis of rampant opportunism, but also because a form of (indigenous) life was not recognized as properly human. Not only were indigenous Australians not property-owning, industrious and industrializing developers of the land with a techno-science oriented to the maximization of a life they identified as human, and thereby not deemed worthy of recognition, the very logic of techno-science that could only recognize such cultures as minor and racial (distinct, enigmatic) would be the same planet-transforming “species” that now proclaims itself as author of the Anthropocene. The very possibility of utilitarian questions -- who ought to live, is this a life worth living, how might we live on maximally?-- is part of a logic of appropriation, extension, survival and calculus that divides species/genus questions. There are metaphysical questions -- about how “one” ought to live, and the life worth living -- and these are for man, who is not a species but a potentiality – a power of thinking and living that transcends any body. And then there are genus questions, how “we” negotiate different claims for survival. It makes sense to mourn the extinction of “the” Aboriginal people, for those people have a race that might survive only by way of blood, language, culture and a distinct archive. To conclude, I would note first that what counts as the individual of ability -- where self and ability are mutually constitutive -- is at the heart of the “Anthropos” who has precipitated itself and others into accelerated extinction. The self of technoscience can easily be tied to the pollution of the earth, but so can the universalizing self of liberal and utilitarian theory: I can kill, exterminate and save if I have the ability to think beyond myself to the curious value of life as such, of life that might be maximized and weighed. The self of disability might appear to be secondary or parasitic concern, but I would argue the contrary: it is organic disability that requires a body to generate techne, stored energy and archives; the more this dependence is mastered, the more a disequilibrium opens up between those who render themselves productively and theoretically able and those who possess different abilities and disabilities. I am not just saying that had “we” not developed all those abilities that are definitive of the liberal subject the earth would be better off, as though human excellence came at a price to non-humans, I am saying that the very questions of how one ought to live, of the value and meaning of life, of weighing life, creates a specific terrain and orientation that is now reaching its limit. It is not, then, that the self of liberalism and utilitarianism needs to expand and include other modes of the self, to be more caring to those not blessed with the same abilities; that self needs to be seen not as the basis of the species that must be saved, but as a genus tied inextricably to logics of extinction. One can only calculate the worth of living, at the expense or cost of other life, if one has a conception of life, and it is that general conception that is both historically and culturally odd, and that requires an anthropology. How did some living beings constitute themselves as an ability to evaluate life? How is it possible for a being to ask about the value of one life as opposed to another life? How is it that the agonistics of life became a calculus? I want to point out not only that there are many modes of being human for whom the overall existence and extinction of the human is not a problem, but that the modality for whom extinction of intellectual life is a problem, is a self of white, modern, calculative ability that is exceptional and not the default setting of the species - if there is such a thing. Gilles Deleuze, writing on Foucault, points towards the specificity of the man-form, that comes into being by way of a certain type of question (Deleuze 1988). What allows something like “man” to emerge is that rather than see his being as an aspect of a complex whole that he knows with some degree of clarity and distinction, he comes to know himself clearly and distinctly, and then places what is other than himself -- nature, life, the biological or species being of the human -- in parentheses. We are distanced from that life, but that distance or absence of foundation, allows us to become self-legislating, contractual, formally rational subjects. Life does not tell us what to do, and we are not simple expressions of life; the human, or man as question, must now labor over whether all life makes a claim to be, or whether the being who asks that question -- a being liberated from mere life -- has some privilege: do we save the local, indigenous, immediate and unreflective; or, does the capacity to ask that question create every other form of life as one expression of anthropological calculating man? When philosophers dispute about a life worth living, arguing for or against whether a life is able enough to live, they are part of the same voice that can observe fragments of the human species as a genus, or a particular kind of a general species, over which a single voice might range. End of the world narratives, and scenarios of catastrophic risk - such as those of Nick Bostrom -- contemplate the extinction of this “genus which is not one,” and assume both that this would be the catastrophe of all catastrophes, and that humanity is necessarily defined by a certain concept of personhood that is irreducible to the human species. Indeed, it is ability -- in Bostrom’s case, intelligence - that needs to be preserved; it is this life that would count as extinction as such, and not “merely” genocide. An anthropological and calculative “we” emerges by way of technologies that generate and calculate the worth of “a” life, and this life is the life of a person: a being who is distinct from nature, and who may even calculate something like their own right to life or cost to the earth by way of a carbon footprint, imagining that they might live on this earth but deftly erase any damage to their milieu. It is this same person, distinct by way of certain predicates, who might view and weigh other human non-persons as members of a genus, as instances of a way of life to be preserved, or not.

#### The alternative is to engage in a heterotopic imagination of disability – our alternative operates as a method of seeing disability as good enough rather than an obstacle to overcome or fix. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best rejects linear models of optimism.

Fritsch 3 The Neoliberal Biopolitics of Disability: Towards Emergent Intracorporeal Practices by Kelly Fritsch JUNE 2015 pp. 174-175 //UTDD + ACCS JM

Challenging the undesirability of disability is a shared responsibility and goes beyond the inclusion of disabled people within the exploitative and individualized relations of neoliberal capitalism. That is, challenging the undesirability of disability requires more than individualized access to education, employment, or vibrant social lives. Challenging the undesirability of disability requires that disability be imagined differently, that is, imagined in ways that ensure that disability can be collectively practiced and experienced differently. In order to imagine disability differently, it is imperative to understand how the neoliberal hegemonic social imagination both works to curtail who is considered desirable and informs the production of a good, individualized neoliberal subject that limits disabled and able-bodied people alike. Neoliberal policies and practices individualize both able-bodied and disabled bodies through forms of debility and capacity (Puar 2011) and through the economization of social relations and life itself (Murphy 2013) such that being critical of these forms of social, economic, and political relations is not enough to extricate ourselves from our role in maintaining and reproducing these relations. In order to desire disability differently, we must begin with marginal, heterotopic imaginations whereby disability is practiced as not something to overcome or merely tolerate, but rather as a part of a life worth living. Building on Michel Foucault’s concept of heterotopia (1998), a concept that marks “outside places” by their discontinuity and multiplicity, and drawing on the work of Mel Chen (2012) and Rod Michalko (1999), I argue that the heterotopic imagination reconfigures how disability emerges, with whom it emerges, and where. When disability is viewed through the lens of the heterotopic imagination, it becomes an intracorporeal, non-anthropocentric, multiplicity that exceeds the individualized human body inscribed by neoliberal biocapitalism. To elaborate on disability as this emergent multiplicity, I read Chen’s and Michalko’s work alongside Thomas Lemke’s (2015) work on Foucault’s concepts of the milieu and government of things, as well as the agential realism of feminist materialist Karen Barad (2007; 2008). Desiring disability differently does not merely allow the current formulation of disability to become desirable. On the contrary, desiring disability differently through the heterotopic imagination radically alters what disability is, how it is practiced, and what it can be.

## 3

#### Interp – mega-constellations aren’t appropriation – 2 warrants.

**Johnson summarizes 20** Johnson, C. D. (2020). *The Legal Status of MegaLEO Constellations and Concerns About Appropriation of Large Swaths of Earth Orbit*. Promoting Cooperative Solutions for Space Sustainability | Secure World. <https://swfound.org/media/206951/johnson2020_referenceworkentry_thelegalstatuso> (Chris Johnson is the Space Law Advisor for Secure World Foundation and has nine years of professional experience in international space law and policy.) //Recut Xu

No, This Is Not Impermissible Appropriation An opposite conclusion can also be reasonably arrived at when approached along the following lines. The counter argument would assert that the deployment and operation of these global constellations, such as SpaceX’s Starlink, OneWeb, Kepler, etc., are aligned with and in full conformity with the laws applicable to outer space. These constellations are merely the exercise and enjoyment of the freedom of exploration and use of outer space and do not constitute any impermissible appropriation of the orbits that they transit. Freedom of Access and Use Permits Constellations Rather than being a violation of other’s rights to access and explore outer space, the deployment of these constellations is more correctly viewed as the exercise and enjoyment of the right to access and use outer space. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes a right to access and use space without discrimination. Not allowing an actor to deploy spacecraft, regardless of their number or destination, would be infringing with the exercise of their freedom. It would be discriminatory. Additionally, actors do not need permission from any other State, or group of States, to access and explore outer space. Aligned with the Intentions of the Outer Space Treaty This use of outer space by constellations in LEO, while not explicitly mentioned by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty or other space law, actually is the fulfillment of their visions for the use of outer space. The preamble to the Outer Space Treaty (which contains the subject matter and purpose of the treaty and can be used for interpreting the operative articles of the treaty) speaks of the aspirations of humanity in exploring and using outer space. It is easy to see constellations that will provide Internet access to the world as fulfilling the visions of the drafters: The States Parties to this Treaty, Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development, Desiring to contribute to broad international cooperation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that such cooperation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples, As such, subsequent article of the Outer Space Treaty should be read in a permissive light, as permitting constellations, rather than a restrictive light which only sees potential negative aspects of constellations. Due Regard and Harmful Contamination Will be Addressed Operators in LEO are well aware of the challenges to space sustainability that their constellations will pose and will be taking efforts to mitigate the creation of debris. OneWeb is keenly focused on space sustainability and has even argued that the current norm, whereby spacecraft are not in space for longer than 25 years and are deorbited from lower orbits at the end of their lifetime (aka post mission disposal), is not sufficient to keep outer space clean and that shorter lifespan limits should be imposed on operators, especially operators in LEO, and operators of small satellites. Additionally, these systems will be able to cooperate with emerging space safety and space traffic management plans and can operate in ways that do not restrict or impinge on other users of the space domain. Because due regard is therefore displayed for the space domain, and to the interests of others, these constellations do not prejudice or infringe upon the freedoms of use and exploration of the space domain and are therefore not occupation, or possession, much less appropriation.

#### OST is the standard for space law.

Wikipedia No Date [Wikipedia. “Outer Space Treaty.” No Date. Accessed 12/18/21. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outer_Space_Treaty> //Xu]

The Outer Space Treaty, formally the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, is a multilateral treaty that forms the basis of international space law. Negotiated and drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, it was opened for signature in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on 27 January 1967, entering into force on 10 October 1967. As of February 2021, 111 countries are parties to the treaty—including all major spacefaring nations—and another 23 are signatories.[1][5][note 1]

#### Semantics o/w –

#### a] Precision – they can arbitrarily jettison words which decks ground and preparation because there is no stasis point

#### b] Durability – grammatical correctness makes debaters effective academics and professionals

#### c] Legal ed –

Heath 06 Brad, reporter at USA Today. “Small mistakes cause big problems” November 21, 2006. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-20-typo-problems\_x.htm IB

In the legislative world**, such** small errors**, while uncommon, can** carry expensive consequences. **In a few cases** around the nation **this year,** typos and **other** blunders have redirected millions of tax dollars or threatened to invalidate new laws.

#### Vote for predictable limits – their aff explodes the object of the resolution to include random space activities from tourism to research to satellite surveillance – that allows them to cherry-pick the best aff with no neg ground – also kills predictable advocacies which decks prepared engagement.

#### Fairness – it’s a prereq to judge evaluation

#### Education – it’s the only portable impact

#### CI – a) brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving which doesn’t set good norms b) it collapses since weighing between brightlines rely on offense defense

#### DTD – its key to deter future abuse

#### No RVI’s – a) chilling effect – people will be too scared to read theory because RVI’s encourage baiting theory b) clash – people go all in on theory which decks substance engagement

## 4

#### CP Text: Do the aff without the ballot.

#### The 1AC is an activist game – they trade violence for points and collect the ballot for passing “Go” – voting neg induces a break in that operationality in favor of critical reflection.

**Schleiner 19** Anne-Marie Schleiner, 2019, “The broken toy tactic: Clockwork worlds and activist games,” from “The Playful Citizen Civic Engagement in a Mediatized Culture,” edited by René Glas, Sybille Lammes, Michiel de Lange, Joost Raessens, and Imar de Vries, SJBE

Although my argument in this chapter will be informed by the substantial inroads that Bogost and others have wrought theorizing the dynamic procedural rhetoric of games, what has been somewhat overlooked, even by critics of ‘procedurality’ like Miguel Sicart (2011), is a closer consideration of procedurality itself. In particular, I am interested in the impact of these ‘gamic’ procedures on political or social critique in what are called ‘serious games.’ Serious games is a grab-bag appellation for diverse educational, training, and activist games, which I will for this chapter primarily limit to the analysis of ‘activist simulation games,’ games such as Climate Defense (Auroch Digital 2013) or Sweatshop (Littleloud 2011) with explicit political and/or persuasive ambitions on the part of their concerned citizen makers. A one- or two-person developer is often solely responsible for all aspects of the game-making in these independent small companies, including art direction, design, programming, and playtesting. The maker of an activist simulation game attempts to make use of mimetic algorithms in the game to present a persuasive argument in motion, to launch a social, environmental, or other activist critique, or to open a political question. As more ordinary citizens come of age among the ‘ludoliterate’ versed in the language and genres of gameplay, relatively easy to produce casual games are becoming an attractive vehicle for political action (Raessens 2010). Still, we are only beginning to forge an understanding of how such games both serve and fail as activist tools, as tactics, among others, available to the concerned citizen. Therefore, my definition in this chapter of an ‘activist simulation game’ is both: a. motivated by an activist or political intent on the part of the game-maker, and b. attempts to harness simulation and procedurality in the game to carry the maker’s political critique or message to the playing public.3 A definition relying partially on the game-maker’s intention does encounter inherent contradictions, as when, for example, games not explicitly intended to be politically persuasive, such as entertaining war games, can easily be read as propaganda. But the desire on the part of the game-maker to use a game as a form of political argumentation with a broader public, both when it succeeds and fails as it is countermanded by aspects of the game, is a primary tension that I will explore in this chapter. Referring to this difficulty in designing serious games Mary Flanagan writes: “These play spaces must retain all the elements that make a game enjoyable while effectively communicating their message” (2009, 249). In an activist simulation game, a play move is not only an inconsequential act of fun, but also carries symbolic weight by referencing real issues and world problems, for instance signifying whether a member of a threatened species like the polar bear in Polar Plunder (AIMS Games Center 2013) can find enough food under the ice for her cubs despite Arctic climate change. And yet, in spite of this added worldly weight and consequentiality, it is often difficult to take serious games seriously. Although game-makers set out to shock players with a moving diagram of harmful and tragic operations, players conversely succumb to the enchantment of lively, toy-like, mechanical processes within the miniature, abstracted clockwork game world, no matter how damaging the actual operations in the exterior world, regardless of how many dolphins are killed or how many tracts of rainforest are destroyed. The game asks to be played and mastered, inviting the player to enter into its cause and effect mechanical loops, regardless of the consequences—it is only a game, after all. The ‘toyness’ of the world of the game, the miniature abstraction of the model that announces itself as game, not life, contributes to this nullification of the game’s critical impact, as I will discuss further on. Moreover, I will argue that the operational movements running inside the game induce a complacency akin to what Martin Heidegger referred to as “everyday sight,” a way of “Being-in-the-World” already familiar to us from procedural interactions in the world outside the game (1927, 107). In order to better understand the effect of the procedurality of the game on the player, in this chapter I will draw on what may seem an unlikely and acontemporous source from outside the fields of game studies and computer science, where procedurality itself has often been accepted at face value as a positive rhetorical tool within games.4 In Being and time, his primary work devoted to forwarding a temporal, embodied phenomenological understanding of human existence, Heidegger theorized a common, everyday mode of being (ontology) and a mental framework that he understood as a submersion within the everyday circulations and procedures of the work-a-day, social world (Ibid., 78). This practical view of the workings of the world is what he refers to alternately as “everyday sight” and “circumspection” (2003, 107). A railway line transports workers from the suburbs to the city; the suburban train stops to let a passenger off at an inner-city station guarded by a vigilant conductor who steps back and forth on the station platform. Such an interlocking set of functional workings, which we also see running compellingly in the toy city of Madurodam, is supplementary to Heidegger’s “Dasein in the They,” an immersed everyday orientation within the common world (1927, 167). We seldom question or “disclose” our place or the place of others in such work-a-day utilitarian operations, for to do so continuously would impede our ability to plug into the “equipmental workshops” we use to take care of daily business (Ibid., 105). The dilemma that confronts the activist game-maker is that the very procedural logic of the simulation game that he or she hopes to harness for a provocative critique has a bewitching effect on the player, comparable to Heidegger’s state of fascinated absorption in the practical workings of the world (1927, 107). Examples of equipment in Being and time, of clocks, hammers, planes, and needles, speak of a more rhythmic, mechanical, Industrial Age, but almost a century later, well into the Information Age, much of our world is still composed of functional, instrumental relations, on and off the screen (Ibid., 99). Circuitous operationality has found yet another abode in the weightless, abstract toy workings of computer games. And yet there are exceptions to this rule of the genre, ways for concerned citizens to design games that snap the player out of the hypnotic circle of toy operationality, via what I will refer to as the broken toy tactic. A rupture in the game catapults the player outside the comforting and rewarding operational sphere of the clockwork game world and induces him or her to critical reflection, contestation, or action. While analyzing two popular activist games closely, I will argue that the player’s shift from fascinated immersion in moving game world operations to a disturbed confrontation with a malfunction of play mirrors Heidegger’s anxious illuminations of the operational clockwork loops of the world that might arise when a tool, like his oft invoked hammer, is broken or missing (1927, 102). A break in the smooth functionality of the game discloses its operational logic in greater “totality” (Ibid., 105). For Heidegger, a “clearing” of everyday sight uncovers the disquieting temporality of “the who’s” existence, as well as illuminating his possibilities (Ibid., 167). Yet, in the hands of the concerned citizen game-maker, this unsettling existential pause or stop, this interruption of the game’s workings, is also a moment ripe for critical reflection and evaluation that precedes the formation of a political stance and possible action, the intended transformation of ‘games for change.’Overseers of toy world operations Let’s enter into a closer comparison of toy world operations at work in two widely played pioneering activist simulation games. The player of Uruguayan Gonzalo Frasca’s airstrike simulator game, September 12th (Frasca 2003a) assumes a ‘god’ or ‘bird’s-eye’ position overlooking a Middle Eastern city from above (see Figure 6.1). This is similar to the perspective on Will Wright’s classic SimCity (Maxis 1989) where the player as city planner constructs and manages a city from above. In fact, many simulation games, following the genre template set by SimCity and The Sims (Maxis 2000), position the player as a distant overseer of automated, minutely scaled, toy working worlds. The goal at the outset of September 12th, similar to many commercial war games released after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, appears to be to eliminate terrorists from the streets of a Middle Eastern city, identifiable by their gray robes and machine guns. But as the game proceeds, the player recognizes that the more frequently he launches missiles on the terrorists in the city, the more neighboring civilians, including women and children, are converted into terrorists. Forging a rational feedback loop between the player’s actions and visible outcomes in the game environment, September 12th simulates an escalating cycle of conflict exasperated by the War on Terror. This interactive, escalation between player and game becomes a dynamic, interactive argument for “violence begets violence.” Thus, the game procedurally makes a case for peace via the interactive simulation of strife between the terrorists and the player—who is cast in the role of an air force striker. But here we may be slightly misled in applying Frasca’s own belief in the rhetorical efficacy of simulation to the analysis of the game (2003b). The cycle of the escalation of violence largely becomes illuminated in a critical light because the game does not work properly as a game—the only way to ‘win’ the game would be to abstain from playing, from interacting with the game! On the flip side of the ‘positive’ simulation of a damaging cycle of the escalation of violence, lies a negative argument for non-intervention, for non-engagement, a ‘no play imperative’ in either war or games. Paradoxically, can the simulation of a harmful process only become visible (disclosed) to the player, and thereby leveraged as critique, if the game is made frustratingly unplayable, in effect rendered a broken toy? Before we continue with this question, let’s take a few moments to consider how procedurality and simulation have been understood in game scholarship thus far. Murray was one of the first to call attention to the procedurality of games and electronic media. According to Murray, [p]rocedural authorship means writing the rules by which the texts appear as well as writing the texts themselves. It means writing the rules for the interactor’s involvement, that is, the conditions under which things will happen in response to the participant’s actions. It means establishing the properties of the objects and potential objects in the virtual world and the formulas for how they will relate to one another. (1997, 152-153) Bogost refers to the rhetorical impact of such gamic procedural mechanisms on the player as ‘procedural rhetoric’: “I suggest the name procedural rhetoric for the practices of using processes persuasively, just as verbal rhetoric is the practice of using oratory persuasively and visual rhetoric is the practice of using images persuasively” (2008, 125). As a rhetorical form, game procedurality appears to be an important new form of communication available in the public political sphere. Similarly emphasizing the communicative power of gamic procedures, according to Frasca, a game designer or ‘Simauthor’ (simulation author) communicates via the rules, logical processes, and algorithms in the game that model the trajectory of outside the game workings and outcomes: Whoever designs a strike simulator that is extremely hard to play is describing his beliefs regarding social mechanics through the game’s rules rather than through events. […] They are not only able to state if social change is possible or not, but they have the chance of expressing how likely they think it may be. (2003b, 228) Activist game-makers such as Frasca therefore believe it is possible to harness the procedures of the game to mimic the probable outcome of a military assault, and to thereby communicate a particular belief about the workings of the world to the player-citizen, a citizen who may have voting rights and live in a nation with influence over the course of the war. Simulation games deliberately encourage the forging of correspondences from inside-the-game actions, procedures running within Johan Huizinga’s “magic circle” of play (1950), to external spheres of action, so as to provoke a confusion that Bogost dubs as ‘simulation fever’: “But for the magic circle to couple with the world, it must not be hermetic; it must have a breach through which the game world and real-world spill over into one another” (2006, 136). Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, what is important from Huizinga’s much-cited and challenged magic circle is the relation between procedures running inside the game and those outside the game. Worldly goings-on, when transposed via simulation to the game sphere or magic circle, become magically enchanting because they are miniature toy-like abstractions. My application of the magic circle to contemporary simulation games is not intended to imply that such digital games are magical, sorcerous rituals, as in Daniel Pargman and Peter Jakobsson’s (2008) critique of the contemporary usage of Huizinga’s term. The movement of causal loops within the game exerts the more mundane, everyday magic of the toy miniature, what Chaim Gingold (2003) refers to as a “miniature garden,” a spatially reduced, abstracted world like a Japanese garden, model train set, or a doll house. Over the course of his Master’s thesis, also conducted at Georgia Tech, Gingold expands on the term he encountered in an interview with Shigero Miyamoto, the influential Japanese game designer of Nintendo computer games. Gingold writes: [A] garden has an inner life of its own; it is a world in flux which grows and changes. A garden’s internal behaviors, and how we understand those rules, help us to wrap our heads and hands around the garden. […] Gardens, like games, are compact, self-sustained worlds we can immerse ourselves in. (2003, 7) The reduction in scale and in complexity in a Japanese garden, the scaling down from forest to tree, from lake to pond, serve in a game as a cognitive aid for the player’s apprehension of the systematic clockwork world, a miniature sphere of operations. The simulation game’s ‘procedural argument’ intentionally blurs the line between the miniature game world and the outside world, but there are important differences between the operations running on either side of this fence or ludic border. Although all games have dynamic, timebased procedures, not all of these play moves make much sense outside the game—in other words, to state the rather obvious, not all games are simulation games. For example, when a player makes a move in checkers, this does not correlate to a specific action undertaken in the world outside the game. In this way, the falling, colorful squares of Tetris (Pajitnov 1984) are just that, falling colorful squares. These primarily signify play moves. In such abstract games, actions procedurally advance the game forward toward a goal (or multiple goals) triggering wins and losses. By contrast, in the simulation game, actions and processes have a double signification as both gamic procedures and as metaphoric actions. And yet this added layer of metaphoric significance does not mean that the player will reflect critically on the simulated operation in activist games, as will become apparent in the following example. By way of comparison to September 12th, let’s now consider another widely played, free for download, activist simulation game that affords the player an overview of a miniature toy world. Similar to September 12th, Paulo Pedercini’s farcical McDonald’s Video Game (Molleindustria 2006), simulates a harmful operation, in this case, an environmentally destructive fast food corporate industry. McDonald’s Video Game is structured as a managerial simulation game, and although designed and programmed entirely by Pedercini, the prolific creator behind Molleindustria, the game implements a slick graphical user interface button panel (see Figure 6.2) reminiscent of commercially produced The Sims. The McDonald’s Video Game player alternates between managing four distinct production cycles: a. overseeing farm production; b. administering a cattle feedlot; c. managing a chain of hamburger-grill workers; and d. negotiating policies and marketing campaigns in ‘corporate headquarters.’ The challenge of the game is to effectively multitask, manage, and maintain the production routines in all four areas without letting one slip. As the player’s skill improves, outcomes of actions in one sphere of operations have ramifications elsewhere in the game. For instance, if not enough cattle are raised, negative consequences arise further up the supply chain, ultimately effecting the McDonald’s corporation bottom-line. Although McDonald’s Video Game periodically discloses snippets of textual information about fast food industry practices, it is this simulation of lively processes that imparts a convincing overview of interlocking cycles of fast food bio-production, from deforestation to raising enough cattle for meat to fastfood public relations campaigns. Despite recurrent dips into bankruptcy, McDonald’s Video Game operates so well as managerial training software with the management of a miniature, toy-like, cheerful cow and hamburger world that the ironic subtext of this being an unethical business practice is often missed by players. For instance, when my game design students in Singapore played McDonald’s Video Game, they seemed largely unconcerned about the detrimental side effects of this type of production on workers, animals, consumers, or the environment. They were willing to undertake whatever was necessary to keep the game system alive and the McDonald’s corporation above the bottom line, even adding diseased cows to the food chain. The enchanting ordinariness of toy world equipment Unlike the vehicles circulating in the toy model city of Madurodam, games like September 12th and McDonald’s Video Game require interaction from the player via buttons or a graphical user interface (GUI), conventionally organized into an instrumental dashboard at the edge of the screen. September 12th presents the player with a weapon for targeting and shooting the terrorists; McDonald’s Video Game offers the player a colorful toy-like button interface of slaughterhouse machinery to first convert the livestock into hamburgers, and then a different range of equipment for converting hamburgers into dollars. This observation on the equipment of the game interface may seem obvious, but it is this very ordinariness in game interaction that poses another challenge to critical and activist game design because ‘equipmental’ interactions with game procedures contribute to the player’s ‘everyday sight.’ In a chapter of Being and time entitled ‘The worldhood of the world,’ Heidegger describes the equipment required for his everyday operational view of ‘Being-in-the-World’: “In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. […] A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the ‘in-order-to,’ such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability” (1927, 97). When observable in the clockwork toy world, these equipmental operations impart everyday common sense. Referring to the simulation of a natural cycle in a clock, Heidegger writes: “In a clock, account is taken of some definite constellation in the world system” (2003, 72), and further on he writes: “When we make use of the clock-equipment, which is proximally and inconspicuously ready-to-hand, the environing Nature is ready-to-hand along with it” (Ibid., 101). In other words, those earthly relations that are simulated or incorporated in the equipment, such as the movement of the sun from day to night being replicated in the clock, are easily ‘discovered’ and naturalized in the ‘clock-equipment’. Equipment, or the “ready-to-hand” is easy to see, contrasting to Heidegger’s “presence-at-hand,” the term he uses to refer to the sounds and colors of perceived but not yet differentiated “reality,” such as a rumble of noise that upon reaching the ear does not quite resolve into the screech of a passing motorbike (1927, 228). Unlike the confusion that an intrusion of “presence-at-hand” reality might occasion, the equipmental operations of the ready-to-hand world are easily apprehended, made sense of, or ‘discovered.’ The equipment’s functionality seems obvious, running smoothly in plain sight, in the common-sense realm of ‘the They.’ Naturally, the player would want to use the available buttons to operate the farm machinery and produce hamburgers. Thus, simulation games simulate alleged processes from outside the game sphere in plain view, invoking the everyday perspective of how things work, the operations of fast food production, or of an efficient airstrike. If we apply an extended Heideggerian interpretation, ‘equipment’ refers not only to interface buttons, but also to the larger operations (in his terms ‘workshops’) that these buttons trigger or manipulate. For instance, September 12th presents the player with a weapon for targeting and shooting the terrorists; while McDonald’s Video Game offers the player a colorful toy-like button-interface of slaughterhouse machinery to turn livestock into hamburgers, and then a different range of equipment for turning hamburgers into dollars. Although ready-to-hand equipment is easily discoverable, it is also hidden, in another sense. The familiarity of everyday sight or circumspection, conceals “the totality” of a clockwork operation, the in-order-to relations that it is connected to, including objects and persons at a distance (Heidegger 1927, 105). Immersion in the clockwork world’s operations is a state of “concernful” absorption that is to a certain extent blind and alienated, not only to its own existence, but to the larger repercussions of the operation (Ibid., 101). The game’s movement compels the player to accept its operations as ordinary, as unquestionable cycles of everyday life, unfolding within plain view or, to be more precise, in relation to simulation genre games, within the elevated plain view of the great overseer of the toy world operations. The challenge that then confronts the concerned citizen game-maker is that no matter what these simulated operations are, as they run with the evocative mimicry within miniature toy worlds, they acquire everyday currency and uncritical acceptance among players via the motion of their interlocking, toy-like workings. Player vs. game But do the toy world’s procedures really subsume the player to such an extent? Is the operational functionality of the game truly so bewitching? Furthermore, an allegation could be made that Bogost’s rhetorical transmission of procedural game logic from the sender (the game-maker or ‘Simauthor’) to receiver (the player) is limited by a communications model of sending and receiving. The player in this analysis, even while interacting with the game, becomes a passive recipient of rhetoric in motion. In a similar vein, Sicart critiques the limited role that players are afforded in designer-weighted, instrumental ‘proceduralist’ game studies, writing that players “are important, but only as activators of the process that sets the meanings contained in the game in motion” (2011). Are game designers, then, the only ones afforded the role of agents of engaged ludic citizenship? In support of player agency, Frasca proposes that players, not only game designers, potentially impact the ultimate rhetorical “outcome” of a game by channeling the course of play into directions unimagined by the game-maker (2003b, 228). Frasca calls upon Brazilian theater director Augusto Boal’s “Theater of the Oppressed” as a model for how a game can depart from Aristotlean narrative closure. Frasca writes “one of [Boal’s] most popular techniques, re-enacts the same play several times by allowing different audience members to get into the stage and take the protagonist’s role,” resulting in unforeseen outcomes (Ibid.). For instance, such player-directed outcomes are evident in the spectacular demise of artificial game life, of entire families and their pets, in a dark genre of the Sims known as ‘Disaster Sims.’ The player’s influence on the game’s rhetorical outcome in such cases amounts to a breaking of the original game designer’s ‘script’ to breed a suburban American family. With these morbid, broken games, often ending in fire, we return via a different path, following the player’s initiative rather than the game-maker’s, to derailed and broken game equipment. On the other hand, when the toy is not broken, when the system is running without interruption, as when the player engages with the productive fast food mechanizations of McDonald’s Video Game, the player remains blind to its workings even as she plugs into its persuasive everyday perspective. Losing track of time, the player immerses herself in a sequence of game challenges that, if designed well, alternates rewards (points, bonuses, and additional tools) with escalating peaks of difficulty, oscillating within what psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi refers to as a pleasurable “flow state” between challenge and skill (1990, 74). Thus, the player’s fascinated state of absorption during gameplay suggests a loss of agency to the game’s mechanics, except for when the player willfully alters the course of the game’s ‘oppressive script’. Similarly, again from the realm of phenomenological philosophy, Heidegger’s student Hans-Georg Gadamer makes the inverse proposal that the game plays the player rather than the player the game (1975). Gadamer conducted an inquiry into aesthetics and art that brought him to the phenomenology of play. Gadamer’s player gives up his will to the game while performing the reflexive moves demanded by a game: “The structure of play absorbs the player into itself, and thus frees him from the burden of taking the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of existence” (1975, 105). The player merges with the game, entering into an ongoing interactive, reflexive feedback loop: “What happens to us in the experience of art, Gadamer suggests, is very much like what happens to us in play: we lose ourselves” (Weinsheimer 1985, 102). Unless the player is forced to reflect upon correspondences reaching beyond the game, the player’s critical and reflective capacity, political or otherwise, is easily bewitched amid the movement of game actions. Reacting with neither doubt, nor, on the contrary, belief, the player flows with the game’s operational allegations about how the world works. Only when the model is broken or interrupted by a renegade player, such as the maker of a Disaster Sim, or a game cheater or breaker, or through some form of sabotage installed by the game-maker, does the toy world’s algorithms and workings become visible. Frasca’s September 12th catapults the player outside the cozy assumptions of the clockwork game world and the comfortable correlations between rewarding player proficiency with toy weapons and ‘how things work.’ The brokenness of September 12th manifests in that playing well delivers loss, subverting the expectation of the player to master a rewarding challenge of eliminating terrorists. In McDonald’s Video Game, on the other hand, the very operationality of the model of fast food production cycles transmitted to the player overcomes the game’s critical impact. Beautiful toys that run too well are always enchanting, no matter how ugly the outcome of their workings. The player is lost in the game. Broken toys and the no play imperative The operational logic of the game takes hold. A player’s action inspires a resulting reaction on the part of the game. The game, in turn, compels the player to further reflexive play moves and if the game is designed well, the player loses herself, losing even a sense of the passage of hours and days, within the game, absorbed into the game’s workings, immersed in a feedback loop, Gadamer’s aesthetic union of player and game. The player performs a role among other processes running within the clockwork world through interaction with the game machine and the management of its simulated processes. Like the imprint of a popular tune that demands to be liked through its repeated exposure to the ears, players unreflectively absorb the logic of military operations, internalize the production cycle of hamburgers, and flow with the hum of tractors. How satisfying when at least the toy world is operating as it should. In the rational, operational spheres of games, as in the instrumental spheres of life, one’s everyday perspective turns away from suffering and the consequences of damaging human operations. Most feel powerless to disengage from, halt, or redirect harmful goings-on that are naturalized. Players flee their own mortality to the artificial circulations of ageless clockwork, toy worlds. In this sense, Madurodam’s endless ship and train circulations are a soothing and forgetful memorial to the untimely demise of young George Maduro. A tactical recipe for the activist simulation game consists then of two steps, f irst a positive, then a negative; f irst to constructively program a simulation of a harmful operation from the world into the game, followed up by either a game-maker, or player instigated interruption, or sabotage that breaks the spell of the game’s movement and procedurality, thereby illuminating its operationality in a critical light. Absorption in the everyday world of ‘equipmental’ dealings and transactions are broken at this rift of ‘in-order-to’ relations among entities, things, and persons. Induced to a discomforting re-evaluation and analysis of the games’ operational logic, the player performs a critical diagnosis of the wrongness or rightness of the broken play equipment. After being subjected to the broken toy tactic, a worldly operation’s common sense, the everyday claim on existence comes into dispute, becoming a matter of critical concern for the citizen-player. What is paradoxical with the broken toy tactic is that the game and activist critique remain in the last instance incompatible—only by interrupting or ejecting the player from the game, the no play imperative, is a critique illuminated and a political questioning made possible. Moreover, the intended effect of such games is not just a break in the game, but also the possibility of putting a stop to the destructive worldly procedure that is being simulated. The no play imperative extends beyond the game to the refusal to be a ‘player’ in the harmful processes of the world, a refusal to play at war, a refusal to play at the exploitation of the environment in the production and consumption of fast food. Thus, the most earnest mixture of politics and games seems to be delivered in games that do not believe in playing per se, but in the impossibility of separating the world and game, of separating procedurality in one realm or the other on either side of the ludic border. The activist game attempts to catapult the player from absorption in the clockwork toy world, to a realm of politics that he or she is otherwise quite busy avoiding.