## 1

#### A. Interpretation: The aff may not defend that we ought to reduce a subset of medicines or a single medicine.

#### “States” is a generic bare plural.

Nebel 19 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution.” Vbriefly. August 12, 2019. <https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO_avWCNzi14> TG

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the [upward-entailment test](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#IsolGeneInte) for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution.

#### It applies to “medicines” –

#### B. Violation: They only defend synethic biology medicines.

#### C. Standards –

#### 1. Precision –

#### 2. Limits and Ground –

#### 3. TVA – Read your aff as an advantage under a whole advantage – solves all your offense and also incentivizes more cheaty word PICs like agent and consult against plan affs since they lose access to DAs.

#### D. Voters:

#### Fairness is a voter –

#### Drop the debater –

#### Competing interps –

#### No RVIs –

## 2

### Framework – Short

#### Use a truth testing paradigm –

#### Presumption and permissibility negates –

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa  
But justice**,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which** must not wait**.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a **just** decision is **always** required immediately**, "right away."** It cannot furnish itself with infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions**,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And even if it did have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, the moment of decision**,** as such, **always** remains a **finite** moment of urgency and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, since it **always** marks **the** interruption of **the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive** deliberation that precedes it**,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule.** Not of the absence of rules and knowledge but of a reinstitution of rules which by definition is not preceded by any knowledge or by any guarantee as such. If we were to trust in a massive and decisive distinction between performative and constative – a problem I can’t get involved in here – we would have to attribute this irreducibility of precipitate urgency, at the bottom this irreducibility of thoughtlessness and unconsciousness, however intelligent it may be, to the performative structure of speech act and acts in general as acts of justice or law, whether they be performatives that institute something or derived performatives supposing anterior conventions. A constative can be juste (right), in the sense of justesse, never in the sense of justice, except by founding itself on conventions and so on other anterior performatives, buried or not, it always maintains within itself some irruptive violence, it no longer responds to the demands of theoretical rationality. Since every constative utterance itself relies, at least implicitly, on a performative structure (“I tell you that, I speak to you, I address myself to you to tell you that this is true, that things are like this, I promise you or renew my promise to you to make a sentence and to sign what I say when I say that, tell you, or try to tell you the truth,” and so forth), the dimension of justesse or truth of the theoretico-constatie utterances (in all domains, particularly in the deoman of the theory of law) always thus presupposes the dimension of justice of the performative utterances, that is to say their essential precipitation, which never proceeds without a certain dissymmetry and some quality of violence. That’s how I would be tempted to understand the proposition of Levinas, who, in a whole other language and following an entirely different discursive procedure, declares that “La Verite suppose la justice” (“Truth supposes justice”) (“Verite et justice, in Totalite et infini 3, p. 62). Dangerously parodying the French idiom, we could end up saying: “La justice, y a qu’ca de vrai.” This is not without consequence, needless to say, for the status, if we still can call it that, of truth.

#### External world skep is true.

Neta 14, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, 2014, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa

You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, if you **do** have hands, then you are not **merely** a brain floating in a vat **of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences** that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. But how could you know **that** you are not **such a brain? If you were such a brain,** everything would seem exactly as it does now; you would (by hypothesis) have **all** the same sensory experiences that you’re having **right** now. Since your empirical knowledge of the world around you must **somehow** be based upon **your** sensory experiences**, how could these experiences**—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—**furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.**

#### Even if it was possible to form sufficient reasons, those reasons are epistemically bankrupt in terms of their truth value because of the Gettier problem.

Chapman 18, Andrew. “The Gettier Problem.” 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, 25 July 2018, 1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem //Massa  
First, the thought is that a person must believe something to in order to know it. It would seem contradictory to claim that Max knows, but that Max doesn’t believe, that his tennis racquet is in the closet. Second, it would seem contradictory to claim to Max knows that his tennis racquet is in the closet while his racquet is actually back at the court. Max might believe that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might believe that he knows that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might even have good evidence that his racquet is in the closet and nonetheless be wrong. In none of these cases would we say that Max knows where his racquet is, since what he believes is false. Finally, it seems as though Max needs some justification, evidence, or good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet in order for him to know that it is.3 Suppose that Max has no good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet. If Max just guesses that it’s in the closet, even if he serendipitously gets things right, it seems as though Max, while having a true belief, has an unjustified true belief, and hence, does not have knowledge.4

#### Intuitions are fundamentally unsound –

#### Moral uncertainty is wrong –

## 3

#### Extinction is good under util—there is an asymmetry of pleasure and pain. The absence of pain is good, while the absence of pleasure is not bad. Even if life is pleasurable, err neg because non-existence is always good while pleasure in life is variable.

**Benatar 97** (David, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Cape Town, "Why it is better never to come into existence." American Philosophical Quarterly 34.3 (1997): 345+. General OneFile.) SJCP//JG

However, such a symmetrical evaluation does not apply to the absence of pain and pleasure**, for: 3)** the absence of pain is good**, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone,** whereas **4)** the absence of pleasure is not bad **unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation**. My view about the asymmetry between 3) and 4) is widely shared. A number of reasons can be advanced to support this. **First,** this view is the best explanation for the **commonly held** view that **while** there is a duty to avoid **bringing** suffering **people into existence,** there is no duty to bring happy people into being. In other words, **the reason why** we think **that** there is a duty not to bring suffering people into existence is that the presence of this suffering would be bad (for the sufferers) and the absence of the suffering is good (even though there is nobody to enjoy the absence of suffering). **In contrast to this,** we think that there is no duty to bring happy people into existence because**, while their pleasure would be good,** its absence would not be bad **(given that there would be nobody who would be deprived of it).**

#### Life has net-negative utility – death is key to stop future accumulation of negative value because it precludes procreation.

**Benatar 15** Benatar, David. "‘We Are Creatures That Should Not Exist’: The Theory of Anti-Natalism." The Critique. N.p., 15 July 2015. Web. <http://www.thecritique.com/articles/we-are-creatures-that-should-not-exist-the-theory-of-anti-natalism/>. //Recut ACCS JM

First, there is ample evidence from psychological research that (most) people are prone to an optimism bias and are subject to other psychological traits that lead them to underestimate the amount of bad in life [4]. We thus have excellent reason for distrusting most people’s cheery assessments of how well their lives are going. Second, when we look closely we notice just how much suffering there is. Consider, for example, the millions living in poverty or subjected to violence or the threat thereof. Psychological distress and disturbance is widespread. Rates of depression are high. Everybody suffers frustrations and bereavements. Life is often punctuated by periods of ill-health. Some of these pass without enduring effects but others have long-term sequelae. In poorer parts of the world, infectious diseases account for most of the burden of disease. However, those in the developed world are not exempt from appalling diseases. They suffer from strokes, from various degenerative diseases and from cancer. Third, even if one thought that the best of human lives were good (enough), to procreate is to inflict, on the being you create, unacceptable risks of grotesque suffering, even if that occurs at the end of life. For example, 40% of men and 37% of women in Britain develop cancer at some point. Those are just terrible odds. To inflict them on another person by bringing him into existence is reckless. Rust Cohle expresses this idea when he says that he thinks “about the hubris it must take to yank a soul out of nonexistence into this … Force a life into this thresher …” [5] (His talk of souls should obviously be taken metaphorically.) Another route to anti-natalism is via what I call a “misanthropic” argument. According to this argument humans are a deeply flawed and a destructive species that is responsible for the suffering and deaths of billions of other humans and non-human animals. [6] If that level of destruction were caused by another species we would rapidly recommend that new members of that species not be brought into existence. Although Rustin Cohle does not explicitly employ misanthropy in support of his anti-natalism, he is certainly misanthropic. For example, he observes astutely that “people incapable of guilt usually do have a good time.” [7] His inferences from misanthropy are not ones that an anti-natalist would necessarily endorse. For instance, in justifying his own (“righteous”) violence, he says that the “world needs bad men. We keep the other bad men from the door.” [8] Anti-natalists are not committed to any particular views about when violence is and is not justified. Anti-natalism is not a complete moral theory, but only a view about the morality of procreation. However, it is unlikely that vigilante violence, in which Rustin Cohle and his partner Martin Hart engage, would pass muster if relevant moral considerations were applied. Nor does anti-natalism imply that we should resort to alcoholism. Consumed to excess, alcohol tends to make life not better but rather worse – both for those who imbibe it and for those who come in contact with the alcohol abusers. There is a common tendency to regard anti-natalists as nihilists. Rust Cohle claims to be a nihilist. However, despite that claim, as Nic Pizzolatto himself has noted, Rust is no nihilist [9]. Nihilists (about value) think that nothing matters, but Rust and anti-natalists in general, **t**hink that that there is much that matters. It matters, for example, whether people suffer. Anti-natalism is grounded in deep concern about value rather than in the absence of any value. It is not only humans but also animals, or at least sentient animals that are harmed by being brought into existence. The basic curse of consciousness applies to all sentient beings. However, many anti-natalists focus on humans. The reasons vary. Among them is that (normal, healthy, adult) humans face an additional curse of self-consciousness. For related reasons, most humans are also able, at least in principle, to reflect on whether they should create offspring.

## 4

#### A. Interpretation: If the affirmative defends anything other than “The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines,” then they must provide a counter-solvency advocate for their specific advocacy. (To clarify, you must have an author that states we should not do your aff, insofar as the aff is not a whole res phil aff)

#### B. Violation: They didn’t.

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Fairness –

#### a) Ground –

#### b) Limits –

## 5

#### Reject 1AR Theory – a) Resolvability – b) No infinite abuse – c) Time Skew – d) New Extrapolation –

# Accessibility

## 1

#### “States” is a generic bare plural.

Nebel 19

Generic can’t be affirmed by particular instances “colleges fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals Colleges ought not consider the SAT.” does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. “colleges fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals Dogs are barking outside my window expresses an existential true just in case there are some dogs barking inserting any adverb of quantification cannot add meaning

## 2

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida**

justice must not wait a decision is required immediately It cannot furnish itself with unlimited knowledge of conditions even if it did the moment of decision remains a moment of urgency since it marks interruption of deliberation that precedes it

#### External world skep is true.

Neta 14

if you have hands, then you are not a brain floating in a vat But how could you know you are not everything would seem exactly as it does now; you would have the same sensory experiences that you’re having now. empirical knowledge of the world must be based upon sensory experiences

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Chapman 18

it would seem contradictory to claim Max knows his racquet is in the closet while his racquet is back at the court. Max might believe his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. even have good evidence that his racquet is in the closet and nonetheless be wrong. In none of these would we say Max knows where his racquet is Suppose If Max just guesses that it’s in the closet, even if he gets things right Max, while having a true belief, has an unjustified true belief, and does not have knowledge.

## 3

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**Benatar 97**

a symmetrical evaluation does not apply to the absence of pain and pleasure the absence of pain is good whereas the absence of pleasure is not bad this view is the best explanation for the view that there is a duty to avoid suffering we think there is a duty not to bring suffering people into existence we think that there is no duty to bring happy people into existence because its absence would not be bad

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**Benatar 15**

First, there is evidence from psych research that people are prone to optimism bias and other psychological traits lead them to underestimate the amount of bad in life Second millions living in poverty or subjected to violence disturbance is widespread depression are high They suffer from degenerative diseases Third to procreate is to inflict unacceptable risks of grotesque suffering 40% develop cancer humans are a deeply destructive species responsible for the suffering and deaths of billions of other humans and animals. Nihilists think nothing matters, but anti-natalists think people suffer sentient animals that are harmed The curse of consciousness applies to all sentient beings.