## 1

#### Interpretation: All debater’s theory shells must operate through NCM, or the norm-creation model, not the abuse model. To clarify, an interpretation under NCM necessitates that a proposed interpretation would produce better norms for debate than the mutually exclusive counter-interp and that those norms should be endorsed.

#### Violation: it’s preemptive and reactive.

#### 1] No RVI –

#### 2] Possible 1AR interps –

#### 3] Reasonability –

#### Vote Neg –

#### 1] Norming –

#### Norming outweighs and is a voter –

#### A] Collapses –

#### B] Needs norms to constitute it –

#### C] Resolvability –

#### D] It’s constitutive of the voter –

#### Voters –

#### Competing interps –

#### DTD –

## 2

#### The safety of the space is prima facie – we don’t know who’s winning if people can’t engage. Anything that doesn’t immediately denounce atrocities excludes people who have and can experience them.

**Teehan** Ryan Teehan [NSD staffer and competitor from the Delbarton School] – NSD Update comment on the student protests at the TOC in 2014. //Massa

Honestly, I don't think that 99% of what has been said in this thread so far actually matters. It doesn't matter whether you think that these types of assumptions should be questioned. It doesn't matter what accepting this intuition could potentially do or not do. It doesn't matter if you see fit to make, incredibly trivializing and misplaced I might add, links between this and the Holocaust. **All** of the **arguments that talk about how** debate isa **unique** space for questioning assumptions **make** an assumption of safety. They say that this is a space where one is safe to question assumptions and try new perspectives. **That is not true** for everyone. When we allow arguments that question the wrongness of racism, sexism, homophobia**, rape**, lynching, etc., we make debate unsafe for certain people. The idea that debate is a safe space to question all assumptions is the definition of privilege, it begins with an idea of a debater that can question every assumption. People who face the actual effects of the aforementioned things cannot question those assumptions, and making debate a space built around the idea that they can is hostile. So, you really have a choice. Either 1) say that you do not want these people to debate so that you can let people question the wrongness of everything I listed before, 2) say that you care more about letting debaters question those things than making debate safe for everyone, or 3) make it so that saying things that make debate unsafe has actual repercussions. On "**debate is not the real world**". **Only for people who can separate their existence in "the real world" from their existence in debate.** That means privileged, white, heterosexual males like myself. I don't understand how you can make this sweeping claim when some people are clearly harmed by these arguments. **At the end of the day, you have to figure out whether you care about debate being safe for everyone** involved. I don't think anyone has contested that these arguments make debate unsafe for certain people. If you care at all about the people involved in debate then **don't vote on these arguments**. If you care about the safety and wellbeing of competitors, then don't vote on these arguments. If you don't, then I honestly don't understand why you give up your time to coach and/or judge. The pay can't be that good. I don't believe that you're just in it for the money, which is why I ask you to ask yourselves whether you can justify making debate unsafe for certain people.

#### Utilitarian calculus fails to account for moral atrocities.

Jeffrey **Gold**, Utilitarian and Deontological Approaches to Criminal Justice Ethics //Massa

According to utilitarianism, an action is moral when it produces the great-est amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. A problem arises, however, when the greatest happiness is achieved at the expense of a few. For example, if a large group were to enslave a very small group, the large group would gain **certain comforts and** luxuries (and **the** pleasure **that accompanies those comforts) as a result of the servitude of the few**. If we were to follow the utilitarian calculus strictly, the suffering of a few **(even intense suffering)** would be outweighed by the pleasure of a large enough majority. A thousand people’s modest pleasure would outweigh the suffer-ing of 10 others. Hence, utilitarianism would seem to endorse slavery when it produces the greatest total amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. This is obviously a problem for utilitarianism. Slavery and oppression are wrong regardless **of the amount of pleasure accumulated by the oppressing class.** In fact, when one person’s pleasure results from **the** suffering **of another,** the pleasure seems all the more abhorrent. The preceding case points to a weakness in utilitarianism, namely, the weak-ness in dealing with certain cases of injustice. Sometimes it is simply unjust to treat people in a certain way regardless of the pleasurable consequences for others. A gang rape is wrong even if 50 people enjoy it and only one suffers. It is wrong because it is unjust. To use Kant’s formulation, it is always wrong to treat anyone as a mere means to one’s own ends. When we enslave, rape, and oppress, we are always treating the victim as a means to our own ends.

#### Util justifies horrific conclusions, since no state of affairs could be intrinsically bad from its standpoint – it also literally doesn’t believe in rights.

**Vallentyne**, Peter. *Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism*. **2006**, mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/10174/AgainstMaximizingActConsequentialism.pdf?sequence=1. //Massa

If core consequentialism is true, then any action with maximally good consequences (in a given choice situation) is permissible. The main argument in favor of this claim is the following: P1: An action is **morally** permissible if **it is best** supported by insistent moral reasons for action. P2: The value of consequences is always an insistent moral reason **for action.** P3: The value of consequences is the only insistent moral reason **for action. C:** Thus, an action is **morally** permissible if it maximizes **the value of** consequences**.** This is the same argument given in the previous section for the impermissibility of actions that do not have maximally good consequences, except that (1) the appeal to insistent reasons has been made explicit, (2) the necessary conditions of the original P1 and C have been converted to sufficient conditions, and (3) the qualification in P3 that allowed the possibility of some prior constraints has been dropped. P1 is highly plausible. An action that is best supported by insistent moral reasons is surely permissible. P2 can be challenged, as I did earlier, on the ground that beyond some point the value of consequences ceases to be an insistent moral reason (once consequences are good enough, their value may only be a non-insistent reason). For the present purposes, however, we can grant this claim. The crucial claim is P3. It is implausible, because there are insistent moral reasons other than the value of consequences. There are also deontological insistent reasons, and these, or at least some of these, are lexical prior to the value of consequences. In particular**,** individuals have certain rights that may not be infringed **simply because the consequences are better.** Unlike prudential rationality, morality involves many distinct centers of will (choice) or 15 interests**, and these** cannot simply be lumped together and traded off **against each other.**16 **The basic problem with standard versions of core consequentialism is that** they fail to recognize **adequately** the normative separateness of persons**.** Psychological autonomous beings (as well, perhaps, as other beings with moral standing) are not merely means for the promotion of value. They must be respected and honored, and this means that at least sometimes certain things may not be done to them, even though this promotes value overall. An innocent person may not be killed against her will, for example, in order to make a million happy people slightly happier. This would be sacrificing her for the benefit of others.

#### The alt is to vote neg – it’s as simple as not to vibe with oppression – as an educator it’s your job to dismiss racist, sexist, homophobic, and ableist discourse that kills the spirit of marginalized debaters.

## 3

#### Use a truth testing paradigm

#### A] Logic –

#### B] Fiat is illusory –

#### C] Isomorphism –

#### D] Inclusion –

#### E] Constitutivism –

#### Presumption and permissibility negates –

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa  
But justice**,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which** must not wait**.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: a **just** decision is **always** required immediately**, "right away."** It cannot furnish itself with infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions**,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And even if it did have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, the moment of decision**,** as such, **always** remains a **finite** moment of urgency and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, since it **always** marks **the** interruption of **the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive** deliberation that precedes it**,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule.** Not of the absence of rules and knowledge but of a reinstitution of rules which by definition is not preceded by any knowledge or by any guarantee as such. If we were to trust in a massive and decisive distinction between performative and constative – a problem I can’t get involved in here – we would have to attribute this irreducibility of precipitate urgency, at the bottom this irreducibility of thoughtlessness and unconsciousness, however intelligent it may be, to the performative structure of speech act and acts in general as acts of justice or law, whether they be performatives that institute something or derived performatives supposing anterior conventions. A constative can be juste (right), in the sense of justesse, never in the sense of justice, except by founding itself on conventions and so on other anterior performatives, buried or not, it always maintains within itself some irruptive violence, it no longer responds to the demands of theoretical rationality. Since every constative utterance itself relies, at least implicitly, on a performative structure (“I tell you that, I speak to you, I address myself to you to tell you that this is true, that things are like this, I promise you or renew my promise to you to make a sentence and to sign what I say when I say that, tell you, or try to tell you the truth,” and so forth), the dimension of justesse or truth of the theoretico-constatie utterances (in all domains, particularly in the deoman of the theory of law) always thus presupposes the dimension of justice of the performative utterances, that is to say their essential precipitation, which never proceeds without a certain dissymmetry and some quality of violence. That’s how I would be tempted to understand the proposition of Levinas, who, in a whole other language and following an entirely different discursive procedure, declares that “La Verite suppose la justice” (“Truth supposes justice”) (“Verite et justice, in Totalite et infini 3, p. 62). Dangerously parodying the French idiom, we could end up saying: “La justice, y a qu’ca de vrai.” This is not without consequence, needless to say, for the status, if we still can call it that, of truth.

#### External world skep is true.

Neta 14, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, 2014, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa

You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, if you **do** have hands, then you are not **merely** a brain floating in a vat **of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences** that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. But how could you know **that** you are not **such a brain? If you were such a brain,** everything would seem exactly as it does now; you would (by hypothesis) have **all** the same sensory experiences that you’re having **right** now. Since your empirical knowledge of the world around you must **somehow** be based upon **your** sensory experiences**, how could these experiences**—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—**furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.**

#### Even if it was possible to form sufficient reasons, those reasons are epistemically bankrupt in terms of their truth value because of the Gettier problem.

Chapman 18, Andrew. “The Gettier Problem.” 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, 25 July 2018, 1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem //Massa  
First, the thought is that a person must believe something to in order to know it. It would seem contradictory to claim that Max knows, but that Max doesn’t believe, that his tennis racquet is in the closet. Second, it would seem contradictory to claim to Max knows that his tennis racquet is in the closet while his racquet is actually back at the court. Max might believe that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might believe that he knows that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might even have good evidence that his racquet is in the closet and nonetheless be wrong. In none of these cases would we say that Max knows where his racquet is, since what he believes is false. Finally, it seems as though Max needs some justification, evidence, or good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet in order for him to know that it is.3 Suppose that Max has no good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet. If Max just guesses that it’s in the closet, even if he serendipitously gets things right, it seems as though Max, while having a true belief, has an unjustified true belief, and hence, does not have knowledge.4

# Accessibility Formatting

## 2

#### The safety of the space is prima facie – we don’t know who’s winning if people can’t engage. Anything that doesn’t immediately denounce atrocities excludes people who have and can experience them.

Teehan

debate is an assumption of safety When we allow arguments that question the wrongness of racism, sexism, homophobia we make debate unsafe for certain people. The idea that debate is a safe space to question all assumptions is privilege People who face the actual effects cannot question those assumptions, and making debate built around the idea that they can is hostile

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if a large group were to enslave a very small group, the large group would gain luxuries (and pleasure If we were to follow the utilitarian calculus the suffering of a few would be outweighed by the pleasure of a large enough majority Slavery and oppression are wrong regardless In fact, when one person’s pleasure results from suffering the pleasure seems all the more abhorrent.

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Vallentyne

If consequentialism is true, then any action with maximally good consequences is permissible P1: An action is permissible if supported by insistent moral reasons for action. P2: The value of consequences is always an insistent moral reason P3: The value of consequences is the only insistent moral reason Thus, an action is permissible if it maximizes consequences individuals have certain rights that may not be infringed interests cannot simply be lumped together and traded off they fail to recognize the normative separateness of persons autonomous beings must be respected and honored

## 3

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida**

justice must not wait a decision is required immediately It cannot furnish itself with unlimited knowledge of conditions even if it did the moment of decision remains a moment of urgency since it marks interruption of deliberation that precedes it

#### External world skep is true.

Neta 14

if you have hands, then you are not a brain floating in a vat But how could you know you are not everything would seem exactly as it does now; you would have the same sensory experiences that you’re having now. empirical knowledge of the world must be based upon sensory experiences

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Chapman 18

it would seem contradictory to claim Max knows his racquet is in the closet while his racquet is back at the court. Max might believe his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. even have good evidence that his racquet is in the closet and nonetheless be wrong. In none of these would we say Max knows where his racquet is Suppose If Max just guesses that it’s in the closet, even if he gets things right Max, while having a true belief, has an unjustified true belief, and does not have knowledge.