# Harvard 1NC – R7

## 1

#### Our interpretation is the affirmative must defend that space appropriation by private entities is unjust – hold the line, CX and the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet.

#### First, limits – Non-topical advocacies monopolize ground and allow the aff to unilaterally determine neg positions – they have the competitive incentive to find the most uncontroversial advocacy possible and frontline every negative response.

#### Second, engagement – lack of a resolutional stasis point erases any role of the negative by erasing all preparation and forcing the proliferation of stale generics that never engage with the nuances of their literature. Negation is necessary for distinguishing debate from discussion – the topic is up to the affirmative, but depth and nuanced engagement is determined by negative ground.

#### Third, switch-side debate – our model forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives.

#### Fourth, TVA – read the aff as a normative condemnation of space appropriation since it’s a form of futurism.

#### Drop the debater on T – we indict your model of debate. Competing interps – reasonability incentives a race to the bottom that proliferates violent practices to fit arbitrary brightlines. No RVIs or impact turns – A] Illogical – being topical doesn’t mean you should win, it’s a burden. B] Chilling effect – debaters will be scared to read theory for fear of losing to a prepped-out counter interp, proliferating violence.

## 2

#### Their refusal to center affect as a method of resistance dooms their project to failure – only affect can bridge the gap between discursive regimes and the material world – it’s cruelly optimistic to force chaotic identity into stable structures.

**Schaefer 13** – Schaefer ’13. Schaefer, D. "The Promise of Affect: The Politics of the Event in Ahmed's The Promise of Happiness and Berlant's Cruel Optimism." Theory & Event 16.2 2013. Project MUSE

At a recent talk at the University of Pennsylvania, Lauren Berlant was asked a question about the relationship between her work—she had just finished a lecture on the theme of flat affect in Gregg Araki's 2004 film Mysterious Skin—and the political. "Because I work on affect," she responded, "I think everything is realism" ([Berlant: 2012](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b3)). Like the dense introductory segments of each of her chapters—thick but fast-moving genealogical waterslides—I think that unpacking statements like this from Berlant is best repaid by taking them in a low gear. When Berlant maps her method as affect theory, she is suggesting that the works she examines in her capacity as a scholar of literature cannot be divorced from the political-material contexts out of which they emerge, but at the same time must be recognized as incarnations of aparticular embodied iteration within this field. Texts are produced by bodies that are both enmeshed in their political worlds and trying to negotiate those worlds in their own distinct way. Everything we do is realism: Berlant's textual objects of study are mediations, attempts to work something out, exhibitions of tensed, embodied, affective realities.[1](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f1) This is the promise of affect theory, the possibility sliding together analytical tools used to pick apart both highly individuated and highly social contact zones—bodies and histories—as incarnated realities. Affect theory wants to maintain the insights of high theory, the doctrinaire approach that says "historicize everything," while at the same time thinking of how bodies inject their own materiality into spaces. This means using language that enters the orbit of the biological. In the introduction to their 1995 edited volume Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader (later reprinted in Sedgwick's Touching Feeling)—one of the earliest manifestoes of contemporary affect theory— Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank acerbically catalog what theory "knows today," first and foremost that 1: The distance of [an] account from a biological basis is assumed to correlate near precisely with its potential for doing justice to difference (individual, historical, and cross-cultural), to contingency, to performative force, and to the possibility of change ([Sedgwick: 2003, 93](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b11)). And 2: Human language is assumed to offer the most productive, if not the only possible, model for understanding representation ([Sedgwick: 2003, 93](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b11)). Affect theory in this vision is designed to explore[s] the "crucial knowledges" of bodies outside a purely theoretical determination, outside the traditional domains of humanist scholarship—reason, cognition, and language ([Sedgwick: 2003, 114](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b11)). Affect, for Lauren Berlant, is thus understandable as "sensual matter that is elsewhere to sovereign consciousness but that has historical significance in domains of subjectivity" ([Berlant: 2011, 53](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Affect theory is about how systems of forces circulating within bodies—forces not necessarily subsumable or describable by language—interface with histories. It is about how discourses form ligatures with pulsing flesh-and-blood creatures. Two recent texts, Sara Ahmed's The Promise of Happiness ([2010](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)) and Berlant's Cruel Optimism ([2011](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)), can be seen as developing this strand, and in particular, of indicating new ways of feeling out politics through the membrane of affect theory. Both of these authors suggest that the repertoire of the analytics of power ([Foucault: 1990](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b6)) must be supplemented with resources from the affective turn. Recent critiques of affect theory[2](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f2) have focused on a branch of affect theory heavily informed by Gilles Deleuze's reading of Spinoza. In this strand, affect is rendered as a set of ontological properties, as an ensemble of mutable attributes.[3](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f3) Contemporary Deleuzians such as Brian Massumi[4](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f4) and William Connolly[5](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f5) have been targeted by these critics for their attempts at absorbing scientific research into the Spinozistic discourse of affect. But Spinoza and Deleuze are second-tier characters in Ahmed and Berlant's work—which is perhaps why Ahmed situates herself in a lineage—stretching back to Sedgwick—that she calls "feminist cultural studies of affect"[6](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f6) ([Ahmed: 2010, 13](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Where the Deleuzian strands focuses on affect as the raw material of becoming, as the play of substances, Ahmed and Berlant locate affect theory [is] as a phenomenological, rather than ontological enterprise. It is in the phenomenology of the political that Ahmed and Berlant ground their projects. For Ahmed, this comes in the form of a new attention to happiness as an object of analysis. This does not mean a circumscribed exploration of happiness as a thing, but rather programmatically asking the question "what does happiness do?" ([Ahmed: 2010, 2](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Happiness is not autonomous, Ahmed argues, but a relationship of evaluation that creates the horizon of the self. For Ahmed, the "near sphere" of the self is constituted by a perimeter studded with "happy objects." This cluster of objects is what gives the field of mobile operations of the self its shape. In this "drama of contingency," we "come to have our likes, which might even establish what we are like" ([Ahmed: 2010, 24](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). But for Ahmed, happiness as an affective field settling in proximity to bodies is not necessarily transparent in its shape or its function to the self. Happiness often takes the form, she suggests, of a promise, of a deferred possibility. Taking the phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl as a springboard for a discussion of time-consciousness, she suggests that happiness as a promise—from the Latin verb promittere, "to let go or send forth"—is an anticipation rather than a felt presence ([Ahmed: 2010, 38](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Rather than simply an affect that circulates between bodies and objects, happiness is also a promise that is passed around. This analysis of the promise of happiness underpins the genealogy Ahmed organizes in the opening chapter of the book: an exploration of the contemporary "happiness turn" in scholarship and the "happiness industry" emerging in parallel in popular media marketplaces. This discourse, she suggests, moves happiness further away from its etymological origin point—in the Middle English hap or fortune, cognate with "perhaps" and "happenstance"— suggesting chance to a sense of happiness as a scheme, a program that, if followed, leads to ultimate good ([Ahmed: 2010, 6](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). This sense of the promise of happiness is the elimination of contingency by guaranteeing the futurity of happiness: "The promise of happiness takes this form: if you have this or have that, or if you do this or do that, then happiness is what follows" ([Ahmed: 2010, 29](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Happiness as a guarantee—a promise that circulates through power-knowledge regimes—but one that defers happiness rather than making happiness present, is one of the mechanisms by which happiness is translated into the skin of a political organism, an "affective community"—such as a family or a society. Through the promise of happiness, bodies are brought together by a shared expectation of future comfort. But because this is a promise rather than immediate happiness, an interstice is formed between this promise and individual experiencing bodies— an interstice that can either be full and complete or disconnected. The family, for instance, does not share a happiness, but a happiness deferred, a promise or image of happiness to-come ([Ahmed: 2010, 46](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). It is in this interstice, either blockaded or fluid, that Ahmed articulates the need for a politics of killing joy, of breaking down the promise of happiness as a regime that demands fidelity without recourse. For Ahmed, the discourse of happiness is performative: it produces a politics of promise (or nostalgia) that suffocates alternative promises and alternative explorations. Here Ahmed produces biographies of a range of "affect aliens," bodies that are called on to be silent and accept the happiness that has been promised, while their actual desires and hopes are out of joint with the world around them: feminist killjoys, unhappy queers, melancholic migrants. The promise of happiness, Ahmed suggests, must be interrupted to make room for emancipatory politics. "I am not saying that we have an obligation to be unhappy," she writes, "I am simply suggesting that we need to think about unhappiness as more than a feeling that should be overcome" ([Ahmed: 2010, 217](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). In the closing passage of the book she writes that since "the desire for happiness can cover signs of its negation, a revolutionary politics has to work hard to stay proximate to unhappiness" ([Ahmed: 2010, 223](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Political change, Ahmed contends, is paralyzed by the imperative to be happy, to stay within the narrow guidelines of happiness's promise. Where Ahmed's background is in a western philosophical lineage that leads up to contemporary questions of affect, the immediate theoretical precursor of Lauren Berlant's Cruel Optimism is Kathleen Stewart's Ordinary Affects ([2007](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b12)), which develops the notion of the "ordinary" as a felt reality. "Ordinary affects," Stewart writes, "are the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergences" ([Stewart: 2007, 1f](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b12)). Berlant is interested in particular in how the ordinary comes to take the form of a sort of affective impasse, a set of felt relationships that cannot be moved through. Cruel Optimism is a focused study of a particular category of impasse, what she calls "cruel optimism." Cruel optimism, she explains at the book's outset, refers to a relation that emerges "when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing. It might involve food, or a kind of love; it might be a fantasy of the good life, or a political project" ([Berlant: 2011, 1](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Berlant explores a range of situations where these attachments emerge, as a response to trauma or out of the ongoing pressures of the ordinary, in particular through the parameters of what she calls "genres of precarity," a range of aesthetic practices and styles—"mass media, literature, television, film, and video"—that ... emerge during the 1990s to register a shift in how the older state-liberal-capitalist fantasies shape adjustments to the structural pressures of crisis and loss that are wearing out the power of the good life's traditional fantasy bribe without wearing out the need for a good life ([Berlant: 2011, 7](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Realism: texts always reflect an affective situation, a force field of desires, a labile contact zone between bodies and intersecting historical frames. Framing literary criticism (broadly construed) as a practice of tracing the connective tissue between bodies and situations is what lets Berlant speak to the political uses of affect. She suggests that affect theory is a "another phase in the history of ideology theory," that it "brings us back to the encounter of what is sensed with what is known and what has impact in a new but also recognizable way" ([Berlant: 2011, 53](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Affect—especially ordinary affect—is the missing link between discursive regimes and bodies, the arterial linkages through which power is disseminated. "The present" is not an assemblage of texts and knowledges, bloodless discursive inscriptions on the body, but a felt sense out of which political circumstances emerge. "We understand nothing about impasses of the political," she writes, "without having an account of the production of the present" ([Berlant: 2011, 4](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Cruel optimism as a byproduct of political situations colliding with bodies plays out in ongoing, semistable routines, in ordinariness. This focus on the ordinary frames Berlant's conception of the political as a slow-motion reaction rather than a series of staccato punctuations. This comes out, for instance, in her exhortation to move away from trauma theory as a way of "describing what happens to persons and populations as an effect of catastrophic impacts" ([Berlant: 2011, 9](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Rather, Berlant suggests that trauma is only one facet of the ordinary, a precursory event that yields new historical trajectories lived out in slow-motion. "Trauma," she writes, ... forces its subjects not into mere stuckness but into crisis mode, where they develop some broad, enduring intuitions about the way we live in a now that's emerging without unfolding, and imagining a historicism from within a discontinuous present and ways of being that were never sovereign ([Berlant: 2011, 93](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Rather than the instantiating event, Berlant is interested in the fallout of politics, the long-running reverberations. It is in these interwoven aftermaths following in the wake of bodies that Berlant locates the tropic of cruel optimism. Optimism, she is careful to point out, can "feel" any number of different ways, can come clothed in any number of affective orientations. "Because optimism is ambitious," she writes, "at any moment it might not feel like anything, including nothing: dread, anxiety, hunger, curiosity, the whole gamut from the sly neutrality of browsing the aisles to excitement at the prospect of 'the change that's gonna come'" ([Berlant: 2011, 2](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Rather than a singularly identifiable feeling, optimism takes the phenomenological form of a "knotty tethering to objects, scenes, and modes of life that generate so much overwhelming yet sustaining negation" ([Berlant: 2011, 52](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Optimism binds bodies to "fantasies of the good life," to horizons of possibility that may or may not be defeated by the conditions of their own emergence. Cruel optimism is the outcome of this circumstance of tethering confused by itself, of Möbius-strip cycles of ambition and frustration. The ordinary, precisely because of its complexity, can contain the intransigent contradictions of cruel optimism ([Berlant: 2011, 53](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). It is the space of the rubble, the hovering dust, the shockwaves that follow the event rather than the piercing clarity of the punctum itself. Berlant is interested in the ways that habits form out of situations of impossibility—for instance, in her reading of Gregg Bordowitz's documentary filmHabit (2001), about the body rituals that structure the daily lives of a gay man living with AIDS and his partner in New York City in the 1990s. Bordowitz's work maps a crisis that reflects Berlant's delineation of the field of the political: with the new availability of anti-retroviral drugs in the 1990s, AIDS ceased to be "a death sentence," and thus "turned fated life back into an ellipsis, a time marked by pill- and test-taking, and other things, the usual" ([Berlant: 2011, 58](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). For Berlant, the event is a rarity, and is only secondarily the zone of the political, which is itself constituted by ongoing patterns of response and desire—slow-motion echoes producing new forms as they cross-cut and interfere with one another ([Berlant: 2011, 6](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). In this sense, Berlant explains, her work meshes with Sedgwick's queer reading of affect as the histories that make us desire in unexpected, perverse ways. "The queer tendency of this method," Berlant writes, "is to put one's attachments back into play and into pleasure, into knowledge, into worlds. It is to admit that they matter" ([Berlant: 2011, 123](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Berlant sees the terrain of the political emerging out of this tissue of affectively-embroidered histories. Although both Ahmed and Berlant write about the uses of affect as a phenomenological bridge to the political, and the slipperiness of happiness or the good life—the way that pleasure can be wrapped up with a strain of unease— there is a distinction between their respective scopes of inquiry. Where Ahmed's book is about frustration/promise/deferral, Berlant's is about addiction. When I asked my students to come up with examples of cruel optimism, they brainstormed the following list: heroin, abusive relationships, candy, horcruxes. Each of these instances suggests a vital but destructive need, an ambivalent compulsion—an addiction, where the tectonic plates of the body's affects shift in friction with one another. Cruel optimism indexes these moments where a body desires and needs an arrangement of the world that is also frustrating or corrosive. Politics is one of these zones of fractious attraction. Berlant writes, for instance, that Intensely political seasons spawn reveries of a different immediacy. People imagine alternative environments where authenticity trumps ideology, truths cannot be concealed, and communication feels intimate, face-to-face" ([Berlant: 2011, 223](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Politics produces fantasies, tethers that draw us forward to particular attachments in the form of images, narratives, bodily practices. But these fantasies also contain the elements of their own frustration or refusal. President George W. Bush, for example, is able to use the affective elements of statecraft (a practice which, Berlant assures us, is decidedly non-partisan) to create a façade that diverts attention from his flailing foreign and economic policies ([Berlant: 2011, 226](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Berlant's focus in Cruel Optimism is on politics as a field of attachments, a skein of affectively pulsing tissues linking bodies together. "Pace Žižek," she writes, ... the energy that generates this sustaining commitment to the work of undoing a world while making one requires fantasy to motor programs of action, to distort the present on behalf of what the present can become. It requires a surrealistic affectsphere to counter the one that already exists, enabling a confrontation with the fact that any action of making a claim on the present involves bruising processes of detachment from anchors in the world, along with optimistic projections of a world that is worth our attachment to it ([Berlant: 2011, 263](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Berlant looks at how politics pulls on bodies using the ligaments of affect, how politics becomes irresistible, even when it is self-frustrating. Ahmed's focus is very different: she is interested in thinking through politics as the space of unhappiness and deferment. In a section of Chapter 5 entitled "The Freedom to Be Unhappy," Ahmed writes that revolutionary practices may need to follow from the willingness to suspend happiness, to dissolve the imbricated promises of happiness that produce hermetically sealed political systems. Affect aliens are forged in the pressure of unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises of happiness, sealed in a relationship of anticipation pinned to the guarantee of ultimate good. Thus Ahmed writes that "any politics of justice will involve causing unhappiness even if that is not the point of our action. So much happiness is premised on, and promised by, the concealment of suffering, the freedom to look away from what compromises one's happiness" ([Ahmed: 2010, 196](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). The revolutionary politics Ahmed wants to advance is willing to put happiness at risk, to dissolve promises of happiness. Ahmed is clear, though, that this is not to make politics about unhappiness: It is not that unhappiness becomes our telos: rather, if we no longer presume happiness is our telos, unhappiness would register as more than what gets in the way. When we are no longer sure of what gets in the way, then 'the way' itself becomes a question ([Ahmed: 2010, 195](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Neither happiness nor unhappiness is the telos of revolutionary politics. Rather, Ahmed wants to connect the political back to the "hap" of happiness. Rather than a critique of happiness, I would suggest that the broader channel of her project is best understood as a critique ofpromise. Thus she ends Chapter 5 with the later work of Jacques Derrida, indicating the need to keep politics open to the event, to the unexpected possibilities to-come. She proposes a vision of happiness that "would be alive to chance, to chance arrivals, to the perhaps of a happening" ([Ahmed: 2010, 198](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Where for Berlant the event is in the past, the ancestor of our tensed bodily habits today, for Ahmed, the event is ahead, the always-anticipated but radically unknown future. There is also a complementarity to these books, a sense in which both come at the relationship between affect and the political from different sides of the problem, but are nonetheless hurtling towards a common point of impact. Is Ahmed describing scenes where cruel optimism unravels under the internal pressure of a frustrated promise? Is cruel optimism the deferral of happiness implicit in the temporal structure of the promise? These are not fully resolved or resolvable questions, in part because Ahmed and Berlant roll their theoretical lens over such a wide range of circumstances. I would suggest that deepening the conversation between these approaches will hinge in part on exploring the relationship between affect and time—a question that is surfaced by both of these texts but not resolved. Ahmed wants to play inside the deconstructive thematics of the promise that allows us to view affect as a state of deferral. But Ahmed comes closest to Berlant when she writes that "[i]f we hope for happiness, then we might be happy as long as we can retain this hope (a happiness that paradoxically allows us to be happy with unhappiness)" ([Ahmed: 2010, 181](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Is deferred happiness really divided from happiness? What if fantasies—what Silvan Tomkins calls "images"[7](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f7)—are so crucial to the production of affect that to save and savor fantasies in one's near sphere is "worth" their eventual frustration? What if a promise deferred is itself a form of happiness—even if the deferral turns out, in retrospect, to have been endless? What happens while we wait? This is in no way to acquiesce to those situations, sketched by Ahmed in the inner chapters of the book, where promises are made that produce affect aliens— investment in a community of promise that will never materialize as happiness. But it is to suggest that the economic flows of affect are more complex than a simple binary of presence/deferment. There may be a clearer divergence in Berlant and Ahmed's respective emphases on the felt temporality of politics. Ahmed suggests that political transformation happens by orienting us to the perhaps, towards an evental horizon constituted by uncertainty, rather than promise. Berlant seems more skeptical about the possibility of untethering ourselves from an orientation to future happiness. As in her response to Žižek, she emphasizes the intransigence of fantasy, especially as a conduit that can produce political energy. I wonder if Berlant's answer here points to a different way of resolving the problem of temporality hovering over Ahmed's work: what if the dissolution of promise did not leave us at the mercy of a pure politics of hap, of chance, but opened us up to new horizons of hope—neither guaranteed nor radically accidental? This dynamic interfaces with an equally provocative question lodged early on and left unresolved in Berlant's book: "I have indeed wondered," she writes in her Introduction, "whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself" ([Berlant: 2011, 24](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). In mapping affectively mediated politics, how do we assess the cruelty of hope? What are the singular psychic costs of disappointment that must be risked or countenanced in the production of a politics without promise? These books are profoundly important contributions advancing the still-new and in some ways still-tentative field of affect theory. They open up two distinct but interrelated methodological templates for thinking through issues of globalization, race, gender and sexuality, media, philosophy, and religion: the thematics of frustration and of addiction in the moving affectsphere of the political. What both Ahmed and Berlant demonstrate is that affect theory offers a crucial set of resources for thinking through the relationship between bodies and discourses. The enterprise of thinking politics, of mapping the enfolding of bodies by power, cannot move forward without affect.

#### The politics of stable subjectivity stabilizes complex features into unchanging models which dooms all radical praxis to failure.

**Rolli** – Rolli, Marc. “Immanence and Transcendence” Bulletin de la Sociite Amincaine de Philosophie de Langue Franfais Volume 14, Number 2, Fall 2004

We now arrive at the last point. I have emphasized how immanence can be considered as a profane source of experience that makes sense only in the context of temporal subjectification processes. It does not therefore suffice to posit a pure sensuality or a pure thinking of immanence. Our self and worldly relations are always determined by relations of power. But only on the basis of a scheme of immanent thinking is it possible to really begin to see these determining factors.28 Otherwise an empricial state of affairs-an empirical normality-is hypostatized as a transcendental norm, in such a way that its genetic background and conditions can be considered mere byproducts and ignored. Thus, as long as it is considered a foregone conclusion that a normal human [is] being has white skin, is of the male gender, middle aged, belongs to a (particular) religion, and so on, then there is no need to ask about the disciplining, sociological, political, and economical processes in recent or past history[s] that have given rise to that person. From the perspective of immanence, what can be located within power relations-in the sense of the conditions of actualization of immanent structures-thus seems naturally legitimate. Deleuze's philosophy of immanence is therefore both political as weil as "absolute." Immanent perceptions, sensations, and concepts are just as much immediately determined by social conditions as are the micrological regions of the political as immanent processes of being. Against established power structures that benefit the rich to the detriment of the many, a kind of thinking emerges that relies on immanence and is thereby qualified to inquire into the implicit strategies that motivate all representative forms of life production and empowerment. Such [immanent] a thinking does not solely aim at unveiling the orders of life that are otherwise presumed to be natural, but is directed towards a model of free associations and free action. Deleuze's temporal ontology of **imn1anence** thus reveal[ing]s itself as excluding dejure concentrations of power and thereby making them comprehensible as facts with regard to their causal conditions. It is therefore impossible to tacitly insert transcendence into the corresponding level of immanence, where its power can be played out. It is impossible because the structural characteristic of immanence is a constant transport of difference, so that the syntheses of differential singularities always refer to a particular actuality of immanent structures-and according to Deleuze, it is only on this level that densities and consolidations of power relations are situated. By contrast, the postulates of transcendence, by relying on natural orders and homologies, conceal the power- drenched determination of forms of thinking and action. Although in his early lectures on Kant, Heidegger drew on the dimension of time to expand critical philosophy-and in this regard he was a source of inspiration for Deleuze-his orientation towards the origin of imagination as a medium between understanding and contemplation testifies to a certain natural accordance which in fact renders superfluous any profound analysis of conditioning power relations. Central to Heidegger's discourse is an act of transcendence which assigns the level oE temporal immanence to a self-identical Dasein which overcomes itself. The same problem can be identified in the context of the critique of onto-theology. Here the difficulty has to do with the presumed philosophical "unity" ofbeing and thinking which, according to Heidegger, pre-exists any active or spontaneous activity of thinking and is but the task of thinking to heed.29 In this regard Deleuze can be seen to playoff Nietzsche against Heidegger. For while Nietzsche, with the "will to power," presents a concept of immanence that leaves modern nihilism behind because it radically questions the value of value, Heidegger, in his criticism of Nietzsche, relies on the "proper" (eigentliche) value of a dedicated "experience of being" (5 which backs away from the escalating nihilism of the times. Insofar as Heidegger, faced with the decay of modernity, holds on to a thinking of transcendence, his diagnosis of the present thus remains stuck in resentment. For instead of taking fate (Geschick) into our own hands, we are to let fate follow its course and obey the order that comes from the highest ruler: Being itself.

#### Restrictions of creative difference are the root cause of material violence and collapse to fascism.

Evans 10– Brad Evans, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations, “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424

**Imposing liberalism has** often **come at a price**. That price has tended to be a **continuous recourse to war.** While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. **Liberalism** today, they argue, **is underwritten by the** unreserved **righteousness of its mission**. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘Liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/**elimination of** all forms of **political difference** in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, **The more peace is commanded, the more war is declared** in order **To achieve it**: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . **liberals are** nonetheless **committed** also **to making war.**’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). **Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war.** However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), **These wars no longer benefit from the possibility of** scoring outright **victory**, retreating, **or** achieving a lasting negotiated **peace** by means of political compromise**.** Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . **The project** of removing war from the life of the species **becomes** a lethaland, in principle, continuous and **unending** process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars**,** which is **fought on and between the modalities of life itself.** . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how **Liberalism gains its mastery by posing** fundamental **questions of life and death –** that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by **a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative** (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be **for the unification of the species.** This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. **With enmity** instead **depending upon the** complex, adaptive, dynamic **account of life** itself**, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those** newly **appointed enemies of humanity** – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival**.** Vital in other words to all human existence, **Doing what is necessary** out of global species necessity **requires a new moral assay of life that**, pitting the universal against the particular, **willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference**, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters**.** Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). **Racism** thus **appears here** to be a **thoroughly modern** phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002)**.** This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of **The threat** that **is now** from **the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within –** that **societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous** and nobody can be exempt, **for political modernity to function** one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘Killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255)**.** While killing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, **when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of The most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’**, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form (Agamben, 1995: 171)**.** The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

## 3

#### The 1AC’s ideological pessimism reifies the idea that disability is something that should be “cured” or abandoned and relies on a vision of psychoanalysis that abstracts from disabled people’s lived experiences and resistance. The alternative is to enact utopic imaginations of disability.

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**My critique of anti-cure politics arises from my personal experiences** described in other parts of this essay. Those experiences **include chronic pain, depression, and abuse** and participation in feminism, anti-racism, queer theory, disability studies, and other critical-political projects. Drawing on my experiences assists me in engaging analytic concepts, and vice versa. The personal and theoretical are thus inseparable from, if not reducible to, each other. Yet **academia**, with its love of the View from Nowhere, typically **treats personal experience with suspicion**. It purportedly cannot meet academic criteria for adequate evidence because it is imagined as too particular, too embodied, and too subjective. Even critical-political fields often view personal experience with skepticism and wariness, a defensive reflex against attempts to discredit them by conflating them with the personal alone. Indeed, appeals to personal experience sometimes shut down critique, especially within a confessional and therapeutic culture that demands performances of authenticity to justify the exercise of power (Mollow and McRuer 8). Although personal experience never speaks for itself and must always be theorized, this discomfort risks cordoning the two off from one another, rather than teasing out their entanglements.

Although this suspicion of personal experience is endemic to most academic fields, **I turn** here **to a particular preference for the abstract and the theoretical at the expense of the material and experiential: the anti-relational strand of queer theory influenced by psychoanalysis** and represented by work like Lee Edelman's No Future and Leo Bersani's "Is the Rectum a Grave?" Unlike the work of Halberstam, Warner, Ahmed, and Muñoz, this strand gives up on the tension between positivity and negativity altogether in favor of the strictly negative (as one might gather from the titles of Edelman's and Bersani's pieces). I read Bersani's piece in graduate school and Edelman's book when it was originally published, but I became reacquainted with them through Anna Mollow's essay "Is Sex Disability? Queer Theory and the Disability Drive" in the anthology Sex and Disability. Reading them now, with experiences like those chronicled in this essay under my belt, their complicity with the View from Nowhere comes sharply into view. Just as the disabled normate haunts Brilliant Imperfection, a desire for the "purity of sexuality as a singular trope of difference," not contaminated by "race, gender, and other particularities," haunts anti-relational work (Muñoz 11).

**Edelman's book critiques reproductive futurism**, a pro-natalist ideology that conflates futurity with procreation, upholds heteronormativity, and abjects queerness in the name of the Child (2). **Following Edelman, Mollow critiques rehabilitative futurism, a pro-cure ideology that conflates futurity with the eradication of disability** and upholds compulsory able-bodied/mindedness in the name of the Child (288). **Mollow draws on** Bersani's and **Edelman's** articulations of the **death drive to theorize** what she calls **the disability drive**. She contends, "to foreground associations between disability and the death drive means theorizing disability in terms of identity disintegration, lack, and suffering… I critique politics of disability that emphasize identity formation and pride, exploring instead the benefits of highlighting those aspects of sex and disability that undercut and perhaps even preclude assertions of humanity" (287). In some ways, then, **Mollow**, Edelman, and Bersani argue for an embrace of negativity not entirely different from what I call for in the above section. However, their work **relies on the ahistorical language of psychoanalysis, a closed symbol system that feigns universality and casts material and personal experience as irrelevant to abstract theorizing.**

I call queer theory's anti-relational strand **"a closed system" because of its explicit rejection of both politics and history.** **Edelman contends that queer theory represents "the 'side' outside all political sides"** (7). **Mollow** nuances such sentiments, but ultimately **agrees** with Edelman that reproductive and rehabilitative futurism structure the "only politics we're permitted to know" (134). **This sweeping claim ignores** feminist, queer, antiracist, and crip **critical-political projects, dismissing them as mere identity politics**, too wrapped up in dominant notions of the human and therefore **not ideologically pure enough** to provide a real alternative to futurism. **What is that "real" alternative** that only queer theory and psychoanalysis can offer**? The implosion**/explosion **of the self** into nothingness. **This** type of self-annihilation **also requires a detachment from history.** Edelman, for instance, distinguishes the rhetorical figure of the Child from "the lived experiences of any historical children" (11). He makes a comparable move with the death drive, arguing that it does not denote literal death, but rather a metaphoric or symbolic death of the sovereign subject via the self-shattering nature of sex.

Similarly, Bersani's famous piece "Is the Rectum a Grave?" redeems penetrative (anal) sex as the space for the destruction of the sovereign subject, revels in its "anti-communal, anti-egalitarian, anti-nurturing, and anti-loving" qualities, and praises the metaphoric "suicidal ecstasy of being a woman" (22; 18). It's important to note that this recuperation only applies to penetrative sex, leaving other forms of sexual intimacy unaccounted for and bereft of any radical potential. Although I understand Bersani's piece as an intervention in homophobic discourses around gay men and the AIDS epidemic, he comes perilously close to reinforcing the vision of sex at the heart of U.S. rape culture. He argues for the appeal of "powerlessness" and "loss of control" during sex, a white masculinist fantasy given that Western culture always already positions femininity and black/brownness in these very terms (23-24).

My own experiences illustrate how a sexual breach of subjecthood can play out differently for members of marginalized groups than they might for those with more privilege. On one level, I get the appeal of the sort of surrender discussed by Bersani. In fact, I once asked my partner to tie me up on my stomach and blindfold me. In the process, she violated me via unwanted anal penetration, an "anti-loving" breach of trust and interdependence on both physical and emotional levels. On Bersani's view, this breach is the whole point of sex, the moment when the self loses autonomy, integrity, and control (as if I ever enjoyed such subjecthood in the first place). If we take this line of thinking to its logical conclusion, we come dangerously close to the familiar heteropatriarchal apology for rape, buttressed by a theoretical apparatus that claims universality: regardless of my explicitly stated wishes, I subconsciously wanted to be violated. Situating the self-annihilating queer as the site of revolution obscures these kinds of problematic echoes, dismissing them from the start as too personal, particular, and material.

**The turn to the self-annihilating queer animates Mollow**'s essay, as well. She postulates queerness and disability as structuring positions that raise important questions about "self-disintegration" (305). Far more attentive to history and lived experiences, her piece grapples directly with challenges to the anti-relational strand, much like Clare reckons with challenges to anti-cure politics in Brilliant Imperfection. Yet, also like Clare's book, her essay is haunted by the disabled normate and the naturally impaired body-mind; instead of celebrating it, she wants to destroy it, but still remains within its terms. **She notes that "disability is fantasized in terms of a loss of self**, of mastery, integrity, and control, a loss that … is indissociable from sexuality" (297; emphasis in original). **She wants us to lean into this fantasy**, which requires that we accept the conflation of the self with mastery, integrity, and control in the first place.

Through the grammatical slippage of the dependent clause, **any other visions of the self** (e.g., based on interdependence, care, or empathy) **vanish**. If we accept the sovereign self, then, yes, the death and disability drives might be resources for exploding or imploding it and the systems of oppression it enables. But such explosions and implosions need not lead to **self-annihilation**, which **seems to me just another instantiation of the disembodied View from Nowhere wherein death represents transformation** into pure soul **and** thus ultimate **freedom from the** located-ness of the **body**. If we're going to explode or implode sovereign subjectivity, then **let's clear space for other notions of the self, rather than glorifying nothingness.**

Moreover, what happens if we take literal death (biological and/or social) seriously? What happens if we take material violence, which can and does end lives, seriously? In that case, it should become clear that reproductive futurism is the domain of only some children. This ideology values children only insofar as they themselves can further reproduce whiteness, heterosexuality, the gender binary, able-bodied/mindedness, and so forth. In Muñoz's words, in a world where queer youths of color too often do not get a chance to grow up, "racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity" (95-96). The fact that the anti-relational strand pretends such questions can or should be set aside speaks to the normative positions it upholds.

**I** therefore **read these** anti-relational **pieces** with interest, but also **with growing anger.** **I am in the process of healing from over a decade's worth of chronic pain, depression, and abuse**. I am not over these things. **I learn to survive with them**, maybe even learn from them and integrate them into my self-perception, even as I refuse to romanticize or celebrate them as keys to enlightenment and transcendence. **I haven't overcome my disabilities in some** Herculean **display of** willpower and **sovereign subjecthood**. I haven't overcome them at all, but I do embrace the value of my own survival as part of my critical-political orientation toward the world.

I respect attempts to identify the excessive, the very thing that cannot be resolved, captured, or made to signify in any coherent way, and to think beyond the human. Yet **the anti-relational strain** reads very differently now that I have emerged from a kind of living death. It **angers me given how hard I fight to believe in my right to survive and exist**, not as a lone self with mastery and control, but as an interdependent self fumbling towards compassion, justice, and care. **I'm not interested in being a figurehead for** the revolution if that revolution depends on my **erasure, absence, and self-sacrifice**. I've come too close to actual suicide to see anything ecstatic about it; **I've existed too long in chronic pain to see anything liberatory about that**, either.

I know that psychoanalysis often takes bodily pain and pleasure as one of its starting points, typically imagined as the acute, extraordinary experience of orgasm. It is not the daily slog of chronic pain that inhibits not only mastery and control, but also care, compassion, and survival. Queer versions of **psychoanalysis** claim to pay attention to sexual pain and pleasure, but then **do their best to** escape and **transcend material embodiment. They focus so narrowly on the symbolic destruction of the sovereign self that they end up treat**ing **it** as if it's detached from the body, **as if it's "just" metaphor**. But **metaphors live in actual suicidal women; they are more than abstracted playthings** for academic bad boys, their closed symbolic systems, and their "white gay male crypto-identity politics" that reproduce the mind/body dualism (Muñoz 95).

# Accessibility

## 2

#### Their refusal to center affect as a method of resistance dooms their project to failure – only affect can bridge the gap between discursive regimes and the material world – it’s cruelly optimistic to force chaotic identity into stable structures.

**Schaefer 13**

Texts are produced by bodies enmeshed in their political worlds and trying to negotiate those worlds in their own way. Affect theory explore[s] knowledges" of bodies outside purely theoretical domains of humanist scholarship Affect is matter that is elsewhere to sovereign consciousness but has significance in domains of subjectivity Cruel optimism emerges "when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing a fantasy of the good life, or a political project Affect is the missing link between discursive regimes and bodies a felt sense out of which political circumstances emerge. We understand nothing about the political without an account of the production of the present Optimism binds bodies to "fantasies of the good life," possibility that may or may not be defeated by the conditions of their own emergence. affect theory offers a crucial resources for thinking through the relationship between bodies and discourses

#### The politics of stable subjectivity stabilizes complex features into unchanging models which dooms all radical praxis to failure.

**Rolli**

Our relations are determined by power. empirical normality-is a transcendental norm, in such a way that its genetic background can be ignored [immanent] thinking is a model of free associations reveal[ing] power and making them comprehensible to their causal conditions

#### Restrictions of creative difference are the root cause of material violence and collapse to fascism.

Evans 10

Imposing liberalism has come at a price a continuous recourse to war. peace predicated on the elimination of political difference The project becomes unending fought between the modalities of life Liberalism gains mastery by posing questions of life and death for the unification of the species when notions of security are invoked to preserve the destiny of a species calculated, utilitarian life emerges as the new object of power law renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege but produce genocides: in the name of survival The modern constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that separates what is inside from what is outside’

## 3

#### The 1AC’s ideological pessimism reifies the idea that disability is something that should be “cured” or abandoned and relies on a vision of psychoanalysis that abstracts from disabled people’s lived experiences and resistance. The alternative is to enact utopic imaginations of disability.

**Bailey 19**

My critique of anti-cure politics arises from my personal experiences Those include chronic pain, depression, and abuse I turn to a preference for the abstract at the expense of the material Mollow, Edelman relies on psychoanalysis, a closed symbol system that feigns universality and casts material experience as irrelevant it both politics and history. Edelman contends queer theory represents "the 'side' outside politic s Mollow agrees This ignores critical-political projects, dismissing them as not ideologically pure enough The implosion of the self requires a detachment from history her essay is haunted by the naturally impaired body-mind She notes "disability is fantasized in terms of a loss of self She wants us to lean into this fantasy self-annihilation seems another instantiation of the View from Nowhere wherein death represents freedom from the body let's clear space for other notions of the self, rather than glorifying nothingness I haven't overcome my disabilities in some display of sovereign subjecthood the anti-relational strain angers me given how hard I fight to believe in my right to survive I'm not interested in being a figurehead for self-sacrifice psychoanalysis do their best to transcend material embodiment. They focus so narrowly on symbolic destruction that they treat it as just" metaphor metaphors live in actual suicidal women; they are more than abstracted playthings