## 1

## 1

#### The meta-ethic is procedural moral realism –

#### [1] Uncertainty –

#### [2] Naturalistic fallacy –

#### Practical Reason is that procedure –

#### Moral law must be universal—

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with liberty. Prefer:

#### 1] The state is obligated to prioritize freedom.

Otteson 09 [(James R., professor of philosophy and economics at Yeshiva University) “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism,” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3, Winter, [2009](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-015-9506-9)] TDI

It is difficult to imagine a stronger defense of the “sacred” dignity of individual agency. Kantian individuality is premised on its rational nature and its entailed inherent dignity, and the rest of his moral philosophy arguably is built on this vision.1 Kant relies on a similarly robust conception of individuality in work other than his explicitly moral philosophy. The 1784 essay “An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?’” (Kant 1991), for example, emphasizes in strong terms the threat that paternalism poses to one’s will. Kant argues that “enlightenment” (Aufklärung) involves a transition from moral and intellectual immaturity, wherein one depends on others to make one’s moral and intellectual decisions, to maturity, wherein one makes such decisions for oneself. One cannot effect this transition if one remains under another’s tutelage, and, as a corollary, one compromises another’s enlightenment if one undertakes to make such decisions for the other person—which, as Kant argues, is the case under a paternalistic government. Kant also writes in his 1786 essay “What Is Orientation in Thinking?” that “To think for oneself means to look within oneself (i.e. in one’s own reason) for the supreme touchstone of truth; and the maxim of thinking for oneself at all times is enlightenment” (1991, 249, italics and bold in the original). These passages are consistent with the position he takes in Grounding that a person who depends on others is acting heteronomously, not autonomously, and is to that extent not exercising a free moral will. These passages also help to clarify Kant’s notion of personhood and rational agency by indicating some of their practical implications. For example, on the basis of his argument, one would expect him to argue for setting severe limits on the authority that any group of people, including the state, may exercise over others: because individual freedom is necessary both to achieve enlightenment and to exercise one’s moral agency, Kant should argue that no group may impinge on that freedom without thereby acting immorally. Kant expressly draws this conclusion in his 1793 essay “On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice’”: Right is the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonises with the freedom of everyone else (in so far as this is possible within the terms of a general law). And public right is the distinctive quality of the external laws which make this constant harmony possible. Since every restriction of freedom through the arbitrary will of another party is termed coercion, it follows that a civil constitution is a relationship among free men who are subject to coercive laws, while they retain their freedom within the general union with their fellows. (1991, 73, emphasis in original) Kant insists on the protection of a sphere of liberty for each individual to self-legislate under universalizable laws of rationality, consistent with the formulation of the categorical imperative requiring the treatment of others “always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (1981, 36). This formulation of the categorical imperative might even logically entail the position Kant articulates about “right,” “public right,” and “freedom.” Persons do not lose their personhood when they join a civil community, so they cannot rationally endorse a state that will be destructive of that personhood; on the contrary, according to Kant, a person enters civil society rationally willing that the society will protect both his own agency and that of others. Robert B. Pippen rightly says that for Kant “political duties are a subset of moral duties” (1985, 107–42), but the argument here puts it slightly differently: political rights, or “dignities,” derive from moral rights, which for Kant are determined by one’s moral agency. Thus, the only “coercive laws” to which individuals may rationally allow themselves to be subject in civil society are those that require respect for each others’ moral agency (and provide for the punishment of infractions thereof) (see Pippen 1985, 121). When Kant comes to state his own moral justification for the state in the 1797 Metaphysics of Morals, this claim is exactly the one he makes: the state is necessary for securing the conditions of “Right”—in other words, the conditions under which persons can exercise their autonomous agency (see 1991, 132–35). Consistent with this interpretation, Kant elsewhere endorses free trade and open markets on grounds that make his concern for “harmony” in the preceding passage reminiscent of Adam Smithian invisible-hand arguments. In his 1784 essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” Kant writes: “Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest” (1991, 41). This statement is similar to Smith’s statement of the invisible-hand argument.2 Kant proceeds to endorse some of the same laissez-faire economic policies that Smith advocated—for example, in his discussion in his 1786 work “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History” of the benefits of “mutual exchange” and in his claim that “there can be no wealth-producing activity without freedom” (1991, 230–31, emphasis in original), as well as in his claim in the 1795 Perpetual Peace that “the spirit of commerce” is motivated by people’s “mutual self-interest” and thus “cannot exist side by side with war” (1991, 114, emphasis in original).3 Finally, although Kant argues that we cannot know exactly what direction human progress will take, he believes we can nevertheless be confident that mankind is progressing.4 Thus, in “Universal History” he writes: The highest purpose of nature—i.e. the development of all natural capacities—can be fulfilled for mankind only in society, and nature intends that man should accomplish this, and indeed all his appointed ends, by his own efforts. This purpose can be fulfilled only in a society which has not only the greatest freedom, and therefore a continual antagonism among its members, but also the most precise specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can co-exist with the freedom of others. The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly just civil constitution. (1991, 45–46, emphasis in original) Kant’s argument in this essay runs as follows: human progress is possible, but only in conditions of a civil society whose design allows this progress; because the progress is possible only as individuals become enlightened, and individual enlightenment is in turn possible only when individuals are free from improper coercion and paternalism, human progress is therefore possible only under a state that defends individual freedom. Kant believes that individuals have the best chance to be happy under a limited civil government, and he therefore argues that even such a laudable goal as increasing human happiness is not a justifiable role of the state: “But the whole concept of an external right is derived entirely from the concept of freedom in the mutual external relationships of human beings, and has nothing to do with the end which all men have by nature (i.e. the aim of achieving happiness) or with the recognized means of attaining this end. And thus the latter end must on no account interfere as a determinant with the laws governing external right” (“Theory and Practice,” 1991, 73, emphasis in original). The Kantian state is hence limited on the principled grounds of respecting agency; the fact that this limitation in his view provides the conditions enabling enlightenment, progress, and ultimately happiness is a great but ancillary benefit. Thus, the positions Kant takes on nonpolitical issues would seem to suggest a libertarian political position. And Kant explicitly avows such a state. In “Universal History,” he writes: Furthermore, civil freedom can no longer be so easily infringed without disadvantage to all trades and industries, and especially to commerce, in the event of which the state’s power in its external relations will also decline. . . . If the citizen is deterred from seeking his personal welfare in any way he chooses which is consistent with the freedom of others, the vitality of business in general and hence also the strength of the whole are held in check. For this reason, restrictions placed upon personal activities are increasingly relaxed, and general freedom of religion is granted. And thus, although folly and caprice creep in at times, enlightenment gradually arises. (1991, 50–51, emphasis in original) In “Theory and Practice,” Kant writes that “the public welfare which demands first consideration lies precisely in that legal constitution which guarantees everyone his freedom within the law, so that each remains free to seek his happiness in whatever way he thinks best, so long as he does not violate the lawful freedom and rights of his fellow subjects at large” and that “[n]o-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law” (1991, 80, emphasis in original, and 74). In a crucial passage in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that the “Universal Principle of Right” is “‘[e]very action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right.’” He concludes, “Thus the universal law of right is as follows: let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (1991, 133, emphasis in original).5 This stipulation becomes for Kant the grounding justification for the existence of a state, its raison d’être, and the reason we leave the state of nature is to secure this sphere of maximum freedom compatible with the same freedom of all others. Because this freedom must be complete, in the sense of being as full as possible given the existence of other persons who demand similar freedom, it entails that the state may—indeed, must—secure this condition of freedom, but undertake to do nothing else because any other state activities would compromise the very autonomy the state seeks to defend. Kant’s position thus outlines and implies a political philosophy that is broadly libertarian; that is, it endorses a state constructed with the sole aim of protecting its citizens against invasions of their liberty. For Kant, individuals create a state to protect their moral agency, and in doing so they consent to coercion only insofar as it is required to prevent themselves or others from impinging on their own or others’ agency. In his argument, individuals cannot rationally consent to a state that instructs them in morals, coerces virtuous behavior, commands them to trade or not, directs their pursuit of happiness, or forcibly requires them to provide for their own or others’ pursuits of happiness. And except in cases of punishment for wrongdoing,6 this severe limitation on the scope of the state’s authority must always be respected: “The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here; it is no use devising hybrid solutions such as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway between right and utility. For all politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance” (Perpetual Peace, 1991, 125). The implication is that a Kantian state protects against invasions of freedom and does nothing else; in the absence of invasions or threats of invasions, it is inactive.

#### 2] Enterprise –

#### 3] Performativity—

#### Contention –

#### 1] Libertarianism mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20 [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

#### 2] Property rights in space can be consistent with international law

Simberg 12 [(Rand, MSE in technical management from West Coast University, recognized as an expert in space transportation by the Office of Technology Assessment) “Homesteading the Final Frontier A Practical Proposal for Securing Property Rights in Space,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, April 2012, <https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Rand-Simberg-Homesteading-the-Final-Frontier.pdf>] TDI

But is it true that any recognition of off-planet property claims is de facto a violation of the Outer Space Treaty? Not necessarily. For instance, one could argue that the existence of the Moon Treaty is in and of itself a refutation of the notion that the Outer Space Treaty outlaws private property in space, or else there would be no need for another treaty that essentially explicitly does so. And there is at least one potential loophole that could be exploited by appropriately worded legislation. There are two key assumptions in the legal argument used by opponents of off-planet property claims: 1) that the recognition by a government would only recognize claims by its own citizens; and 2) that it would defend them by force. That need not necessarily be so. Under the treaty, it would in fact be possible for a government, or group of governments, to recognize the property claims of anyone who met specified conditions, regardless of their citizenship or nationality. Such cooperation would obviate the need for physical force to defend claims. The argument that the treaty permits individual property rights was actually made from the very beginning. In 1969, two years after the treaty went into force, the late distinguished space-law professor, Stephen Gorove, noted that under it, “[A]n individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies.”32 This clearly provides support for the concept of individual claims off planet under Article II.

#### 3] Property rights –

#### 4] Negs get Contention Choice –

## 2

#### Interpretation – Affirmatives must define *private entities* in a delineated card in the 1AC.

UpCounsel ND – “Private Entity: Everything You Need to Know”. UpCounsel (interactive online service that makes it faster and easier for businesses to find and hire legal help). No Date. Accessed 12/17/21. <https://www.upcounsel.com/private-entity> //Xu

A private entity can be a partnership, corporation, individual, nonprofit organization, company, or any other organized group that is not government-affiliated. Indian tribes and foreign public entities are not considered private entities.

Unlike publicly traded companies, private companies do not have public stock offerings on Nasdaq, American Stock Exchange, or the New York Stock Exchange. Instead, they offer shares privately to interested investors, who may trade among themselves.

Private Company vs. Private Entity

The Companies Act of 2013 governs the registration of private companies.

This type of company is formed by following the steps laid out by this law.

Private entities are determined not by this law but by ownership and holding. For example, sole proprietorships and partnerships are designed as private entities.

A private entity is not necessarily a private company, but all private companies are private entities.

How Private Entities Work

Although private companies can be of any size, they often include a small group of chosen investors who may include employees, colleagues, friends and family, and other interested parties. If this type of company needs funding to grow, it may seek it from venture capital firms or from large institutional investors. Some private companies eventually decide to go public with an initial public offering (IPO) of stock shares on a public exchange. Sometimes, public companies go private when a large investor buys a bulk of the outstanding stock shares and plans to remove them from public exchanges.

How FOIA Affects Private Entities

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a federal law that requires certain agencies to provide certain types of records to any person who asks. Major government bodies such as federal courts and Congress are exempt from FOIA. Some state agencies are also exempt depending on state laws governing public records. In general, FOIA applies to:

Federal, state, and local government agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission.

Certain state legislatures depending on the laws in those states.

Most private entities are not bound by federal FOIA laws. However, these laws may apply to private entities involved in government business. This situation occurred in Colorado in 2000, when a nonprofit corporation was required by the state's Court of Appeals to share documents related to a project it was working on with the city of Denver.

#### Prefer:

#### 1 – Stable Advocacy –

#### 2 – Real World –

#### 3 – Resolvability –

#### Fairness is a voter –

#### Reject the team –

#### No RVIs –

#### Competing interpretations –

#### 1NC theory first –

## 3

#### Good and bad mean nothing outside of context – virtues only gain power because of life denial and repression – you should ask yourself, why not be unvirtuous. Nietzsche Friedrich Nietzsche[German Badass] On the Genealogy of Morals.

So all respect to the good spirits that may govern in these historians of morality! But it’s certainly a pity that they lack the historical spirit itself, that they’ve been left in the lurch by all the good spirits of history! As a group they all think essentially unhistorically, in what is now the traditional manner of philosophers. Of that there is no doubt. **The incompetence of** their **[historians’]** genealogies of morals **reveals itself** at the very beginning, **where the issue is** to determine **the origin** of the idea and **of** the judgment **“good.” “People,”** so **they proclaim, “originally praised unegoistic actions** and called them good from the perspective of those for whom they were done, that is, those for whom such actions were useful. **Later people** forgot how this praise began, and because unegoistic actions had, according to custom, always been praised as good, people then **felt** them as **good—as if they were something inherently good.”** We perceive right away that this initial derivation already contains all the typical characteristics of the idiosyncrasies of English psychologists—we have “usefulness,” “forgetting,” “habit,” and finally “error,” all as the foundation for an evaluation in which the higher man up to this time has taken pride, as if it were a sort of privilege of men generally. This pride is to be humbled, this evaluation of worth emptied of value. Has that been achieved? . . . Now, first of all, it’s obvious to me that from this theory the essential focus for **the origin of the idea “good” has been** sought for and **established in the wrong place: the judgment “good” did not move** here **from those to whom “goodness” was shown!** On the contrary, **it was the “good people” themselves**, that is, the noble, powerful, higher-ranking, and higher-thinking people **who** felt and **set** themselves and **their actions up as good**, that is to say, of the first rank, **in opposition to everything low**, low-minded, **common, and vulgar.** From this pathos of distance **they** first **arrogated to themselves the right to create values,** to stamp out the names for values**.** What did they care about usefulness! Particularly in relation to such a hot pouring out of the highest rank-ordering, **rank-setting judgments of value,** the point of view which considers utility **is as** foreign and **inappropriate as possible.** Here the feeling has reached the very opposite of that low level of warmth which is a condition for that calculating shrewdness, that reckoning by utility—and not just for a moment, not for an exceptional hour, but permanently. **The pathos of nobility** and distance, as mentioned, **the** lasting and **domineering feeling**, something total and fundamental, **of a higher ruling nature** in relation to a lower type, to a “beneath”—**that is the origin of the opposition between “good” and “bad.”** (The right of the master to give names extends so far that we could permit ourselves to grasp the origin of language itself as an expression of the power of the rulers: they say “that is such and such”; they seal every object and event with a sound, and in the process, as it were, take possession of it.) **Given this origin, the word “good” is from the start in no way necessarily tied up with “unegoistic” actions**, as it is in the superstition of those genealogists of morality. Rather, that occurs for the first time with the collapse of aristocratic value judgments, when this entire contrast between “egoistic” and “unegoistic” pressed itself ever more strongly into human awareness—it is, to use my own words, the instinct of the herd which, through this contrast, finally gets its word (and its words). And even then, it still takes a long time until this instinct in the masses becomes master, with the result that moral evaluation gets thoroughly hung up and bogged down on this opposition (as is the case, for example, in modern Europe: today the prejudice that takes “moralistic,” “unegoistic,” and “désintéressé” [disinterested] as equally valuable ideas already governs, with the force of a “fixed idea” and a disease of the brain)

#### **The alternative is becoming animal – reject your human perspectives and embrace the temporality of the new through the mindset of simplicity and primitivism.**

Colebrook 02 (Claire, “Understanding Deleuze”, 2002, p. 58) SJCP//JG

Everything in Deleuze’s thought comes down to the crucial idea of immanence. (Immanence is a concept in the Deleuzean sense: a way of connecting new ideas and possibilities for thinking. Immanence is also necessarily connected with other Deleuzean concepts, concepts that open up the new style of thought.) Imma- nence begins with the commitment to the given. There is just one flow of life or one plane of being. This plane ought not to be thought of as some thing or being—some object towards which we bear a relation—but as a dynamic and open flow of becoming. This means that the whole of life or the totality is not given—the whole is virtual, not actual, for we cannot know the future in advance, nor can we determine the effects of the past. And this virtual whole is not a collection of beings, but poten- tials or possibilities for becoming. Even more importantly, this becoming is not uniform or homogenous; there is no overall goal or end towards which change is directed. Each flow of life affirms its distinct power to become; there is no evolutionary trend in general, only the striving or creative change of singularities. Change or becoming does not take place in order to reach an end or goal; life is change itself. Genetic mutations, for example, are expressions of the power of life to change; they are not changes for the sake of some form or being. It is becoming which is the power of life, a becoming that has no end other than itself. Deleuze refers to distinct tendencies of becoming—the becoming of animals, the becoming of plants, the becoming of human bodies, and even the becoming of philoso- phy and art cannot be unified by some general form or goal of becoming. The flow of life or becoming is not a general progres- sive development. This is why Deleuze writes in the plural of flows, becomings, multiplicities, series and singularities. If we do need to think of the difference, flow or becoming from which beings are differentiated, then we need to avoid thinking of this difference or flow as yet one more being. The unity or One from which all life emerges is, Deleuze insists, not an identity but a difference that differs from itself: virtual difference or pure differ- ence, a difference that is not yet actualised into any distinct and determined form, a pure power to differentiate. This means that life does not unfold itself in any single form or manner; there are multiplicities of folds and flows.

#### Power operates via restrictions—striations of potential such as the aff are a method of control, this restriction allows the system to eradicate those that don’t conform to specific roles through the concept of a transcendent ethic. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the advocacy that best increases potentiality – the elimination of restriction is the only way to cultivate ethical thought.

Peta **Malins 3** (Department of Criminology, PhD Graduate from the University of Melbourne) (Machinic Assemblages: Deleuze, Guattari and an Ethico-Aesthetics of Drug Use) (The University of Melbourne) Page 6 file:///C:/Users/Owner/Desktop/Research/D&G/Rebar's%20stuff%20VERY%20good/bwo\_drug\_use\_malins.pdf

Perhaps **the most signiﬁcant ambition of Deleuze’s writing is to make thought itself ethical** . . . (Goodchild, 1997: 39) A Thousand Plateaus is, like Anti-Oedipus before it, undoubtedly a book of ethics.8 **A pragmatic, embodied ethics** that **distinguishes itself from Morality by its immanence, its immediacy, and its refusal to privilege the mind (rationality**, reason, free will) over the body. **Unlike the transcendental laws of moral reasoning, and their a priori determination of Good and Evil (gay sex is evil, procreation is good; illicit drugs are evil, medicines are good), De**leuze and Guattari’s **embodied ethics focuses on particular bodily relations and their aﬀects**. A body, substance or **action can no longer be thought of as being bad, but as only becoming bad**–or good–**in relation to the speciﬁc assemblage it forms** **with other bodies** and the speciﬁc aﬀects it enables. As Deleuze notes in one of his earlier texts on Spinoza: “there is no evil (in itself), but there is that which is bad (for me)” (SPP: 33). Drawing on the work of Spinoza, Deleuze distinguishes between **good and bad aﬀects** according to whether a particular assemblage enhances or harms each body’s life force; in other words, whether it **increases or reduces each body’s power to act and its potential to go on forming new relations**. It is a complex distinction, especially given that a body can form multiple relations with another body–some good, some bad: “we have many constituent relations, so that one and the same object can agree with us in one respect and disagree with us in another” (SPP: 33). **An ethical event for Deleuze and Guattari is one in which bodies emerge with a strengthened–or at least undiminished–potentiality.** A drug is not intrinsically bad: it becomes bad when it harms a body (overdose, liver failure) and good when it beneﬁts a body (pain relief, joy, enhanced sensation). **What becomes important is that bodies are able to go on connecting with other bodies, creating new ﬂows of desire and undertaking new becomings. An embodied ethics of this sort aims to reduce unethical assemblages (which reduce bodily potentials) and increase ethical, life-enhancing assemblages.** **Assemblages that increase a body’s power to form creative, productive relations and which increase its capacity for life.** The concept of the rhizome developed by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus provides another way of thinking through this ethical framework. **The rhizome** (imagine a web that has no patterning or order) **is a way of thinking the world and its relations that does away with foundations, hierarchies and the other tree-like formations which permeate western thought**. Unlike the image of the tree, which reduces all relations to a single foundation or cause (roots) and which structures relations hierarchically (branches), **the rhizome enables a body’s relations and potentials to be thought of as connecting up with an almost inﬁnite number of other bodies and potentials in multiple directions. It places all relations on a single plane** (not in the two-dimensional sense, but in the sense of having no hierarchies) and acknowledges that bodies form multiple relations simultaneously**. Unlike the illusion of stratiﬁed subjectivity, a rhizomatic understanding of the body refuses to limit a body and its relations by always tracing them back to a family history or root cause. Rhizomatic thought is ethical, for it opens up life to diﬀerence (variation) and multiplicities**: “the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, “and . . . and . . . and . . .” This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb ‘to be.’”Instead of the singular unity of a continuous self, t**he rhizome allows a body to be multiple: to be simultaneously a smoker and a non-smoker and a social smoker and an ex-smoker** and . . . ; to be a heroin injector and an abstainer and a peer educator and . . . ; **to be a continuous becoming rather than a static being. Thinking rhizomatically acknowledges that a body has multiple potentials, which each depend upon the other bodies it connects with and the assemblages it forms**. It acknowledges, in other words, that a body “has as many meanings as there are forces capable of seizing it” (Massumi, 1992: 10).  The rhizome also replaces the system of self/other (I = I = not you) with an open potentiality.

# Accessibility

## 1

#### 1] The state is obligated to prioritize freedom.

Otteson 09

agency set limits on the state the only “coercive laws” to which individuals may rationally allow are those that require respect for agency human progress is possible only under a state that defends individual freedom. happiness is a great but ancillary benefit. the reason we leave the state of nature is to secure maximum freedom compatible with the same freedom of others.

#### 1] Libertarianism mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20

private investment is moving space exploration in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic or public good will be meaningless. the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights could be valued

#### 2] Property rights in space can be consistent with international law

Simberg 12

the Moon Treaty is a refutation or else there would be no need for another treaty Under the treaty, it would be possible for a government to recognize the property who met conditions, Such cooperation need physical force This provides support for the concept of individual claims

## 2

#### Interpretation – Affirmatives must define *private entities* in a delineated card in the 1AC.

UpCounsel ND

private entity can be partnership corporation individual nonprofit company Some go public with IPO Some go private when large investor Most are not bound by FOIA laws However may apply to entities involved in government business

## 3

#### Good and bad mean nothing outside of context – virtues only gain power because of life denial and repression – you should ask yourself, why not be unvirtuous. Nietzsche

the origin of the idea “good” has been established in the wrong place it was the “good people” themselves who set their actions up as good in opposition to everything low they arrogated themselves the right to create values the domineering is the origin of the opposition between “good” and “bad the word “good” is from the start in no way necessarily tied up with “unegoistic” actions

#### The alternative is becoming animal – reject your human perspectives and embrace the temporality of the new through the mindset of simplicity and primitivism – it’s condo.

Colebrook 02

There is one plane of being open flow of becoming possibilities for becoming there is no goal towards which change is directed Each flow of life affirms distinct power to become no trend only striving change of singularities becoming animal cannot be unified by some general goal there are multiplicities of flows

#### Power operates via restrictions—striations of potential such as the aff are a method of control, this restriction allows the system to eradicate those that don’t conform to specific roles through the concept of a transcendent ethic. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the advocacy that best increases potentiality – the elimination of restriction is the only way to cultivate ethical thought.

**Malins 3**

the most signiﬁcant ambition is to make thought itself ethical Unlike the laws moral reasoning, and their determination of Good and Evil embodied ethics focuses on particular relations and their aﬀects action can no longer be bad, but as only becoming badAn ethical event is one which bodies emerge with a strengthened potentiality embodied ethics aims to reduce assemblages (which reduce potentials) and increase life-enhancing assemblages The rhizome is a way of thinking the world and its relations that does away with hierarchies which permeate western thought. Rhizomatic thought is ethical, for it opens up life to diﬀerence rhizome allows a body to be multiple to be a continuous becoming rather than a static being. Thinking rhizomatically acknowledges that a body has multiple potentials