## 1

#### Interpretation –the aff must disclose the plan text, framework, and advantage area 30 minutes before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

Graphical user interface, text, application, Teams

Description automatically generated

#### Violation – they didn’t

#### Vote neg for prep and clash –

#### Fairness is a voter –

#### Education is a voter –

#### No RVIs –

#### Use competing interps –

#### Drop the debater –

#### Fairness first –

## 2

### Framing

#### Presumption and permissibility negates –

#### Use a truth testing paradigm –

#### The starting point of morality is practical reason:

#### 1] Regress –

#### 2] Action theory –

#### And, reason must be universal –

#### Thus, counter-methodology: Vote negative to engage in a liberation strategy of universal reason. This entails a starting point where we abstract from individual perspectives to understand the universal, and use this starting point to apply it to empirical institutions and agents. No perms – its uniquely non-sensical in the context of a methods debate –

#### Prefer on Performativity –

### Contention

#### [1] Independently, Kant is incompatible with your method – it requires unconditional respect for humanity as an end in itself.

Korsgaard 83 bracketed for gendered language (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR)

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, [they] he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### [2] Only univeralizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### [3] Independently not defending the topic is non-universalizable –

#### [4] You have a contractual requirement to work –

#### [5] A strike uses the employer and society as a means to an end.

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie, professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University, "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers," 30 November 2017, accessed 19 October 2021, Other Papers, <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> JG recut

A further formula of the Categorical Imperative is "so, act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other context, never solely as a means to an end but always as an end within itself' (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). By this Kant meant people should be valued and respected as an individual and not used for the benefit of others. Participating in a labor-strike demonstration/action is a direct violation of this categorical perspective as it would not be ethically permissible because the severe dependence and well-being of clients, the effective functioning of the employer organization, and society is used to duly and unduly influence the bargaining process for better working conditions. In participating in the labor strike demonstration, the humanity, and well-being of clients and society is not seen as crucial and as an 'end', but rather used to demonstrate the undeniable need for the skills and expertise of social workers. Furthermore, through withholding services, social worker professionals demonstrate that the well-being and welfare of society have lost its inherent importance/value. Though the value of overall well-being is taught throughout the social work training process and is enshrined in the professional ethical codes.

## 3

#### The 1AC is an activist game – they trade violence for points and collect the ballot for passing “Go” – vote negative to induce a break in that operationality in favor of critical reflection.

Schleiner 19 Anne-Marie Schleiner, 2019, “The broken toy tactic: Clockwork worlds and activist games,” from “The Playful Citizen Civic Engagement in a Mediatized Culture,” edited by René Glas, Sybille Lammes, Michiel de Lange, Joost Raessens, and Imar de Vries, SJBE

Although my argument in this chapter will be informed by the substantial inroads that Bogost and others have wrought theorizing the dynamic procedural rhetoric of games, what has been somewhat overlooked, even by critics of ‘procedurality’ like Miguel Sicart (2011), is a closer consideration of procedurality itself. In particular, I am interested in the impact of these ‘gamic’ procedures on political or social critique in what are called ‘serious games.’ Serious games is a grab-bag appellation for diverse educational, training, and activist games, which I will for this chapter primarily limit to the analysis of ‘activist simulation games,’ games such as Climate Defense (Auroch Digital 2013) or Sweatshop (Littleloud 2011) with explicit political and/or persuasive ambitions on the part of their concerned citizen makers. A one- or two-person developer is often solely responsible for all aspects of the game-making in these independent small companies, including art direction, design, programming, and playtesting. The maker of an activist simulation game attempts to make use of mimetic algorithms in the game to present a persuasive argument in motion, to launch a social, environmental, or other activist critique, or to open a political question. As more ordinary citizens come of age among the ‘ludoliterate’ versed in the language and genres of gameplay, relatively easy to produce casual games are becoming an attractive vehicle for political action (Raessens 2010). Still, we are only beginning to forge an understanding of how such games both serve and fail as activist tools, as tactics, among others, available to the concerned citizen. Therefore, my definition in this chapter of an ‘activist simulation game’ is both: a. motivated by an activist or political intent on the part of the game-maker, and b. attempts to harness simulation and procedurality in the game to carry the maker’s political critique or message to the playing public.3 A definition relying partially on the game-maker’s intention does encounter inherent contradictions, as when, for example, games not explicitly intended to be politically persuasive, such as entertaining war games, can easily be read as propaganda. But the desire on the part of the game-maker to use a game as a form of political argumentation with a broader public, both when it succeeds and fails as it is countermanded by aspects of the game, is a primary tension that I will explore in this chapter. Referring to this difficulty in designing serious games Mary Flanagan writes: “These play spaces must retain all the elements that make a game enjoyable while effectively communicating their message” (2009, 249). In an activist simulation game, a play move is not only an inconsequential act of fun, but also carries symbolic weight by referencing real issues and world problems, for instance signifying whether a member of a threatened species like the polar bear in Polar Plunder (AIMS Games Center 2013) can find enough food under the ice for her cubs despite Arctic climate change. And yet, in spite of this added worldly weight and consequentiality, it is often difficult to take serious games seriously. Although game-makers set out to shock players with a moving diagram of harmful and tragic operations, players conversely succumb to the enchantment of lively, toy-like, mechanical processes within the miniature, abstracted clockwork game world, no matter how damaging the actual operations in the exterior world, regardless of how many dolphins are killed or how many tracts of rainforest are destroyed. The game asks to be played and mastered, inviting the player to enter into its cause and effect mechanical loops, regardless of the consequences—it is only a game, after all. The ‘toyness’ of the world of the game, the miniature abstraction of the model that announces itself as game, not life, contributes to this nullification of the game’s critical impact, as I will discuss further on. Moreover, I will argue that the operational movements running inside the game induce a complacency akin to what Martin Heidegger referred to as “everyday sight,” a way of “Being-in-the-World” already familiar to us from procedural interactions in the world outside the game (1927, 107). In order to better understand the effect of the procedurality of the game on the player, in this chapter I will draw on what may seem an unlikely and acontemporous source from outside the fields of game studies and computer science, where procedurality itself has often been accepted at face value as a positive rhetorical tool within games.4 In Being and time, his primary work devoted to forwarding a temporal, embodied phenomenological understanding of human existence, Heidegger theorized a common, everyday mode of being (ontology) and a mental framework that he understood as a submersion within the everyday circulations and procedures of the work-a-day, social world (Ibid., 78). This practical view of the workings of the world is what he refers to alternately as “everyday sight” and “circumspection” (2003, 107). A railway line transports workers from the suburbs to the city; the suburban train stops to let a passenger off at an inner-city station guarded by a vigilant conductor who steps back and forth on the station platform. Such an interlocking set of functional workings, which we also see running compellingly in the toy city of Madurodam, is supplementary to Heidegger’s “Dasein in the They,” an immersed everyday orientation within the common world (1927, 167). We seldom question or “disclose” our place or the place of others in such work-a-day utilitarian operations, for to do so continuously would impede our ability to plug into the “equipmental workshops” we use to take care of daily business (Ibid., 105). The dilemma that confronts the activist game-maker is that the very procedural logic of the simulation game that he or she hopes to harness for a provocative critique has a bewitching effect on the player, comparable to Heidegger’s state of fascinated absorption in the practical workings of the world (1927, 107). Examples of equipment in Being and time, of clocks, hammers, planes, and needles, speak of a more rhythmic, mechanical, Industrial Age, but almost a century later, well into the Information Age, much of our world is still composed of functional, instrumental relations, on and off the screen (Ibid., 99). Circuitous operationality has found yet another abode in the weightless, abstract toy workings of computer games. And yet there are exceptions to this rule of the genre, ways for concerned citizens to design games that snap the player out of the hypnotic circle of toy operationality, via what I will refer to as the broken toy tactic. A rupture in the game catapults the player outside the comforting and rewarding operational sphere of the clockwork game world and induces him or her to critical reflection, contestation, or action. While analyzing two popular activist games closely, I will argue that the player’s shift from fascinated immersion in moving game world operations to a disturbed confrontation with a malfunction of play mirrors Heidegger’s anxious illuminations of the operational clockwork loops of the world that might arise when a tool, like his oft invoked hammer, is broken or missing (1927, 102). A break in the smooth functionality of the game discloses its operational logic in greater “totality” (Ibid., 105). For Heidegger, a “clearing” of everyday sight uncovers the disquieting temporality of “the who’s” existence, as well as illuminating his possibilities (Ibid., 167). Yet, in the hands of the concerned citizen game-maker, this unsettling existential pause or stop, this interruption of the game’s workings, is also a moment ripe for critical reflection and evaluation that precedes the formation of a political stance and possible action, the intended transformation of ‘games for change.’Overseers of toy world operations Let’s enter into a closer comparison of toy world operations at work in two widely played pioneering activist simulation games. The player of Uruguayan Gonzalo Frasca’s airstrike simulator game, September 12th (Frasca 2003a) assumes a ‘god’ or ‘bird’s-eye’ position overlooking a Middle Eastern city from above (see Figure 6.1). This is similar to the perspective on Will Wright’s classic SimCity (Maxis 1989) where the player as city planner constructs and manages a city from above. In fact, many simulation games, following the genre template set by SimCity and The Sims (Maxis 2000), position the player as a distant overseer of automated, minutely scaled, toy working worlds. The goal at the outset of September 12th, similar to many commercial war games released after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, appears to be to eliminate terrorists from the streets of a Middle Eastern city, identifiable by their gray robes and machine guns. But as the game proceeds, the player recognizes that the more frequently he launches missiles on the terrorists in the city, the more neighboring civilians, including women and children, are converted into terrorists. Forging a rational feedback loop between the player’s actions and visible outcomes in the game environment, September 12th simulates an escalating cycle of conflict exasperated by the War on Terror. This interactive, escalation between player and game becomes a dynamic, interactive argument for “violence begets violence.” Thus, the game procedurally makes a case for peace via the interactive simulation of strife between the terrorists and the player—who is cast in the role of an air force striker. But here we may be slightly misled in applying Frasca’s own belief in the rhetorical efficacy of simulation to the analysis of the game (2003b). The cycle of the escalation of violence largely becomes illuminated in a critical light because the game does not work properly as a game—the only way to ‘win’ the game would be to abstain from playing, from interacting with the game! On the flip side of the ‘positive’ simulation of a damaging cycle of the escalation of violence, lies a negative argument for non-intervention, for non-engagement, a ‘no play imperative’ in either war or games. Paradoxically, can the simulation of a harmful process only become visible (disclosed) to the player, and thereby leveraged as critique, if the game is made frustratingly unplayable, in effect rendered a broken toy? Before we continue with this question, let’s take a few moments to consider how procedurality and simulation have been understood in game scholarship thus far. Murray was one of the first to call attention to the procedurality of games and electronic media. According to Murray, [p]rocedural authorship means writing the rules by which the texts appear as well as writing the texts themselves. It means writing the rules for the interactor’s involvement, that is, the conditions under which things will happen in response to the participant’s actions. It means establishing the properties of the objects and potential objects in the virtual world and the formulas for how they will relate to one another. (1997, 152-153) Bogost refers to the rhetorical impact of such gamic procedural mechanisms on the player as ‘procedural rhetoric’: “I suggest the name procedural rhetoric for the practices of using processes persuasively, just as verbal rhetoric is the practice of using oratory persuasively and visual rhetoric is the practice of using images persuasively” (2008, 125). As a rhetorical form, game procedurality appears to be an important new form of communication available in the public political sphere. Similarly emphasizing the communicative power of gamic procedures, according to Frasca, a game designer or ‘Simauthor’ (simulation author) communicates via the rules, logical processes, and algorithms in the game that model the trajectory of outside the game workings and outcomes: Whoever designs a strike simulator that is extremely hard to play is describing his beliefs regarding social mechanics through the game’s rules rather than through events. […] They are not only able to state if social change is possible or not, but they have the chance of expressing how likely they think it may be. (2003b, 228) Activist game-makers such as Frasca therefore believe it is possible to harness the procedures of the game to mimic the probable outcome of a military assault, and to thereby communicate a particular belief about the workings of the world to the player-citizen, a citizen who may have voting rights and live in a nation with influence over the course of the war. Simulation games deliberately encourage the forging of correspondences from inside-the-game actions, procedures running within Johan Huizinga’s “magic circle” of play (1950), to external spheres of action, so as to provoke a confusion that Bogost dubs as ‘simulation fever’: “But for the magic circle to couple with the world, it must not be hermetic; it must have a breach through which the game world and real-world spill over into one another” (2006, 136). Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, what is important from Huizinga’s much-cited and challenged magic circle is the relation between procedures running inside the game and those outside the game. Worldly goings-on, when transposed via simulation to the game sphere or magic circle, become magically enchanting because they are miniature toy-like abstractions. My application of the magic circle to contemporary simulation games is not intended to imply that such digital games are magical, sorcerous rituals, as in Daniel Pargman and Peter Jakobsson’s (2008) critique of the contemporary usage of Huizinga’s term. The movement of causal loops within the game exerts the more mundane, everyday magic of the toy miniature, what Chaim Gingold (2003) refers to as a “miniature garden,” a spatially reduced, abstracted world like a Japanese garden, model train set, or a doll house. Over the course of his Master’s thesis, also conducted at Georgia Tech, Gingold expands on the term he encountered in an interview with Shigero Miyamoto, the influential Japanese game designer of Nintendo computer games. Gingold writes: [A] garden has an inner life of its own; it is a world in flux which grows and changes. A garden’s internal behaviors, and how we understand those rules, help us to wrap our heads and hands around the garden. […] Gardens, like games, are compact, self-sustained worlds we can immerse ourselves in. (2003, 7) The reduction in scale and in complexity in a Japanese garden, the scaling down from forest to tree, from lake to pond, serve in a game as a cognitive aid for the player’s apprehension of the systematic clockwork world, a miniature sphere of operations. The simulation game’s ‘procedural argument’ intentionally blurs the line between the miniature game world and the outside world, but there are important differences between the operations running on either side of this fence or ludic border. Although all games have dynamic, timebased procedures, not all of these play moves make much sense outside the game—in other words, to state the rather obvious, not all games are simulation games. For example, when a player makes a move in checkers, this does not correlate to a specific action undertaken in the world outside the game. In this way, the falling, colorful squares of Tetris (Pajitnov 1984) are just that, falling colorful squares. These primarily signify play moves. In such abstract games, actions procedurally advance the game forward toward a goal (or multiple goals) triggering wins and losses. By contrast, in the simulation game, actions and processes have a double signification as both gamic procedures and as metaphoric actions. And yet this added layer of metaphoric significance does not mean that the player will reflect critically on the simulated operation in activist games, as will become apparent in the following example. By way of comparison to September 12th, let’s now consider another widely played, free for download, activist simulation game that affords the player an overview of a miniature toy world. Similar to September 12th, Paulo Pedercini’s farcical McDonald’s Video Game (Molleindustria 2006), simulates a harmful operation, in this case, an environmentally destructive fast food corporate industry. McDonald’s Video Game is structured as a managerial simulation game, and although designed and programmed entirely by Pedercini, the prolific creator behind Molleindustria, the game implements a slick graphical user interface button panel (see Figure 6.2) reminiscent of commercially produced The Sims. The McDonald’s Video Game player alternates between managing four distinct production cycles: a. overseeing farm production; b. administering a cattle feedlot; c. managing a chain of hamburger-grill workers; and d. negotiating policies and marketing campaigns in ‘corporate headquarters.’ The challenge of the game is to effectively multitask, manage, and maintain the production routines in all four areas without letting one slip. As the player’s skill improves, outcomes of actions in one sphere of operations have ramifications elsewhere in the game. For instance, if not enough cattle are raised, negative consequences arise further up the supply chain, ultimately effecting the McDonald’s corporation bottom-line. Although McDonald’s Video Game periodically discloses snippets of textual information about fast food industry practices, it is this simulation of lively processes that imparts a convincing overview of interlocking cycles of fast food bio-production, from deforestation to raising enough cattle for meat to fastfood public relations campaigns. Despite recurrent dips into bankruptcy, McDonald’s Video Game operates so well as managerial training software with the management of a miniature, toy-like, cheerful cow and hamburger world that the ironic subtext of this being an unethical business practice is often missed by players. For instance, when my game design students in Singapore played McDonald’s Video Game, they seemed largely unconcerned about the detrimental side effects of this type of production on workers, animals, consumers, or the environment. They were willing to undertake whatever was necessary to keep the game system alive and the McDonald’s corporation above the bottom line, even adding diseased cows to the food chain. The enchanting ordinariness of toy world equipment Unlike the vehicles circulating in the toy model city of Madurodam, games like September 12th and McDonald’s Video Game require interaction from the player via buttons or a graphical user interface (GUI), conventionally organized into an instrumental dashboard at the edge of the screen. September 12th presents the player with a weapon for targeting and shooting the terrorists; McDonald’s Video Game offers the player a colorful toy-like button interface of slaughterhouse machinery to first convert the livestock into hamburgers, and then a different range of equipment for converting hamburgers into dollars. This observation on the equipment of the game interface may seem obvious, but it is this very ordinariness in game interaction that poses another challenge to critical and activist game design because ‘equipmental’ interactions with game procedures contribute to the player’s ‘everyday sight.’ In a chapter of Being and time entitled ‘The worldhood of the world,’ Heidegger describes the equipment required for his everyday operational view of ‘Being-in-the-World’: “In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. […] A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the ‘in-order-to,’ such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability” (1927, 97). When observable in the clockwork toy world, these equipmental operations impart everyday common sense. Referring to the simulation of a natural cycle in a clock, Heidegger writes: “In a clock, account is taken of some definite constellation in the world system” (2003, 72), and further on he writes: “When we make use of the clock-equipment, which is proximally and inconspicuously ready-to-hand, the environing Nature is ready-to-hand along with it” (Ibid., 101). In other words, those earthly relations that are simulated or incorporated in the equipment, such as the movement of the sun from day to night being replicated in the clock, are easily ‘discovered’ and naturalized in the ‘clock-equipment’. Equipment, or the “ready-to-hand” is easy to see, contrasting to Heidegger’s “presence-at-hand,” the term he uses to refer to the sounds and colors of perceived but not yet differentiated “reality,” such as a rumble of noise that upon reaching the ear does not quite resolve into the screech of a passing motorbike (1927, 228). Unlike the confusion that an intrusion of “presence-at-hand” reality might occasion, the equipmental operations of the ready-to-hand world are easily apprehended, made sense of, or ‘discovered.’ The equipment’s functionality seems obvious, running smoothly in plain sight, in the common-sense realm of ‘the They.’ Naturally, the player would want to use the available buttons to operate the farm machinery and produce hamburgers. Thus, simulation games simulate alleged processes from outside the game sphere in plain view, invoking the everyday perspective of how things work, the operations of fast food production, or of an efficient airstrike. If we apply an extended Heideggerian interpretation, ‘equipment’ refers not only to interface buttons, but also to the larger operations (in his terms ‘workshops’) that these buttons trigger or manipulate. For instance, September 12th presents the player with a weapon for targeting and shooting the terrorists; while McDonald’s Video Game offers the player a colorful toy-like button-interface of slaughterhouse machinery to turn livestock into hamburgers, and then a different range of equipment for turning hamburgers into dollars. Although ready-to-hand equipment is easily discoverable, it is also hidden, in another sense. The familiarity of everyday sight or circumspection, conceals “the totality” of a clockwork operation, the in-order-to relations that it is connected to, including objects and persons at a distance (Heidegger 1927, 105). Immersion in the clockwork world’s operations is a state of “concernful” absorption that is to a certain extent blind and alienated, not only to its own existence, but to the larger repercussions of the operation (Ibid., 101). The game’s movement compels the player to accept its operations as ordinary, as unquestionable cycles of everyday life, unfolding within plain view or, to be more precise, in relation to simulation genre games, within the elevated plain view of the great overseer of the toy world operations. The challenge that then confronts the concerned citizen game-maker is that no matter what these simulated operations are, as they run with the evocative mimicry within miniature toy worlds, they acquire everyday currency and uncritical acceptance among players via the motion of their interlocking, toy-like workings. Player vs. game But do the toy world’s procedures really subsume the player to such an extent? Is the operational functionality of the game truly so bewitching? Furthermore, an allegation could be made that Bogost’s rhetorical transmission of procedural game logic from the sender (the game-maker or ‘Simauthor’) to receiver (the player) is limited by a communications model of sending and receiving. The player in this analysis, even while interacting with the game, becomes a passive recipient of rhetoric in motion. In a similar vein, Sicart critiques the limited role that players are afforded in designer-weighted, instrumental ‘proceduralist’ game studies, writing that players “are important, but only as activators of the process that sets the meanings contained in the game in motion” (2011). Are game designers, then, the only ones afforded the role of agents of engaged ludic citizenship? In support of player agency, Frasca proposes that players, not only game designers, potentially impact the ultimate rhetorical “outcome” of a game by channeling the course of play into directions unimagined by the game-maker (2003b, 228). Frasca calls upon Brazilian theater director Augusto Boal’s “Theater of the Oppressed” as a model for how a game can depart from Aristotlean narrative closure. Frasca writes “one of [Boal’s] most popular techniques, re-enacts the same play several times by allowing different audience members to get into the stage and take the protagonist’s role,” resulting in unforeseen outcomes (Ibid.). For instance, such player-directed outcomes are evident in the spectacular demise of artificial game life, of entire families and their pets, in a dark genre of the Sims known as ‘Disaster Sims.’ The player’s influence on the game’s rhetorical outcome in such cases amounts to a breaking of the original game designer’s ‘script’ to breed a suburban American family. With these morbid, broken games, often ending in fire, we return via a different path, following the player’s initiative rather than the game-maker’s, to derailed and broken game equipment. On the other hand, when the toy is not broken, when the system is running without interruption, as when the player engages with the productive fast food mechanizations of McDonald’s Video Game, the player remains blind to its workings even as she plugs into its persuasive everyday perspective. Losing track of time, the player immerses herself in a sequence of game challenges that, if designed well, alternates rewards (points, bonuses, and additional tools) with escalating peaks of difficulty, oscillating within what psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi refers to as a pleasurable “flow state” between challenge and skill (1990, 74). Thus, the player’s fascinated state of absorption during gameplay suggests a loss of agency to the game’s mechanics, except for when the player willfully alters the course of the game’s ‘oppressive script’. Similarly, again from the realm of phenomenological philosophy, Heidegger’s student Hans-Georg Gadamer makes the inverse proposal that the game plays the player rather than the player the game (1975). Gadamer conducted an inquiry into aesthetics and art that brought him to the phenomenology of play. Gadamer’s player gives up his will to the game while performing the reflexive moves demanded by a game: “The structure of play absorbs the player into itself, and thus frees him from the burden of taking the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of existence” (1975, 105). The player merges with the game, entering into an ongoing interactive, reflexive feedback loop: “What happens to us in the experience of art, Gadamer suggests, is very much like what happens to us in play: we lose ourselves” (Weinsheimer 1985, 102). Unless the player is forced to reflect upon correspondences reaching beyond the game, the player’s critical and reflective capacity, political or otherwise, is easily bewitched amid the movement of game actions. Reacting with neither doubt, nor, on the contrary, belief, the player flows with the game’s operational allegations about how the world works. Only when the model is broken or interrupted by a renegade player, such as the maker of a Disaster Sim, or a game cheater or breaker, or through some form of sabotage installed by the game-maker, does the toy world’s algorithms and workings become visible. Frasca’s September 12th catapults the player outside the cozy assumptions of the clockwork game world and the comfortable correlations between rewarding player proficiency with toy weapons and ‘how things work.’ The brokenness of September 12th manifests in that playing well delivers loss, subverting the expectation of the player to master a rewarding challenge of eliminating terrorists. In McDonald’s Video Game, on the other hand, the very operationality of the model of fast food production cycles transmitted to the player overcomes the game’s critical impact. Beautiful toys that run too well are always enchanting, no matter how ugly the outcome of their workings. The player is lost in the game. Broken toys and the no play imperative The operational logic of the game takes hold. A player’s action inspires a resulting reaction on the part of the game. The game, in turn, compels the player to further reflexive play moves and if the game is designed well, the player loses herself, losing even a sense of the passage of hours and days, within the game, absorbed into the game’s workings, immersed in a feedback loop, Gadamer’s aesthetic union of player and game. The player performs a role among other processes running within the clockwork world through interaction with the game machine and the management of its simulated processes. Like the imprint of a popular tune that demands to be liked through its repeated exposure to the ears, players unreflectively absorb the logic of military operations, internalize the production cycle of hamburgers, and flow with the hum of tractors. How satisfying when at least the toy world is operating as it should. In the rational, operational spheres of games, as in the instrumental spheres of life, one’s everyday perspective turns away from suffering and the consequences of damaging human operations. Most feel powerless to disengage from, halt, or redirect harmful goings-on that are naturalized. Players flee their own mortality to the artificial circulations of ageless clockwork, toy worlds. In this sense, Madurodam’s endless ship and train circulations are a soothing and forgetful memorial to the untimely demise of young George Maduro. A tactical recipe for the activist simulation game consists then of two steps, f irst a positive, then a negative; f irst to constructively program a simulation of a harmful operation from the world into the game, followed up by either a game-maker, or player instigated interruption, or sabotage that breaks the spell of the game’s movement and procedurality, thereby illuminating its operationality in a critical light. Absorption in the everyday world of ‘equipmental’ dealings and transactions are broken at this rift of ‘in-order-to’ relations among entities, things, and persons. Induced to a discomforting re-evaluation and analysis of the games’ operational logic, the player performs a critical diagnosis of the wrongness or rightness of the broken play equipment. After being subjected to the broken toy tactic, a worldly operation’s common sense, the everyday claim on existence comes into dispute, becoming a matter of critical concern for the citizen-player. What is paradoxical with the broken toy tactic is that the game and activist critique remain in the last instance incompatible—only by interrupting or ejecting the player from the game, the no play imperative, is a critique illuminated and a political questioning made possible. Moreover, the intended effect of such games is not just a break in the game, but also the possibility of putting a stop to the destructive worldly procedure that is being simulated. The no play imperative extends beyond the game to the refusal to be a ‘player’ in the harmful processes of the world, a refusal to play at war, a refusal to play at the exploitation of the environment in the production and consumption of fast food. Thus, the most earnest mixture of politics and games seems to be delivered in games that do not believe in playing per se, but in the impossibility of separating the world and game, of separating procedurality in one realm or the other on either side of the ludic border. The activist game attempts to catapult the player from absorption in the clockwork toy world, to a realm of politics that he or she is otherwise quite busy avoiding.

#### Their discourse intends to maximize speech without creating change. Baudrillard, (Jean Baudrillard, sociologist, philosopher and cultural theorist, “Symbolic Exchange and Death,” <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B5o2oXdmBrRYbHR5VGlWM242LVE/view)> We will not destroy the system by a direct, dialectical revolution of the economic or political infrastructure. Everything produced by contradiction, by the relation of forces, or by energy in general, will only feed back into the mechanism and give it impetus, following a circular distortion similar to a Moebius strip. We will never defeat it by following its own logic of energy, calculation, reason and revolution, history and power, or some finality or counter-finality. The worst violence at this level has no purchase, and will only backfire against itself. We will never defeat the system on the plane of the real: the worst error of all our revolutionary strategies is to believe that we will put an end to the system on the plane of the real: this is their imaginary, imposed on them by the system itself, living or surviving only by always leading those who attack the system to fight amongst each other on the terrain of reality, which is always the reality of the system. This is where they throw all their energies, their imaginary violence, where an implacable logic constantly turns back into the system. We have only to do it violence or counter-violence since it thrives on symbolic violence not in the degraded sense in which this formula has found fortune, as a violence 'of signs', from which the system draws strength, or with which it 'masks' its material violence: symbolic violence is deduced from a logic of the symbolic (which has nothing to do with the sign or with energy): reversal, the incessant reversibility of the counter-gift and, conversely, the seizing of power by the unilateral exercise of the gift. 25 We must therefore displace everything into the sphere of the symbolic, where challenge, reversal and overbidding are the law, so that we can respond to death only by an equal or superior death. There is no question here of real violence or force, the only question concerns the challenge and the logic of the symbolic. If domination comes from the system's retention of the exclusivity of the gift without counter-gift the gift of work which can only be responded to by destruction or sacrifice, if not in consumption, which is only a spiral of the system of surplus-gratification without result, therefore a spiral of surplus-domination; a gift of media and messages to which, due to the monopoly of the code, nothing is allowed to retort; the gift, everywhere and at every instant, of the social, of the protection agency, security, gratification and the solicitation of the social from which nothing is any longer permitted to escape then the only solution is to turn the principle of its power back against the system itself: the impossibility of responding or retorting. To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death. Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains.

#### Their linkage of identity politics with trauma maintains affective structures that undergird liberalism. Baudrillard 94, Jean, Baudrillard The illusion of the End, Page 66-70

**We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world'** [['autre monde]. **We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence.** **The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines.** **The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience**. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. **World capitalist oppression is** now merely **the vehicle and alibi for this other**, much more ferocious, form of **moral predation**. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that **material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives.** **The 'Fourth World'** (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) **is** once again **beleaguered**, this time **as a catastrophe-bearing stratum**. **The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residu**e. And **the white world repents and seeks absolution** - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. **The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe**. **The North**, for its part, **specializes in** the **reprocessing of raw materials** and hence also in **the reprocessing of catastrophe.** **Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity,** etc. The last phase of colonialism: **the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground**. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for **universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne?** Just as **the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes** (Eastern Europe, **the Gulf,** the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). **We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen.** And the **poor countries are the best suppliers** - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. **Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development**. Up to now, **the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain.** But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, **when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself, in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food**. It will reach the point where **it devours itself**. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. **One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame,** **if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe**. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case**, the under-developed are only so** by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity. In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but **natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy** – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race. No solution has been found to the dramatic situation of the under-developed, and none will be found since their drama has now been overtaken by that of the overdeveloped, of the rich nations. The psychodrama of congestion, saturation, super abundance, neurosis and the breaking of blood vessels which haunts us - the drama of the excess of means over ends – calls more urgently for attention than **that of penury, lack and poverty. That is where the most imminent danger of catastrophe resides, in the societies which have run out of emptiness**. **Artificial catastrophes, like the beneficial aspects of civilization, progress much more quickly than natural ones.** The underdeveloped are still at the primary stage of the natural, unforeseeable catastrophe. **We are already at the second stage, that of the manufactured catastrophe - imminent and foreseeable - and we shall soon be at that of the pre-programmed catastrophe, the catastrophe of the third kind, deliberate and experimental.** And, paradoxically, it is our pursuit of the means for averting natural catastrophe - the unpredictable form of destiny - which will take us there. **Because it is unable to escape it, humanity will pretend to be the author of its destiny. Because it cannot accept being confronted with an end which is uncertain or governed by fate, it will prefer to stage its own death as a species.**

#### They’ll say voting negative does nothing, but I’ll say they should be more creative – what does voting aff accomplish?

OUCB 09 Occupied UC Berkeley, 10-18-2009, “The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death, and the UC.” Anti-Capital Projects, <https://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/>, SJBE

Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the \*\*\* and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless.

## 4

#### A. Interpretation: If the aff differs from the conventional truth testing model, they must explicitly specify a comprehensive role of the ballot and clarify how the round will play out under that role of the ballot in the form of a text in the 1AC.

#### B. Violation: They didn’t.

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Engagement –

# Accessibility

## 2

#### [1] Independently, Kant is incompatible with your method – it requires unconditional respect for humanity as an end in itself.

Korsgaard 83 bracketed for gendered language

when a rational being makes a choice [they] supposes its pursuit to be justified there must be something that is unconditionally good It cannot be the inclinations Nor can it be external things the unconditionally valuable thing must be rational nature we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon objects But we must regard others as capable of value rational choices as ends in themselves

#### [2] Only univeralizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02

The fact that I cannot satisfy my desires without considering the rightness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also . The individual is not allowed to exclude others as moral agents the universalizability is a principle of consistency and of inclusion include the perspective of other moral agents

#### [5] A strike uses the employer and society as a means to an end.

Fourie 17

people should be valued and not used for benefit a labor-strike is a direct violation because the effective functioning of the organization, and society is used to bargain working conditions. the humanity of clients and society is not seen as an 'end', but used to demonstrate the need for workers.

## 3

#### The 1AC is an activist game – they trade violence for points and collect the ballot for passing “Go” – vote negative to induce a break in that operationality in favor of critical reflection.

Schleiner 19

activist games present a persuasive argument to open a political question a play move is an inconsequential act of fun but carries symbolic weight players succumb to the enchantment no matter how damaging in the exterior world, The game asks to be played and mastered, inviting the player to enter its cause and effect loops, the operational movements induce complacency outside the game We seldom question our place in such utilitarian operations, And yet A rupture in the game catapults the player outside A break in the smooth functionality of the game discloses its operational logic is a moment ripe for critical reflection that precedes the formation of a political stance only by interrupting is political questioning made possible

#### Their discourse intends to maximize speech without creating change.

Baudrillard

We will not destroy the system by revolution Everything produced by contradiction will only feed back into the mechanism it thrives on symbolic violence We must displace into the symbolic where reversal and overbidding are the law by an equal or superior death the impossibility of responding

#### Their linkage of identity politics with trauma maintains affective structures that undergird liberalism.

Baudrillard 94

charity cannibalism worse than violence material exploitation serves as psychological nourishment for rich countries the crisis will be complete when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's catastrophes Our whole culture lives off this news media encouraging it

#### They’ll say voting negative does nothing, but I’ll say they should be more creative – what does voting aff accomplish?

OUCB 09

The classroom manages our social death, even the chancellor congratulates our strike shaping the meaning and force of the movement Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only perpetually deliberate, the boundaries reconfigure themselves to contain us the university is a graveyard, but also a factory of meaning which produces civic life and social death knowledge for its own sake perpetuate the inertia of meaning containing radical potential