## 1

#### A. Interpretation: The affirmative must specify the meta-ethic of their ethical theory/framework in the delineated text of the 1AC.

#### B. Violation: They didn’t.

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Resolvability –

#### 2. Extinction –

#### 3. Phil debate –

#### 4. Strat skew –

#### 5. Engagement –

#### D. Voters:

#### Fairness is a voter –

#### Education is a voter –

#### No RVIs –

#### Use competing interps –

#### Drop the debater –

## 2

#### The world is an extension of the self’s conceptual frames – however, the Other’s infinite nature interrupts our imposition of meaning. Totalization, or the attempt to reduce the Other to a one-dimensional object is the root cause of violence as it denies our obligation to preserve the Other’s mystery. Thus, the role of the ballot is to resist totalization – they can’t weigh the case if we win their starting point is flawed.

**Hooft 6** [Stan Van Hooft “Understanding Virtue Ethics” 2006 pg. 99-101]

Let us try to understand that suggestion more fully by taking a few steps back from interpersonal relations and considering our knowledge of the world. The way in which philosophers have traditionally understood knowledge and perception is to suggest that we assimilate things into our cognitive schemes. It is as if we impose categories and classifications on things in order to integrate them into our familiar world. We cognitively take possession of what we perceive and know. I do not mean by this that we literally or legally own them, of course. I mean that we assimilate what was previously unknown and therefore beyond our ken into a lived environment in which everything has its place and its relation to me. Once again, we can use your pen as an example. Whether or not you legally own the pen, the key point is that it is a familiar item in your world. If you are sitting in your study, then your desk, the books in front of you, the poster of a pop star on your wall and even the buildings that you see through your window are all a familiar environment to you. This environment contains things that you use and also things that are not your legal possessions but that are familiar parts of “your” world. You gaze upon it as your own domain. This was, of course, Sartre’s point in relation to the park. The very processes of cognition, of making sense of the world, involve your imposing your concepts and categories upon it and thereby appropriating it as your world. But now imagine yourself having dinner with a person you are very close to. Once again you are in a familiar environment. As far as you are concerned you are assimilating this world of the restaurant to yourself. But what of your companion sitting opposite you at this candle-lit table? Do you also assimilate them into your world? As you gaze at their face and into their eyes, do you appropriate them into the lived world of familiar objects that constitutes your known and comfortable environment? Levinas would say no. He would insist that the face of the Other person, and particularly their eyes (traditionally thought of as the “windows to the soul”) are[is] not assimilable in this way. They are a mystery. They are infinite in the sense of being ungraspable in the cognitive categories with which we appropriate our lived world. They are beyond our ken. Levinas is alluding to more than the important point that people are hard to get to know. Everyone seems to be keeping their own natures hidden within themselves. Indeed, the closer we are to someone the harder they seem to be to know. Th e spouse you might have lived with for many years continues to be a mystery to you. All of this is relevant, but Levinas is appealing to the very moment at which you look into that person’s face. What you see there has such depth and mystery as to forever escape your cognitive grasp. You cannot assimilate it. You must let it be what it is. The face is present in its refusal to be contained. It is neither seen nor touched – for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content. But this is not experienced as a problem to be overcome or as a threat to your own authenticity or selfhood. It is experienced by you as an opening on to something wonderful. It is experienced by you almost as a mystical rapport with something of infinite depth. (One can only speak in metaphors here since the hypothesis is that the other is unattainable through the categories of understanding.) And this changes the quality of your own being. Rather than now being the Nietzschean self-affi rmer or the existential self-project, you become an openness to the mystery of the Other. This is not, of course, a stance taken consciously or as the result of a decision. It is simply your mode of being as transformed by the presence of the Other person. Your primordial comportment towards the world is now no longer that of a self-project bent on making and affirming your own identity and on appropriating the environment as your own lived world; it is that of reverence and wonder in the presence of the mystery of the Other. And this comportment or stance always already has an ethical quality. I can illustrate this last point by using a much more mundane example than the intimate candle-lit dinner. Imagine yourself buying a railway ticket from an automatic vending machine. Here you are engaging in an interaction with a machine. As such the action falls clearly within that familiar world that you have appropriated to yourself through the way you understand and live in that world. You are the centre of this world and you do not need to respond to the machine as anything other than a thing that is there for you. But now imagine yourself buying the train ticket from a station attendant seated in a ticket booth. From a pragmatic or functional point of view the exchange is not different from the previous one. You are obtaining a ticket in exchange for money. However, there is a qualitative difference. This difference is marked by the etiquette of saying “please” and “thank you” and, perhaps, of exchanging some remarks about the weather. Th ese words add nothing to the functionality of the exchange but they are important in that they mark your acknowledgement of the other as a person rather than a machine. The very presence in that booth of a person elicits in you a courteous and pleasant response. Although hardly a dramatic moment in your life, this response is an expression of a primordial ethical comportment that marks your mode of being as ethical. Without any deliberate thought, you acknowledge and respect the mystery of that other person in those simple gestures.

#### Util totalizes the Other to mechanical calculations which destroys ethics, politics, and the value to life. Vote negative to recognize the Other as a complex subject that demands a continual quest of understanding.

**Joseph 17** [<https://dspace.wlu.edu/bitstream/handle/11021/33878/RG38_TaylorZ_Poverty_2017_A.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> ” The Essential Poverty of the Face: A Case for Levinasian Responsibility and Justice in Poverty Studies” Zachary Taylor Joseph 2017 Washington and Lee University]

On the one hand**,** Levinas and utilitarians ostensibly share a similar view of responsibility. Utilitarianism is a kind of consequentialism; whether an action is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act, as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the act or what happens before the act.112 While, for simplicity’s sake, I focus here on act utilitarianism, my comments about how Levinasian responsibility is instructive to utilitarianism apply to other forms of utilitarianism as well. Act utilitarians claim that I am morally required to promote the most preferences or satisfactions of the most people. Act utilitarianism, it should be noted, cannot easily distinguish the different categories of moral permissibility, impermissibility, obligation, and supererogation. In effect, act utilitarianism implies that I do wrong each time I fail to perform an action that maximizes the most preferences or satisfactions for the most people. Since it makes the optimal action obligatory and the suboptimal action wrong, act utilitarianism expands the realm of that which is morally impermissible, collapses the distinction between the permissible and the obligatory, and eliminates the possibility of the supererogatory. **My responsibilities according to act utilitarianism, then, are more or less endless.** Moreover, as John Stuart Mill, one of utilitarianism’s foremost exponents, writes in Utilitarianism, “the happiness that forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent’s own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”114 My responsibilities, then, are endless with respect to the happiness, preferences, or satisfactions of others. Insofar as the ideal utilitarian agent is a “disinterested and benevolent spectator” with responsibilities determined by the needs of others, utilitarianism’s account of responsibility notably parallels Levinasian responsibility. Bernard Williams, in “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” elucidates how the demands of others impact the responsibility of the utilitarian agent. He writes: On the utilitarian view, the undesirable projects of other people as much determine […] one’s decisions as the desirable ones do: if those people were not there, or had different projects, the causal nexus would be different, and it is the actual state of the causal nexus which determines the decision. The determination to an indefinite degree of my decisions by other people’s projects is just another aspect of my unlimited responsibility to act for the best in a causal framework formed to a considerable extent by their projects.115 It is notable here how Williams characterizes utilitarianism’s account of responsibility as “unlimited.” It is also notable how, similar to Levinas’s phenomenological description of responsibility, the projects of other people seem to impose themselves on the utilitarian agent Williams describes. Williams also claims that on the utilitarian view, the projects of others will more often than not override the preferences or satisfaction I derive from my own projects, so that even if the projects of others conflict with some project of mine, “the satisfaction to [me] of fulfilling [my] project, and any satisfactions to others of [my] doing, have already been through the calculating device and have been found inadequate.”116 On this point, too, the utilitarian account of responsibility intrinsically tied to the projects of others closely resembles Levinasian responsibility, insofar as what I want to pursue is secondary to that which I know will benefit other people. Whatever the similarities between utilitarian responsibility and Levinasian responsibility, the utilitarian account severely undervalues the importance of both subjectivity and individuation. In his critique of utilitarianism, Williams points out that the ideal utilitarian agent is not at all someone with a unique identity and robust personality. To the contrary, he is at the whims of the mechanistic calculations that utilitarianism prescribes. Whatever actions he performs “will depend entirely on the facts, on what persons with what projects and what potential satisfactions there are within calculable reach of the casual levers near which he finds himself.”117 Williams rightly characterizes the demands of utilitarianism as “an attack on [a person’s integrity].” **Utilitarian responsibility effectively strips a person of projects and attitudes which in some cases he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about**. […] It is absurd to demand of such a man, when the sums come in from the utility network which the projects of others have in part determined, that he should just step aside from his own project and decision and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation requires. It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his action in his own convictions.118 Levinasian responsibility, on the other hand, while no less demanding than utilitarian responsibility, avoids reducing the subjected “I” to a mechanistic tool through which utilitarian calculations impersonally run. For Levinas, responsibility is synonymous with subjectivity; rather than lose myself in the projects of other people, I discover who I am in responsibility to the Other. Recall the words of Paul Celan, quoted earlier:119 “I am you, when I am I,” or, as I also rendered his statement, only when I am for another, am I really the “I” I should be. According to Levinas’s phenomenological description, responsibility by no means alienates me from my actions or the source of my actions. Quite the opposite, it in fact constitutes my unique identity and robust personality as a human subject.120 In this sense, Levinas’s account of responsibility is instructive to the utilitarian account while still retaining the moral exigency of utilitarianism that those who are concerned with poverty alleviation might find attractive in utilitarian responsibility.

## 3

#### The space race is simulacra – the 1ACs mythos of a distinction between institutional space flight and the market fuels the image-machine.

**Dickens and Ormrod 16** – Peter Dickens, Senior Research Associate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cambridge, member of the Red-Green Study Group in London, James S Ormrod, Principal Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Brighton, 2016, “Introduction: The Production of Outer Space” in The Palgrave Handbook of Society, Culture and Outer Space, pp 5-6, footnote 4 included in curly braces

An argument can be made that ‘the space race’ – as a material technological project, as a discourse about the conquest of space, and as an imagined competition – clung on to the older conceptions of space that were being abandoned in so many other areas of social life (while, it should be noted, embracing some of the developments Kern identifies). The space race was historicized and spatialized by its protagonists, by academics, and by the public, in largely consensual terms on both sides of the iron curtain (‘consensual’ in the sense that all agreed on how the race was to be understood). Indeed, for Baudrillard (1994), this was one of the keys to understanding the space race. Its aim was not to put a man on the Moon. The Moon landings functioned as models of rational, calculated control, in relation to which all earthly activity was to become oriented. As in nuclear proliferation,4 ‘[t]heir truth is to be models of simulation, the model vectors of a system of planetary control (where even the superpowers of this scenario are not free – the whole world is satellized)’ (1994, p. 35). Viewed in this way, the space race was a conspiracy, albeit one that nobody had charge of.

{4. Baudrillard believed the space race played the same role as the Cold War arms race that preceded it. In his understanding, nuclear deterrence was not aimed at containing a real threat from the other side, just as the aim of the space race was not to put a man on the Moon. Rather, the former represented a pretext ‘for installing a universal security system whose deterrent effect is not at all aimed at an atomic clash … but, rather, at the much greater probability of any real event, of anything that would be an event in the general system and upset its balance’ (p.33). Baudrillard sees the Cold War and space race as taking place in the cause of rationalization of the world and the exclusion of pre-modern forms: ‘[B]ehind this simulacrum of fighting to the death and of ruthless global stakes, the two adversaries are fundamentally in solidarity against something else, unnamed, never spoken, but whose objective outcome in war, with the equal complicity of the two adversaries, is total liquidation. Tribal, communitarian, precapitalist structures, every form of exchange, of language, of symbolic organization, that is what must be abolished, that is the object of murder in war – and war itself, in its immense, spectacular death apparatus, is nothing but the medium of this process of the terrorist rationalization of the social – The murder on which sociality will be founded, whatever its allegiance, Communist or capitalist’ (p.37)}

Because of this conspiracy, there now exists a standard account of the space race, and of the history of the American space programme. Histories of the Soviet programme are still being produced (see, for example, Siddiqi, 2010), but these do not necessarily challenge this standard account. A very condensed account runs as follow. Wernher von Braun, the Nazi rocket scientist, had been taken back to the United States in 1945 as part of Operation Paperclip, to later use what he had learnt working on the V-2 in the services of the American space programme. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 by the Soviet Union had shocked the United States. Eisenhower had then created NASA in 1958, and Kennedy had announced the decision to send a human to the Moon in 1962 in the wake of the embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The United States had beaten the Soviet Union to the Moon by 1969.5

Kennedy (1962) had attempted to assert that the reasons for conquering space were noble and involved ‘new knowledge to be gained and new rights to be won … for the progress of all people’. However, he also made it clear that it was crucial for America to secure these victories. It was meant to be understood that the space race was intimately connected with the Cold War, although academics disagreed about exactly how (see Dickens & Ormrod, 2007b). The space race was nonetheless about the extension of the space of the nation state, whether this was physical space or the space of national prestige. It was also well understood that the space race, civilian and military, had to do with the proper or improper ‘meshing’ of the spaces of government, business and politics (see Chapter 3 by Wills, this volume). The existence of a military-industrial complex of some kind is widely accepted, even if historians and social scientists have been left arguing about which interests were the most significant (see, for example, Baran & Sweezy, 1966).

#### This war of images plays on the terms of simulation – the aff reinforces technological forms and refashions a new space race headed by the government.

**Dickens and Ormrod 16** – Peter Dickens, Senior Research Associate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cambridge, member of the Red-Green Study Group in London, James S Ormrod, Principal Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Brighton, 2016, “Conclusion: The Future of Outer Space” in The Palgrave Handbook of Society, Culture and Outer Space, pp 446-449

An argument can be made that the conquest of outer space has represented the ultimate victory of abstract space (see also Shaw, 2008, p. 115). Any meaningful distinction between terrestrial space and the rest of the cosmos has been eroded. This is not to say that the whole of outer space has been humanized, which of course it has not, but that space has come to be reconceptualized and re-experienced as a space for accumulation like any other. It is a space thoroughly colonized by terrestrial knowledge and practice (whether considered primarily capitalist, male, white or anything else).

For Benjamin and a host of others (from Klerkx, 2005, to Parker, 2009), the disinvestment in outer space exploration and development came as a result of the bureaucratization of NASA, and its engulfment within the military-industrial complex. With the development of the International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle (which according to some accounts were each the rationale for the development of the other), space exploration became routine and unexciting. Nothing fundamentally new appeared to be happening in space. Whether or not this is seen as true depends a great deal on perspective. Even if NASA budgets were being cut, this volume has hopefully made clear that a great deal was still happening in space. New space technologies continued to be developed, and these technologies were being integrated into terrestrial life in innumerable ways. But we believe it is also true (and this has been the emphasis of our work elsewhere, see Dickens and Ormrod, 2007) that these developments represent the continuation of terrestrial power relations and social dynamics. Space development is, to put it one way, business as usual. And crucially, any novelty to these developments was undermined by the representation of outer space in similar terms to the representation of terrestrial space. As evidenced in this book, political scientists, geographers and legal scholars had begun to talk about outer space as a knowable, if not actually known, space. The origins of this representation of space can be traced to Copernicus (MacDonald, 2009) and/or Kepler (Zubrin, 1996). But with the routinization of outer spatial practices (from increasing launch rates to the proliferation of satellite-receiving terminals, to the everyday use of satellite services to underpin military operations, communications, entertainment, navigation and so on), these representations were made manifest in the creation of a new social space.

The central problem with the final victory of abstract space was that it obliterated the very ‘absolute spaces’ on which it was founded, and from which it derived its emotional appeal. It is in a way surprising that the development of modern spaceflight was from its inception anchored in a religious or spiritual cosmology. This was true of both Russian and American contexts (see also Geppert, 2007, p. 599). The Russian programme has long roots in the tradition of Russian cosmism (Kohonen, 2009; Siddiqi, 2010). And, as Pop notes, Richard Nixon said to the Apollo 11 astronauts; ‘Because of what you have done, the heavens have become a part of man’s world.’ Pop goes on:

‘Are we today turning mythology into fact?’ – asked Joseph Campbell on the occasion of the Apollo programme. The astronauts walked on the real astronomical moon, as it was; but they walked on the mythical moon of each culture, as thought to be, as imagined. Their trip was physical and metaphysical. They walked through different cosmogonies; through different models of the universe.

(Pop, 2012, personal communication, see also ‘High Flight: A Spiritual History of the Space Age’, in preparation)

This continued relationship was not coincidental. As a number of contributions here show, the appeal of outer space lay in the promise of conquering the wondrous or Godly and hence the elevation of the status of humanity (or, rather more specifically, white men). This is not necessarily that dissimilar to the process Sims describes in his chapter, whereby myths ‘record time’. Ormrod illustrates this in his chapter through analysis of Tsiolkovsky’s science fiction in which the best human beings are able to fly like angels in space. As Kilgore notes in his chapter, Carl Sagan owed his continued appeal to his simultaneous reproduction of wonder as well as knowledge. The British celebrity cosmologist Brian Cox (see Mellor, this volume, for more on him) has arguably taken this even further, such that his popular shows and writing dedicate more time to what is unknown than to knowledge itself. These lacunae became spaces for wild imaginative projects – projects more captivating than any empirical knowledge. It is no wonder that the continued disenchantment and re-enchantment of the universe have become a major theme in recent work. Based largely on studies of astronauts’ experiences, Kilbryde (2015) argues that space exploration can potentially be a means of overcoming the dualism through which outer space is constructed as an object, and thus of experiencing unity. This is provided that the sense of awe and wonder it engenders is not sought as a ‘possession’ of the individual or as something to be subsequently rationalized.

It is the invocation of obstacles that produces space as something potentially unconquerable, and hence worth conquering. And yet the obliteration of the irrational or wondrous sweeps the ground from underneath such a project. To the extent that outer space has become an abstract space, it has been foreclosed as a frontier. It is a frontier, but a frontier without a future. In removing the possibility of an elsewhere, it serves only to secure terrestrial hegemony. In their own ways, both Baudrillard and Virilio present such a view of outer space. For Baudrillard, it was in any case a frontier that served as a model for terrestrial life, which set the permissible limits for struggle and confrontation within it. He concludes,

Through the orbital inscription of a spatial object, it is the planet earth that becomes a satellite, it is the terrestrial principle of reality that becomes eccentric, hyperreal, and insignificant. Through the orbital installation of a system of control like peaceful coexistence, all the terrestrial microsystems are satellized and lose their autonomy. (p. 35)

Everyone on Earth is neutralized and homogenized. The proliferation of space technology since he was writing, and the blurring of civilian and military technologies, has only broadened the potential of such an understanding. Parks and Schwoch (2012, p. 4), in the context of the ‘satellization’ of global security, refer to the satellites as ‘the ultimate rationalization and instrumentalization of the quest for global security and domination’.

For Virilio, there was such a homology between the technologies of war, the image of space as a battlefield and the political discourses about space that the future seemed equally foreclosed. He makes the claim that any space is constituted ‘from the outside’ (cited in Bormann, 2009, p. 80). That is to say, it is perceived on the basis of that which precedes it. Bormann is therefore able to argue that ‘nothing about outer space is “out there”, what we get to know about outer space is always socially, spatially and locally embedded’ (p. 80). Bormann, following Virilio, seems to believe that this is especially true of the vacuum of outer space:

[O]ther than the view there is no physical or physiological contact. No hearing, no feeling in the sense of touching materials, with the exception of an actual Moon landing. Thus the conquest of space, of outer space – isn’t it more the conquest of the image of space?

(Virilio & Ujica, 2003, cited in Bormann, 2009, p. 84)

Bormann reaches the pessimistic conclusion that ‘the perpetuation of outer space as a sphere of permanent war and its claims to weaponization will soon make no alternative possible’ (p. 84). This is the product, in the large part, of her assumption that ‘[w]hat we get to know about the space of outer space is dominated by information provided through the possibilities (and limits) of military technology’ (p. 81).

#### We refuse to be for or against New Space. Vote negative to understand the space race as pure spectacle – anything else plays into the military industrial complex.

Shapiro 14– Alan, senior lecturer at the Offenbach Art and Design University in Germany, “Jean Baudrillard and Albert Camus on the Simulacrum of Taking a Stance on War”, IJBS Volume 11, Number 2 (May 2014), Special Issue: Baudrillard and War

Unlike other thinkers such as Noam Chomsky or Chris Hedges (whose positions are highly valuable in their own right), Jean Baudrillard is not ‘against war’. Baudrillard’s position is rather that of being ‘neither for nor against’ contemporary hyper-real mediatized wars, and seeing the imperative of choosing whether one is ‘for’ or ‘against’ war as being something of a forced and imposed simulacrum. To say that one is ‘against’ a specific war, or even all wars, would be to implicitly acknowledge the ‘reality’ of war(s), which have, to the contrary, drifted increasingly into the fakeness of virtuality, simulation, and an indeterminate hyperspace. Baudrillard, in his orientation of being ‘neither for nor against’ war, finds a strong predecessor in another great writer and thinker who wrote in French: Albert Camus. In his political theory and activist engagements, Camus was an independent hybrid anarchist-liberal (the very notion of hybrid, with which one can retrospectively illuminate Camus’ politics, has only emerged as a well-known concept in recent times, in the wake of, for example, Donna Haraway’s cyborg theory). Camus was a serious thinker who – like Plato, Nietzsche, Baudrillard, Deleuze and Philip K. Dick – had deep insights into the genealogy of image-making simulacra in and of Western culture. As a major figure of twentieth century French intellectual history, Albert Camus appears now in retrospect to have been way ahead of his time in his positions on ethics, aesthetics, virtuality, and political philosophy. The intention of this essay is not to claim that Baudrillard and Camus had ‘the same position’ on war or on simulacra. It is, rather, to make an initial attempt to outline important affinities between the two thinkers, hinting at a sort of ‘alliance’ between these two intellectual figures which has not been previously articulated in the academic literature in Baudrillard or Camus studies. The essay indicates certain key starting points for substantiating the affinity/alliance, but it should also be read in the spirit of suggesting fruitful directions for future research. The stance of opposition to a war undertaken by America’s ’military-industrial complex’ (MIC), as President Dwight D. Eisenhower termed it in his Farewell Address to the nation on January 17, 1961 after spending 8 years as President, seems to be based on the assumption of the discursive viability of projecting oneself into the imaginative space of being a sort of ‘shadow government of truth-speakers’, empowered by democracy into the democratic position of being able to make ‘better’ decisions for the body politic of democracy than those who hold institutional power in political economy and government. Most political discourse in the U.S., including the anti-war stance, seems to take for granted the idea that we should clarify ‘our politics’ by imaginatively putting ourselves ‘in the shoes’ of national strategists choosing among the policy options available. Jean Baudrillard expands our sense of what is history because he does not operate with a strict separation between what are ‘the facts’ and what are the engaging stories that we as a culture have written and enacted about important ‘historical’ events. Much of what we know about the Holocaust, the Second World War, and the Vietnam War comes from Hollywood films about the Holocaust, the Second World War, and the Vietnam War that we have seen. In his essay on Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 blockbuster Vietnam War movie Apocalypse Now, Baudrillard writes that Coppola’s masterpiece is the continuation of the Vietnam War by other means. “Nothing else in the world smells like that,” says Lt. Colonel Bill Kilgore – played by Robert Duvall – in the 2 hour and 33 minute film. “I love the smell of napalm in the morning… It smells like victory.” The high-budget extravaganza was produced exactly the same way that America fought in Vietnam, says Jean Baudrillard of the film made by director Francis Ford Coppola (Baudrillard 1981: 89-91). “War becomes film,” Baudrillard writes of Coppola’s spectacularly successful cinematic creation. “Film becomes war, the two united by their shared overflowing of technology” (Ibid.: 89). There is implosion or mutual contamination between ‘film becoming Virtual Reality’ and War. Think also of Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan (1998): total immersion in the Virtual Reality of combat – an aesthetics of VR different from ‘critical distance’ – as a new kind of ‘testimonial position’ with respect to war and atrocities. In Vietnam-slash-Apocalypse Now, War is a Drug Trip and a God Trip, a psychedelic and pornographic carnival (Baudrillard 2010), a savage cannibalism practiced by the Christians, a film before the shooting and a shoot before the filming, a vast machine of excessive special effects, a ‘show of power’, a territorial lab for testing new weapons on human guinea pigs, and the sacrificial jouissance of throwing away billions of dollars – all these aspects alluded to or mentioned by Baudrillard. Coppola’s film, according to Baudrillard, is the carrying on of an undeclared, unfinished and unending War. An interminable Heart of Darkness. Jean Baudrillard is not ‘against war’, not even against specific wars like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He says this explicitly in “Le masque de la guerre,” published in the Parisian daily newspaper Libération, just prior to President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ni pour ni contre. Neither for nor against. “This war is a non-event,” writes Baudrillard, “and it is absurd to take a stance on a non-event (Baudrillard 2003).” The non-events of the Iraq War and the War on Terror opposed themselves to the event of September 11th, 2001. Baudrillard’s two most explicit texts about war are The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1991), written just before, during, and just after the Persian Gulf War of 1991 that was initiated by President George H.W. Bush, and The Spirit of Terrorism (2002), written just after 9/11. At the very beginning of the essay “The Gulf War Will Not Take Place,” the first of the three essays that comprise The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Baudrillard explains that non-war – which is what the military-industrial complex or the (non-)war machine has become very adept at carrying out in the age of virtuality – “is characterised by that degenerate form of war which includes hostage manipulation and negotiation (Baudrillard 1995: 24). The Eisenhower-coined term of the military-industrial complex is used by Baudrillard in his essay "No Reprieve For Sarajevo," published in Libération, January 8, 1994. He sees the MIC as still operative yet in need of conceptual upgrading. “Hostages and blackmail,” Baudrillard continues in “The Gulf War Will Not Take Place,” “are the purest products of deterrence. The hostage has taken the place of the warrior. He has become the principal actor, the simulacral protagonist, or rather, in his pure inaction, the protagoniser (le protagonisant) of non-war” (Baurillard 1995: 24). And we, the television viewers of the non-war, are all in the situation of hostages, “all of us as information hostages on the world media stage” (Ibid.). Hostages of the screen, of the intoxication of the media, dragged and drugged into a logic of deterrence, "we are no longer in a logic of the passage from virtual to actual but in a hyperrealist logic of the deterrence of the real by the virtual” (Ibid.: 27). The post-structure [the successor to a sociological structure with less stability and with less of a center] of the (non-)war machine in the age of media virtuality has properties of binary/digital, simulation/modeling, viral metastasis, and complex intricate paradoxical topology. Let us consider all four of these properties as aspects of a Baudrillardian theory of war (or a theory of war in honour of Jean Baudrillard). First of all, the post-structure of the (non-)war machine in the age of media virtuality has the property of binary/digital. It presents itself to us through the dualistic structure of a forced binary choice, where the system obliges each of us to take a position ‘for’ or ‘against’ war, or ‘for’ or ‘against’ particular wars, as waged, for example, by the Pentagon, the EU ‘humanitarian’ forces, or the surveillance state’s War on Terror. It is this very binary logic of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ that is the news media discourse, the rhetoric of politicians, and the hybrid virtual-and-real-killing of the screen and the bomb. Today, of course, the Internet has superceded television as the prevailing universal media (although there is much convergence and combination of the two). And the Internet is much more interactive and participatory. There is much more response. There is much less of a ‘spectacle’ than there was when Guy Debord and the Situationists conceptualized their media theory in the 1960s. Yet everywhere that the ‘news media’ and the (non)-war machine still prevail, everywhere that they are still massively influential, everywhere that they still exercise their power, we are not quite liberated from the ‘speech without response’ described by the early Baudrillard. When Muammar Gaddafi, the former dictator of Libya, was brutally killed by rebel forces on October 20, 2011, during the Libyan Civil War, the event, having been filmed by a cell phone, was presented to worldwide viewers by almost all of the ‘news media’ as some kind of triumph for ‘justice’, even though it was clearly a loss for democratic principles and the possible coming to light of priceless information about the decades of atrocities committed by Gaddafi’s regime during a public trial which would never take place.

## 4

#### A. Interpretation: If the affirmative defends anything other than “The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust,” then they must provide a counter-solvency advocate for their specific advocacy.

#### B. Violation: You read a plan but not a CSA.

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Ground –

#### 2. Limits –

## 5

#### Interpretation – affirmatives must defend the resolution as a general principle. This requires that you defend that the plan is a good idea in the abstract and don’t defend implementation.

#### Violation: they defend implementation.

#### 1. Jurisdiction – it’s NSDA rules.

**NSDA 21** – 2021-22 Lincoln-Douglas Ballot, https://www.speechanddebate.org/wp-content/uploads/Sample-Lincoln-Douglas-Debate-Ballot-Blank.pdf // JB

Each **debater** has the burden to **prove** their **side** of the resolution **more valid** as a **general principle**. It is **unrealistic** to expect a debater to prove **complete validity or invalidity** of the resolution. The **better debater** is the one who, on the whole, proves their side of the resolution **more valid** as a general principle.

#### Outweighs – it’s on the LD ballot

#### 2. Precision:

#### Resolved in LD is a statement of values.

**UPitt ND** – University Of Pittsburgh Communications Services Webteam, copyright 2015-21, "Basic Definitions," Department of Communication , <https://www.comm.pitt.edu/basic-definitions> CHO

Affirmative/Pro. The side that “affirms” the resolution (is “pro” the issue). For example, the affirmative side in a debate using the resolution of policy, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens, would advocate for federal government implementation of a poverty reduction program. Argument. A statement, or claim, followed by a justification, or warrant. Justifications are responses to challenges, often linked by the word “because.” Example: The sun helps people, because the sun activates photosynthesis in plants, which produce oxygen so people can breathe. Constructive Speech. The first speeches in a debate, where the debaters “construct” their cases by presenting initial positions and arguments. Cross-examination. Question and answer sessions between debaters. Debate. A deliberative exercise characterized by formal procedures of argumentation, involving a set resolution to be debated, distinct times for debaters to speak, and a regulated order of speeches given. Evidence. Supporting materials for arguments. Standards for evidence are field-specific. Evidence can range from personal testimony, statistical evidence, research findings, to other published sources. Quotations drawn from journals, books, newspapers, and other audio-visuals sources are rather common. Negative/Con. The side that “negates” the resolution (is “con” the issue). For example, the negative side in a debate using the resolution of fact, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production, would argue that global warming does not threaten agricultural production. Preparation Time. Debates often necessitate time between speeches for students to gather their thoughts and consider their opponent's arguments. This preparation is generally a set period of time and can be used at any time by either side at the conclusion of a speech. Rebuttal Speech. The last speeches in a debate, where debaters summarize arguments and draw conclusions about the debate. Resolution. A specific statement or question up for debate. Resolutions usually appear as statements of policy, fact or value. Statement of policy. Involves an actor (local, national, or global) with power to decide a course of action. For example, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens. Statement of fact. Involves a dispute about empirical phenomenon. For example, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production. Statement of value. Involves conflicting moral dilemmas. For example, Resolved: The death penalty is a justified method of punishment. Topic. A general issue to debate. Topics could be “The Civil War,” “genetic engineering,” or “Great Books.”

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE dialectal present tense first-person and third-person singular of BE dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### That requires logical coherence and implies no implementation.

Your Dictionary ND – "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### Be is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent.

Grammar Monster ND – "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)

# Accessibility

## 2

#### The world is an extension of the self’s conceptual frames – however, the Other’s infinite nature interrupts our imposition of meaning. Totalization, or the attempt to reduce the Other to a one-dimensional object is the root cause of violence as it denies our obligation to preserve the Other’s mystery. Thus, the role of the ballot is to resist totalization – they can’t weigh the case if we win their starting point is flawed.

**Hooft 6**

we assimilate everything pen is in your world the Other [is] infinite in being ungraspable in which we appropriate our lived world. the face has mystery as to escape your cognitive grasp you become open to the Other. This is not taken consciously Your world is now of reverence and wonder of the Other

#### Util totalizes the Other to mechanical calculations which destroys ethics, politics, and the value to life. Vote negative to recognize the Other as a complex subject that demands a continual quest of understanding.

**Joseph 17**

util requires disinterested spectator util override preferences I derive satisfaction to others have already been through the calculating device and inadequate util severely undervalues subjectivity the utilitarian is not unique he is at the whims mechanistic calculations Utilitarian strips a person of at the deepest level Levinasian responsibility avoids reducing the “I” to a mechanistic tool responsibility is subjectivity I discover who I am in the Other

## 3

#### The space race is simulacra – the 1ACs mythos of a distinction between institutional space flight and the market fuels the image-machine.

**Dickens and Ormrod 16**

‘the space race’ was spatialized in consensual terms all agreed on how the race was to be understood landings functioned as calculated control ‘[B]ehind this simulacrum of global stakes, the two adversaries are in solidarity against something else, unnamed with equal complicity of the two adversaries total liquidation is nothing the medium of this terrorist rationalization of the social

#### This war of images plays on the terms of simulation – the aff reinforces technological forms and refashions a new space race headed by the government.

**Dickens and Ormrod 16**

Any distinction between terrestrial space and the cosmos has been eroded space has come to be reconceptualized for accumulation disinvestment in space exploration came as a result of NASA s engulfment in the military-industrial complex With the ISS and the Space Shuttle exploration became unexciting these developments represent the continuation of terrestrial power relations and social dynamics Space development is business as usual ‘nothing about outer space is “out there”, what we know about outer space is always socially embedded’

#### We refuse to be for or against New Space. Vote negative to understand the space race as pure spectacle – anything else plays into the military industrial complex.

Shapiro 14

choosing whether one is ‘for’ or ‘against’ war acknowledge the ‘reality’ of war(s), which have, drifted into virtuality opposition to a war project oneself into shadow government truth-speakers’ the anti-war stance clarify politics’ by putting ourselves ‘in the shoes’ of national strategists choosing among the policy options available the (non-)war machine in the age of virtuality is characterised by hostage manipulation the MIC as still operative yet in need of conceptual upgrading. “ we are all hostages drugged into a logic of deterrence, the (non-)war machine presents itself to us through binary choice, where the system obliges each of us to take a position ‘for’ or ‘against’ war, or particular wars, It is this very binary logic of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ that is the hybrid virtual-and-real-killing of the screen and the bomb

## 4

#### Interpretation – affirmatives must defend the resolution as a general principle. This requires that you defend that the plan is a good idea in the abstract and don’t defend implementation.

#### Violation: they defend implementation.

#### 1. Jurisdiction – it’s NSDA rules.

**NSDA 21**

Each debater burden to prove the resolution more valid as a general principle unrealistic to expect debater to prove complete validity or invalidity of the resolution better debater is one who proves their side more valid as a general principle.

#### Outweighs – it’s on the LD ballot.

#### 2. Precision:

#### Resolved in LD is a statement of values.

**UPitt ND**

Resolution statements of policy, fact or value. Involves conflicting moral dilemmas Resolved: The death penalty is just

#### That requires logical coherence and implies no implementation.

Your Dictionary ND

definition of dialectical example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order logic reason exchange of opposing ideas.

#### Be is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent.

Grammar Monster ND

A linking verb describe its subject Alan is a vampire. subject is re-identified as a vampire.)