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#### Abled subjectivity is tied up in a two-tiered affective response that explains disabled life – primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status, which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

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Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 Primary pity arises when one witnesses a fall of the self, a collapse of the ego; such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman’s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one’s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers’s formulation: one “cannot bear to look...but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego’s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person’s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud’s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body’s ‘normal’ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity’s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else’s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture’s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people’s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity’s incursions, reinforces the ego’s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud’s primary- secondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud’s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual’s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person’s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability’s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one’s own self undone?

#### The 1AC’s belief of a better future becomes complicit in the logic of rehabilitative futurism, which is threatened by the Disabled Child.

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“Let us begin our reexamination of Tiny Tim with a discussion of No Future, a text in which Tiny Tim takes a prominent position. No Future is a text with a target: the book takes aim at “the Child whose innocence solicits our defense,” a trope that Edelman names as the emblem of an ideology that he terms “reproductive futurism” (2). According to Edelman, commonplace cultural invocations of the figure of the Child (“not to be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children”) uphold “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (11, 2). Defying pronatalist social imperatives, Edelman names queerness as “the side of those not fighting for the children‟” (3) and urges queers to accept the culture’s projection of the death drive onto us by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. (No Future 29) Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future’s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists’ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You’re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman’s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman’s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive – cementing an order of signification that relies upon ableist value systems.

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Tropes of disability are also present in what Edelman reads as Jean Baudrillard‟s “panicky offensive against reproduction without heterogenital copulation,” in which sex is described as devolving into a “useless function” and humans are distinguished (unsuccessfully, Edelman argues) from “the order of the virus” (qtd. in Edelman 64, 62).111 Edelman‟s apt reading of these remarks by Baudrillard in relation to what was once called “the gay plague,” as well as his own plays on the word “bent,” suggest that it can be difficult, in homophobic and ableist culture, to distinguish between queerness and disability (62, 90).112 Anti-queer religious leaders, Edelman notes, characterize queer sexualities as “unhealthy” and “ugly,” and “ministries of hope” offer cures to those who have “grown sick-to-death of being queer” (91, 47). 113 Against the “pathology” or “social disease” as which queerness is diagnosed, queer-baiting of children, Edelman argues, functions as a form of “antigay immunization,” while the narrative of A Christmas Carol serves as an annual “booster shot” (143, 19, 49). These repetitive references to disability suggest that not only queerness but also disability might be a fitting name for what Edelman, alluding to the death drive, calls “the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order” (25). Indeed, disability metaphors are often the closest approximations that Edelman can find for the “unnameable” death drive (25). The terms that Edelman uses to describe the death drive include “wound,” “fracture,” “stupid enjoyment,” “mindless violence,” “lifeless machinery,” “senseless compulsion,” “disfiguration,” and a “shutdown of life‟s vital machinery” (No Future 22; “Kid” 28; No Future 38, 23, 27, 38, 37, 44). Although these signifiers do not directly refer to specific impairments, they do, taken together, evoke the physical and mental injury and dysfunction as which disability is commonly understood. And then there is Edelman‟s term “sinthomosexuality,” a neologism formed by “grafting, at an awkward join,” the word “sexuality” onto Lacan‟s term “sinthome.” With its “awkward” “grafting,” the word “sinthomosexuality” embodies disability at the level of the letter.114 Etymologically, too, Edelman‟s term harkens back to disability: “sinthome” is an archaic way of spelling the French word for “symptom” (qtd. in Edelman 33). The root meaning of “sinthomosexuality,” then, is something like “symptom-sexuality.” However, Lacan‟s “sinthome” means more than simply “symptom”: it refers, Edelman explains, to “the particular way each subject manages to knot together the orders of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real” (35). The sinthome is the only means by which the subject can access the Symbolic order of meaning production; but paradoxically, because each subject‟s sinthome is arbitrary and meaningless (as individual as a fingerprint), the sinthome also threatens the Symbolic order to which it provides access (36). Both this access and this threat are figured as disability. In order to be constituted as a subject and to take one‟s place within the Symbolic order, one must be metaphorically blind: the cost of subjectivity is “blindness to this determination by the sinthome,” “blindness to the arbitrary fixation of enjoyment responsible for [the subject‟s] consistency,” “blindness” to the functioning of the sinthome (Edelman 36, 38). The alternative to subjectivity as disability would be, according to remarks that Edelman attributes to Lacan, “radical psychotic autism” (qtd. in Edelman 37).115 That is, whatever might alleviate our constitutive “blindness” by exposing “the sinthome as meaningless knot” must effect a “disfiguration” (Edelman 38), the consequences of which would be “pure autism” (Žižek 81, qtd. in Edelman 38). On the one side, blindness; on the other, disfiguration, psychosis, autism: when it comes to recognizing the senselessness of one‟s sinthome, it seems we‟re disabled if we do, disabled if we don‟t. This is why I have proposed that the “death drive”—a force that has less to do with literal death than with a strange persistence of life in death, or of death in life (perhaps like the “life not worth living” of which disability is often supposed to consist)—would more accurately be termed the “disability drive.” Writing of the contingency of disability as an identity category, Michael Bérubé observes: Any of us who identify as “nondisabled” must know that our self-designation is inevitably temporary, and that a car crash, a virus, a degenerative genetic disease, or a precedent-setting legal decision could change our status in ways over which we have no control whatsoever. If it is obvious why most nondisabled people resist this line of thinking, it should be equally obvious why that resistance must somehow be overcome. (viii) Could part of this resistance be attributable to a fear that, in the car crash or other identity- shattering event, it might be the driver‟s own hand that makes that disabling turn, that is, that the driver might be driven by an impulse, unwanted and unconscious, toward something beyond the principles of pleasure and health? Applying the name “the disability drive” to this “beyond” affords insight into the reasons that images of disability so powerfully excite and repel, becoming, as Tobin Siebers writes, “sources of fear and fascination for able-bodied people, who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look” (178). Later in this chapter, I will define the affect that Siebers references here as “primary pity.” For now, though, I simply want to point out that Siebers‟s important observation can be extended by noting that it is not only nondisabled people who react to images of disability with a mixture of aversion and attraction. Disabled people may also respond in this way, especially when contemplating impairments other than those that currently disable us.116 Building on Douglas Baynton‟s famous assertion that “disability is everywhere,...once you begin looking for it,” I suggest that the same may be true in regard to the disability drive: this ego-undoing psychic force shapes the subjectivities of disabled and nondisabled subjects alike (52). Manifestations of the disability drive may be present in Edelman‟s discussion of Tiny Tim. Take, for example, Edelman‟s contention that “the pleasurable fantasy of survival” in Dickens‟s story requires the survival of the fantasy that Tiny Tim “does not excite an ardent fear (or is it a fearful ardor?) to see him . . . at last cash in his chips” (45). It‟s a familiar cultural fantasy: cure ‟em (as Dickens might hope) or kill ‟em (as Edelman suggests readers must secretly wish).117 But in this unacknowledged wish, there may be more at stake than either killing or curing. In the chapter that follows his reading of A Christmas Carol, Edelman adduces Lacan‟s discussion of the legend of Saint Martin, who was said to have cut his own cloak in two in order to give half of it to a beggar. “Perhaps,” Lacan suggests, “over and above that need to be clothed, [the beggar] was begging for something else, namely that Saint Martin either kill him or fuck him” (qtd. in Edelman 83). Drawing upon this passage in his analysis of North by 72 Northwest, Edelman proposes that as Leonard attempts to push Roger Thornhill to his death from atop Mount Rushmore, he “enacts . . . the one [killing] as displacement of the other [fucking]” (85). Killing as displacement of fucking: might a similar displacement be at work in Edelman‟s attribution, to Dickens‟s readers, of a “fearful ardor” to see Tiny Tim “at last cash in his chips” (45)? As evidence for this suggestion, take the mode by which Edelman introduces his discussion of A Christmas Carol: “Take Tiny Tim, please!,” “with a nod to the spirit of the late Henny Youngman” renders Tiny Tim wifelike—clearly undesirable in this context, but not wholly uneroticized (41). And then there is the word “take,” which, particularly when followed by the word “please,” has a meaning other than the ones Edelman seems deliberately to invoke: “take” means “fuck,” and so Edelman‟s directive to “take Tiny Tim, please!,” which echoes his earlier injunction to “fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net,” seems to authorize an additional imperative: fuck Tiny Tim. “Fuck” here means, of course, “remove” or “the hell with,” but it also means fuck.118 Arguably, these two ways in which No Future says “fuck Tiny Tim” coincide with what disability studies most ardently desires. “Fuck Tiny Tim, please!” disability scholars beg: rid us, please, of this most reviled textual creation. And also: if it is our cultural mandate to embody this pitiable, platitude-issuing, infantilized, and irritating figure—well, then fuck us, every one. Fuck us because figuratively, we are already “so fucked” by our culture‟s insistence, through this figure, that the disabled are not fuckable. This insistence must be understood as a form of reactive reinforcement: propelling every cultural representation of disability as undesirable, there may be a “fearful ardor,” an unacknowledged drive. Such representations include Edelman‟s abjection of Tiny Tim. And, I will argue, they also pertain to a similar abjection of Tiny Tim in the field of disability studies. As we shall soon see, the drive that infuses affective reactions to disability with ardor is often expressed through the emotion of pity. In taking account of the various forms that pity can take, we will be led to pose a question to disability studies and to queer antisocial theory together: are we sure that we want to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text? A Tale of Two Pities “Piss on pity,” declares a well-known disability activist bumper sticker. A more polite companion to this tag, the slogan “No pity” is a rallying cry of the disability rights movement.119 For disability studies, a field that since its inception has vigorously resisted the imposition of pity upon disabled people, Tiny Tim is anathema. Understandably so: every year, the image of Tiny Tim is used to drum up pity for disabled people; the widespread circulation of this affect, disability scholars have compellingly argued, does not alleviate the social barriers that we face but instead reinforces our oppression. Indispensable as this disability studies analysis is, it leaves some important questions about pity unanswered. For example: if, as is commonly said, “No one wants to be pitied,” then why is this so? And also, if nobody wants to be pitied, who, if anyone, wants to feel pity? At first glance, the answer to the latter question might seem to be “everyone.” Certainly, multitudes of moviegoers appear to enjoy our culture‟s annual recitations of Tiny Tim‟s pity inducing tale. If it can be fun to perform pity, perhaps this is because pity gives a boost to the ego of the pitying person. “You are broken, and I am whole,” the pitier says to the one who is pitied. “I look down on you because you suffer.” Naturally, disabled people resist performing this service for the nondisabled. “Spare us your pity,” we say, because pity is felt to be demeaning. 73 Yet an incoherence structures this familiar account of pity: if pity fortifies the ego of the subject who feels it, then why do people so often resist feeling pity? Some folks get pissed when they are prodded to pity. “Your appeals to pity won‟t work,” they say. “I have no pity for you.” This is the attitude that Scrooge takes toward Tiny Tim. It‟s also the stance that Edelman invites queers to take in relation to the Child—and not only to the Child per se, but also to anyone who calls for a performance of pity. Edelman argues that compassion (which, of course, is a close relative of pity) is fundamentally narcissistic (73). When we call ourselves compassionate, we think we‟re feeling for the other; but, Edelman contends, we‟re really only feeling for ourselves (83). That is, compassion involves projecting one‟s own ego onto the object of one‟s compassion. In this schema, the pitied person is used as a vehicle for the pitier to feel sorry for his or her own self.

#### Their analysis ignores the ways in which uncertainty, confusion, and the overall drive determine us. Instead, you should adopt epistemological disablement and be suspect of complete knowledge of the self.

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How, then, might we begin to acknowledge our own determination by the drive? Any knowing of the drive that we might hope to achieve must, on account of the structural barriers that render the drive unthinkable, be an effort characterized by failure and incompletion—that is, we might say, by epistemological disablement. The term “epistemological disablement” will appear frequently in this dissertation, as I will argue that coming into close proximity with the disability drive produces states of cognitive and affective uncertainty, confusion, and incapacity that are akin to disability. In the works that I shall analyze, epistemological disablement will often be performed on a textual level, as theorists and narrators seem to lose control of what they want to say about disability. These moments of epistemological disablement are often disavowed by theorists and narrators and are instead projected onto disabled people. When this happens, disabled people’s impairments are depicted as the result of an insufficiency of self-knowledge that is assumed not to determine nondisabled subjects. I will challenge these characterizations of disabled people not only by arguing for the value of “cripistemologies” (that is, ways of knowing that arise from disabled people’s lived experiences) but also by using drive theory to undermine belief in the possibility of a transparent and wholly knowable self, whether disabled or nondisabled.18 My two-pronged approach to the issue of epistemological disablement may seem to present a paradox: on the one hand, I am asserting that disabled people’s lived experiences generate important knowledge about disability; yet at the same time I am seeking to destabilize the very notion of self-knowledge. Let me be clear, then, that in undertaking this double endeavor I do not forward all-or-nothing claims either “for” or “against” the possibilities of self- knowledge. I will not assert that people cannot ever know anything reliable about themselves, but I will also not suggest that truth claims derived from personal knowledge about disability are infallible. Instead, this dissertation highlights the limits of complete self-knowledge for nondisabled and disabled subjects alike, while at the same time interrogating the social dynamics that give rise to imbalances in the distribution of epistemological authority to particular subjects on the basis of their perceived status as disabled or nondisabled.

#### The imaginary body ego trapped in the image of the symbolic becomes the way the material body is lived. There remains a fundamental gap between the imaginary body and the real body – the affirmative is fundamentally a failed project.

Breu 16 Christopher Breu, “Identity vs. Embodiment: A Materialist Rethinking of Intersex and Queerness” symplokē, Vol. 24, No. 1-2, Materialisms (2016), pp. 65-79 Published by: University of Nebraska Press // UTDD

“To add to this list, I think we need to focus on embodiment as distinct not only from identity, but from all of these other dynamics as well. While it intersects with each of these dynamics it is important to emphasize embodiment in its resistance, intransigence, malleability, and agency. The advent of the material turn enables us to theorize this more fully, by refusing to merely see the body as a discursive production or as what Butler in 1994 called a process of materialization. **In the conception of the body** I want to argue for, **materiality isn’t just a passive site of** inscription or **construction, culture’s and language’s plaything, but also something that actively** intervenes, insists, resists, and **exerts agency. One way of theorizing** this form of **embodiment**, one I employed in Insistence of the Material, **is to use the** developmentalist **account of the real and the imaginary** in Lacan. The imaginary body, for Lacan, is one that is produced by the phantasmatic mapping of the body that takes place during the mirror stage. This imaginary body, or what Freud terms the body ego, is a phantasmatic construction, one that both **differs from the material body as it also** becomes the way in which the material body is lived. Thus, **the imaginary body can exist in contradiction with the material body, even as it provides the subject’s apprehension of the material body.**18 The real body in Lacan functions as uncoded materiality. It is those aspects of the material body that elude or exist in tension with symbolization and imaginary mapping. Such a conception of the real body would posit it as, to use Clough’s language in a different context, “an autonomic remainder.” Another way to posit a conception of embodiment that exists in tension with **language, culture and** the symbolic, would be to use Graham Harman’s speculative realist account of objects as withdrawn.19 What Harman means by this is that the “phenomenal reality of things for consciousness does not use up their being.”20 Such a concept then, whether using Lacan’s language, Harman’s language, posits objects (what I would want to define as material entities, in contradistinction to Harman, who oddly argues that his theory of objects is not a form of materialism) as always partially exceeding and in partial tension with any attempt at symbolic naming or conscious apprehen- sion. Such an understanding of materiality **in relationship to embodiment** would always posit a tension and gap (and perhaps a negative dialectic) between **identity and embodiment,** the language by which we signify, understand, and construct our **or others’** sense of embodiment as well as the material dimensions of embodiment itself. I want to suggest a similar gap or tension also has to be posited between our actions on the body (including medical and scientific actions) and the materiality of the body itself. This gap isn’t a literal one, indeed medicine often impinges on the body in violent if also often necessary ways, but a conceptual one. It is the positing of a crucial disjunction a not all at the heart of any of our engagements with matter including the matter of the body. Levi Bryant helpfully casts this gap in the language of excess: materiality partly exceeds any attempt to apprehend, shape, control, or dominate it.” (72-73)

#### The alternative is to disable the figure of the “human” – instead of seeing disability as a redeemable position within civil society, the alternative weaponizes disability’s structural position against the human. If we win their starting point is ableist they cannot weigh the consequences of it.

Mollow 12 Mollow, Anna. "Is Sex Disability? Queer Theory and the Disability Drive." Sex and Disability, by R. McRuer and A. Mollow, Durham, Duke UP, 2012, pp. 306-10. http://www.sfu.ca/~baw2/GSWS826/Mollow.pdf //ACCS JM

But here a problem emerges: as we have seen, the writing by Bersani and Edelman that I have examined forwards powerful arguments against the project of becoming human. Urging queers to embrace the “inhumanity of the sinthomosexual,” Edelman observes that the liberal goal of expanding the category of “human” to encompass those presently excluded from it will not “stop the cultural production of figures” made to embody the inhumanity of the death drive (No Future 107). What would it mean for disability theory to embrace disabled people’s figuration as inhuman? As we contemplate this possibility, a moment from How I Became a Human Being may give us pause. After a presentation by the physicist Stephen Hawking at the U.C. Berkeley campus, O’Brien posed the following question: “Doctor Hawking, what can you say to all the disabled people who are stuck in nursing homes or living with their parents or in some other untenable situation and who feel that their life is over, that they have no future?” (Human Being 230). A response that might be derived from Edelman’s book—that there is, and can be, no future, since the future, by definition, can only ever be a fantasy (“always / A day / Away,” in Annie’s paean to “Tomorrow”)—hardly seems more adequate than Hawking’s reply: “All I can say is that one must do the best one can in the situation in which one finds oneself ” (No Future 30; Human Being 231). In light of O’Brien’s question, Edelman’s embrace of the death drive, or Bersani’s celebration of what he calls “the breakdown of the human itself in sexual intensities,” can easily appear as irresponsible theoretical indulgences (“Rectum” 29). Indeed, the word “irresponsible” is one that Bersani himself uses when he reflects, at a distance of thirteen years, on “Is the Rectum a Grave?”: “Much of this now seems to me a rather facile, even irresponsible celebration of ‘self- defeat.’ Masochism is not a viable alternative to mastery, either practically or theoretically” (“Sociality” 110). This remark highlights important shifts and ambivalences in Bersani’s thinking over the course of his career, which may serve as an entry into the question of the status of the human in disability theory. Bersani and Edelman are often cited, as if in the same breath, as proponents of an “antisocial” or “antirelational” “thesis” in queer theory, in opposition to which some critics of their work, such as Muñoz, have defined their own projects as “utopian.”17 But Bersani’s work, rather than conforming to either side of a utopian/antirelational binary, often reveals an interest in thinking in both of these ways at once. For example, writing of passages in his book, Homos (published in 1995) that are frequently cited as the origin of the “antirelational thesis,” Bersani describes the “performance of antirelationality” that he celebrates in Jean Genet’s Funeral Rites as a “utopic form of revolt” (“Sociality” 103; emphasis added). This joining of the utopian and the antirelational corresponds to what Bersani describes, in an essay published in 2004, as a central concern throughout his career: “a dialogue (both conciliatory and antagonistic) between” Foucault and Freud (“Fr- oucault” 133). In this essay and other recent writings, Bersani moves away from the “Freudian” and toward the “Foucauldian.” Worrying that the psychoanalytic (or antirelational) side of this paradigm may be politically irresponsible (insofar as its insistence on the intractability of the death drive seems “resistant to any social transformations whatsoever”), Bersani has become increasingly interested in the creation of what, invoking a phrase of Foucault’s, he calls “new relational modes” (“Fr- oucault” 134). Interestingly, this “admittedly utopic” project often employs a rhetoric of futurism, both reproductive and rehabilitative (Bersani, “Fr- oucault” 134). For example, in a reading of Plato’s Symposium, Bersani approvingly observes that “the goal of a love relation with Socrates” is “the bringing to term of the other’s pregnancy of soul” (“Sociality” 110; 117).18 Not only a pregnancy but perhaps also a rehabilitation of the soul is at stake at moments in which a utopian impulse is evident in Bersani’s work—as when, for example, he speaks of effecting “a curative collapse of social difference,” or of enabling a future enjoyment of “as yet unarticulated pleasures” that have thus far been “suppressed and crippled” (Homos 177; “Fr- oucault” 137; emphasis added). If, as these examples suggest, Edelman is correct in asserting that we cannot think of the future without reference to the Child—and if I am right in suggesting that the overlapping ideology of rehabilitative futurism is equally pervasive and insidious—then how should disability theory answer O’Brien’s question? The disability rights movement, of course, has already provided compelling responses: protestations against the injustice of institutionalization, critiques of the nursing home lobby, and advocacy for attendant programs. Theoretically, it could be said that the goal of de- institutionalization is merely a liberal one, as it aims only to include disabled people within the social fabric. Yet in this instance (and many similar ones), an imperfect politics clearly seems better than no politics at all. But what is the role of disability theory in relation to this politics? Is it, as Paul Longmore described disability studies in 2003, to serve as the “academic counterpart to disability rights advocacy” (Burned 2)? Or should disability theory conceive of itself as sometimes in tension with this movement (as queer theory often is in relation to the mainstream lGbt movement)? Insofar as it has acted as a “counterpart” to the disability rights movement, disability studies has made crucial contributions to what might be called a humanizing enterprise. It has offered, for example, myriad analyses of the reasons for our society’s willingness—its desperation, even—to dehumanize and exclude disabled people, even to the point of locking them up. But when sex enters the picture, things get complicated. Consider, for example, the following remark, made by a doctor to a group of patients at one of O’Brien’s rehabilitation hospitals: “You may think you’ll never have sex again, but remember . . . some people do become people again” (Human Being 80). The doctor’s comment points to a paradox that inheres in any conversation about sex and disability: disabled people, it is implied here, are less than fully human because they are presumed not to “have sex”—but sex, psychoanalysis shows us, is radically dehumanizing, effecting a “shattering” of “the structured self” rather than its entrenchment in personhood or identity. This paradox is at the root of the double bind I discussed in the introduction to this chapter, in which disability simultaneously figures sexual excess and sexual lack: disabled people are regarded as sexually deficient and therefore not fully human, but at the same time, disabled people register as less than human because disability is the ubiquitous figure for a dehumanizing, identity- disintegrating force that resembles sex. If, as the second half of this paradoxical construction suggests, assertions of humanity are in necessary conflict with expressions of sexuality, then perhaps disability theory should, rather than seeking to humanize the disabled (insisting that disabled people be treated “as human beings”), instead ask how disability might threaten to undo, or disable, the category of the human. It might do so in part by attending to the insights Bersani’s and Edelman’s readings of psychoanalytic theory yield, according to which sex, far from enabling us to “become people,” ruptures the self and dehumanizes us all. But what, then, would become of disability politics? Critics of No Future— despite Edelman’s insistence that its argument pertains to “figurality,” not to “being or becoming” the death drive—tend to read the book as advocating, on a literal level, the abandonment of hope and political goals (No Future 17; 25).19 As noted earlier, however, it is “politics as we know it” that Edelman refuses, and even this refusal does not mean that queers should stop insisting on “our equal right to the social order’s prerogatives” (No Future 3; 29; emphasis added). Edelman further clarifies this point in his essay “Ever After”: “Without for a moment denying the importance that distinguishes many [political] projects, I want to insist on the need for an ongoing counterproject as well: a project that’s willing to forgo the privilege of social recognition” (473; emphasis added). Such a counterproject—one that can be read as possibly opposing the humanizing impulse behind O’Brien’s narration of How I Became a Human Being—may take shape in some of O’Brien’s own poetry. While the title of his autobiography speaks of becoming human, his unpublished poem “Femininity” disrupts this trajectory. O’Brien writes of lying: Naked on the gurney in the hospital corridor, surrounded by nurses, tall, young, proud of their beauty, admiring my skinny cripple body. “You’re so thin, you should’ve been a girl.” “I wish my eyelashes were as long as yours.” “Such pretty eyes.” I thought or think I thought or wish I’d said, “But your bodies work. Get scissors, cut my cock and balls off. Make me a girl, without anaesthesia, make me a girl, make me a girl.”20 Much of the unnerving intensity of these lines derives from what, invoking Bersani, we might refer to as their embrace of “the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman” (or a girl, or queer, or disabled); from their rejection, that is, of the ideology of rehabilitative futurism, and from their refusal to engage in a “redemptive reinvention” of sex or disability. O’Brien’s speaker does not plead with the nurses who admire his “skinny cripple body” to “cure me” or “make me walk again.” Nor does he attempt to redefine his body (which does not “work”) as merely a manifestation of human variation. Suffering and lack, rather than being dissociated from disability, are amplified and eroticized: “cut my cock and balls off . . . without anaesthesia,” the speaker implores, the repetition of his plea (“make me a girl, / make me a girl”) evoking the repetitiveness of a drive. “Femininity” can indeed be read as an instantiation of the disability drive: disability in this poem, like “the rectum” in Bersani’s essay, “is the grave in which the masculine [and nondisabled] ideal of proud subjectivity is buried.” It will of course be tempting to evade this “nightmare of ontological obscenity” (“Rectum” 29), this fantasy of unbecoming human.21 But the dehumanizing double binds that so persistently structure cultural representations of sex and disability suggest that such evasions may be futile. Intrinsically obscene, yet inherently asexual: rather than attempting to assume a different position within this impossible paradigm, disability theory should perhaps underscore its pervasiveness as evidence of a disability drive; as a sign, that is, that our culture’s desexualization of disabled people functions to defend against a deeply rooted but seldom acknowledged awareness that all sex is incurably, and perhaps desirably, disabled.

#### Communicative spheres always zone out disability – breaking down notions of progress is necessary in the face of social death. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best disrupts notions of progress within civil society.

Selck 16 Selck, Michael L. "Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn't." (Jan 2016) //ACCS JM

Despite the fact that a large basis of American culture is founded on ability, dis/ability rarely enters the dominant public communication sphere. The unpleasant and visceral questions that accompany communication about dis/ability have been strategically re-zoned and relocated like so many dis/abled patients, veterans, and transients. Yet, when conversation about dis/ability does seem to permeate the ideological walls of ability the messages are inspirationally distorted and optimistic. My time researching dis/ability in academia found that the conversation there mimicked the exploitive inspirational humaninterest trope found in cinema and journalism. To break the optimistic silence I set out with a performance art piece titled Under The Mantle to advance a theme of crip-pessimism, which intended to raise the stakes of contemporary dis/ability research. The beginning of this essay takes the time to detail the vast theoretical backgrounds of critical disability theory and philosophical pessimism. In the following section I reviewed intercultural communication literature for dis/ability because much of the theory literature I drew from existed outside the communication studies discipline. The evidenced lack of intercultural dis/ability artifacts up against a dis/ability centric performance art project necessitated an interdisciplinary multi-method framework. In that framework I demonstrate how autoethnography is significant to dis/ability studies because it illuminates even the most mundane able-bodied norms. In the final sections I offer a textual description of the performance and hone in on three explicit arguments that augment traditional thinking about dis/ability and communication. The trouble I encountered with dis/ability research in communication studies has to do with the way American culture understands offensive communication. Political correctness as a disciplining communication concept dictates what terms are socially acceptable at a given time. Political correctness underscores how many communication studies programs operate within the rubric of conflict (Wilderson, 2010). The thinking that suggests simply avoiding offensive terms will diminish oppression is within the rubric of conflict because it understands the oppression as materially reconcilable. What crippessimism does, and what UTM performed, is skepticism that speaking inspirationally and avoiding speaking offensively about dis/ability would end disablism. Instead I argued that what dis/ability represents is an antagonism, it is an oppression so much more foundational to the core of American values that linguistic reforms would not even scratch the surface. The significance of antagonism is that it raises the stakes of dis/ability research. The end goal of research should not be to service the meta-theoretical assumptions of the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962), because consequently the researcher never stops to ask if the assumptions of the paradigm are ethical, valid, or effective. Crippessimism is a call for some demolition and redistribution of communicative identity paradigms. If the radical promise of our theories is nothing more than a call for social stability then they are complicit in the neoliberal eugenic project. We need to theorize so that there is nothing already ‘given’ or taken for granted. Often in those moments, like the moments of so many textbooks, the underlying optimism goes completely unquestioned. Crip-pessimism as a theme is characterized by negotiating debates surrounding the efficacy of identity politics. Arguments that fit within the theme ask why the disabled should abandon their bodies in the political sphere. Social death has already occurred, the dis/abled are being rendered culturally unintelligible and physically fungible. So what we need when we are having discussions about how to progress is a theory that breaks down the notion of progress. The recognition and need for a theory like this comes about when we ask central dis/ability questions like: ‘when did eugenics end?’ and ‘where is disability in U.S. society before and after the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act?’ and ‘globally has the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities reconciled the antagonism of disablism?’. These are the questions that I want to end on and encourage communication and dis/ability scholars alike to take up. As scholars and mass media engines continue to project dis/ability within the rubric of conflict our collective reliance on capitalism and neoliberalism grow deeper. It is my hope at the end of this project that my voice both in performing and in writing encourages more scholarship detailing the omnipresence of disablism in American culture. Under The Mantle is a reminder to me that all representations of dis/ability have consequences and in many cases all we need to witness those consequences is a slight perspectival shift.

# Accessibility

## 1

### K

#### Abled subjectivity is tied up in a two-tiered affective response that explains disabled life – primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status, which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 15

pity involves a reaction to the “tragedy of disability.” Primary pity is unbearable to contemplate another person’s suffering is to question, “Could this happen to me?” Secondary pity attempts to heal the ego at someone else’s expense and calls for a cure. we feel primary pity and then deny that we have felt it.

#### The 1AC’s belief of a better future becomes complicit in the logic of rehabilitative futurism, which is threatened by the Disabled Child.

Mollow 2

the image of the Child” is inextricable from disability the Child is a display of pity that demeans disabled people. the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism because not fighting for is unthinkable. The logic relies on “rehabilitative futurism,” Futurity is imagined that the eradication of disability would bring a better future.

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive – cementing an order of signification that relies upon ableist value systems.

Mollow 3

disability might be fitting for “the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order” signifiers evoke disability The sinthome is the means the subject can access meaning paradoxically, because each is individual also threatens the Symbolic to be constituted as a subject one must be blind to the fixation of enjoyment to alleviate “blindness” must effect disfiguration we‟re disabled if we do, disabled if we don‟t. the “death drive” has less to do with death than life not worth living which disability is supposed to consist nondisabled know a decision could change our status a fear that the driver makes that disabling turn the drive affords insight into sources of fear and fascination this shapes subjectivities You are broken, and I am whole because you suffer compassion is narcissistic we think we‟re feeling for the other; but only for ourselves projecting one‟s own ego onto the object

#### Their analysis ignores the ways in which uncertainty, confusion, and the overall drive determine us. Instead, you should adopt epistemological disablement and be suspect of complete knowledge of the self.

Mollow 4

Any knowing of the drive must be characterized by failure coming into proximity with the drive produces uncertainty and incapacity These moments of epistemological disablement are disavowed by theorists and projected onto disabled people. disabled people are depicted as an insufficiency of self-knowledge drive theory undermine the possibility of a whol knowable self this limits complete self-knowledge while interrogating dynamics that imbalance epistemological authority

#### The imaginary body ego trapped in the image of the symbolic becomes the way the material body is lived. There remains a fundamental gap between the imaginary body and the real body – the affirmative is fundamentally a failed project.

Breu 16

The imaginary body is one that is produced by the mapping of the body This imaginary body ego becomes the way in which the material body is lived. The real body functions as uncoded materiality. It is those aspects of the material body that exist in tension with symbolization and imaginary mapping. embodiment exists in tension with the symbolic Such an understanding of materiality would always posit a tension and gap between the language by which we signify, understand, and construct our sense of embodiment as well as the material dimensions of embodiment itself. It is the positing of a crucial disjunction at the heart of any of our engagements with matter materiality partly exceeds any attempt to apprehend, shape, control, or dominate it.

#### The alternative is to disable the figure of the “human” – instead of seeing disability as a redeemable position within civil society, the alternative weaponizes disability’s structural position against the human. If we win their starting point is ableist they cannot weigh the consequences of it.

Mollow 12

expanding the category of “human” to encompass those excluded will not “stop the inhumanity of the drive rather than conforming to a utopian/antirelational binary think both at once disability studies has offered reasons for society’s desperation to dehumanize and exclude disabled people the double bind simultaneously figures excess and lack disability theory should rather than humanize the disabled instead disable the human. abandon politics Suffering and lack, rather than dissociated from disability, are amplified It will be tempting to evade unbecoming human. But the dehumanizing double bind suggest that evasions may be futile. rather than to assume a different position within this impossible paradigm, disability theory should underscore its pervasiveness as evidence of a disability drive

#### Communicative spheres always zone out disability – breaking down notions of progress is necessary in the face of social death. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best disrupts notions of progress within civil society.

Selck 16

dis/ability rarely enters the communication sphere. communication about dis/ability have been relocated when conversation does permeate the messages are distorted and optimistic. To break the optimistic silence I advance crip-pessimism The trouble dis/ability has with Political correctness is because it understands oppression as materially reconcilable. dis/ability represents antagonism reforms would not scratch the surface. If theories call for stability then they are complicit in eugenic Crip-pess is characterized by debates surrounding why the disabled should abandon the political Social death has already occurred the dis/abled are being rendered unintelligible and fungible. what we need is a theory that breaks down the notion of progress.