# 1AC

### Framework

#### I value morality. Ethics must first start by defining good and bad because ethical answers rely on a correct interpretation of what they’re representing –

#### Therefore, the meta-ethic is moral non-naturalism.

Hume 72 Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1772). Hackett Publ Co. 1993; Chapter on Cause and Effect. //Massa

That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that **a**n object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet [has] the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning a priori.If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments [that] to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment,[can] these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning [can] be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all [these] arguments [that trust in past experience] concerning existence are founded on the [assumption that] relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.

#### Since moral properties cannot be defined by natural properties, it becomes impossible to externally distinguish good and bad. Non-naturalism, however, does not deny the ability to internally recognize the good just like distinguishing between natural observations.

McHugh <http://brothersjuddblog.com/archives/2002/05/an_open_question.html> \*original website is down but this URL works and cites the original IEP article\* //ACCS JM

The naturalistic fallacy is a metaethical theory proposed by G.E. Moore (1873-1958) in Principia Ethica (1903) that the notion of moral goodness cannot be defined or identified with any property. Moore argues that “goodness” is a foundational and unanalyzable property, similar to the foundational notion of “yellowness,” and is not capable of being explained in terms of anything more basic. We intuitively recognize goodness when we see it, as we similarly recognize yellowness when we see it. But the notion of "goodness" itself cannot be defined. For Moore, philosophers who attempt to define intrinsic goodness commit the naturalistic fallacy, the fallacy of defining the term "goodness" in terms of some natural property, such as pleasure. Moore defends his contention with what has been called the open question argument. For any property we attempt to identify with "goodness," we can ask, "Is that property itself good?" For example, if I claim that pleasure is the highest intrinsic good, the question can be asked, "But, is pleasure itself good?" The fact that this question makes sense shows that "pleasure" and "goodness" are not identical. Moore believes that no proposed natural property can pass the test of the open question argument. This implies that all moral theories fail that are based on anything other than immediate moral intuition. It is only of secondary importance whether an action produces pleasure, is in accord with the will of God, or is conducive to reason. What truly matters is whether we can simply recognize the goodness of a particular action.

#### That means non-naturalism prima facie justifies intuitionism as the only ethical theory that can guide action. The fallacy of Loki’s Wager is true because we know certain things are observationally relevant despite a clear articulation of what they are, just like I know the difference between red and blue. Thus, the standard is consistency with a priori moral intuitions.

McMahan, Jeff [<http://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Moral%20Intuition%202nd%20edition.pdf>] //Massa

What are moral intuitions? As I will understand the term, a moral intuition is a moral judgment – typically about a particular problem, a particular act, or a particular agent, though possibly also about a moral rule or principle – that is not the result of inferential reasoning. It is not inferred from one’s other beliefs but arises on its own. If I consider the act of torturing the cat, I judge immediately that, in the circumstances, this would be wrong. I do not need to consult my other beliefs in order to arrive at this judgment. This is not to say that a moral intuition is necessarily elicited instantaneously, the way a sense perception is. If a particular problem or case is complex, one may have to consider it at length in order to distinguish and assimilate its various relevant features—in much the same way that one might have to examine the many details of a highly complex work of art in order to judge or appreciate it.

#### Prefer the standard additionally:

#### First, rule following fails –

#### Second, motivation –

#### Third, not following intuitions produces poor ontological understandings of the self –

#### Fourth, the neg may not contest both the standard and ROB –

#### Impact Calc:

#### First, frameworks all share equal value –

#### Second, moral intuitions can be rationally unsound –

### Contention

#### I affirm Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### [1] Appropriation by private entities is unintuitive – brain studies prove.

APS 10. (2010, August 17). An intuitive sense of property. Association for Psychological Science - APS. <https://www.psychologicalscience.org/news/were-only-human/an-intuitive-sense-of-property.html> //Massa

Americans like to own their homes, and the rules and conventions for ownership are generally well understood. So it’s easy to forget that in many corners of the globe the rules are more ambiguous–and more open to challenge. Indeed, there are an estimated one billion squatters in the world today–people who, mostly out of necessity, are living on property they do not own and cannot afford. Squatters rarely have a voice, but in a few industrialized cities where they do, their claims are usually founded on the idea of improvement. If an owner abandons or neglects a property, shouldn’t another human being be allowed to take shelter, invest sweat equity in making it a home, and lay some claim to it? In other words, does hard work improving a property convey some right to occupancy, even ownership? New research suggests that our moral judgments about property ownership may be an intuitive process–one more fundamental than society’s laws and regulations. Psychological scientist Patricia Kanngiesser and colleagues at the University of Bristol, UK, studied three and four-year-old children (as well as adults) to see how children think about private property before they come under the influence of adult rules. Previous research had shown that very young children tend to honor the rights of the first owner as a default position–as long as they are given no compelling reason to think differently. But the scientists wanted to see if creative labor is such a compelling reason–that is, if improving property trumps the original ownership rights. To test this idea in the lab, they used a form of property that children might realistically “own”–clay animals. Both the experimenter and the subjects were given title to a set of clay cookie-cutter animals, each set different: blue ducks, for example, or red butterflies. Then each of them “borrowed” and worked on one of the other’s animals, using cookie cutters to transform the clay into something new–an elephant, for example. Or, alternatively, they simply held the animal for a bit, or snipped off a small piece of clay with a knife. The idea was to compare mere possession with two levels of creative labor, to see if any of these affected views of ownership. And they did, in some interesting ways. [As reported on-line this week in the journal Psychological Science](http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/08/09/0956797610380701.abstract), all of the subjects–children and adults–were much more likely to transfer ownership of the property to a second person if that person showed some industry in changing the property. And the more work, the greater the entitlement: That is, transforming the animal into a new animal was more significant than just snipping off some clay, which was more significant than merely holding the animal. Even if they transformed a duck into a different kind of duck, that was sufficient for entitlement, though changing a duck into an elephant conveyed somewhat more in the way of ownership rights. In other words, it was work that mattered most; creativity was important but secondary. But here’s the really interesting part: These views of ownership and labor were much more common in the preschool children than in the adults. Adults were much more likely to give priority to the original owner–and much less likely to value labor and creativity. In that sense, adults appear to have outgrown their intuitive belief in squatters’ rights, replacing this sensibility with formal laws and regulations.

#### [2] Psychological research proves rule breaking is reliant on group conformity.

Krause et al. 21 Krause, J., Romanczuk, P., Cracco, E., Arlidge, W., Nassauer, A., & Brass, M. (2021, September 4). Collective rule-breaking. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Retrieved December 17, 2021, from <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1364661321002060> //ACCS JM

Cognitive mechanisms underlying collective rule-breaking To understand rule-breaking in groups from the individual’s perspective, we must first understand what drives people to conform with the group rather than following the rule. For over half a century, social psychological research has investigated the social factors underlying group conformity [6,7] and uncovered its social determinants [8]. Group conformity is based on two types of influence: normative influence, where people follow the group to obtain social approval, and informational influence, where people base their judgement on social information [9]. These different sources interact when decisions are made in groups [10]. Because the social psychological literature has already extensively covered normative influences on conformity (see [8] for a review) and informational influences are particularly relevant in the context of collective rule-breaking, this section will primarily focus on informational influences by discussing the cognitive mechanisms [11–13] that might contribute to collective rule-breaking. In collective rule-breaking, the group and the rule exert an opposing influence on behaviour. Because people tend to comply with rules, and violating rules therefore leads to cognitive conflict [14], rule compliance has to be counteracted by the forces of conformity. The example of jaywalking [1,15,16] nicely illustrates how group conformity can facilitate rule-breaking. The decision to cross a road in an unsafe situation is often triggered by one or a few individuals influencing others (Figure 1). But what are the cognitive processes underlying this social influence? Recent research suggests that perceptual and attentional processes [17], motor processes [18], and evaluative processes [9,19] all contribute to conformity. Applied to the example of jaywalking, seeing other people cross the road may bias perception, by drawing attention towards the moving group and away from the traffic light. Other jaywalkers can also exert a kind of ‘drawing power’ at the motor level: pedestrians start walking because others start to walk. And finally, seeing others cross the road can affect the evaluation of the situation, causing people who are waiting at the red light to assume it is legitimate or safe to cross as well. These factors all contribute to the decision process of whether or not to cross the road and therefore determine to some degree whether people will break the rule. In the following section, we will briefly review recent research that investigated the three aforementioned processes.

# Accessibility

### Framework

#### Therefore, the meta-ethic is moral non-naturalism.

Hume 72

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McMahan

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### Contention

#### Appropriation by private entities is unintuitive – brain studies prove.

APS 10

research suggests moral judgments about property may be intuitive more fundamental than laws Psychological scientist at University of Bristol studied children to see how children think about private property before they influence rules scientists wanted to see if improving property trumps ownership they used property that children might “own” all of the subjects were more likely to transfer ownership of the property

#### Psychological research proves rule breaking is reliant on group conformity.

Krause et al. 21

In rule-breaking, the rule exert influence on behaviour. people tend to comply with rules, and violating rules leads to cognitive conflict rule compliance has to be counteracted by conformity.