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#### Communicative spaces such as debate are governed through biopolitical technologies of fluency which smooth over semiotic interruptions in search for stable and univocal operations. This bends bodies to align their speech patterns with compulsory able-bodiedness.

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Given that compulsory able-bodiedness emanates from everywhere and nowhere, it is perhaps more fruitful to parse this consensus through the mode by which compulsory able-bodiedness circulates and is translated across different ideas, practices, and institutions rather than isolating the specific sites where this consensus, this hegemony, is produced. For McRuer, “the experience of the able-bodied need for an agreed-on common ground” is a common experience that “links all people with disabilities under a system of compulsory able-bodiedness” (8), and I suggest that this “common ground” of disability oppression is a how as much as a where or a what. That is, a common ground is never just found, but must be cleared away and maintained with effort through time. “Fluency” can accordingly be understood as a technology operating at the intersection of biopower and hegemony that smooths over and straightens discontinuous semiotics, temporalities, and materialities to eliminate frictions within productive, biopolitical systems and thus secure social order within the material realm. An attention to fluency moves beyond the orthodox focus on ideology as the essential vehicle of hegemony to locate, alongside Jon Beasley-Murray’s notion of “posthegemony,” the production of consensus and the security of social order not within the realm of representation but the governance of bodies and life itself. Fluency attempts to regulate and collapse not merely the time between encounters, but the embodied time of encounter and access and judgment. Fluency attempts to cover over political spaces—to mitigate (when it cannot eliminate) interruption and disruption—thus facilitating in one move the rationalization and naturali- zation of embodied difference that seems to emanate from everywhere and nowhere, as if everyone agrees. But whatever else it may be, fluency is first a process enacted and lived within the material and corporeal. Here I start from the semiotic and expand outwards. The vast array of rhythms, semiotic modes, tempos, dictions, and (racialized or disabled) accents that constitute practices of aural “communication” have become the objective domain of the biomedicalizing industry of Speech-Language Pathology. Barry Guitar, in his well-used textbook on speech impediments, offers an exemplary definition of fluency: “simply as the effortless flow of speech” (13). Yet there is hardly anything simple about this definition, which is offered amid caveats and backtracking. Guitar readily admits (12) that fluency is difficult to pin down and that researchers within Speech-Language Pathology often focus on what it is not—namely, dysfluency. There are a few characteristics: Fluent speech is marked by a lack of hesitation, and Speech-Language Pathology is forced to make (dubious and highly arbitrary) distinctions between “normal” and “abnormal” hesitations (Goldman-Eisler) since breaks and hesitations crop up in all speech. Fluent speech is marked by rhythmical (read: thoroughly normalized) patterning. Fluent speech is similarly marked by the lack of “extra sounds” interjected into culturally dominant phonetic patterns. Fluency is defined by the overall rate of speech, which includes not just the rate of vocal flow but of information flow (Starkweather). And lastly, fluency is often defined by a lack of “effort” on the part of the speaker; a conceit of mastery over language that highlights the twinned meaning of “fluency.” Transposing this definition into a critical register, the “effortless flow of speech” can be read as a coordinated—yet often strained—performance of bending the energies and capacities of bodies toward stable and univocal futures. Autistics are compelled to restrict stimming, to sit on their hands (to have “quiet hands,” Bascom), and thereby reroute bodily capacities to the smooth performance of so-called intelligible communication. Dyslexic bodies that process information piecemeal and slowly are forced out of social time (Cosenza 7). As Zach Richter has argued, the facial tics and erratic gestures of dysfluent speakers are likewise never communicative inflections, but are made abject and cast out of the communicative realm altogether by what I am here calling technologies of fluency. Tics of loud cursing and grunting from a public speaker with Tourette’s are imagined as an interruption to communication. Dysfluencies are erased from closed captions and courtroom transcripts. What is thus left is a univocal and fluid semiotic operation that instrumentalizes our relations with others. Or more precisely, if fluency is a type of Foucauldian technology, then the function of this biopolitical strategy is to regulate and focus the communicative event toward specific, technical ends through the logic of optimization and closure.

#### This is part of a larger shift in the socioeconomic terrain whereby semiocapitalism now requires information to move quickly and effortlessly. The result is the capacitation of certain disabled bodies at the expense of debilitating dysfluent laborers.

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Considered in terms of optimization, the function of fluency is quite familiar: technologies of normalizing embodied difference rely upon manageable or “docile” communication channels and semiotic protocols (Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 135). Speech is now human capital (a flattened capacity that produces future return) and it is hardly surprising that technologies of fluency have come to play a central role in the productive machinery of semiocapitalism. This system requires not only vast quantities of information, but the ability to move it around quickly and effortlessly. Fluency is not a “repressive” but a productive force (Foucault, Discipline and Punish), one that impels modern subjects to be loquacious, to increase their information flow (see, for example, Starkweather above), and to maximize their communicative inputs and outputs. These transformations have created new forms of disability oppression. Many disabled people who could not work under industrialized capitalist conditions have benefitted from the fact that communication has become immanent to the production process (see Mitchell and Snyder, “Disability as Multitude,” 189) yet such changes, while empowering for some, shift the socioeconomic terrain in threatening ways for others. Call centers, for example, are a mainstay of immaterial labor yet effectively exclude people with communication disabilities from employment across the board. The ability to regulate informational and affective flow has become a baseline for postindustrial labor. Clare Butler argues that “Being a skilled verbal communicator is [now] treated as a justifiable requirement in the workplace” (720), such that the imperatives to “sound right” and possess “excellent communication skills” marginalize dysfluent laborers in postindustrial economies.

#### Neoliberal biocapitalism operates through disabling certain bodies at the expense of enhancing others. Through figure of the Child, biocapitalism sustains a reproductive order geared towards the future in the image of a better than able-bodied subject. In reality, this sacred Child is impossible to satisfy and requires the simultaneous death and enhancement of disability. This replicates a cruel optimism towards the promise of the future that only works to disable others.

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Thus, while Edelman (2004) is correct in asserting that the contemporary political order favours heteronormativity in the ways in which it incites the Child as the image of the future, this image of the Child of the future also continuously incites compulsory enhanced-bodiediness as the child of reprductive futurity is not only not to be disabled, but must be better than able-bodied. McRuer, in the context of Edelman’s work comments: “‘everybody,’ after all, or so the saying goes, ‘wants a healthy baby.’ At the same time, despite this commonplace desire, the imagined future is actually inescapably inaccessible; no real, flesh-and-blood child can ever embody the innocence, health, and ability associated with the sacred Child” (2008). I agree with Edelman’s sharp and scathing critique of reproductive futurity, and while I also agree with McRuer that Edelman’s Child is able- bodied, what neither Edelman or McRuer elucidate is how reproductive futurity relies on both a capacitated and bodily enhanced Child that shapes the ways the political gets mobilized in the name of the future, and for some disabled children to grow up at the expense of others who are never intended to grow up. Edelman is right, then, about the ways in which the figure of the Child re-inforces heteronormativity but he fails to take stock of the ways in which the Child is also always, already able-bodied, or how the Child is capacitated and enhanced. While McRuer is right to point out that no child can fully embody the desirable able-bodied child, and, thus, sets up disability as the impediment to a desirable future, I am interested in how the better-than-able-bodied Child requires some disabled children to grow up at the expense of other disabled children in order to give the Child meaning. Thus, the disabled child is the figure of no future, as will be demonstrated in the case of Emily Rapp (2013) desiring to terminate pregnancy on the basis of disability, and in the case of infanticide and filicide on the basis of disability. However, the disabled child is also the figure of the future in that the suffering child creates particular neoliberal futures through the mobilization of biocapital, cure, and enhancement. Therefore, as I will go on to show, we are deeply invested in narratives of suffering children, but some of those children are always supposed to remain children, never growing up, while others are celebrated, enhanced, and capacitated precisely because they can be made to slide into the neoliberal promise of the future. As I will argue, it is precisely in sliding into neoliberalism’s forms of capacitation and enhancement that incapacitates and disables others.”

#### The figure of the better than able-bodied Child circulates happy affects of pride, hope, cure, and progress, which sustains a neoliberal order whereby the promise of happiness shapes our affective dispositions. This affective economy determines the value and circulation of social goods which allows biocapitalism to frame disability through a narrative of overcoming suffering. This produces disability as tragedy, pity, and disgust.

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Indebted to the work of Henri- Bergson, Baruch Spinoza, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guarttari, affect can be conceptualized as pre-individual forces that augment or diminish a body’s capacity to act, engage, or connect. For Ahmed (2010), happiness involves affects in order for the objects of happiness to become social goods. That is, she argues that feelings do not reside within individual subjects and then move outwards towards particular objects but rather, she contends, objects create impressions through feelings (14). To feel happiness “is to recognize that happiness starts from somewhere other than the subject who may use the word to describe a situation” (21). And, as Ahmed continues, “If happiness creates its objects, then such objects are passed around, accumulating positive affective value as social goods” (21). Through the production of happiness, objects become social goods that have positive affective qualities. “To be affected ‘in a good way’ thus involves an orientation to something as being good” (24). Happiness is an affective economy that allows us to have contact with good objects. Since “we move toward and away from objects through how we are affected by them” (24), happiness orients what objects we come into contact with. That objects are considered happy or are considered the cause of happiness “means they already circulate as social goods before we ‘happen’ upon them, which is why we might happen upon them in the first place” (28). That is to say, the objects we encounter are never neutral. In order to happen upon an object, its affective value is already in place; the object is already invested with positive and negative value (34). As happiness is a shared social orientation toward what is good (56), going along “with happiness scripts” is a way of getting along; “to get along is to be willing and able to express happiness in proximity to the right things” (59). The ISA is, I argue, a site of affective happiness within neoliberalism and functions in such a way as to hamper the conditions necessary to dismantle ableism and compulsory able-bodiedness. In what follows, I trace the ways in which the production of disability has been built upon positive affects, and in turn, how the ISA is imbued with happy affects that capacitate certain forms of disability inclusion. I conclude by considering where the “cruel optimism” (Berlant 2010) of the ISA leaves disability scholars and activists who seek disability justice. The contemporary production of disability has been built on positive affects. The circulation of positive affects in the production of disability does not replace other modes of producing disability, but rather is layered within them. This is to say, the ways in which disability is produced through tragedy, pity, or disgust, are all tangled up with positive affects; all these forms of producing disability work together and re-enforce one another. From the demand to overcome shame and embody pride (Kolarova 2012), to the medically driven imperative to overcome suffering and embody an expression of hope (Fritsch 2013), the disabled have been positioned as the inspiring and courageous crip, the ones who will be cured through positive thinking, and as an individualized problem that is solvable. Disability is caught up in the ableist turn towards healthism and the imperative for everyone to have intensively enhanced bodies (see Chapter 3). From the oft-cited “Jerry’s Kids” (see Chapter 5), to the culturally ubiquitous inspirational quotes that mark disability as something to conquer and fight, happy affects of cure, overcoming, and progress are embedded in dominant conceptions of disability. Happy affects drive what McRuer (2006) has termed “compulsory able-bodiedness,” not only because people are invested in the “happiness scripts” of biological cures, narratives of overcoming, and the allure of technological advances, but because compulsory able-bodiedness is always, already, a social good in neoliberal capitalism. As such, the happy affects circulating by way of pride, hope, cure, or progress, end up retrofitting disability as “a vector of neoliberal governance” (Kolarova 2012, 268). Disability as thing, or disability as contained by the International Symbol of Access is not only knowable and profitable, but it is also the site of happy affects. By having the wheelchair symbol adorn a bus or a building, the problem and uncomfortableness of the difference of disability appears to be taken care of. With the appearance of the ISA, happy affects of having “done our duty for the disabled” circulate, even in the face of contested understandings of disability or accessibility.

#### Neoliberal biocapitalism sustains itself through wounded attachments. This forecloses futures by locking groups into existing insofar as they suffer and ignores the ways that other disabled groups suffer. What is needed is a move away from the politics of recognition that creates a division between the abled and disabled towards gradations of debility and capacity that focus on ecologies of sensation and bodily capacities.

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Puar's intervention is uncomfortable for disability studies insofar as she challenges the ways in which the field reproduces disability as an oppressed identity and an aggrieved subject enacted through what Brown (1993) terms “wounded attachments.” According to Brown, identity groups form wounded attachments when they define themselves through the suffering they experience within dominant society in such a way that their identity becomes the painful underside of normative culture. While Brown does not argue that marginalized groups who are left to wither do not suffer, her concern is that such wounded attachments foreclose the freedom of a group by identifying exclusively with its “historical and present pain rather than conjure an imagined future of power to make itself” (1993, 400). Instead of critically evaluating dominant culture and working to replace it with something else, Brown argues that wounded attachments lead groups to strive for the material, social, and political wellbeing enjoyed by the very social elites whose privilege produced their suffering and marginalization. By enunciating and making claims for themselves through “entrenching, dramatizing, and inscribing [their] pain in politics” a suffering group hold “out no future – for [themselves] or others – that triumphs over this pain” (Brown 1993, 406). Wounded attachments lead to an unproductive but self-sustaining loop: because one identifies through their own suffering, a future without suffering would cause them to cease to exist. As such, they continuously reiterate their suffering and, thus, demand that everyone put their intellectual and affective energies into the source of their suffering as opposed to alternative political relations that would produce a more just and less oppressed future. Neither dismissing the suffering any group faces, nor abetting the social relations that are at the root of that suffering, Brown instead wants to foster ways in which a group can enunciate and perform its historical oppression so as to not entirely delimit themselves but open themselves up to modes of healing that produce new and more just social relations. And because the wound or suffering that defines a marginalized group works to detach their suffering – and, thus, their group identity – from the ways in which that group participates in dominant culture, those wounds can cause others to suffer as well. As such, Sara Ahmed (2004) argues that enunciating and performing historical and contemporary injustices must also open up any oppressed group to the suffering they cause others through the few privileges they enjoy. By focusing on normal/abnormal, or abled/disabled, rather than on gradations of debility and capacity, disabled people hang onto an understanding of themselves as being excluded in a way that is not productive for fighting the neoliberal biocapitalist conditions in which disabled people are situated. One such wounded attachment is expressed in the desire of disabled people to be included in the workforce, from which they are largely excluded, despite the ways in which such a goal can re-inscribe the competitive, individualized, entrepreneurial subject formation that is key to neoliberalism’s success. This wounded attachment pre-empts certain critiques of the violence of neoliberalism more generally; critiques that would orient disabled subjects towards a future that rejects inequitable labour practices and the desire to be good neoliberal subjects. This wounded attachment and the desire to be included closes avenues of political discussion and action that recognize and work to counter the suffering such inclusion would perpetuate for others – including other disabled subjects. Just as Brown wants to approach suffering from an obtuse angle and not negate it, Puar takes up debility and capacity not to “disavow the crucial political gains enabled by disability activists globally, but to invite a deconstruction of what ability and capacity mean, affectively and otherwise, and to push for a broader politics of debility that destabilizes the seamless production of abled-bodies in relation to disability” (2009, 166). In doing so, Puar asks: “How would our political landscape transform if it actively decentered the sustained reproduction and proliferation of the grieving subject, opening instead toward an affective politics, attentive to ecologies of sensation and switchpoints of bodily capacities, to habituations and unhabituations, to tendencies, multiple temporalities, and becomings?” (2011, 157). While Puar may be interested in decentering a liberal political subject, rather than rehabilitating a grieving subject through intersectional politics, debility and capacity can be a means to open up the suffering of disabled people and their communities in multiple ways that could allow for a more just future for everyone.

#### Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best resist the logic of fluency which functions through debilitating and capacitating certain bodies.

#### We enact dysfluency as an interruption to the semiotic flow of debate. This is not a “communicative breakdown” but a flight that escapes the totalizing demands of fluency. Our politics of the mouth trips over proper speech and resist the spell of the linguistic.

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In conclusion, we might consider that for McRuer, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “disability” can refer to “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of bodily, mental, or behavioral functioning aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically” (156–57). An attention to dysfluent voices as material enunciations offers one specific way to think about this crip excess, particularly as resistance to hegemony. Fluent voices presume to signify monolithically and thus anticipate and linearly sustain the givenness of what is—fluency must be decomposed for a crip politic to flourish. Yet while fluency may have the first word (my speech arrives always a hesitation), it certainly never has the last—the impulse of fluency is totalizing but “something always escapes!”(Beasley-Murray xxi). Chris Eagle has written that an attention to dysfluency within disability studies would “understand mastery over language as always already tenuous, fragile, and partial” (6) and we might in this way begin to imagine dysfluency not as a communicative “breakdown” but as a type of escape or, in Deleuzio-Guattarian terms, flight. In Lexicon of the Mouth: Poetics and Politics of the Voice and the Oral Imaginary, Brandon LaBelle suggests that by “considering interrupted speech, we enter into a politics of the mouth. By tripping over the word, stuttering evidences the deep performative drive of the mouth under the spell of the linguistic. It stumbles precisely over a syllable, a grammar, a phoneme; the mouth gasps along the fault lines of a given vocabulary, to lisp over words, and in doing so, raises the volume on the very question as to what constitutes ‘proper speech’” (139; emphasis added). I have always imagined LaBelle’s offhanded remark a playful engagement with the Germanic fable the “Pied Piper.” In many versions of this classic tale, the piper leads all but three of the entranced village children into the river to drown. These are three crips, in fact: the first, physically disabled who could not keep pace; the second, deaf, who like Odysseus who could not hear the piper’s song; and the third, blind. Only those transformed by disability could resist the irresistible, the linear pull into deep water. In a similar way, the spell of fluency lures and strings words from our mouths in the lock-and-file order of “proper speech,” intelligibility, and surplus value. To what world and what dangers does this straightening syntax lead? The crip mouth, on the other hand, stumbles over and along the major grammar. It cannot follow and in this excess forms a collective site of material agency that stubbornly resists the spell of the linguistic. Against the liberal sirens (those masters of consensus) the agential capacity of dysfluency lies precisely in its flight from understanding and intelligibility.

#### The affirmative is not merely a war waged on futurity – we recognize that the battle must be fought within relationality and the figure of the Child. Instead, the aff complicates neoliberalism’s current investments in the future and negates the options it has offered us. The figure of the Child is understood for what it is, a regime of hygiene that co-constitutes disability, race, class, and queerness as sites of delimiting reproductive futurity. This is a demand for a better future, not for our children, but as an ethical call that affirms our relationality.

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However, as this chapter has shown, disability cannot operate in a full negation of the figure of the Child, or unequivocally embrace “no future” because disability is always already embedded in the production of the future as a future of technological and medical advances, of a future to be found through the saving grace of biocapitalism. The future is accessible, happy, hopeful, and inclusive, even when it is not (see Chapter 2). Disability, through neoliberal processes of capacitation and withering, participates in the formation of the figure of the Child, and this is precisely an important site of contestation. Commenting on Edelman and negating the future, the late Jose Esteban Muñoz writes in Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity (2009): “...when I negotiate the ever-increasing sidewalk obstacles produced by oversized baby strollers on parade in the city in which I live, the sheer magnitude of the vehicles that flaunt the incredible mandate of reproduction as world-historical virtue, I could not be more hailed” (92) by the queer imperative to not fight for the children. But, Muñoz notes: “as strongly as I reject reproductive futurity, I nonetheless refuse to give up on concepts such as politics, hope, and a future that is not kid stuff,” (2009, 92) for “all children are not the privileged white babies to whom contemporary society caters” (2009, 94). Muñoz furthers “Racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity. Although Edelman does indicate that the future of the child as futurity is different from the future of actual children, his framing nonetheless accepts and reproduces this monolithic figure of the child that is indeed always already white” (2009, 95). In addition to McRuer’s critique of the Child as always already able-bodied, other queer and disability studies scholars have echoed Munoz’s critique. For Alison Kafer writes that “this always already whiteness is a whiteness framed by and understood through regimes of health and hygiene” whereby racialized and queer kids cast out of reproductive futurity “have been and continue to be framed as sick, as pathological, as contagious” marking the co-constitution of race, class, and disability as delimiting reproductive futurity (2013, 32). This conclusion is also echoed by Chen (2011; 2012). Kafer (2013) and Muñoz agree that “It is important not to hand over futurity to normative white reproductive futurity” (Muñoz 2009, 95), for “The dominant model of futurity is indeed ‘winning,’ but that is all the more reason to call on a utopian political imagination that will enable us to glimpse another time and place: a ‘not-yet’ where queer youths of colour actually get to grow up” (Muñoz 2009, 96). Indeed, Muñoz comments that “The way to deal with the asymmetries and violent frenzies that mark the present is not to forget the future. The here and now is simply not enough” (Muñoz 2009, 96), leading Kafer to suggest that the task at hand is to “imagine disability and disability futures otherwise” (2013, 34). Following Muñoz (2009) and Kafer (2013), it is important to fight for the future, but to do so requires addressing the ways by which neoliberal futurity depends upon both negating the futures of disability while also promoting particular inclusions of disability. Thus, to underscore the epigraphs of this chapter, while the ableism that underlies the ways in which Kafer’s (2013) future is written on her body and the ways in which disabled lives are not tractable, these accounts do not mark the ways in which neoliberal futurity promotes and capacitates certain disabled lives so as to affirm particular forms of biocapitalism and the circulation of good feelings that has implications for the way in which disability can become in the world. It is not enough then, to invest in the neoliberal forms of capacitated futures of disabled people, but rather it is imperative to turn away from the future that is currently being served to us in the form of neoliberal biocapitalism that strives to foreclose the possibility of other worlds. Unlike Edelman (2004), I am interested in negating reproductive futurity not simply to negate the social order that relies on the Child, but rather to invest otherwise in social relations that complicate both this horizon and that of neoliberal biocapitalism that underlies our current interest in the future. What I want to suggest is that futurity is about the neoliberal imperative to manage risk, individualize access, and mobilize hope. The fight then, is not an anti-social turn away from the future entirely, but a negative turn away from the future that is currently forecloses the possibility of other worlds. It is a question of struggling for a better world, and demanding a better future, not for our individual selves, or for our children, but as an ethical jester of being of and within the world, whereby disability itself can only ever emerge within intracorporeal relations (see Chapter 6). Muñoz notes: “The act of accepting no future is dependent on renouncing politics and various principles of hope that are, by their very nature, relational” (2009, 94). If it is indeed within relations that disability emerges, then that is where the fight is to be had. In the next chapter, I explore this idea of disability being in and of the world and posit the important consequences re-imagining disability relationally has for both disabled people and others. Negating neoliberal reproductive futurity is thus not simply a question of “fucking the child,” but, as I will outline in my next chapter, is to heterotopically and intracorporeally invest otherwise in social relations that complicate this horizon.

#### Voting affirmative engages in a heterotopic imagination of disability. This is a method of imagining disability differently outside of the current neoliberal conditions. The product is a figure of disability not as something to overcome but as a life worth living.

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Challenging the undesirability of disability is a shared responsibility and goes beyond the inclusion of disabled people within the exploitative and individualized relations of neoliberal capitalism. That is, challenging the undesirability of disability requires more than individualized access to education, employment, or vibrant social lives. Challenging the undesirability of disability requires that disability be imagined differently, that is, imagined in ways that ensure that disability can be collectively practiced and experienced differently. In order to imagine disability differently, it is imperative to understand how the neoliberal hegemonic social imagination both works to curtail who is considered desirable and informs the production of a good, individualized neoliberal subject that limits disabled and able-bodied people alike. Neoliberal policies and practices individualize both able-bodied and disabled bodies through forms of debility and capacity (Puar 2011) and through the economization of social relations and life itself (Murphy 2013) such that being critical of these forms of social, economic, and political relations is not enough to extricate ourselves from our role in maintaining and reproducing these relations. In order to desire disability differently, we must begin with marginal, heterotopic imaginations whereby disability is practiced as not something to overcome or merely tolerate, but rather as a part of a life worth living. Building on Michel Foucault’s concept of heterotopia (1998), a concept that marks “outside places” by their discontinuity and multiplicity, and drawing on the work of Mel Chen (2012) and Rod Michalko (1999), I argue that the heterotopic imagination reconfigures how disability emerges, with whom it emerges, and where. When disability is viewed through the lens of the heterotopic imagination, it becomes an intracorporeal, non-anthropocentric, multiplicity that exceeds the individualized human body inscribed by neoliberal biocapitalism. To elaborate on disability as this emergent multiplicity, I read Chen’s and Michalko’s work alongside Thomas Lemke’s (2015) work on Foucault’s concepts of the milieu and government of things, as well as the agential realism of feminist materialist Karen Barad (2007; 2008). Desiring disability differently does not merely allow the current formulation of disability to become desirable. On the contrary, desiring disability differently through the heterotopic imagination radically alters what disability is, how it is practiced, and what it can be.

# Accessibility

#### Communicative spaces such as debate are governed through biopolitical technologies of fluency which smooth over semiotic interruptions in search for stable and univocal operations. This bends bodies to align their speech patterns with compulsory able-bodiedness.

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the need for common ground” links all disabilities under compulsory able-bodiedness “Fluency” smooths over discontinuous semiotics to eliminate frictions within productive, biopolitical systems and moves beyond ideology as hegemony to the governance of bodies and life itself. fluency is enacted within the material and corporeal. The vast array of rhythms, semiotic modes and (racialized or disabled) accents have become the objective domain of Speech-Language Pathology. Fluent speech is marked by a lack of hesitation, and mastery over language the “effortless flow of speech” can be read as a performance of bending the capacities of bodies toward stable and univocal futures. Autistics are compelled to restrict stimming Dyslexic bodies that process information slowly are forced out of social time facial tics and erratic gestures are made abject and cast out of the communicative realm altogether What is left is a univocal and fluid semiotic operation that instrumentalizes our relations with others.

#### This is part of a larger shift in the socioeconomic terrain whereby semiocapitalism now requires information to move quickly and effortlessly. The result is the capacitation of certain disabled bodies at the expense of debilitating dysfluent laborers.

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Speech is now human capital technologies of fluency play a central role in semiocapitalism. This system requires information to move quickly and effortlessly. Fluency impels subjects to increase their information flow Many disabled people who could not work have benefitted yet such changes, shift the socioeconomic terrain in threatening ways for others. The ability to regulate information has become a baseline for postindustrial labor. such that the imperatives to “sound right” and possess “excellent communication skills” marginalize dysfluent laborers

#### Neoliberal biocapitalism operates through disabling certain bodies at the expense of enhancing others. Through figure of the Child, biocapitalism sustains a reproductive order geared towards the future in the image of a better than able-bodied subject. In reality, this sacred Child is impossible to satisfy and requires the simultaneous death and enhancement of disability. This replicates a cruel optimism towards the promise of the future that only works to disable others.

Fritsch 15

the Child as the image of the future incites compulsory enhanced-bodiediness as the child is not only abled, but must be better than able-bodied. futurity relies on both a capacitated and bodily enhanced Child no child can fully embody the desirable able-bodied child, and, thus, sets up disability as the impediment to a desirable future Thus, the disabled child is the figure of no future However, the disabled child is also the figure of the future in that the suffering child creates particular neoliberal futures through the mobilization of biocapital, cure, and enhancement. some children are supposed to never grow up, while others are enhanced, and capacitated precisely because they can be made to slide into the neoliberal promise of the future. that incapacitates and disables others. The figure of the better than able-bodied Child circulates happy affects of pride, hope, cure, and progress, which sustains a neoliberal order whereby the promise of happiness shapes our affective dispositions. This affective economy determines the value and circulation of social goods which allows biocapitalism to frame disability through a narrative of overcoming suffering. This produces disability as tragedy, pity, and disgust. Fritsch 2 Since “we move toward and away from objects through how we are affected by them” happiness orients what we come into contact with. the objects we encounter are never neutral. its affective value is already in place disability has been built on positive affects produced through tragedy, pity, or disgust From the medically driven imperative to overcome suffering and embody hope the disabled have been positioned as the ones who will be cured through positive thinking compulsory able-bodiedness is a social good in neoliberal capitalism the happy affects circulating by way of pride, hope, cure, or progress, end up retrofitting disability as “a vector of neoliberal governance”

#### Neoliberal biocapitalism sustains itself through wounded attachments. This forecloses futures by locking groups into existing insofar as they suffer and ignores the ways that other disabled groups suffer. What is needed is a move away from the politics of recognition that creates a division between the abled and disabled towards gradations of debility and capacity that focus on ecologies of sensation and bodily capacities.

Fritsch 3

wounded attachments foreclose the freedom of a group by identifying exclusively with its pain because one identifies through suffering, a future without suffering would cause them to cease to exist. As such, they continuously reiterate their suffering By focusing on abled/disabled, rather than on gradations of debility and capacity, disabled people hang onto an understanding not productive for fighting neoliberal biocapitalist This wounded attachment and desire to be included closes avenues that counter the suffering perpetuate for others debility and capacity invite a broader politics that destabilizes the seamless production of abled-bodies in relation to disability” opening instead an affective politics, attentive to ecologies of sensation and switchpoints of bodily capacities debility and capacity could allow for a more just future for everyone.

#### Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best resist the logic of fluency which functions through debilitating and capacitating certain bodies.

#### We enact dysfluency as an interruption to the semiotic flow of debate. This is not a “communicative breakdown” but a flight that escapes the totalizing demands of fluency. Our politics of the mouth trips over proper speech and resist the spell of the linguistic.

St. Pierre 3

attention to dysfluent voices offers one way to think about excess as resistance to hegemony. the impulse of fluency is totalizing but “something always escapes!” an attention to dysfluency would “understand mastery over language as always already partial” we imagine dysfluency not as a communicative “breakdown” but as a type of escape or flight. by “considering interrupted speech, we enter into a politics of the mouth. the spell of fluency strings words in the order of “proper speech,” The mouth forms a collective site of material agency that stubbornly resists the spell of the linguistic. Against consensus the agential capacity of dysfluency lies precisely in its flight from understanding and intelligibility.

#### The affirmative is not merely a war waged on futurity – we recognize that the battle must be fought within relationality and the figure of the Child. Instead, the aff complicates neoliberalism’s current investments in the future and negates the options it has offered us. The figure of the Child is understood for what it is, a regime of hygiene that co-constitutes disability, race, class, and queerness as sites of delimiting reproductive futurity. This is a demand for a better future, not for our children, but as an ethical call that affirms our relationality.

Fritsch 4

disability cannot operate in a full negation Disability participates in the formation of the figure of the Child, and this is precisely a site of contestation. “as strongly as I reject futurity, I refuse to give up on a future that is not kid stuff,” “all children are not privileged whiteness is framed by regimes of health and hygiene” whereby racialized and queer kids continue to be framed as pathological marking the co-constitution of race, class, and disability “It is important not to hand over futurity for “The dominant model is ‘winning,’ but that is all the more reason to call on a utopian political imagination that will enable us to glimpse another time and place it is important to fight for the future, but to do so requires addressing the ways by which neoliberal futurity depends upon both negating the futures of disability while also promoting inclusions of disability. The fight is not a turn away from the future entirely, but a negative turn away from the future that currently forecloses the possibility of other worlds. It is a question of demanding a better future, not for our selves, or our children, but as an ethical jester of being within the world accepting no future is dependent on renouncing politics and various principles of hope that are relational” If it is indeed within relations that disability emerges, then that is where the fight is to be

#### Voting affirmative engages in a heterotopic imagination of disability. This is a method of imagining disability differently outside of the current neoliberal conditions. The product is a figure of disability not as something to overcome but as a life worth living.

Fritsch 5

Challenging the undesirability of disability requires that disability be imagined differently it is imperative to understand how the neoliberal hegemonic social imagination works to curtail who is considered desirable through forms of debility and capacity we must begin with marginal, heterotopic imaginations whereby disability is practiced as not something to overcome but rather as a part of a life worth living. heterotopia marks “outside places” by their discontinuity and multiplicity, When disability is viewed through the lens of the heterotopic imagination, it becomes a multiplicity that exceeds the individualized human body inscribed by neoliberal biocapitalism. heterotopic imagination radically alters what disability is, how it is practiced, and what it can be.