# 1AC – Princeton R1

### The Disabled Narrative

#### It’s time for the system to hear our outcries – abled subjectivity is tied up in a two-tiered affective response that explains disabled life – primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status, which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 15 The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 //ACCS JM

Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 Primary pity arises when one witnesses a fall of the self, a collapse of the ego; such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman’s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one’s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers’s formulation: one “cannot bear to look...but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego’s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person’s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud’s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body’s ‘normal’ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity’s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else’s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture’s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people’s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity’s incursions, reinforces the ego’s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud’s primary- secondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud’s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual’s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person’s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability’s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one’s own self undone?

#### Debate is a sphere of “fiat” and “futurism” which reifies rehabilitative futurism where the signifier of the fantasmatic child is placed forward to eradicate and cure disability. When the question of disability arises, communicative projects such as debate are centered around solely optimism and trying to create the ‘better future’ – this obsession with optimism pathologizes the disabled Child that cannot be in the better future – this 1AC serves as an ‘perspective shift’ that differs from the current form of how disability is presented – absent questioning the form of argumentation the content of argumentation becomes unethically flawed – thus, the role of the ballot is to disrupt biopolitical systems of productivity and futurity.

Mollow 2 The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 //ACCS JM

“Let us begin our reexamination of Tiny Tim with a discussion of No Future, a text in which Tiny Tim takes a prominent position. No Future is a text with a target: the book takes aim at “the Child whose innocence solicits our defense,” a trope that Edelman names as the emblem of an ideology that he terms “reproductive futurism” (2). According to Edelman, commonplace cultural invocations of the figure of the Child (“not to be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children”) uphold “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (11, 2). Defying pronatalist social imperatives, Edelman names queerness as “the side of those not fighting for the children‟” (3) and urges queers to accept the culture’s projection of the death drive onto us by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. (No Future 29) Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future’s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists’ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You’re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman’s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman’s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### Our affirmative is a refusal to invest into ableism notions such as “fiat” which have been normalized as a tool to inflict violence upon disabled learners – the notion of scenario planning through the invocation of fiat is a voting issue – engagement with simulation forces disability to contemplate the nature of ability and disability which fosters internalized ableism and necessitates crip death.

Campbell 08 (Dr Fiona Kumari Campbell is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Health and Wellbeing at the University of South Queensland <http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/21024/50540_1.pdf> “Exploring Internalized Ableism using Critical Race Theory” Disability and Society, Vol. 23 (2), p. 151-162) //ACCS JM

Internalized oppression is not the cause of our mistreatment; it is the result of our mistreatment. It would not exist without the real external oppression that forms the social climate in which we exist. Once oppression has been internalized, little force is needed to keep us submissive. We harbour inside ourselves the pain and the memories, the fears and the confusions, the negative self-images and the low expectations, turning them into weapons with which to re-injure ourselves, every day of our lives. (Mason, as cited Marks, 1999, p.25). Internalised ableism means that to assimilate into the norm the referentially disabled individual is required to embrace, indeed to assume an ‘identity’ other than one’s own – and this subject is repeatedly reminded by epistemological formations and individuals with hegemonic subjectifications of their provisional and (real) identity. I am not implying that subjects have a true or real essence. Indeed the subjects' formation is in a constant state of fluidity, multiplicity and (re)formation. However, disabled people often feel compelled to fabricate ‘who’ they are – to adopt postures and comportments that are additional to self. The formation of internalised ableism cannot be simply deduced by assessing the responses of individuals to Althusser’s famous interpolative hailing “Hey you, there” (Althusser & Balibar, 1979). Whilst a subject may respond to “Hey you there, crip!” – it is naïve to assume that an affirmative response to this hailing repressively inaugurates negative disabled subjectification. In fact the adoption of more positive or oppositional ontologies of disability by the subject in question may be unexpectedly enabling. As Susan Park (2000: 91) argues “what is at stake here is not so much the accuracy behind the hailing privilege, but the power of the hailing itself to instantly determine (or elide) that thing it is naming”. Nonetheless, censure and the cancellation of the legitimacy of oppositional subjectivities remains common place as Cherney reminds us with respect to Deaf culture: “If abnormal [sic] bodies must be fixed to fit within dominant cultural views of appropriateness then the Deaf celebration of their differences must be read as an illegitimate model of advocacy”. (Cherney, 1999, p. 33). Foucault’s (1976; 1980) theorisation of power as productive may provide some offerings from which to build a conversation about internalised ableism. I am not so much interested in the ‘external’ effects of that power, but for the moment wish to concentrate on what Judith Butler aptly refers to as the ‘psychic life’ of power. She describes this dimension: … an account of subjection, it seems, must be traced in the turns of psychic life. More specifically, it must be traced in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself that takes place in acts of self-reproach, conscience, and melancholia that work in tandem with processes of social regulation (Butler, 1997b, p.19). In other words, the processes of subject formation cannot be separated from the subject him/herself who is brought into being though those very subjectifying processes. The consequences of taking into oneself negative subjectivities not only regulate and continually form identity (the disabled citizen) but can transcend and surpass the strictures of ableist authorizations. Judith Butler describes this process of the “carrying of a mnemic trace”: One need only consider the way in which the history of having been called an injurious name is embodied, how the words enter the limbs, craft the gesture, bend the spine …how these slurs accumulate over time, dissimulating their history, taking on the semblance of the natural, configuring and restricting the doxa that counts as “reality”. (Butler, 1997b, p. 159) The work of Williams and Williams-Morris (2000) links racism experienced by African Americans to the effects of hurtful words and negative cultural symbols on mental health, especially when marginalized groups embrace negative societal beliefs about themselves. They cite an international study by Fischer et al (1996) which inter alia links poor academic performance with poor social status. Although using different disciplinary language Wolfensberger (1972) in his seven core themes of SRV, identified role circularity as a significant obstacle to be overcome by disabled people wanting socially valued roles. Philosopher Linda Purdy contends it is important to resist conflating disability with the disabled person. She writes My disability is not me, no matter how much it may affect my choices. With this point firmly in mind, it should be possible mentally to separate my existences from the existence of my disability. (Purdy, 1996, p. 68). The problem with Purdy’s conclusion is that it is psychically untenable, not only because it is posited around a type of Cartesian dualism that simply separates being-ness from embodiment, but also because this kind of reasoning disregards the dynamics of subjectivity formation to which Butler (1997a; 1997b) has referred. Whilst the ‘outputs’ of subjectivity are variable the experience of impairment within an ableist context can and does effect formation of self – in other words ‘disability is me’, but that ‘me’ does not need to be enfleshed with negative ontologies of subjectivity. Purdy’s bodily detachment appears locked into a loop that is filled with internalised ableism, a state with negative views of impairment, from which the only escape is disembodiment; the penalty of denial is a flight from her body. This finds agreement in the reasoning of Jean Baudrillard (1983) who posits that it is the simulation, the appearance (representation) that matters. The subject simulates what it is to be ‘disabled’ and by inference ‘abled’ and whilst morphing ableist imperatives, in effect performs a new hyper reality of be-ing disabled. By unwittingly performing ableism disabled people become complicit in their own demise – reinforcing impairment as an outlaw ontology.

#### Debate is a communicative sphere which is systematically structured to exclude disability – communicative spaces privilege those who can conform to marketable forms of affect by rewarding normality and conformity and excluding those who are deemed incompetent through perceiving disabled affect as parasitic due to literally slowing down information. The drive to perform means disability is always constituted by affective labor and regulated to the bottom of the communicative register causing violence and exclusion.

St. Pierre 17 (Becoming Dysfluent: Fluency as Biopolitics and Hegemony Joshua St. Pierre Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, Volume 11, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 339-356 (Article) Published by Liverpool University Press) [BRACKETED FOR ABLEIST RHETORIC] //Lex VM Recut by ACCS JM

“Given that compulsory able-bodiedness emanates from everywhere and nowhere, it is perhaps more fruitful to parse this consensus through the mode by which compulsory able-bodiedness circulates and is translated across different ideas, practices, and institutions rather than isolating the specific sites where this consensus, this hegemony, is produced. For McRuer, “the experience of the able-bodied need for an agreed-on common ground” is a common experience that “links all people with disabilities under a system of compulsory able-bodiedness” (8), and I suggest that this “common ground” of disability oppression is a how as much as a where or a what. That is, a common ground is never just found, but must be cleared away and maintained with effort through time. “Fluency” can accordingly be understood as a technology operating at the intersection of biopower and hegemony that smooths over and straightens discontinuous semiotics, temporalities, and materialities to eliminate frictions within productive, biopolitical systems and thus secure social order within the material realm. An attention to fluency moves beyond the orthodox focus on ideology as the essential vehicle of hegemony to locate, alongside Jon Beasley-Murray’s notion of “posthegemony,” the production of consensus and the security of social order not within the realm of representation but the governance of bodies and life itself. Fluency attempts to regulate and collapse not merely the time between encounters, but the embodied time of encounter and access and judgment. Fluency attempts to cover over political spaces—to mitigate (when it cannot eliminate) interruption and disruption—thus facilitating in one move the rationalization and naturalization of embodied difference that seems to emanate from everywhere and nowhere, as if everyone agrees. But whatever else it may be, fluency is first a process enacted and lived within the material and corporeal**.** Here I start from the semiotic and expand outwards. The vast array of rhythms, semiotic modes, tempos, dictions, and (racialized or disabled) accents that constitute practices of aural “communication” have become the objective domain of the biomedicalizing industry of Speech-Language Pathology. Barry Guitar, in his well-used textbook on speech impediments, offers an exemplary definition of fluency: “simply as the effortless flow of speech” (13). Yet there is hardly anything simple about this definition, which is offered amid caveats and backtracking. Guitar readily admits (12) that fluency is difficult to pin down and that researchers within Speech-Language Pathology often focus on what it is not—namely, dysfluency. There are a few characteristics: Fluent speech is marked by a lack of hesitation, and Speech-Language Pathology is forced to make (dubious and highly arbitrary) distinctions between “normal” and “abnormal” hesitations (Goldman-Eisler) since breaks and hesitations crop up in all speech. Fluent speech is marked by rhythmical (read: thoroughly normalized) patterning. Fluent speech is similarly marked by the lack of “extra sounds” interjected into culturally dominant phonetic patterns. Fluency is defined by the overall rate of speech, which includes not just the rate of vocal flow but of information flow (Starkweather). And lastly, fluency is often defined by a lack of “effort” on the part of the speaker; a conceit of mastery over language that highlights the twinned meaning of “fluency.” Transposing this definition into a critical register, the “effortless flow of speech” can be read as a coordinated—yet often strained—performance of bending the energies and capacities of bodies toward stable and univocal futures. [Those with Autism] ~~Autistics~~ are compelled to restrict stimming, to sit on their hands (to have “quiet hands,” Bascom), and thereby reroute bodily capacities to the smooth performance of so-called intelligible communication. Dyslexic bodies that process information piecemeal and slowly are forced out of social time (Cosenza 7). As Zach Richter has argued, the facial tics and erratic gestures of dysfluent speakers are likewise never communicative inflections, but are made abject and cast out of the communicative realm altogether by what I am here calling technologies of fluency. Tics of loud cursing and grunting from a public speaker with Tourette’s are imagined as an interruption to communication. Dysfluencies are erased from closed captions and courtroom transcripts. What is thus left is a univocal and fluid semiotic operation that instrumentalizes our relations with others. Or more precisely, if fluency is a type of Foucauldian technology, then the function of this biopolitical strategy is to regulate and focus the communicative event toward specific, technical ends through the logic of optimization and closure.” (342-344)

#### Vote affirmative as an endorsement of dysfluency and the failure of disability to be productive – this 1AC is a performative affective intervention by diverting from what is expected in a space that is meant to purposefully exclude disability in the name of productivity – this 1AC serves as a reminder of the failed ASL movement that the PRL instantly stopped in the name of productivity and efficiency. Only a refusal of this world addresses ableism as the basis of communication—we defend the 1AC’s affective pessimism as an example of a die-in within topic discussions, a refusal to breathe life into the resolution. Pessimistic die-ins break from institutional participation as a starting point for politics in favor of disrupting the circulation of discourses predicated upon optimism and disabled death. This hijacks communicative spheres by purposefully forefronting discussions of disabled killability.

Selck 16 [Selck, Michael L. "Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn't." (Jan 2016) // WHSRS and Lex VM]

“The disabled are dying and with them dis/abled culture is being eradicated. In the time between formulating this project and its completion already too many disabled souls have been taken from this world, including pivotal disability studies influences for this research. I barely had enough time to mourn the loss of disability advocate and inspiration porn critic Stella Young before grieving the loss of disability studies exemplar Tobin Siebers. Attached to the grief I feel as a result of the fading disability studies community is the perpetual grief I harbor since my disabled Father’s suicide and in turn the grief concomitant to the claiming of a disabled identity. I choose to start out this project with grief because it communicates the tenor of this research; this is not the disability studies project of inspiration or utopia. My entry point to the disability studies dialogue is riddled with grief, anger, and pain and it is as such that this project plots a course of disability research that attempts to make a space free from the ideological constraints of optimism. The language surrounding dis/ability is highly political. Entire words, phrases, and identities are stretched between, in, and out of the nexus of dis/ability. The choice, for instance, to include a backslash in the word dis/ability represents for Goodley (2014) a desire to delineate and expand each of the categories in the face of global neoliberalism. My initial research inquired about the impact of dis/abled terms and phrases. I went to interrogate rhetoric like “special education”, “handicapable”, and one of the most glaringly overused insults in the American education system “retard”. The scholarship I was coming up with was plentiful but was for the most part located entirely outside of intercultural communication programs like the one I was attending. For the most part the few and far between intercultural communication projects about dis/ability I was able to locate were without modal complexity and didn’t bear semblance to so many of my own experiences. I was beginning to notice a layer of optimism that has been communicatively imprinted upon the negotiation of dis/abled identity. The angst started to manifest as I questioned if I was in the correct field or if dis/ability even was ‘cultural’. I felt a very real cultural erasure of dis/ability in academia and ultimately that glaring lack of consideration is what pushed me to performance studies. I first worked to close the apparent research gap by crafting a collaborative performance titled Under the Mantle (UTM), which put dis/ability, communication scholarship, and pessimist philosophy on stage. The larger purpose of this research report is to antagonize the erasure of dis/ability from communication studies by autoethnographically analyzing the crip-pessimist performance art project Under The Mantle.” (1-2) This research report will first detail the components of the theoretical work that was drawn on to create UTM. Next I offer a literature review to demonstrate the combination of optimism and neglect dis/ability has undergone in intercultural communication models. Following that section I mark my shift to performance methods as I explain how narrative autoethnography can illuminate cultural misconceptions regarding the dis/abled. In the last sections of this report I offer a textual analysis of the performance UTM and analyze three significant arguments of the instillation before concluding. Contextualizing Critical Dis/Ability Theory Often used interchangeably, critical disability theory (CDT) and critical disability studies (CDS) contest dis/ablism (Goodley, 2011, 2014; Devlin & Pothier, 2006; Hosking, 2008). There are several unique additions made to CDS with every new instantiation. Scholars in European countries and Canada attend to the theory, with United States academics often underrepresented. There are three concurrent themes of CDT that I will synthesize in this section with some dis/ability studies authors claiming there are as many as seven themes of CDT (Hosking, 2008). In the introduction to their edited collection of dis/ability essays, Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier (2006) present three themes of CDT as, first, to highlight the unequal status to which persons with disabilities are confined; second, to destabilize necessitarian assumptions that reinforce the marginalization of persons with disabilities; and third, to help generate the individual and collective practical agency of persons with disabilities in the struggles for recognition and redistribution. (p. 18, emphasis mine) Already the connections between the CDT and the critical communication paradigm are visible as each respectively forefronts notions of power, privilege, identity, and agency. Outlined in more detail, the first theme of CDT argues that there is systemic micro and macro level discrimination against bodies with disabilities. To some critical communication scholars, this theme might be obvious, but it seldom is when “the resulting exclusion of those who do not fit able-bodied norms may not be noticeable or even intelligible” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). As the bumper sticker on my laptop proudly disclaims, “Not all disabilities are visible,” which necessarily adds a level of nuance and complexity to the way that dis/ability studies attend to the prospect of discrimination and violence. Often times, “social organization according to able-bodied norms is just taken as natural, normal, inevitable, necessary, even progress” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). It might be true that the lack of collaborative work between critical communication studies and dis/ability studies is because neoliberalism is supremely effective at rebranding marginalized oppression as a marker of its progress. The implications of this assertion are dire but essential to the basis of crip-pessimism. Theoretical approaches based in pessimism and skepticism are often necessary to distinguish the instruments of self destruction that have been mistaken for those of self betterment. Thus, a key question remains, what is regarded as progress and to whom does it count? The politics of progress call for the second tenet of CDT, which is a destabilization of neoliberal practices that strip power and agency from bodies with disabilities. Devlin and Pothier (2006) use the language of “anti-necessitarian” (p. 2), which refers to the efficacy of social organizations and an unflinching skepticism of liberalism. For Shildrick and Price (1999), “disabled bodies call into question the ‘giveness’ of the ‘natural body’ and, instead, posit a corporeality that is fluid in its investments and meanings” (p. 1). Anti-necessitarian logics ask questions that remain innocuous to the critical communication paradigm. Can the architectural proliferation of stairs and multiple levels on buildings be attributed to neoliberalism and active disablism? If stairs seem to focus too exclusively on physical impairments, then what about the sensitivity of the building’s lighting, acoustics, and spatiality? Finally, if neoliberalism fights to protect its grand narrative of progress then is the social exclusion of bodies with disabilities necessary for the day-to-day operation of our globalized world? As Donaldson (2002) posits: “theories of gendered, raced, sexed, classed, and disabled bodies offer us critical languages for ‘denaturalising’ impairment’” (p. 112) at the level of the subjective and inter-subjective. The third theme of CDT is to attend to the agency of bodies with disabilities in the struggle for recognition. One key element of extending agency to the disabled is the use of social experience. Experience is subjective “but experience remains intimately connected to political and social existence, and therefore individuals and societies are capable of learning from their experiences” (Siebers, 2008, p. 82). Though absolutely necessary, it is not enough to write treatises on the oppression of the disabled over time. Academics, theorists, intercultural trainers, and storytellers alike should be aware of the constant risks of representation. Representation and context are at the core of critical disability studies. The notion of agency is as unstable as the notions of dis/ability. There is no one-size-fits-all human rights based approach that will be suitable to address all disabled experiences, as the theoretical call for crip-pessimism will remind us. Instead of a universal abstract Rawlsian concept of social justice, CDS “attend(s) to the relational components of dis/ablism” (Goodley, 2011, p. 159). By a Rawlsian concept of social justice I mean a model that relies on distributive justice with utopist equality at its core. Where utopist equality projects highlight human sameness to the point of purity. CDT unavoidably invites a discussion about difference into the folds as postmodern and post-structural thinkers position the self as defined constantly in relation to others. Therein lies the difference between an equality model and a justice model of social identity. Often in the attempt to open up spaces for reconsidering self and other, CDS celebrates disability as a positive identity marker. This essay offers a strong argument of caution that the inclusion of CDS in critical communication studies might rely too heavily on celebrations of disabled identity. Nothing better demonstrates that reliance on celebrating identity than the myriad language choices used to describe a disabled identity including: differently-abled, special needs, person with disability, disabled person, temporarily able-bodied, and others. Often, able- bodied audiences have a tendency to sensationalize the presence of disability in a space that has not traditionally welcomed it. Examples of this are highlighted by the increasingly popular discussion of ‘inspiration porn’ (Young, 2014) and Hollywood’s representation of disability. The tendency is to inspirationalize the disabled for achieving tasks that would not be celebrated if they were accomplished by an unimpaired body. Crossing the street, showing up on time, entering a building by oneself are all tasks profoundly routine to the non-disabled and yet simultaneously cherished as markers of progress for the disabled. Philosophical pessimism is articulated next as a way to temper the risk of sensationalizing dis/ability. The theories ultimately fuse together like orchids and wasps to generate the larger theme of crip-pessimism. Philosophical Pessimism Throughout the 19th century pessimism was one of the most popular intellectual and philosophical strains, crossing countries and continents. Authors such as Rousseau, Leopardi, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche overwhelmingly created and lead the spirit of pessimism. Contemporarily however, the word ‘pessimism’ is pejorative and describes a body’s emotional discontent rather than intellectual engagement with the world. Dienstag (2009) writes, “Since pessimism is perceived more as a disposition than as a theory, pessimists are seen primarily as dissenters from whatever the prevailing consensus of their time happens to be, rather than as constituting a continuous alternative” (p. 3). Power is responsible for ontological shifts, and during shifts some populations benefit while others are harmed. The turn in thinking about pessimism from an intellectual position to an emotional state has been particularly gratuitous for bodies with disabilities. I come to pessimism because of my experience with disability. My anxiety disorder comes with an exteriority of anti-social behavior that has branded me pessimistic. The concern for my anxiety in public situations is often commented on as overly critical, negative, narcissistic, and most often pessimistic. I experience an anxious state of becoming different, and after years of failing to rehabilitate my sameness to able-bodied standards, I have come to a comfort with pessimism.

#### Disability controls proximate cause to and explains all other violence – treating those as inferior is only justifiable through the guise of disability.

**Siebers et al. 17** Tobin, et al. (2017): Culture – Theory – Disability: Encounters between Disability Studies and Cultural Studies, Siebers began his career at the University of Michigan in 1980. He has authored ten books, including field-defining Disability Aesthetics (UM Press, 2010) and Disability Theory (UM Press, 2008). In 2004 Siebers was named the V. L. Parrington Collegiate Professor. Siebers was a Chair of the LSA Comparative Literature Program (currently the Department of Comparative Literature). In 2009, the University of Michigan Council for Disability Concerns presented Siebers with the James T. Neubacher Award in recognition of extraordinary leadership and service in support of the disability community. Siebers has been selected for fellowships by the Michigan Society of Fellows, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, and the Institute for the Humanities at the University of Michigan. Tobin Siebers passed away in January 2015. In March 2015, the University of Michigan announced the establishment of the Tobin Siebers Prize for Disability Studies in the Humanities "for best book-length manuscript on a topic of pressing urgency to Disability Studies in the humanities.", DOI: 10.14361/9783839425336-002 SJCP//JG

The use of disability identity as a prop to denigrate minority politics has a long and pernicious history on the right, although it is bewildering to find the usage alive and well in Butler, Brown, and other cultural critics on the left.5 (This surprising agreement between the right and left gives one small clue to the tenacious hold that ability as an ideology exercises over political thinking today.6 ) Indeed, the idea that the political claims made by people of color and women are illegitimate because their identities are disabled would be outrageous if it were not such a familiar and successful ploy. Historical opponents of political and social equality for women, Douglas Baynton shows, cite their supposed physical, intellectual, and psychological flaws, stressing irrationality, excessive emotions, and physical weakness, while similar arguments for racial inequality and immigration restrictions involving particular races and ethnic groups invoke their apparent susceptibility to feeble-mindedness, mental illness, deafness, blindness, and other disabilities (see Baynton 33). Moreover, disability remains today, Baynton explains, an acceptable reason for unequal treatment, even as other justifications for discrimination, based on race, ethnicity, sex, and gender, have begun to fall away. It is no longer considered permissible to treat minority people as inferior citizens, although it happens all the time, unless that inferiority is tied to disability. As long as minority identities are thought disabled, there is little hope for the political and social equality of either persons with these identities or disabled people, for there will always be one last justification for inferior treatment. There will always be the possibility of proving the inferiority of any given human being at any given moment as long as inferiority is tied to physical and mental difference. Moreover, that pain in itself leads to inferior identities, ones given to greater self-recrimination or frequent victimizing of others, relies on a fallacious psychological scenario prejudiced inherently against disability.7 Once touching a person, pain is apparently transformative, to all intents and purposes serving as an organic and natural cause whose psychological formation evolves with little variation according to the internal logic of the psyche. First, the psychology of pain links mental and physical suffering inextricably, and, second, it names pain, opposed to all other causes, as transformative of individuals, compelling them to withdraw into selfish, narcissistic, and anti-social behavior. Any attempt to sketch a political theory, especially of minority identity, based on this misleading psychology will produce the same predictable and deplorable results.

#### Put away your psychoanalysis indicts – we integrate intersection with feminist, queer, colonialist, and anti-white supremacist theorization that accounts for lacks in original psychoanalytic theories which accounts for and revises Freudian and Lacanian theorization.

Mollow 3 (The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015) BL

The theoretical trajectory that I will trace, which begins with Dora‟s account of hysteria as a disorder afflicting a minority of disabled subjects, and ends with Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟s universalizing account of the death drive, is not explicitly articulated by Freud. Throughout his career, Freud held fast to his construction of hysteria; therefore, the death drive cannot be seen as supplanting hysteria in Freudian thought. But my reading of hysteria as both a precursor to the theory of the drive and a way for Freud to avoid naming and confronting the drive demonstrates that a rearticulation of Freud‟s concept of hysteria can be a starting point for a more universalizing approach, grounded in the concept of the disability drive. Departing from Freud‟s tendency to pathologize individual disabled people, such a model may yield more nearly universal insights about psychic life. Questions about universalism are among the most compelling and difficult aspects of psychoanalysis, a discipline that posits a set of psychic structures that are said to govern the lives of all subjects. Does psychoanalysis‟ universalizing model mistake the psychological determinants of middle-class members of western capitalist societies for universal norms? This question can in part be answered by way of a distinction: although Freud specifies that the structure of the psyche that he delineates is universal, his model leaves room for the theorization of a great diversity of particular content that might fill that structure. Factors such as gender, queerness, race, class, colonialism, disability, and historical context can radically alter the ways in which constructs such as “the ego,” “the drive,” and “sexuality” come to be figured. The potential fluidity of Freud‟s paradigm has been the basis of important interventions by social theorists who, working within and beyond the discipline of psychoanalysis, have rethought Freud‟s arguments from the vantage points of feminist, antiracist, postcolonial, and queer criticism.22 My project builds upon this work by bringing a critical disability studies perspective to bear upon Freud‟s concept of the death drive. In the chapters that follow, I will examine the 9 ways in which cultural projections of the disability drive shape intersections of multiple modalities of oppression, including ableism, misogyny, homophobia, fatphobia, white supremacy, classism, and colonialism. I also wish to emphasize that although my argument about the disability drive unfolds within a psychoanalytic framework, in which the structuring components of the psyche are said to be universal, I am not suggesting that a psychoanalytic epistemology should be seen as trumping other ways of knowing human minds, bodies, and bodyminds. Nonwestern models of mind and body, for example, may differ significantly from the frame within which I situate my analysis. For this reason, I will neither assume nor attempt to establish that the psychoanalytic ways of thinking that I employ in this dissertation will be useful or meaningful to every subject and culture. However, I will also not assume in advance that my elucidation of the disability drive does not apply to specific groups or individuals, as I am wary of the danger of effecting harmful and unnecessary exclusions by prematurely designating an argument as inapplicable to particular subjects or experiences**. It is for this reason that throughout this thesis I use the term “our culture” to reference the social world(s) in which I understand cultural manifestations of, and defenses against, the disability drive to take shape. I intend for the phrase “our culture” to signify expansively, issuing a deliberately open-ended and indeterminate invitation to any person to whom the language and concepts in this dissertation may be accessible and illuminating. The words “our culture” cannot, of course, reference every person in the world; but because the ableist social and psychic structures that I delineate in this project seem to me to potentially exceed the bounds of demarcations such as “US American culture,” “the West,” or “modern industrial societies,” I employ this “our” to leave open questions about the extent to which my analyses may or may not apply to particular geographies and cultural locations.** The problematic of universalism versus exclusions in this project can be illustrated by raising a set of questions regarding my arguments‟ relation to asexual people‟s experiences and identities. If this dissertation‟s opening assertion of disability‟s sexiness were taken to mean that sexiness is a quality that disabled people should aspire to embody—and conversely, that an absence of sexual desire is grounds for social discrediting—then this assertion would contribute to our culture‟s stigmatization of asexual people. Such a reading, however, would run directly counter to my project‟s central aim: the sexual model of disability is intended to complicate efforts to highlight sexualities as causes for pride or empowerment. In conceiving of sexuality as inextricable from failure, loss, and suffering, I hope to make visible sexuality‟s incompatibility with proud identity claims. Yet even this approach presents risks. As I will discuss in the next section of this chapter, some queer theorists‟ citations of sexuality‟s identity-disturbing effects have been articulated in ways that seem to imply that the more sex one has, or the more that one engages in particular sexual practices, the more effectively one can challenge heteronormative cultural imperatives. “The Disability Drive” will not forward such an argument. I emphasize the sexiness of disability to counter our culture‟s widespread desexualization of disabled people; this emphasis, however, is not meant to suggest that disabled people have, or should have, “more” or “better” sex than nondisabled people (whatever those comparatives might mean), or that we should aim to secure social legitimacy by establishing our “attractiveness” to sexual partners. The sexiness of disability that I highlight refers less to attributes of individual subjects than to aspects of disability as it is envisioned and sometimes experienced. Additionally, although Freud assumed that sexuality was universal, I will not make this assumption, since such a claim would contradict many asexual people‟s lived experiences. This 10 does not mean, though, that the sexual model of disability must be irrelevant to asexual people. The Asexual Visibility and Education Network (AVEN) defines an asexual person as someone “who does not experience sexual attraction”; however, AVEN‟s website notes that many (but not all) asexual people experience sexual arousal, have sexual fantasies, or masturbate.23 Even nonlibidoists, those asexuals who “have no sexual feelings at all,” may nonetheless have experiences that fall within the extremely broad rubric of what Freud designates as sexuality. According to Freud, intellectual work, strong emotion, illness, athletic activity, eating, swinging, warm baths, and train travel can all potentially be regarded as sexual.24 On the other hand, just because such activities and feelings can be described as sexual does not mean that they have to be, and to force the application of the label “sexual” would effect a discursive violence upon subjects who have determined that this term does not apply to their lives. Thus, although I postulate the sexual model as one means of theorizing the disability drive, I do not suggest that it is the only such method.

#### Philosophical analyses centering an ideal theory of normativity lack accountability, forget the value to know the unknown, and contain generalizations that exclude material suffering – prefer the affirmative as an ethic of care which brings humility and provides the necessary empirical realities that stipulate the definitions of your idealized world.

Kittay 09 Eva Feder Kittay is an American philosopher. She is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy (Emerita) at Stony Brook University [Kittay, Eva Feder. “The Ethics of Philosophizing: Ideal Theory and the Exclusion of People with Severe Cognitive Disabilities.” Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal, 2009, pp. 141–143.] BRACKETED FOR ABLEISM //Found by ACCS JM & Cut by Lex AKo + Lex VM

Consider the first maxim, epistemic responsibility. Philosophy, by many accounts, is concerned with ‘truth’. The truth cannot be served if philosophers do not acquaint themselves with the basic facts about the subject under consider. As I have indicated, both Singer and McMahan fail to do so in their discussions of individuals with mental retardation. One might ask, ‘Why is such a clear violation of a philosophical value tolerated?’ Here a pernicious effect of idealization displays itself. Empirical realities give way to idealized descriptions and ‘stipulative definitions,’ in order to construct a theory which then can be ‘applied’ to the real world. But these idealizations and stipulative definitions may well construct a theory that is not applicable, or not applicable to that part of the real world that it purports to cover. Consider, in contrast, the way in which a naturalized care ethics is theorized. The practice of caring requires attention to the actual condition of the individuals who need care. Broad generalizations and presumptions—such as ‘the severely mentally ~~retarded~~ [disabled] cannot have aesthetic experiences’—cannot be the basis of good care for the severely mentally ~~retarded~~ [disabled], since the principal source of joy for many people with cognitive impairments derives from aesthetic experiences. A carer intent on giving good care must reject stereotypes and be attentive to what and how the 142 E.F. Kittay person in front of her responds. (Certainly this no less true of health care situations, although practical pressures result in a considerable relaxation of this demand of care.) A care ethic thus expresses the central values of attentiveness and responsiveness to actual conditions, and with that the responsibility to make oneself knowledgeable about the facts on the ground. That is to say, it values epistemic responsibility of the sort that I discuss above. Not only do we need to be responsible and insure that our philosophizing does not ignore salient empirical realities that are known, we have to be humble in the face of that which is as yet unknown (the third maxim). It seems hardly necessary to remind philosophers of what Socrates taught, that the greatest wisdom is to know what one does not know. Yet idealized theorizing, with its tendency to prefer clear lines of definition and opposition, makes it easy to forget to keep a focus on knowing what we do not know. Humility in the face of ignorance also reflects a value, one might say a necessary virtue, in the practice of caring. When we presume to know what we don’t know we are likely to fail in truly meeting the needs of the one for whom we care. In the practice of medical care, such hubris can easily cost lives. With respect to the third maxim, we can point out a dominant philosophical position is that of liberalism. Central to liberalism is the recognition of a plurality of goods. This elevates the avoidance of an arrogance of imposing one’s own values as the true and sole values to a central precept of contemporary philosophy. Reasonable value pluralism (as distinguished from value relativism, where anything goes) is, if you will, the received view. But philosophers frequently neglect this very maxim by presuming the overriding value of reason. An antidote for such presumption is found in the very practice of care. Many who need care are not in a position to exercise their rational functioning (to whatever degree they possess it). Yet for the carer who does good care the value of, and respect owed, the person is never in doubt. The very act of care (when it is good care and not a merely perfunctory carrying out of assigned duties) attests to the value we place on the person’s life and well-being whether or not they are capable of rational deliberation. Caring for one who is seriously dependent on our ministrations can, however, tempt one to presume to know what is good for another and what is of value. It can tempt us to think that we can (or even should) impose our own view on the other. However, such caring, I maintain, is not respectful caring, caring that respects another’s agency. Thus, I believe, best practices of care equally demand that we do not presume that what we value is the only thing that is valuable.21 Finally, there is the issue of accountability, the final maxim. Most practices require some accountability. The need for accountability is inherent in any practice, for without it, one cannot guarantee a consistency of standards. This is evident in practices of care. Parents are held accountable for their children’s actions when harmful actions were foreseeable and preventable. In medical practice, physicians similarly must be held accountable for foreseeable consequences. Any ethic of care must include the importance of being accountable for what we do. Yet, philosophical practice has been strangely inattentive to the importance of accountability. In this philosophers appear to take their cue from theoretical science, 8 The Ethics of Philosophizing 143 in which practitioners claim that they are only after the truth, and if others use their discoveries in a harmful fashion, that is not the pure scientist’s concern.

#### Colonialism occurs through the categorization of natives as “disabled” – decol fails absent the permutation.

Imada 17 Imada, Adria L. “A Decolonial Disability Studies?” Disability Studies Quarterly, 2017. <https://dsq-sds.org/article/view/5984/4694>. //ACCS JM

I seek to weave two threads of analysis — disability and colonialism — that are not often in conversation in Disability Studies. How might we productively think through disability and colonialism to illuminate how non-normative bodyminds were (and continue to be) imagined, produced, and disciplined? In the broadest sense, colonialism demanded able bodyminds from subordinated subjects. Colonial projects imposed impossible regimes and expectations of self-regulation its subjects would not be able to perform. Thus, the colonized were always already figured and constituted as disabled, whether because of their perceived unproductivity as laborers; embodied racial-sexual differences; "unchaste" proclivities of their women; susceptibility to moral contagion and infectious diseases; or inability to learn. In the undulating colonial hall of mirrors, the inversion of these qualities — too much learnedness and the adoption of European manners, for example — could mean colonized people had failed to maintain the vigor of their "race." Thus, we begin to see how disability operated as a flexible and capacious concept and a very useful weapon during the incarceration, elimination, and removal of unfit colonial Others.1 Lest we think of disability as a relatively recent scholarly paradigm, let me linger on the pointed use of disability in one nineteenth-century settler-colonial context. Reverend Sereno Bishop, prominent American missionary descendant in Hawai'i, characterized Hawaiians as a disabled people in an 1888 address five years before the American-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian kingdom. Asking “Why are the Hawaiians dying out?” Bishop proceeded to itemize the “elements of disability” of Hawaiian people. These elements included unchastity, drunkenness, oppression by chiefs, infectious and epidemic diseases, and idolatry.2 Bishop thus deployed disability explicitly to mark a Hawaiian failure to thrive. If colonists tied ablebodiedness to compulsory productivity and racialized heteronormativity, then how might decolonization projects differ in their relationship to disability? While Bishop's 1888 speech floridly illustrated disability as civilizational failure, Kimo Armitage's stunning 2016 novel The Healers imagines embodied difference as integral to wellness in contemporary Hawai'i.3 The novel's skilled practitioner of Hawaiian medicine, Laka, may seem to fit Bishop's ominous nightmare of a "disabled" Hawaiian: a man born without arms and legs to a woman who had contracted leprosy. However, far from representing the inevitable destruction of Native lifeways, Laka offers life-giving possibilities. Laka was not shunned, but raised as the most treasured child of his extended family. As a healer, he senses deep wounds wrought by colonial violence and trains the next generation of healers. May we follow Laka's example in pursuit of a decolonial disability studies that embraces a spectrum of abilities, embodiments, and decolonizing practices?

# Accessibility

### The Disabled Narrative

#### It’s time for the system to hear our outcries – abled subjectivity is tied up in a two-tiered affective response that explains disabled life – primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status, which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 15

pity involves a reaction to the “tragedy of disability.” Primary pity is unbearable to contemplate another person’s suffering is to question, “Could this happen to me?” Secondary pity attempts to heal the ego at someone else’s expense and calls for a cure. we feel primary pity and then deny that we have felt it.

#### Debate is a sphere of “fiat” and “futurism” which reifies rehabilitative futurism where the signifier of the fantasmatic child is placed forward to eradicate and cure disability. When the question of disability arises, communicative projects such as debate are centered around solely optimism and trying to create the ‘better future’ – this obsession with optimism pathologizes the disabled Child that cannot be in the better future – this 1AC serves as an ‘perspective shift’ that differs from the current form of how disability is presented – absent questioning the form of argumentation the content of argumentation becomes unethically flawed – thus, the role of the ballot is to disrupt biopolitical systems of productivity and futurity.

Mollow 2

the image of the Child” is inextricable from disability the Child is a display of pity that demeans disabled people. the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism because not fighting for is unthinkable. The logic relies on “rehabilitative futurism,” Futurity is imagined that the eradication of disability would bring a better future.

#### Our affirmative is a refusal to invest into ableism notions such as “fiat” which have been normalized as a tool to inflict violence upon disabled learners – the notion of scenario planning through the invocation of fiat is a voting issue – engagement with simulation forces disability to contemplate the nature of ability and disability which fosters internalized ableism and necessitates crip death.

Campbell 08

Internalized oppression is the result of mistreatment. We harbour pain and fears turning them into weapons Internalised ableism means that to assimilate into the norm disabled people feel compelled to fabricate ‘who’ they are to separate existence from disability is untenable bodily detachment is filled with internalised ableism The subject simulates what it is to be ‘abled’ whilst morphing ableist imperatives disabled people become complicit in their own demise

#### Debate is a communicative sphere which is systematically structured to exclude disability – communicative spaces privilege those who can conform to marketable forms of affect by rewarding normality and conformity and excluding those who are deemed incompetent through perceiving disabled affect as parasitic due to literally slowing down information. The drive to perform means disability is always constituted by affective labor and regulated to the bottom of the communicative register causing violence and exclusion.

St. Pierre 17

“Fluency” straightens semiotics to eliminate productive, systems Fluency attempts to cover over embodied difference and is enacted within the material The semiotic have become the domain of Language Pathology. fluency is marked by the flow of speech” a performance of bending bodies toward futures. [Those with Autism] restrict stimming Dyslexic bodies are erased from transcripts.

#### Vote affirmative as an endorsement of dysfluency and the failure of disability to be productive – this 1AC is a performative affective intervention by diverting from what is expected in a space that is meant to purposefully exclude disability in the name of productivity – this 1AC serves as a reminder of the failed ASL movement that the PRL instantly stopped in the name of productivity and efficiency. Only a refusal of this world addresses ableism as the basis of communication—we defend the 1AC’s affective pessimism as an example of a die-in within topic discussions, a refusal to breathe life into the resolution. Pessimistic die-ins break from institutional participation as a starting point for politics in favor of disrupting the circulation of discourses predicated upon optimism and disabled death. This hijacks communicative spheres by purposefully forefronting discussions of disabled killability.

Selck 16

disability is riddled with pain and attempts to make a space free from optimism to antagonize the erasure of dis/ability by analyzing the crip-pessimist neoliberalism is effective at rebranding oppression as progress politics of progress strip agency from bodies with disabilities There is no approach that will address disabled experiences, as crip-pessimism will remind us. after failing to rehabilitate able-bodied standards come to a comfort with pessimism.

#### Disability controls proximate cause to and explains all other violence – treating those as inferior is only justifiable through the guise of disability.

Siebers et al. 17

disability denigrate minority politics people of color and women are illegitimate their identities are disabled successful ploy supposed physical psychological flaws irrationality emotions and weakness racial inequality susceptibility to feeble-mindedness disability remains today an acceptable reason for unequal treatment other justifications have begun to fall away no longer to treat as inferior unless tied to disability there will always be one last justification for inferior treatment tied to physical and mental difference

#### Put away your psychoanalysis indicts – we integrate intersection with feminist, queer, colonialist, and anti-white supremacist theorization that accounts for lacks in original psychoanalytic theories which accounts for and revises Freudian and Lacanian theorization.

Mollow 3

although Freud specifies structure his model leaves room for the theorization of great diversity of content that fill that structure Factors such as gender, queerness, race, class, colonialism, disability can radically alter the ways in which constructs such as “the ego,” “the drive,” and “sexuality” come to be figured. The fluidity of Freud‟s paradigm has been the basis of important interventions by social theorists who I examine the ways in which cultural projections of the disability drive shape intersections of oppression including misogyny homophobia white supremacy , and colonialism I will neither assume nor attempt to establish that the psychoanalytic ways of thinking will be useful to every subject and culture . The words our culture” cannot , reference every person but the ableist social and psychic structures exceed the bounds of demarcations such as “US American culture,” “the West,” or “modern industrial societies

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Kittay 09

Philosophy is concerned with ‘truth’. The truth cannot be served if philosophers do not acquaint with the subject realities give stipulative definitions, these construct a theory applicable to that real world generalizations such as ‘the mentally retarded [disabled] cannot have experiences’ since joy for people with impairments derives from experiences. A care ethic expresses values to conditions idealized theorizing, forget what we do not know This elevates arrogance of imposing one’s values as true care attests value on the life of deliberation. accountability is inherent without it, one cannot guarantee a consistency Yet philosophers take cue that are after the truth

#### Colonialism occurs through the categorization of natives as “disabled” – decol fails absent the permutation.

Imada 17

colonialism demanded able bodyminds from subordinated subjects. the colonized were always constituted as disabled because of their perceived unproductivity disability operated as a weapon during the removal of colonial Others.