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#### At the level of ontology, cartesian metaphysics paradigmatically informs the discussion of whether the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. Endemic to the Cartesian interpretation of the world is a divide between mind and matter, subject and object, as well as nature and culture. Outer space is understood as an object that rational and autonomous subjects exert mastery over the external natural order through the acquisition of material resources. A cultural cognitive and affective shift in our relationality to the earth is necessary to envision relationality to the earth and enable new bio social becomings.

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This being said, wide consensus exists among historians that the radical elevation of the human species over the nonhuman world by means of reflexive reason and scientific self-improvement is an idea of European origin (Leiss 1994). Moreover, there seems to be fair agreement that the idea of human mastery over nature has been progressively shaped by three influential cultural currents, the first of which is arguably the intellectual and artistic tradition of ancient Greece. In his broad historical account entitled The Beginnings of Western Science, David C. Lindberg (2007) illustrates that the emergence of pre-Socratic natural philosophy during the sixth century BC was marked by a distinct turn from a mythical worldview toward independent inquiry and generalised scepticism. **Nature came to be understood as an autonomous object which had to be comprehended through logical reasoning.** However, the gradual change that took place in Greece from the beginning of the sixth century BC was not simply a miraculous turn from mythos to logos that signalled the end of Greek mythology. Mythical thought can be found in every period of ancient Greece for which evidence exists ― to the end of antiquity and into the Middle Ages (Lloyd 1979). These influential mythical tropes certainly played their part in naturalising the ideology of human mastery within western cultural imaginaries. **Aristotelian, Platonic, and Stoic philosophy as well as the works of the Greek playwright Sophocles explicitly emphasised the divinity of the world, while simultaneously asserting ‘the godlike rationality and hence superiority of human beings, and the rightfulness of ruling over land, vegetable and animal life’** (Wybrow 1991: 129). **Western ideas of human mastery, in other words, never developed in a historical and scientific vacuum that was entirely free from mythical thought,** particularly if we turn our attention toward the second mythical tradition that played a decisive role in legitimising the human dominion over nature, the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Decreed by divine providence, ‘Man’ was given dominium terrae, the cultural mandate to rule over God’s creation. Occasionally this mandate was interpreted in the sense of a paternalistic stewardship, while in other cases it was taken quite literally as a divine decree to subdue the earth and all living things.5 As a dominant cultural force and frame of reference for the interpretation of what I would call ‘second degree’ mythical thought (mythical thought that openly disavowed any intention to make a claim of absolute truth), **Christianity exerted a continuous influence throughout the entire early modern period — a period that witnessed the scientific revolution, the colonisation of the Americas, and the emergence of capitalism and the modern nation-state.** Reinforced by technological and scientific progress taking place at a hitherto unprecedented pace, **mythical themes of mastery ― that ‘man’ and spirit stand apart from nature and that human beings rightfully exercise authority over nature ― slowly blended with the modern scientific and capitalist worldview**. In the seventeenth century, iconic thinkers such as Francis Bacon and René Descartes set out to conquer nature by means of philosophy, science, and technology, driven by the desire to reconcile and transmute mythical, alchemical, and Christian influences under the aegis of a naturalistic and rationalistic worldview (Leiss 1994). **Particularly the Cartesian dualism between the extended physical world and the nonphysical world of thought was seen as the definitive completion of the pre-Socratic turn from mythos to logos, when myth finally became synonymous with the subjective and the irrational** (Scarborough 1994). From this point onward, myths could neither serve as cosmological narratives of the universe, nor as valid allegories of nature, for they were now fully associated with the inner realm of subjective experience and not with the outer realm of the objective physical world. In the same vein, myths had to be sharply distinguished from history as well, since history could from then on only refer to objective events. This Cartesian schism was further exacerbated by the spread of Enlightenment thought during the eighteenth century, which celebrated the power of reason and embraced a triumphalist scientism. Even though the Enlightenment was not a unified cultural expression with a single doctrine, it nevertheless gave rise to new forms of secular modernism which gradually reduced the influence of mythical and religious thinking as a dominant cultural frame of reference. **Simultaneously, the Enlightenment created its own utopian paradigm of the rational and autonomous individual who imposed upon nature as well as on herself or himself the orderly totality of a universal reason**. Nevertheless, the persistence of various mythical or spiritual imaginaries in our contemporary societies certainly illustrates that such a lasting demystification of life turned out to be a rather short-lived illusion. **If we consider contemporary discussions about the Anthropocene, we can easily see that the sediments of powerful mythical narratives advancing the idea of human mastery and distinguishing mind from matter, subject from object, and nature from culture can still be found in today’s political debates**. A number of scientists recently suggested that the Anthropocene should be seen as an opportunity and, ultimately, as a ‘good’ epoch in which human ingenuity and technology will provide the means to solve the critical environmental problems of our time (see, for example, Ellis 2011). These Promethean myths of ecomodernism, synthetic biology, and geoengineering are not only fallacies of control in the light of unprecedented changes which are currently occurring in the earth’s ecosystems. **They are also about to be woven into a new geopolitical master narrative that is on the verge of replacing the abstract totality of a single humanity with the abstract plurality of more-than-human entanglements**. Put differently, it is important to realise that more-than-human or posthuman accounts of the Anthropocene provide the discursive background for the mytho-politics of the newly proclaimed human epoch. From the contested metaphor of Gaia, popularised by James Lovelock as a synonym for earth system science (and recently reworked by the French philosopher and anthropologist Bruno Latour), to animistic and pantheistic currents in western environmental philosophy and non-western thought, there currently exists an intriguing interest in imagining other possible ways of relating to the world at large.6 **Decolonial scholars nevertheless argue that such attempts at conceptualising the relations between humans and more-than-human nature(s) must pay attention to the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being, while becoming more sensitive to the vital role that myth and mythology play in articulating alternatives to hegemonic western knowledge practices.** The idea of border thinking, in particular, alerts us to the limiting modes of relationality and representation that are inherent to the anthropocentric worldview, a worldview which perceives more-than-human nature primarily as an object (socially produced, biophysically constituted, or both). The gradual delinking from such a limiting perspective, and the simultaneous consideration of cosmologies which see nature as an active and ‘ensouled’ subject in its own right, so it seems, must therefore appear as one of the most radical projects imaginable vis-à-vis the epistemic hierarchy of westerncentric technoscience. Quite possibly, many scholars would fervently revolt against such a proposed bridging of established science/myth, rational/ primitive or fact/value divides ― particularly if such an attempt is performed without a certain ironic or subjective gesture ― for it conjures up vivid images of seemingly regressive elements that have been expelled from today’s dominant scholarly discourses: essence, spirit, esotericism, non-modernism, non-rationalism, romanticism, totalitarianism, and so on. And yet **it is evident that the predicaments of the Anthropocene, whether they are taken to be economic, spiritual, or sociopolitical in nature, will require a cultural-cognitive and affective shift in how (many) humans relate to the world they inhabit**. **While imagining the possibilities for new biosocial becomings, it is crucial to realise that contemporary societies are still influenced by older mythological substrata that carry with them the sediments of the ‘grand narratives’ of human mastery.** Such deep-seated sociocultural patterns must be taken very seriously in their capacity to shape the future outcomes of Anthropocene politics. After all, the ideology of human mastery might well survive without the much-critiqued nature/culture binary and become enshrouded in new Anthropocene myths. Advanced algorithmic or biopolitical control mechanisms and the capitalist-materialistic ethos of desire, production, and consumption are certainly well attuned to the Anthropocene rhetoric of biosocial complexity, indeterminacy, interconnectedness, and plurality (Pellizzoni 2015). By contrast, decolonial scholarship reminds us of the liberating potential and integrative function of myth and myth-making. The concept of mytho-politics, which I have outlined here, thus draws attention to the complex openness and suggestiveness of myth in the sense of an ideological ‘both/and.’ This means that, even if the role of mytho-politics in transforming imaginaries of biosocial relations is fully recognised, it is difficult to predict how the Anthropocene debate might develop in the near future. Will the discussion become more open to different views of knowing and being? Will it include marginalised perspectives which reject the objectification of nature and point toward the need for a decolonial politics of ‘delinking’ and ‘re-learning’? Or will the debate remain entrenched in western-centric and anthropocentric ideas of planetary stewardship, managerial control, and (bio-)technological fixes? Whatever the case may be, **it is clear that the discussion about the Anthropocene has already moved beyond questions of mere geological evidence. It has become a lively debate about the principles of thought, speech, and action which provide the seemingly ‘natural’ foundations for the idea of unlimited human mastery over the earth.**

#### Dualist understanding of outer spacer presuppose a spirit/matter distinction that grants humanity a privileged position as the authority figure that can harness and harness outer space as a system of resources. Such a presupposition of spirit and material denies the entanglement of the natural world.

**Mitchell 11**(JAMES MITCHELL MADDOX B.A., The University of Virginia, 2004 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS ATHENS, GEORGIA 2011, <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/maddox_james_m_201108_ma.pdf>, RLA)

Galileo‘s optical affirmation of a mathematical discovery is a fitting, if symbolic, beginning of the Scientific Revolution, which gave us a new vocabulary for describing our world. It may be obvious why the church had an interest in maintaining the divine order of cosmos. It gave them a privileged position, a connection to the ―heavens,‖ which, as Donne wrote, were high above us in the perfect order of the firmament—God‘s realm. As we see in his verse, that cosmic order was an integral part of the poet‘s existence—a way to describe the world physically and figuratively. We use the word ―metaphysical‖ to describe Donne‘s poetry because of his skill at drawing long comparisons, or conceits, between our lives and the world around us. It was a way of understanding who we are in the cosmos, not so distant from the cosmos in which the ancients placed themselves. Though the cosmos at this point was essentially Catholic real estate, our position within it gave us meaning, just as our position in our current model of the universe gives us meaning today. The poetry of Donne‘s day, as Francis Bacon believed, ―[expresses] the spiritual condition of humanity, for presenting a ‗more perfect order‘ than one could find in nature ‗since the fall.‘‖ (Craige 17). Today no academic would aver such a claim, though that physical-metaphysical duality persists. **The belief that there is a soul that is somehow separate from the world, a ―spirit/matter dualism that itself can be traced back to Plato,‖ is intimately tied to our representations of the cosmos and where we fit into the cosmic order** (Craig 15). **Christian cosmology, especially in the hands of authority figures, has reinforced that duality and continues to reinforce it**.9 **In this story, that duality is the conflict between the discourses and how we handle outer space and we fit in it.** Today we now know that every atom in our bodies was manufactured in a star at some point during the history of the universe. We learn in school about the ―origin of species,‖ the origins of stars, and the role of DNA in shaping our physical and psychological characteristics. Only a fanatic would argue that Earth is the center of the universe. But we still find that occasionally the scientific narrative falls short. Many of us feel we must be more than ―star stuff,‖ as Carl Sagan once said (Cosmos, episode 9). And indeed, alongside all the great astronomical discoveries, from Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, to William Herschel, to Einstein and Hubble, poets have attempted to satisfy our desire to fill in the gaps that science has left us in our cosmological model. **The vestige of dualist metaphysics still exists in our popular understanding, even if it was parceled out from the church‘s holdings long ago, and even if the academic and artistic discourse communities have completely disassembled it.** Ideas don‘t change overnight. The pervasiveness of that duality in our thinking is the backbone of this comparison between scientific and poetic ontologies, which have evolved together as two stars in a binary system. One of Galileo‘s attackers, Jesuit mathematics professor Orazio Grassi, wrote, ―Even with his telescope, the lynx-eyed astrologer [Galileo] cannot look into the inner thoughts of the mind‖ (Reston 181). His use of the word ―astrologer‖ is a slight that implies that astronomy, a science, is the domain of the church and that Galileo‘s business is not serious work. We know who we side with today. Even the Church would disagree with Grassi today. But did Grassi have a point? The lexical and ontological distance between astronomical discourse and the language of poetry seems at first to support his snub against Galileo, at least objectively, but Catholicdoctrine is not the answer. Nor is poetry. These are ontological salves which work similarly in that they construct a discourse community and a sense of meaning. Science provides, for me at any rate, a more agreeable, secular vocabulary for describing the world, but we cannot explain all our experiences with science. Science even has a word for the experiences that are neurologically elusive: qualia. But even when science creates new vocabulary to signify ever more obscure phenomena, its ontology, as constructed by its discourse, is infinite (like that of any given academic discipline). Science uses the word ―qualia‖ to describe phenomena that are not otherwise quantifiable or otherwise communicable as phenomena in the conscious experience of humans, just as medicine uses the term ―idiopathic‖ to describe medical phenomena that have not yet been worked out by researchers, and just as astronomy uses the term ―dark matter‖ to describe material in the universe whose presence is known but whose physical makeup is unknown. We find all the time that we got something wrong and have to revise. One might think that art, like poetry, is an attempt to fill in those gaps, but it turns out that art too cannot be seen as value-free. So Grassi was right in one thing: **no single discourse can satisfy all our questions about who and what we are. This paper is even a testament to the fact that we‘re still working it out. But the goal for me, like the holistic thinkers whose work has inspired my research, is to work out a narrative that reduces the power relationships between global citizens, and not simply within discourse communities whose discourses might be used to take advantage of those who are not in the know.**

#### Cartesian metaphysics perpetually reduces land to an unlimited resource that is retrofitted into a commodity for sustainable labor. Perpetual reduction of relationality to land to that of an external commodity entangled within a network of capitalist relations necessitates the anthropocentric deadening of being. Indigenous economies that centralize relationality to land become degraded components of primitive and arcane life that are not measurable within settler registers of materialism.

**Henderson 14** (Worlds on the Edge: The Politics of Settler Resentment on the Saugeen/Bruce Peninsula by Phil Henderson B.A., The University of Western Ontario, 2014 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Political Science <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/7414/Henderson_Phil_MA_2016.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> Page 69 – 72, RLA)

As Emma Lowman and Adam Barker assert, attempting to disentangle and isolate capitalist, racial, gender, or colonial oppressions from one another is misguided. Each of these 3 processes operate simultaneously, overlapping and reinforcing one another in a variety of nonschematic ways. Still, settler states such as Canada remain committed to ongoing colonization, and this is the background condition establishing and enabling - or, rather, disabling - what settlers perceive as the immutable ground or bedrock upon which all possible political projects must be built. Glen Coulthard observes that settler colonies mobilize “discursive and nondiscursive facets of economic, gendered, racial, and state power” to secure the continuance of hierarchical social orders predicated from their genesis on dispossessing indigenous peoples. 4 As such, **a decolonial account of dispossession begins by rejecting settlers’ claims to territorial sovereignty as a matter of course**. Moreover, this rejection must continue to contour how political and economic issues are understood within the context of settler colonialism. Narrating the dispossessive drive’s development begins with this rejection, and with a subsequent coming to terms, as Michael Asch says, with the fact that wherever **indigenous peoples and persons are in Turtle Island today**, whether on rural reserves or in urban centres, they live on land that remains under their sovereignty and jurisdiction; and that **we [settlers] ourselves live on ‘unceded land’…** rather than arguing over the point, we need to begin by determining the implications for us and accepting the reality of our status on Indigenous lands.5 Analyses of dispossession that attend to this fact by recognizing the ongoing decolonial struggle to disrupt the settler colony’s presumption of sovereignty and its highly destructive economy begin to accommodate the radical alterity of multiple subject positions. A decolonial critique underscores that the neoliberal regime, which many scholars portray as something radically new, 70 is only an extension of the dispossessive drives which were initiated by and continue to sustain the processes of settler colonization, and now also begin to operate against newly disposable populations of settlers. Neoliberalization does not emerge ex nihilo; rather, it maintains colonization, expanding and entrenching processes of dispossession while striving to open North America to deeper exploitation by the settler economy. For the purposes of this project it is sufficient to trace the initiation of this animating dispossessive drive only as far back as its origins in North America. Though a longer history exists, and is a project worthy of serious consideration, it is nevertheless both too broad and too deep to be contained in this work. 6 With notable and important exceptions, the earliest settlers primarily aimed to establish trade and military alliances between Europe and the various indigenous peoples of northeastern Turtle Island. As Europe’s economy transformed, however, the importance of these partnerships 7 declined precipitously in the reckoning of settlers. The rise of a regime of accumulation predicated on industrial capitalism saw European populations and markets undergo a massive expansion**. To the instrumentalized mentality of early industrial capitalists, the territories of indigenous peoples represented at once a nearly unlimited resource to be commodified and a site to which the “Malthusian excesses” of Europe could be conveniently relocated and used as labour in the extractive economy.** The presence of sovereign indigenous peoples, who may have 8 traded with Europeans but would object to the total exploitation and destruction of their territories by industry, became an impediment to the unbridled expansion of capitalist markets. Exemplified in the repeatedly violated treaties between the Saugeen Anishinaabek and the Crown, as discussed in chapter one, the settler state continually ignored both the letter and spirit 71 of these treaties, using subterfuge and coercion to advance an economy that necessitates the dispossession of their treaty-partners. It is tempting to assert that this is merely an example of cynical self-interest trumping treaties - and, to some degree, it no doubt is. I do not, however, think this explanation can fully account for the voraciousness and reflexivity with which settlers continue dispossessing indigenous peoples. **Settler colonialism relies, as all political regimes do, on the development of a political subject through discourses and social practices that naturalize the distribution of power.** Developed just prior to the initiation of settler colonization, John Locke’s “powerfully and influentially elaborated” labour theory of property provided settlers with a cogent narrative to support their sense of proprietorship. Asserting that all the world was a commons awaiting a 9 claim to private ownership via its transformation through human labour, Locke’s theory presented North America as radically open to the imposition of European possession. 10 In actual fact, and this should be so clear as to hardly require comment, the indigenous peoples of Turtle Island had been extensively labouring in their territories since time immemorial. The economies of indigenous peoples were, however, radically different from those of Europeans. Many of these economies were “based on the land and the free, unrestricted access of everyone to its resources.” Because many indigenous peoples did not engage in the 11 same sort of hierarchically structured and highly destructive economies as Europeans, settlers discounted indigenous labour as too ‘rudimentary’ to warrant acknowledgement. This enabled settlers to assert that North America was unassisted by human improvement and, therefore, that indigenous peoples’ territorial sovereignty need not be recognized. These abstractive discourses encouraged settlers to transplant into North America the material “preconditions underwriting 72 the capital relation” in Europe. Through the regimes of private property, which were codified 12 into laws and enforced by both the violence of the settler state and by vigilante mobs of settlers, indigenous peoples’ access to their territories was gradually eroded by settler enclosures. Enclosure of North America into a patchwork of private properties initiates what Karl Marx refers to as primitive [ursprünglich: original, initial] accumulation. Repeated wherever 13 capitalist relations instantiate themselves, this process represents the severance of a people from their direct access to the land, and the mediating of that access through hierarchical proprietary regimes. As such, in North America, the development of capitalist relations and the foundations of private property - of settlers’ sense possessing land - enacts the dispossession of indigenous peoples of their territories and the degradation of their original economies through processes of settler colonization. This is to say that while the development of capitalism may not necessitate colonialism - the case of England problematizes such a linear causality - in North America the emergence and maintenance of capitalism relies on ongoing processes of settler colonization. That said, **the initiation of the dispossessive drive in North America through the processes of settler colonization cannot be reduced solely, or even primarily, to a materialist account.** As Lowman and Barker note, **beginning the story of dispossession from a materialist standpoint presents the risk that our narrative will act as a conduit for smuggling settler “biases into Indigenous ways of being.”** Instead - as treaty-partners - we must struggle to do the 14 difficult work of learning from indigenous peoples’ ontologies, especially as indigenous peoples have long been required to learn our systems of knowledge in an effort to merely survive settler coloniality’s capriciousness. **of the indigenous peoples across Turtle Island their ontologies place the initial moment of sociality in a culture of relationality to the land, which offers up knowledge to guide the proper conduct of relationships with human and nonhuman others. This is radically different from the anthropocentric deadening of being that is foisted on all nonhuman subjects within the ontological orientations of settlers - who generally hold that the human is the subject of primary consequence.** Put differently, the settler is produced as a subject within a regime of power that 19 locates the human - and, even then, only some humans historically - as the site of ethical concern or relationality. **Settler regimes of proprietorship** - of possessiveness - imposed by colonization, **attempt the dispossession of more than mere materiality**. **It is also always already working to dispossess indigenous peoples of their ways of being in relation to the world, their grounded understandings of responsibility to all relations.** Aileen Moreton-Robinson asserts that the processes of settler coloniality function to “disavow and dispossess the Indigenous subject of an ontology that exists outside the logic of capital”. 20 **As a matter of course settler colonization attempts to eliminate indigenous peoples’ ontological alterity and subsequently to reground the colonized subject in the colonizers’ ontology.** Duncan Campbell Scott confessed to this very aim when he suggested that the Indian Act (1876) would “solve the Indian problem” by ensuring that “there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic.” All difference was to be flattened 21 into the homogeneity of the settler subject. Used throughout the anglophone settler colonies, Residential Schools are a particularly vicious example of the technologies employed in the effort to dispossess indigenous children of all ontological alterity. Designed to “obliterate young children’s connections to indigenous culture”, Residential Schools simultaneously imposed 75 settler ontologies onto indigenous children. The goal, as Stephanie McMullen notes, was to 22 reproduce indigenous children as “assimilated subjects”, imbued with the values of “selfsupporting Christian farmers”. The dispossessive drive that animates settler colonization in its 23 commodification and exploitation of the land operates at two levels simultaneously: attempting to strip indigenous peoples of both their material and ontological relationship to their territories. In a decolonial critique these processes of dispossession must not, as happens so often, be rendered as merely historic events which recede with the passage of time. Moreton-Robinson notes that overwhelmingly settler accounts of colonialism reduce dispossession to “a mere blemish on the historical record,” an event which no longer brings weight to bear on the present except as an historic grievance. Even Marx is ambivalent about the contemporary relevance of 24 the originary dispossessive movement. In the first volume of Capital he writes that primitive accumulation “is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production… it forms the pre-historic stage of capital”. Marx thus relegates the 25 material and ontological dispossessions that initiate enclosures to a discrete and historically finalized fact. Subsequent Marxist scholars have worked to temper this historicizing tendency somewhat. David Harvey notably asserts that the concept of ‘primitive’ accumulation is misleading as it suggests that the processes of enclosure occurred in the past. He proposes subsuming what Marx identifies as primitive accumulation within the phrase “accumulation by dispossession”, a process that he says is occurring “at a certain level” to this day. Despite 26 recognizing primitive accumulation as operating in the present, Harvey nevertheless subtly recapitulates Marx’s historicism, suggesting that dispossession through primitive accumulation 76 occurs through a series of discrete and foreclosed acts. He writes that primitive accumulation is a “necessary though ugly stage” in the developmental movement of economies. While Harvey 27 recovers primitive accumulation from the archaic past, his insistence on stadial development imparts a certain historicism to the process: suggesting that dispossession occurs as a series of singular events, the conclusion and political neutralization of which are determinable. Such an account ignores the always ongoing struggle involved in sustaining dispossession. As MoretonRobinson notes, it “takes a great deal of work” to maintain the processes dispossessing indigenous peoples in the face of their ongoing resistance. Settler possession of the colony is 28 thus never achieved with finality; rather it is a continuous reiteration of dispossessive acts.

#### The existence of an autonomous cartesian body also prefigures the very conditions for its exploitation and destruction. Conceptualizing laborers within biological/physiological categories enables domination of lacking black bodies as well as ongoing processes abstraction and appropriation worker’s bodies through exploitive modes of production.

**Burden-Stelly 15** (The Modern Capitalist State and the Black Challenge: Culturalism and the Elision of Political Economy By Charisse Burden-Stelly A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in African American Studies in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley **Cartesian Dualism** Page 25 – 27 2015 <https://escholarship.org/content/qt2gs4b7z3/qt2gs4b7z3_noSplash_3a3688cf56caa588e87ac34384a8ab66.pdf>,RLA)

**The reduction of laborers to “biological/physiological categories”15 was a technique of domination that had long been applied to the colonized generally, and the Black African particularly.** **Complete domination was rationalized through the reduction of the Black to the body as the condition for the denial of his capacity for intellect: “The plantation order which made it illegal for a slave to learn to read and become educated, which exhausted the black with relentless work, then produced empirical evidence of the Negro’s ‘lack of intellectual faculties.**’ The Negro then becomes the SYMBOLIC OBJECT OF THIS LACK.”16 It can be assumed that “relentless” work is simply a physiological activity that requires no thinking, innovation, or mastery. Work is completely devoid of thought. “As against capital, labor is merely the abstract form, the mere possibility of value-positing activity, which exists only as a capacity, as a resource in the bodiliness of the worker.”17 For the Black, this “**capacity” and “bodiliness” was directly related to the incapacity for reason and rationality. This reduction of labor to the body, and its complete bifurcation from “intellectual faculties” links the Black experience of abstraction of labor to the Cartesian mind/body split.** This is so because abstraction under conditions of freedom assumes the capacity for choice. Thus, it is located in the mind and leads to distortion and false consciousness. Based on conditions of unfreedom, choice was denied to the Black, hence the reduction of Black labor to the realm of the body. As Ramòn Grosfoguel explains, “Descartes claims that the mind is of a different substance from the body. This allows for the mind to be undetermined, unconditioned by the body…. Without ontological dualism, the mind would be located in a body, would be similar in substance to the body and, thus, conditioned by the body…”18 Lewis Gordon adds, “Descartes argued that the mind was distinct from the body because the latter was sensory, changing, and contingent but the former was linked to cogitation or thinking, which revealed essential or necessary invisible features of realitythat were not sensible but comprehensible. Further, parts of the body could be destroyed while thinking continued intact. In thinking, we are linked to God, who thinks reality in its clarity and distinctness.”19 **The potential for the destruction of the body is essential here. It follows that if labor belongs to the body, and if the body can be destroyed, then labor has an intrinsic relationship to violence and subjection to dismemberment as a negation of its existence**. The mind, in contradistinction, is a link to God, a safe haven that allowed the world to be apprehended and understood without the vulnerability of the body. As such the mind is representative of life and living, while the body is under the constant threat of death. Life, to use Hegel’s expression, ‘is a standing fight’ against the possibility of the dismemberment with which death threatens the unity of the living body. Life, in Marx’s analysis of capital, is similarly a ‘standing fight’ against the process of abstraction that is constitutive of the category ‘labor.’ It is as if the process of abstraction and ongoing appropriation of the worker’s body in the capitalist mode of production perpetually threatens to effect a dismemberment of the unit of the ‘living body.’20 Thus labor, the body, the slave, and the Black come together as “lack,” as vulnerability, and as proximity to violence. Thus, “the mind” is essential to Culturalist discourse, inasmuch as the mind can be understood as “spirit… ‘whatever substance is purely active, immaterial and always gains understanding through itself (i.e. directly), and acts from self-motion and with intention in regard to an end and goal of which it is conscious of itself.”21 Culturalism seeks to avoid the shame elicited by embodied labor, which represents the space devoid of education, intellect, literacy, and by extension, civilization. **The Cartesian mind became the trope that provided the means of overcoming the precariousness and lack of the (Black) body because it provided the self with certitude of existence through its immateriality (read superstructural situatedness), as Kwasi Wiredu points out: “[a]s far as he [Descartes] is concerned, the alleged fact that one can doubt all spatial existence and yet at the same time be absolutely certain of one’s existence under the dispensation of the Cogito implied ‘I’, the ego, exists as a spiritual, non-spatial, immaterial entity.”2**2 Black intellectuals sought to distance themselves from physical labor, which had come to be conflated with enslavement and abjection, and asserted their Black modern subjectivity through intellectual labor—especially aesthetic and cultural production—to assert their equality with whites. This is what Sylvia Wynter refers to as the “colonization of desire”: The most desired attribute was the ‘intellectual faculty.’ The sign that pointed to one’s possession of the attribute was whiteness of skin. This sign that pointed to its nonpossession was blackness of skin… The black exists as the Symbolic Object constituting the Lack, the Void of these qualities… That a man, or almost a man can exist, lacking these things, sets into play the terror that these attributes can be lost.23 The colonized desire is engendered by the threat of slipping into the realm of the nonintellectual, the realm of the slave/laborer. The “terror of lack”24 required the New Negro to assert himself on cultural grounds as an escape from the embodied figure of the Old Negro—“the symbol of the Negative Other, the very principle of Lack.”25 Cold War Culturalism was directly transferred from the civilization narrative of the New Negro that associated Black embodied labor with savagery. Both forms of Culturalism, predicated on the departure from the waiting room of history through culture, sought to release the Black from the savagery symbolized by Black skin. The accommodation of the antiradical pedagogy of the state by Black Cold War liberals rested upon this notion that “blackness of the skin” was the sign of nonpossession of intellect. Liberation was collapsed into the realm of culture as Black radical critique became a danger to the state. The inherent contradiction is that “the deliberate creation of lack [is] a function of the market economy.”26 It can only be resolved by a struggle that is waged at the level of the base. Otherwise, the materialities of dispossession—i.e. the exploitation of labor, the inequitable distribution of resources based on the extraction of surplus value, the entrenchment of poverty and the global axial division of labor—would remain uncontested. A focus on the relations of production threatened the order based on the “non-value of being black.”27 More importantly, any challenge to the “non-value of black being” threatened the hegemonic social order.

#### Thus, from the perspective of an Earth Centered Conscientization, I affirm Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### An Earth Centered Conscientization constitutes continual relationality with Mother Earth for all beings. Collective histories and lived realities of Indigenous people all form a historical consciousness that activates sentiments of relationality and intimate stewardship. Giving voice to all our relations enables activists and organizers to dissolve colonial conceptions of a separate natural world and embark in a social web of human and non- human relations that protects the Earth.

**Klutz and Walter 18** (Jenalee Kluttz PhD Student, Education University of British Columbia Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada , Pierre Walter 17. THEORIZING ADULT EDUCATION, POWER AND SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE A Consideration of the Climate Justice Movement Page 195 – 198 INDIGENOUS FEMINISM, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, AND DECOLONIZING EDUCATION, RLA)

How then do notions of power, privilege and socio-environmental change play out in an Earth-centred positionality of place in environmental adult education? Since we as urbanized, colonized human beings have removed ourselves so thoroughly from being able to listen to and seek advice directly from the Earth (nor could we represent knowledge gained this way in textual form), we have no choice but to turn to human theorizing once more. Here, we look to Indigenous feminism, environmental justice, and decolonizing education for guidance. From theoretical work in Indigenous feminism, we understand that although Indigenous identities, societies and peoples are traditionally of Mother Earth, and have a history of working within an equitably differentiated gendered division of labor, and while both Indigenous men and women have been subject to genocidal colonial histories, dispossession of land and culture, White Supremacy and racism, Indigenous women also suffer additionally from systems of colonial-induced patriarchy cutting across indigeneity. That is, “**Indigenous women have endured a double erasure and (marginalization) – first, as indigenous peoples, and secondly, as women”** (Grande, 2004, p. 127). Thus, while maintaining an Earth-based positionality, Indigenous feminism seeks to identify and resist “the ways in which (Indigenous) women are subordinated to men and how women can be emancipated from this subordination” (Green, 2007, p. 21). Decolonizing education requires ,first, the historical study of human systems of oppression – settler colonialism, capitalism, patriarchy, systemic racism – which have destroyed Mother Earth and dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of their basic human rights to land, culture and livelihood. Second, it normally demands a recognition of direct personal complicity in these acts, not only by all present-day settler colonial peoples living on stolen lands (e.g. Canada, U.S. Japan, China, Australia, all of Latin America, Africa), but also by those residing in colonial states built upon these genocidal and environmentally catastrophic histories (England, Spain, France, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal). **An ‘Earth-centred conscientization’ of adult learners continues through the histories and lived realities of Indigenous, poor, and racialized people bearing the costs of toxic waste, polluted water, and climate change; that is, of environmental racism, classism and oppression** (Irlbacher-Fox, 2014). Third, **decolonizing education recognizes that Indigenous Peoples have been defending the Earth and their very lands, lives, cultures, livelihood, human rights and identity against the violent onslaught of colonialism continuously for almost 600 years, continue to struggle today for the restoration of stolen ancestral lands, and are actively working to recover scared sites and cultural knowledge ripped away from them by non-Indigenous People** (Tuck & Yang, 2012). Finally, **with this historical consciousness in place, the question becomes how to re-establish a personal relationship with Mother Earth for all peoples (Plumwood, 2003), and for non-Indigenous people, how to develop a respectful and humble relationship with Indigenous Peoples, who are at once our teachers and ‘co-resisters’ as well as co-advocates for the return of stolen lands, the struggle against climate injustice, capitalism, racism and patriarchy, and the struggle for reconciliation and the healing of the Earth**. The Tsleil-Waututh Nation leading the movement against Trans Mountain are Sklilwkta or ‘People of the Inlet’: they are among the people most directly impacted by the pipeline construction and potential oil spills**. As people of the water, protection of the water is not simply a moral or ethical mandate, it is protection of self, of identity and existence, as well as a spiritual duty.** Yet all Tsleil-Waututh people do not experience their relationship to the water and the powers that threaten it in the same way: intersections of gender, “kinship, age, wealth, race, religion, political situation, and other characteristics affect and frame what one experiences as an indigenous person” (Whyte, 2014, p. 604), just like any other. **The positionality of Indigenous women within Tsleil-Waututh culture grants them particular understandings, identities, relations and responsibilities to water, similar to those they might have to children, elders or other family members**. Starting with water in the womb, water is thought of as life-giving and life-sustaining, and as such, women have a special duty to protect this relation. Of course, not all Indigenous women take up this responsibility, but elders acting as leaders of the movement often speak of this connection. When Indigenous women within the movement talk of their sacred duty to protect the water, they speak of it quite differently from non-Indigenous women or others who might see water as life-sustaining, but not as a living relation. **These different positionalities both embody and create different types of learning and knowledge generation and exchange within and from the movement. A non-Indigenous woman may resist the pipeline to protect the water as a social or moral responsibility, while an Indigenous woman struggles against colonial ideas that challenge her ability to do her spiritual or cultural duty to a relation (water**). Thus, for a non-Indigenous woman, protecting the water may bring about social or environmental consciousness, while for an Indigenous woman, it may support cultural learning and reconnection to spiritual practice. In the same sense, abuses of power, marginalization and oppression are not experienced by non-Indigenous women (or men) in quite the same way. However, by working side-by-side in the movements, these **adults co-enact a decolonizing education, learning from each other, questioning, revealing, undoing and replacing the hegemony of colonial truths with new knowledge of Indigenous history, epistemologies, colonialism, Earth-centered positionality and relations.** **Decolonizing education places human identity and social action into a web of both human and non-human relations - water, land, air, plants, animals - who cannot then be considered exploitable natural 'resources', and whom we are obligated to protect from harm** (Adams, 2003). Thus, 'water protector' becomes not only a name, but also an identity, a relation, a sacred duty, and a way of being. Centering Indigenous voices and leadership, activists and organizers are able to reflect on differences of oppression, identity, and ways of being, **as well as their roles within the movement and their own positioning as part of the collective we in relation to place.** Non-Indigenous climate justice activists in B.C. also have strong ties to land and water, sea, and sky, based on livelihood, life history, spirituality and identity. Some depend on agricultural production, fishing or coastal tourism to support themselves. **Many feel a deep spiritual connection to the immense beauty of B.C.'s landscapes and wild spaces**; others value the opportunities affored by the land and sea for hiking, kayaking, skiing, hunting, camping, boating or fishing. Some ties are shallow, some deep, some cultural, others spiritual or material. Some believe in rights to property and ownership; others see open, un-owned lands for all. However, in learning to see through a decolonizing lens, these and other adults in the movement begin to better understand the situated nature of power in relation to place and Indigenous peoples. **New knowledge uncovers our colonial mindset toward the Earth, where people's relations with nature are controlled by oil companies, governments, courts, rich white men, etc. working against, rather than with, nature** (Adams, 2003). Through a decolonizing lens, this knowledge is not limited to the present - where the fossil fuel industry is controlling relationships to land with implications for human and non-human futures - but also extends to the past teaching lessons of the reality of colonization that has controlled Indigenous communities' relationships to the land for hundreds of years. Positionality in relation to place is complex and varied among adults, in part depending on the extent to which their livelihood is place-based. For some, the Trans Mountain project is understood as both an immediate and future threat to ocean- and land-based livelihood because of oil spills, tanker traffic through marine ecosystems, and the effects of climate change, including sea level rise, acidification and warming. An understanding of environmental justice as integral to decolonizing education highlights these and other positionalities. Wealth, power and education may allow some to shift livelihood in the case of an oil spill or sea levels rise; poorer coastal fishing communities may not have the means to do so. A non-Indigenous organizer working in the coastal tourism industry may be more directly threatened by the pipeline than an Indigenous woman professional working in an urban office, and so on. The threat of the pipeline is experienced and learned differently - culturally, socially, spiritually and economically - depending on the intersects of social categories and positionality within the larger power structures in connection to place. Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists, for example, differ somewhat in their perspectives of the Earth’s role within the movement. Some colonial-settler activists, talking of protecting the non-human world (waterways, orcas, salmon, etc.), frame the Earth as a separate entity, and something to be guarded. **By contrast, Indigenous leaders not only speak of a responsibility to protect their relations, but also acknowledge the non-human world’s participation in the struggle. This is done in ways as simple as recognizing the presence of trees, birds, animals, and plants in the everyday events and activities of resistance**. It might mean drawing attention to eagles flying overhead who are watching over protest marches and rallies, or, before a protest action, acknowledging the history of a place; not only human histories, but also histories of other beings. In this way, **the non-human world is included in the movement rather than simply being a beneficiary of it, giving voice to ‘all our relations’, not just human voices. These recognitions and inclusions provide moments of learning where activists and organizers are encouraged to question colonial conceptions of a separate non-human world.** **Through learning from Indigenous leadership, the Earth and non-human relations are moved from the margins to “take their place as narrative subjects in a speaking and participating land, full of narratives and mythic voices” (Plumwood, 2003, p. 67). Inviting the Earth to be part of the conversation teaches an Earth-centred positionality, facilitated by Indigenous leaders and others who recognize the Earth’s agency and challenge a colonial ‘deafness’ to the non-human world** (Plumwood, 2003). In doing so, they begin a decolonizing dialogue in environmental adult education in which the Earth is an inseparable part of adult learning and education, culture, community, identity and human existence.

#### You’re an ethical facilitator and your role should be to prioritize an ethical consciousness formation.

#### Debate is a place of consciousness formation – all processes of observation and measurement endemic to their research model contribute to our understanding of a subject that stands as an outside of observer to an external physical world. Our intervention in the curriculum is necessary to recalibrate how we formulate and understand consciousness by situating it within the natural world instead of against it.

#### We must question the performative practices through which ideas and inquiry manifest. Practices of scholarship, knowing, and civic responsibility are bound to cartesian premises of observer as subject and an external world as object of study. Re modulating a conception of inquiry outside of Cartesian dogma necessitates integrating affect and cognition in processes that enable being, feeling, committing, and living in the natural world.

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One of the central challenges of applying agential realism to the practice of social science inquiry is working out its specific implications for methodological practice. The philosophies gathered under the banner of “new materialism” reconsider several foundational concepts central to social science as it has been traditionally understood—such as taken for granted notions of representation (MacLure, 2013), the idea of a single or stable object of inquiry (Barad, 2007; Mol, 2002), and the concept of “data” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). **Agent ontologies, however, put more than these individual concepts under reconsideration. They also question the performative practices through which we “have” ideas and the very idea of the “we” of inquiry itself. Barad’s agential realism is an effort to transform not just the ontology of our objects of study but also the ontology of subjects involved in inquiry, and the relation between objects and subjects.** More colloquially, it gestures toward a practice of inquiry that involves transformations not just of our ways of knowing but also of our ways of being, feeling, committing, and living in the world. We should not expect such a reorientation would be a smooth process even for those convinced of its necessity, that it would involve lurches, false starts, and backsliding of various forms. **The material-semiotic architecture that both enables and constrains our practices of scholarship, knowing, and civic responsibility in Western settler colonial societies is very old and runs deep. It is encoded into our language; our habits of perception, feeling, and desire, our identities, the social communities that sustain those identities and desires, the legal codes that bound and bind those communities, the material arrangements of property, land, food consumption, power grids, and much more.** We can critically question one part of this matrix, but the others remain as ballast that draw us back into past practices that are networked with other cultural and material aspects of the world. Consequently, as new materialist scholars invent ways to enact agentially realist inquiries, there is a significant risk that proposed innovations will be superficial and will be interpolated back into deeply ingrained practices of knowing and being. As Maggie MacLure (2017) observed in her 2016 Keynote to the International Congress of Qualitative Inquiry, It is difficult to think outside of the Enlightenment structures of the Cartesian self, and the stories it tells itself about progress, reason and the advancement of knowledge. So although we have come a long way in formulating cartographies for new materialist research, we are necessarily some way from the anticipated ontological transformations to our field. . . I think we continue to underestimate the sheer difficulty of shedding the anthropocentrism that is built into our world-views and our language habits. (p. 55) One of the risks for the new materialisms involves framing the goal of inquiry as producing an improved description of our objects of inquiry, while leaving unchanged the construction of the inquirer as a spectator subject. This can be seen in the emerging literature that seeks to document the operation of self-organizing nonhuman phenomena. This includes research on algorithms, cognitive biology, and neuroscience (Dixon-Roman, 2016, 2017; Hayles, 2017) that identify the ways in which non-human systems engage in pattern recognition and response to changing environments. It can also be seen in research on self-organizing socio-material systems such as disease (Mol, 2002), political formations (Bennett, 2010), or institutionalized racism (Rosiek & Kinslow, 2016). Such scholarship provides informative accounts of the materially dynamic, evolving, nature of our objects of inquiry often through the use of the Deleuzian vocabulary of assemblage (e.g., Alaimo, 2016; Bennett, 2010; Fox & Alldred, 2015; Mazzei, 2017; Taguchi, 2018). However, the ontology of the knowing subject assumed in scholars’ representation of these dynamic objects of study remains largely unaltered (MacLure, 2017). This reinscription of the enlightenment spectator subject can also be seen in the turn to affect in some new materialist scholarship (e.g., Clough, 2009; Gregg & Seigworth, 2010; Massumi, 2002; Zembylas, 2014). **In an effort to get outside of a conception of inquiry based primarily on linguistic representation, cognition, and epistemology, many scholars are shifting their attention to the immediacy of affect. Scholars working in this vein offer that the influence of non-human agents on us may take the form of influence on our affect as much as our cognition.** However, **in an effort to explicate this expanded view of knowledge, scholars often resort to descriptions of the ways affect and cognition are integrated in some practices of knowing, as opposed to performing that integration.**

## AC Cites

<http://mobile.repositorio-digital.cide.edu/bitstream/handle/11651/1019/95971.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> – page 12 – 14

<https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/15323/Ehrentraut_Judy.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y> – duality card

## AR Case OV

#### Affirming the resolution from the perspective of an Earth centered conscientization envisions the mind and network of thoughts as they are entangled with the spiritual, emotional, and physical through processes of ongoing intimate relationality. Mother Earth/the natural and the Human Consciousness are entangled and inseparable parts of a larger whole that transcends the liminal boundaries of Cartesian Metaphysics and Western Settler Materialism. A few implications to voting aff

#### Ethical Political Mandates – It would no longer be permissible to appropriating space for material resources. Governments would mandate bans on Asteroid Mining, Weapons Testing in Outer Space, Private Ownership of Celestial Bodies. Aligned with new modes of relationality that connect beings to the natural world, the distinction between human and space as well as the concept of space as ‘resource’ would no longer exist.

#### Resolves the deadening of being - Cartesian Metaphysics reduces relations to land to that of a dialectical subject and object which naturalizes the slow deadening of Indigenous economies and spirituality that centralize land as subject and enshrine the natural world as sacred. Earth Centered Conscientization restores the modes of being that link the human consciousness and subject to the Earth.

#### Mitigates the exploitation of laboring bodies and domination of black bodies – Burden-Stelly says that cartesian metaphysics informs conceptions of worker’s bodies as exploitable and black bodies as lacking and prone to domination by a western subject. Our method abolishes cartesian concepts of autonomy that enable these conditions of exploitation and anti- black domination.

## AR AT Disad

#### Case solves the Disad – their scenarios for conflict don’t make sense if we are all inter relational stewards of the land as opposed to autonomous actors competing for territories and land. Conscientization affectively compels us to protect the natural world because we recognize that the natural world consist of a complex social web of human and non- human relations that are collectively beneficial and interdependent

#### (?) Cartesian Metaphysics are the root cause of their impacts- colonial and imperial consciousness which created the foundations for international conflict, all presume autonomous subjects. As per the decree of Descartes, subjects and states had to emerge as autonomous actors that competed for control over an external and separate external world.

#### Western bio centrism taints their understanding of death through the imposition of a colonial world view that denies the entanglement of the spiritual, the emotional and the physical. Rather than conceptualizing death as an end to the body as an anatomical unit, death is the catalyst for the body’s return to mother earth and the spirit’s transcendence.

**Anderson and Woticky 18** (Michael Anderson, MD, MSc, FRCSC The Temmy Latner Centre for Palliative Care, Sinai Health System. University of Toronto. mike.anderson@utoronto.ca Gemma Woticky, BA (Hons.), MPH Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto. “The End of Life is an Auspicious Opportunity for Healing: Decolonizing Death and Dying for Urban Indigenous People” page 51 - 58 December 2018) RLA

Indigeneity in Urban Settlements The dramatic increase in the Indigenous population in Canada over the last decade largely results from ethnic mobility (the phenomenon by which individuals and families change their ethnic affiliation) and much of this growth has occurred in urban settlements (Peters & Andersen, 2013). The urban Indigenous community is highly diverse in their identity, lived experiences, and degree of connection to Indigenous culture (Peters & Andersen, 2013). Many urban Indigenous people are second and third generation city dwellers, thus their Indigeneity may not be primarily defined by connection to ancestral land (Peters & Andersen, 2013). Contemporary urban Indigenous people “choose from a variety of other resources to construct identities, including pan-Aboriginal cultures and activities in urban areas”(Peters & Andersen, 2013). Urban Indigenous communities are often arranged around cultural and health care organizations. Cultural engagement has been shown to be beneficial to the health and well-being of Indigenous people (Auger, Howell, & Gomes, 2016; Gone, 2011; Gone & Looking, 2011). However, government policies aimed at cultural extermination and assimilation have resulted in a tremendous loss of Indigenous knowledge, including end-of-life practices and ceremonies. Cultural disruption poses a real risk of permanently losing much of this knowledge given the oral nature of Indigenous knowledge. Rediscovering traditional death ceremonies, increasing access to cultural supports, enhancing death education, and improving relationships with health service providers are of great importance to urban Indigenous people (Anderson, Chalklin, Downey, Lee, & Rodin, 2017). Fortunately, **there are signs of Indigenous cultural and ceremonial revitalization in urban spaces and the end of life stage offers an auspicious healing opportunity.** Indigenous Concepts of Death and Dying **The absence of a word for death in most Indigenous languages underscores how differently the end-of-life experience is constructed by Indigenous people.** Despite being a very heterogeneous group, Indigenous people worldwide share elements of a common spirituality and worldview (Duggleby et al., 2015). **The colonial worldview frames death through a linear, biomedical, and physical lens. Indigenous people view themselves as a spirit having a human experience** (P. Keshane, personal communication, Jan 2017). **Birth and death are inextricably linked as a transition of the spirit through this world. Thus, the end-of-life is a transition of the spirit rather than solely the end of the body. The last stages of life are an auspicious opportunity for healing of the spirit - and spirit is healed through ceremony** (J. Longboat, personal communication, March 2016). The following is an excerpt from Basil Johnston’s (Johnston, 2010) book in which he recounts the Anishinaabe story of the Gift of the Stars (Annangoog Meegiwaewinan), the origins of children to the physical world. It is transcribed here in its entirety to honor the knowledge embedded in the story and to allow for a wholistic interpretation of its message. Johnston begins this story about a five year old, Southwind, and the teachings from his grandmother: "What are stars, grandmother?" he asked. "Babies," his grandmother answered. Southwind looked back up. The stars looked like sparks. But babies they must be. Had his grandmother not said so? So many babies. They filled the entire sky. A star fell. Southwind gasped. "Oh! Grandma! The baby is going to get hurt!" "Don't fret grandson. The baby won't get hurt. It will fall gently as a feather into someone's arms. Someone's going to receive a wonderful gift tonight. It will make them happy." Southwind's grandmother explained. "What kind of gift?". Some woman is going to get a baby that will make her happy,'' Southwind's grandmother said. Southwind looked back up into the sky. Not a word did he say. His mind was too small, too young to understand how stars and babies and gifts could be the same thing. To help Southwind understand, his grandmother told him, "One time you were a little star and you came down as a baby to your mother and to your father and to all of us. You made us all very happy. If ever a star falls near you, take it. Take it home! Look after it. It is a great gift that will make you happy." (Johnston, 2010, p. 19.) Southwind’s grandmother explained that boys don’t receive babies, but they do receive different gifts. “In that moment Southwind wanted a star to fall nearby so that he could take it up, bring it home and look after it. But none ever fell nearby. Always they fell far away. Always they were gifts for somebody else but not for him. For five years Southwind watched stars with his grandmother. Then he stopped going with his grandmother. Looking at stars was boring. Three more years went by. His grandmother fell ill. One night Southwind went out to the knoll where his grandmother used to watch the stars. Before Southwind got to the crest of the little hill, a star fell and it fell just the other side of the hill, where there was a pond. Southwind ran up the knoll and then down the other side to the edge of the pond. But there was nothing in the pond, nothing but white flowers that he'd never before seen. There was no gift. He turned to go back home. "Take me. Take me home. I am medicine. I will make your grandmother well!" a voice said. The little voice came from the middle of the pond. But there was no one there. Again and again the voice called, "Take me! Take me home with you." At last Southwind entered the water, waded out to the middle of the pond. In front of him was the white flower that called out. "Take me! Take me home! I am medicine. I am your gift." Southwind was about to yank the flower from its stalk when it screamed, "No! All of me! All of me!" But it was not an easy thing to lift the flower from its bed. To do this Southwind had to go underwater many times to dig the long root of the flower from its muddy bed. When he finally dug the flower out, Southwind took it home. With the flower Southwind's father made a medicine. They gave it to the old sick woman. The medicine made her better. Some months later Southwind and his grandmother were standing on the knoll studying the stars. He said to her, "No'okomiss, the flower gift that I received; it was really meant for you, wasn't it?. In a way it is. But it was meant for everybody. But that's the way all human gifts are." (Johnston, 2010.p, 20). The reader can interpret the various lessons within this story, but it is noteworthy that this is a children’s story, which educates about the cycle of life. This story addresses the entering of the spirit into this physical world, by the birth of a baby. **In** **death, the spirit is returning to the stars: departing the body as the physical body returns to the first mother, mother earth. In 2016, a diverse group of highly engaged key informants from community, clinical, policy, government, and educational perspectives gathered to consider First Nations, Inuit, and Metis (FNIM) palliative and end-of-life care issues** (Anderson et al., 2017). Numerous themes emerged from facilitated discussions and world cafes including: differing urban and remote community experiences, the need for death education, cultural barriers, challenging interactions with western medical personal, systemic racism, opportunities for healing, and the absence of spirit in the biomedical palliative care system (Anderson et al., 2017). The importance of this topic in the urban context has been affirmed by multiple sources including Indigenous Elders, the Toronto Indigenous Health Advisory Circle, and Anishnawbe Health Toronto. The Medicine Wheel The Medicine Wheel is a circular, wholistic, relational representation of the elements of life including the physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual aspects of self in addition to life stages, seasons, sacred medicines, and the four directions (Dapice, 2006). The Medicine Wheel is widely used for health and wellbeing including as a tool for healing from the imbalance caused by colonialism (Dapice, 2006). Its use is congruent with a theoretical framework for conceptualizing death and dying as it represents the cycle of life. Furthermore**, it opens the space to challenge the idea that the only death is physical and the possibility that death of all parts of self may not occur simultaneously. The explicit nature of spirit in the medicine wheel is critical at the end of life since the modern healthcare model rarely makes space for spirit.** Using examples to explore this concept, I will artificially divide the discussion into the four realms of self and subsequently demonstrate the impossibility of separating them – again consistent with the Indigenous worldview of interconnectedness and relational accountability. Kaswentha – The Two Row Wampum Based upon the Haudenosaunee principles of peace, respect, and friendship, the Two Row Wampum documents the relationship between Turtle Island’s Onkwehonweh (original people) and the first European explorers. Indigenous legal scholar Robert A. Williams Jr (1990). describes the Two Row Wampum: When the Haudenosaunee first came into contact with the European nations, treaties of peace and friendship were made. Each was symbolized by the Gus-Wen-Tah, or Two Row Wampum. There is a bed of white wampum which symbolizes the purity of the agreement. There are two rows of purple, and those two rows have the spirit of your ancestors and mine. There are three beads of wampum separating the two rows and they symbolize peace, friendship and respect. These two rows will symbolize two paths or two vessels, travelling down the same river together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian people, their laws, their customs and their ways. The other, a ship, will be for the white people and theirs laws, their customs, and their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in our own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel. (p. 327) Thus, this belt of wampum reflects both the separation and interaction of First Nations people and the newcomers that continues to this day. This relationship applies to modern urban settlements with the same veracity as the original agreement in 1613. I propose that the modern urban Indigenous experience is rooted in the three white rows between the two purple rows – the space in between. This space in between the two rows seems congruous with post-colonial scholar Homi Bhabha’s concept of a ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 2004) and Willie Ermine’s ethical space (Ermine, 2004). This is a liminal space where two or more cultures interact. Ermine (2004) describes the ethical space as: “The in-between space, relative to cultures, [is] created by the recognition of the separate realities of histories, knowledge traditions, values, interests, and social, economic and political imperatives. The positioning of these two entities, divided by the void and flux of their cultural distance, and in a manner that they are poised to encounter each other, produces a significant and interesting notion that has relevance in research thought. The positioning of the two entities creates the urgent necessity for a neutral zone of dialogue.” (p. 20) In Haudenosaunee teachings this area is defined by peace, friendship, and respect. The urban Indigenous lived experience is often one of variable cultural connection; neither completely in the canoe or in the ship but in some third space between. Conceptualizing Urban Indigenous Death and Dying: The Medicine Wheel and Two Row Wampum Exist in Urban Settlements The Medicine Wheel and the Two Row Wampum offer a vision for restoring respect, balance, and spirit to the end-of-life journey. These two teachings can be used to navigate the unique challenges at the intersection of death, urbanity, and Indigeneity. Together they act as an Indigenous theoretical framework for end-of-life research, policy, and practice. Despite the plurality of cultures in urban settlements on Turtle Island, colonization informs and dominates most systems. Western, colonial worldviews are transactional, hierarchal, and extractive by design. This is the antithesis of relational, collectivist, and egalitarian Indigenous worldviews. Reconciliation for urban Indigenous communities involves negotiating this challenging paradox. However, rather than developing new strategies, I posit existing knowledge – the Medicine Wheel and the Two Row Wampum – can offer an attractive way forward. The Medicine Wheel does not frame aspects in isolation, opposition, or as separable. Intrinsic to the Medicine Wheel is a pathway for change, healing, and reconciliation. Urban Indigenous people do not have the option of living in isolation - although aspects of the colonial system continue to strive to achieve this. As a healing tool, the Medicine Wheel can help address imbalances caused by colonialism, including in relationships by (re)connecting with Indigenous culture. This is of great importance to Indigenous people at the end of life. The original tenets of the Two Row Wampum treaty offer a vision for weaving a relationship that is not dominated by the hegemonic culture. Approaches to this relationship that involve fitting the circular (Indigenous) into a hierarchy (western) have routinely failed Indigenous people. Trying to extract the “best” of both worlds inevitably results in the dominant culture deciding what qualifies as the “best”. While the Two Row Wampum explicitly prohibits steering each other’s vessels, it recognizes we travel the river together and provides a space for interaction. This space between the Indigenous canoe and the western ship is mediated by peace, friendship, and respect. For urban Indigenous people, existing in this liminal, ethical (third) space involves the praxis of building meaningful relationships with both the Indigenous and the non-Indigenous. Paolo Freire’s concept of praxis refers to the linking of theory, informed action, and critical reflection (Freire, 2000). Dialogue, the flow of meaning, is the principle mediator of praxis. I propose that dialogue, grounded in peace, friendship, and respect, and informed by the Medicine Wheel and Two Row Wampum teachings, can improve the end-of-life experience for urban Indigenous communities. Physical The last stages of life frequently involve challenges to one’s physical wellbeing. The western health care system focuses on the physical realm. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the approach to pain. Despite recognizing the concept of ‘total pain,’ (Mehta, 2008; Wein, 2010) in reality, pain is viewed almost exclusively in terms of physical pain as evidenced by the near ubiquitous use of opiates as a remedy (Middleton-Green, 2008; Montes-Sandoval, 1999). **An Indigenous approach would recognize the interconnectedness of the physical, emotional, spiritual, and mental aspects of pain in endeavoring to mitigate the total experience of pain** (Gone, 2009). What does this look like? Through ceremonies such as drumming and smudging which can be incorporated into institutional policies, pain management can take a more Indigenous perspective if combined with traditional Indigenous healing and/or healing circles. Reducing any aspect of pain reduces total pain. The physical structure and regulations of health care institutions are routinely hostile to Indigenous people. This is relevant in urban settlements because most of us will die in hospitals, despite our stated preferences to die at home (Kelly et al., 2009; McGrath, 2007; St Pierre-Hansen, Kelly, Linkewich, Cromarty, & Walker, 2010). Dying at home can be challenging given the high degree of mobility, precarious housing, and homelessness affecting urban Indigenous communities (King, Smith, & Gracey, 2009; Snyder & Wilson, 2015). Physical and policy limits on the number of people allowed in a room and failing to provide adequate space for family in many institutions precludes the role of the larger family, kin, and community networks that coalesce to support a dying individual. These barriers hinder the ability of a broad network of family and kin to empower the spirit for transition (Duggleby et al., 2015). Institutional policies in long term care homes, hospices, and health care facilities often prevent important ceremonies such as smudging or the pipe ceremony. The physical layout of hospitals is intended to hide death. People enter through brightly lit, well appointed, visible front doors but the deceased are removed through unseen service doors often located at the rear of the building. The deceased are rapidly cocooned in body bags, rendered invisible, and moved to places others cannot go or see. It is as if death is shameful and to be hidden. This isn’t surprising, given the illness-based, medical model’s perception of death as a failure. This **presents a barrier for Indigenous people who may wish to maintain a connection to their recently deceased loved one. Touching and bathing the body is an act of love and respect which can empower and release the spirit and support grieving.** Superimposed upon the hidden nature of death in institutions is the invisibility many Indigenous people already experience in the health care system. For Indigenous people, death in urban hospitals is another form of systemic racism that further marginalizes Indigenous ways of knowing. Mental There are many aspects of the mental realm which reflect the tensions between Indigenous and non-Indigenous ways of thinking. Families speak of the difficulty reconciling the health care system’s drive for expediency with Indigenous consensual approaches to decision-making. An example of this is seen in the determination of substitute decision makers (SDM). The colonial approach to defining a SDM is hierarchal and legally framed by way of a presumed series of relations based on blood and lineage. Even the term lineage is inconsistent with an Indigenous way of viewing the world. Indigenous decision-making is not rooted in hierarchical authority but instead in consensus building. I was recently told the story of an Indigenous man who was gravely injured in an accident. The healthcare team felt he was unlikely to recover and decisions regarding care were necessary. The medical team wanted an expedient decision from a SDM dictated by a non-Indigenous, hierarchal, legal protocol. The family, kin, and community gathered to take an Indigenous approach to decision-making. They sat in a circle and shared stories about this man’s life, with people stepping out of the circle after each round if they felt others knew him better. This continued until only three individuals remained. None fit the legal criteria for SDM but everyone agreed they had the deepest understanding of who he was as a human being and what his care decisions would have been. Thus, a community-based, consensual approach to decision-making was employed resulting in a less expedient but more appropriate decision. This is an example of how difficult conversations may require more time, but grounding decision-making in authentic relationships and Indigenous approaches to dialogue is essential to achieve outcomes acceptable to Indigenous communities. A final sad comment is necessary here though. Although the health care professionals were accepting of this decision-making strategy, and health care colleagues I have discussed this with find the approach appealing, the actual SDM transaction had to be carried out in a colonial, hierarchal manner. Emotional The sting of death can be lessened by family and community support or heightened if the circumstances of death are re-traumatizing. Intergenerational trauma expands unless addressed and this is particularly true for those grieving the loss of a loved one. Colonization (e.g., the Indian Act, residential school system, Sixties Scoop, forced relocation, child welfare system) is at the root of intergenerational trauma, and has resulted in many Indigenous people experiencing repeated and ongoing traumas from a wide variety of sources, including health care professionals and institutions (Barker, Goodman, & DeBeck, 2017; Howard, 2014; Kirmayer, Gone, & Moses, 2014; Myhra, 2011; Reeves & Stewart, 2017). Therefore, death and dying may retraumatize individuals and communities resulting in expanded intergenerational trauma unless affected people are afforded opportunities to address both past and ongoing traumas (Gone, 2013). The Medicine Wheel became unbalanced through colonial practices. Restoring balance to the Medicine Wheel through decolonization offers a path to heal. Dying well, within institutions, requires more than cultural safety – it requires empathy and dignity (Chochinov, 2013; Thompson & Chochinov, 2008). A health care system that is unable to deliver on these most basic human needs has failed. Sadly, Indigenous people encounter this failure routinely. In urban settings it is common to encounter stories of Indigenous people experiencing challenges accessing elders, traditional healers, or cultural supports as they are dying due to communication barriers with western healthcare institutions (Harrison J. personal communication, Jan 2017). Even when access to cultural support does occur, it frequently occurs late in their journey (Vautour, J. personal communication, Mar 2017). This limits the healing opportunities for individuals and families, particularly for people wishing to explore their identity and culture at the end of life. The benefits ascribed to early palliative care are not routinely afforded to Indigenous people. Improved relationships between the health care system and Indigenous organizations may enhance the opportunities for emotional support through connection to community and culture. Spiritual **Lastly, and most importantly, is the spiritual realm.** In western health care there is an aversion to all things spiritual. Health care professionals and institutions continue to erect physical as well as policy barriers which impede communal and spiritual activities at the end of life. As **Indigenous people, ‘we are a spirit having a human experience.’ It’s not surprising that one of the most sought out services at the end of life is receiving one’s spirit name. Creating space for spirit is both paramount and challenging at the end of life. The last stages of life are an auspicious opportunity for healing of the spirit. Spirit is healed through ceremony**. It is only very recently that Indigenous ceremonies are being permitted in some health care settings. That ceremonies (e.g., smudging, pipe ceremony) are still restricted in many institutional settings is particularly egregious given the history of legislated bans on Indigenous ceremony and culture. The Indian Act of 1876 outlawed Indigenous cultural and ceremonial practices in an effort to force assimilation (Joseph, 2018), the effects of which continue to be felt by many Indigenous people who are seeking to reclaim their cultural and spiritual practices. Although institutional policies regularly restrict Indigenous ceremonies, in my experience most health care workers are genuinely curious and accepting of Indigenous ceremonies. It is evident that there remains a disconnect between policy and practice that needs to be bridged. This too speaks to the need to construct meaningful relationships.

#### Consciousness occupies a terrain that cannot be falsified by the most scientific renditions of materialism. Neurophysiology can’t even falsify that physicality is true.

**Evans 05** (Charles Stephen Evans, University Professor of Philosophy and Humanities at Baylor University.[1] Evans was born on May 26, 1948, in Atlanta, Georgia. He holds a BA with high honors (philosophy) from Wheaton College, an MPhil (philosophy) from Yale University, and a PhD (philosophy) from Yale University. “Separable Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibility of Life after Death” Page 1-2 <http://www.newdualism.org/papers/C.Evans/Evans-Separable%20Souls%20-%20Dualism%20Selfhood%20and%20the%20Possibility%20of%20Life%20after%20Death.pdf>, RLA)

What should Christians think about the constitution of the self? When the Heidelberg Catechism says "my only comfort in life and death is that I belong, body and soul, to my faithful Savior Jesus Christ," is this language to be taken as sober metaphysics or is it merely a poetic flourish? Recently a number of Christian philosophers, theologians, and scientists have argued that the traditional Christian view of the self, a dualistic account that sees human persons as having an immaterial soul as well as a physical body, should be rejected in favor of a monistic, physicalist view. There are various motivations for this move, some grounded in theology, others in philosophy, and others in science. A common argument of the theological type is that the monistic view of the self is the biblical one; dualism represents the deleterious influence of Greek philosophy on the Christian tradition. A common philosophical criticism is that a dualism of mind and body cannot account for interaction between the two entities. The third type of argument typically claims that dualism, while logically possible, is increasingly implausible in light of recent scientific findings, particularly with respect to neurophysiological research. In this paper I want to focus mainly on the third or scientific type of alleged difficulty for dualism, though I will very briefly indicate some reasons why I am less concerned about the first two types of arguments. In my view the claim that Scripture teaches a monistic materialism is mistaken; I believe that John Cooper has shown this in his book Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate.1 Cooper sees three possible biblical views of life after death: (1) A gap theory: future resurrection with a period of non-existence between death and the resurrection. (2) Immediate resurrection upon death. (3) The traditional view: there is a future resurrection with continued existence ("the intermediate period") between death and that resurrection. There are some scriptural passages consistent with the "gap" theory and some others that are consistent with the immediate resurrection theory. However, each is contradicted by the passages consistent with the other view, and no passages plainly teach either of those views.2 The traditional view that the resurrection is a future event, but that the deceased believer enjoys communion with Christ between death and that resurrection, is the only view that is consistent with all of the scriptural evidence and that seems to be plainly taught in some passages. This third view plainly presupposes a dualistic ontology, since the person must be distinct from his or her body to exist between the biological death of that body and the resurrection. (It is also at least arguable that without a dualistic ontology, the resurrection is not possible. There are difficulties in seeing how the new resurrected body can be identical to the body that died; I believe that it is the soul that continuously exists that makes the resurrected body to be the body of the person that died.) Many of the alleged philosophical difficulties are problems that have been repeatedly answered. In any case, the most commonly cited problem, which is that a non-material reality cannot interact causally with a physical entity, is one that a Christian should not take seriously, since if such a principle held, God could neither create a physical world nor act within it. It is in any case odd, I think, for Christians to advocate a form of materialism on philosophical grounds, since a careful look at recent work on the mind-body problem clearly shows that materialism is in what could be called a state of crisis.3 **Although most philosophers today are materialists, many will acknowledge that materialism currently has no solution to two major problems with respect to the nature of mind.** First, **contemporary materialists do not know how to explain consciousness. The problem is so severe that one group of materialists, the so-called "new mysterians," has more or less given up, conceding that consciousness simply is a mystery that materialism will never explain**.4 The second difficult problem for materialists is explaining the nature of intentionality or "aboutness." **Many mental states of acts have meaning, and it is not clear how a physical entity or state can be meaningful without a mind to provide that meaning.** Given these difficulties, why are most philosophers materialists about human persons? The only answer that makes sense to me is that they are materialists about everything. **Philosophers who are metaphysical naturalists and who are committed to materialism believe that there must somehow be a true materialist account of the human self, even if they have no idea what that account may be.** Christians, however, surely should not share this assumption. In any case I believe it is the third type of problem that is most influential in pressing against dualism today. For example, Nancey Murphy, while admitting that scientific evidence does not prove that dualism is false, claims that "recent scientific advances do indeed provide scientific evidence for [physicalism]".5 After discussing some recent work in neurophysiology, Murphy claims that non-reductive physicalism is "not merely a philosophical thesis, but also the hard core of a scientific research program." She concludes that there is "ample scientific evidence" for the physicalism she espouses.6 Even William Hasker, who in the end espouses a type of dualism and rejects physicalism, sees contemporary scientific evidence as presenting problems for traditional dualistic views. He argues that there are two problems with traditional Cartesian dualism: "**The first is that it cannot plausibly account for the extensive and intimate dependence of mind on brain that we find to exist."7 While dualism is compatible with mind-body interaction, it does not seem to Hasker to fit comfortably with the detailed scientific findings about the way that the mind is dependent on the brain for its activity.** The second problem Hasker sees is that dualism cannot plausibly be incorporated into an evolutionary account of human origins. Of course some scientific creationists might say "so much the better for dualism" at this point, but Hasker wants a view of mind and body that is consistent with evolutionary theory. In what follows I shall argue for two claims: (1) **Recent advances in neurophysiology give us no evidence in favor of physicalism; the plausibility of at least some forms of dualism, rightly conceived, has not been diminished at all.** Scientific findings have given us reason to reject particular versions of dualism but not to reject all versions. There are some dualistic views that are plainly incompatible with scientific findings, but these findings have not affected the plausibility of other forms of dualism at all. (2) Recent forms of socalled non-reductive materialism or physicalism advocated by Christians may, when closely examined (depending on how some crucial interpretive questions are answered), turn out not to be materialistic views at all, but rather forms of dualism. Such views are at least close enough to dualism that a dualist may incorporate some of their features into a dualistic account. Both of my theses turn crucially on what is to count as "dualism," as well as what is to count as "materialism." Before turning to those issues, I need to make one important terminological note. In this paper I shall use the terms "mind" "soul," "person," and "self" more or less synonymously, to refer to whatever a person refers to when that person uses the term "I" to refer to himself or herself as a conscious agent. Of course this terminological practice does not determine whether or not that entity that is referred to in this way is a material thing, a non-material thing, or some combination of the two.

## AR AT Topicality

#### We meet – we defend an affirmation of the whole resolution. Our defense of earth centered conscientization only constitutes a defense of a method that would inform demands to ban or end appropriation of outer space by private entities. It’s no different than a soft left aff that has contention which justifies the research in the affirmative. We still have to defend the effects of affirming the resolution, and all of their disad links would apply.

#### Debate is a place of consciousness formation – rosiek and Schultz say that our preconceived notions of inquiry, what we are, and how we envision our consciousness in relation to the natural world are all influenced by what we read in debate. Their interpretation of the topic all presuppose laborers who operate and strike with the presumption that material resources are end goal.

#### As an ethical facilitator your role is to prioritize a consciousness formation model that places the human consciousness with the earth instead of against it. Currently, debates about this topic reproduce notions that we are autonomous workers entitled to the plunder of our external world – which recreates violent formations of consciousness that facilitate environmental exploitation and the disavowal of indigenous cultures and perspectives that center the land. It is try or die to break free of the grip Cartesian Metaphysics has on debate.

#### Counter Interpretation a

#### All of their definition presuppose western materiality - Prioritizing materiality confines indigenous being to the western domain of physicality where being indigenous is always understood as being the irrational savage at an anatomical level – this legitimizes Indigenous erasure.

**Hokowhitu 09** (Brendan Hokowhitu, The University of Waikato Te Pua Wānanga ki te Ao, The Faculty of Māori & Indigenous StudiesHamilton, New Zealand Position Dean and Professor, The University of Waikato, Indigenous Existentialism and the Body Page 108 – 111, January 2009, RLA)

Exhuming ghosts: A genealogy of the Indigenous body Indigenous studies, as with feminist cultural studies, is best to position itself outside the Western, white masculine intellectual tradition of mind/body dualism: ‘an approach which refuses to privilege mind over body … and which assumes that the body cannot be transcended, is one which … emphasises contingency, locatedness, the irreducibility of difference, the passage of emotions and desire, and the worldliness of being’.13 Such a positioning is double-edged, however, as **the colonial project ‘limited the identity of the colonised to the materiality of their bodies’14 and thus the analysis must be at once deconstructory and existential.** Meaning, it is dangerous ground not to firstly problematise Indigenous theorisation stemming from the body, prior to foregrounding the body as a realm of study from where Indigenous existentialism can develop. Hence, this sub-section entitled ‘exhuming ghosts’. In part, white colonial patriarchy effected colonisation because it claimed to embody the power of reason and, consequently, universal interests. Key to enlightenment rationalism and its reliance on reason to know and to authenticate the objective world was its faith in the mind/body dichotomy orated by Plato and canonised by Descartes. In his 1871 book, The Descent of Man, 15 Charles Darwin emphasises the key differences in intellectual development (that is to say language, observation, curiosity, memory, imagination and reason) between primitive and civilised peoples.16 Darwin and other evolution theorists played an indirect but nonetheless highly significant role in the tainting of European accounts of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous cultures as unenlightened were, from an occipital logic, inherently more ‘physical’, ruled by their passions, and less intelligent than their civilised brethren**. The apparent lack of division between the indigene’s mind, body, spirit and the external world only served to augment the belief of European colonisers that they were indeed encountering savage races. Moreover, Enlightenment philosophers avoided questions of inconsistency in equality and autonomy arising from colonial subjugation by locating the Indigenous being in the realm of the physical and irrational, a site that denied full humanity itself.**17 **If savagery is understood from the perspective of Enlightenment rationalism, then it is apparent that it portends a state of unenlightenment, where reason is ruled by physical impulses and/or superstition.** What Foucault refers to as the invisible ‘breath’ that inhabits discontinuous discourses, even as they mutate,18 I conceive of as ‘physicality’ with reference to the colonised Indigenous savage. **As a sub-theme of the primitive/modern dialectic, physicality describes a complex of interconnecting discourses that enables unitary discursive knowledge to develop around the colonised Indigenous subject.** The thematic of Indigenous 108 VOLUME15 NUMBER2 SEP2009 physicality in the colonial state was ‘capable of linking, and animating a group of discourses, like an organism with its own needs, its own internal force and its own capacity for survival’.19 Darwin’s evolutionary theory, for instance, ‘directed research from afar’ acting as ‘a preposition rather than named, regrouped, and explained … a theme that always presupposed more than one was aware of … forcibly transformed into discursive knowledge’.20 Such discursive knowledge underpinned Indigenous ‘savagery’ and was transcribed into physical terms, onto the Indigenous body and about Indigenous bodily practices. For this essay, it is important to establish that the collision of supposedly embodied Indigenous epistemologies with disembodied Enlightenment rationalism left an inauthentic void that the Europeans, at least, desired to chart through authenticating disciplines such as anthropology and archaeology**. Enlightenment reason, as the determinant of truth and falsehood, was applied to the untranslatable—the epistemologies of other cultures.** The process involved, firstly, authenticating Indigenous knowledge by translating the untranslatable. That is, by encompassing and reconfiguring the incomprehensible into comprehensible forms. The authentication element in this equation is crucial because from the premise of the Enlightenment reason, knowledge was only authentic if it was known to the mind. That is, the embodied cultural concepts from ‘other’ epistemologies were only authentic if they were comprehensible to Western cognition**. The first principle of colonising the Indigenous body, then, was to bring the philosophical underpinnings of the savage under the logic of the coloniser, to authenticate the inauthentic.**21 In the universe of disembodied Enlightenment rationalism, it was assumed that reason (that is, European reason) could differentiate between truth and falsehood and, thus, the physical world was inherently translatable. The embodied practices of Indigenous epistemologies challenged that knowable world and, as a result, the reason of Enlightenment rationalism. The embodied holistic epistemologies of Indigenous societies determined the non-compartmentalisation of the ‘physical’. As opposed to the rational European subject, Indigenous subjectivity was not divorced from the body, nor the rationale from the passions, and so forth.22 **It is also important to recognise Indigenous subjectivities and their consequent bodily practices were often communally defined. Here the distinction can be made with the Western individual subject (who has prevailed in Western thought since the Enlightenment), whose person is comprised of a central and unique core, which determines their distinct identity.** The dissimilarity is important because, as opposed to a singular self, it indicates an Indigenous existentialism that incorporates multiple identities across time, including genealogical and spiritual associations, and communally defined bodily practices. The importance of the visible appearance of indigeneity and its genealogical tithing to moral deficiencies cannot be underestimated to the conception of the Indigenous body today. The Western conception of what it means to be Indigenous is in great part a visual BRENDAN HOKOWHITU—INDIGENOUS EXISTENTIALISM 109 phenomenon, ‘with all the political and ideological force that the seemingly naturalness of the body as the locus of difference can claim … [a] cultural training that quite literally teaches the eye not only how but what to see’.23 Allegorically, it is crucial to make the connection of the rationality of the European with the body of the colonised Other, underscored by: the eighteenth century resurrection of classical values of beauty and their similitude with the criteria of value in the classical economic tradition. Equilibrium and utility functioned in classical economic theory in ways analogous to proportion, symmetry, and refinement for classical aesthetics. Both sets of criteria determined an order of balance and harmony established on the basis of the geometric model ... By the late eighteenth century, beauty was established in terms of racial properties: fair skin, straight hair, organthous jaw, skull shape and size, well composed bodily proportions, and so on. To fail to possess these traits was considered a fault inheritance … Aesthetic value solidified into natural law, which in the eighteenth century was considered as compelling as the laws of nature, economics and morality precisely because they were all deemed to derive from the same rational basis.24 **The corporeal ‘reality’ of the asymmetrical Indigenous body undoubtedly naturalised colonial endeavour and Indigenous subjugation, allowing colonialist claims to moral superiority dependent upon what Robyn Wiegman refers to as ‘bodily fictions’ that ‘unproblematically reflect the natural meaning of flesh**’.25 Here, Bourdieu is useful as he conceives of the body metaphorically: ‘the bearer of symbolic meaning and values and a key site through which social differences are created, perpetuated and reinforced’.26 Bourdieu is also useful in thinking of the Indigenous body in terms of ‘physical capital’,27 especially in relation to mind/body duality in that symbolic meaning inscribed onto the Indigenous body determined inferior mental capacity and thus only contained capital in the inverse sense. The Indigenous body symbolised the physical realm and, thus, was employed for its physical labour, observed for its performativity, and humanised through the physical pursuits of sport.28 For many of the Indigenous parents of my generation, Bourdieu’s analysis becomes important because of its concern with the body in relation to the working class who, through bodily cognition as a necessary effect of a physically intensive life, developed different relations to their bodies than the white middle or dominant classes.29 Moreover, for Indigenous communities, sub-cultures developed throughout much of the twentieth century based on a relationship with a physically labouring body that, in turn, has come to symbolise traditional Indigenous cultures. For instance, the relationship between physical labour and sport with the Mäori male body has determined a traditional Mäori masculinity symbolically reified within the physical realm.30 As a consequence, many Indigenous communities remain predominantly working class. However, if we are to perceive of present day culture 110 VOLUME15 NUMBER2 SEP2009 as ‘postmodern’ then the relationship to the body with work and production becomes less important than an analysis of the fragmentation of the Indigenous body within late-capitalism.

## AT Essential Workers PIC

#### Perm do the counterplan – severance is justified because severance bad arguments presume rational cartesian subjects that are bound to strict lines of thought within a confined space.

#### Perm do both – Unconditional does not preclude exemptions for essential workers to go on strike, an unconditional right simply means that the right to strike can be unconditionally invoked given the limitations established.

#### Counterplan does not solve the aff – bracketing out some countries as capable of implementing and supervising sustainable mining practices reinforces the duality between humans an external outer space we can control.

#### Counterplan recreates cartesian capitalist hierarchies among nation states– States granted privileges to mine or extract are assessed as civilized and sophisticated enough to appropriate celestial resources while countries lacking resources to appropriate outer space are valued as less civilized and inferior – justifying discrimination and violence against less developed states.

## AR AT CAP K

**Top Level**

#### Their deployment of collective institutionalist scholarship produces native erasure – natives are forced to choose between assimilating or being blamed for the movement’s failure. Ask yourself why the aff is the straw that breaks the camel’s back, and crushes their movement. You should view all of the links as a move towards holding native’s copable for institutional solidarity.

### Western Engagement DA

**Institutional engagement strategies that prioritize class and capitalism are paradoxically exclusionary for natives because they prioritize materialism and the division of land as a resource. Indigenous life and spirituality is alienated as a result**

**Mauro 11** (Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro, Associate professor of geography, State University of new york at new paltz, "Fighting for Socialism on Great Turtle Island— The Struggle Against Settler Colonialism," 2011 <http://www.oldandnewproject.net/Essays/Saed_Turtle%20Island.html>, RLA)

**The U.S. and Canada are settler colonial dictatorships.** This is hardly a revelation. Yet **most anti- capitalist leftist radicals seem unaware of or indifferent to this truth, a fact that is well illustrated by the paucity of concern expressed in socialist publications and other outlets with decolonization struggles on Great Turtle Island** (the name some Native Peoples give to what is often called"North America"). **This struggle should, however, be understood as fundamental to bringing about the demise of U.S. imperialism and building a post-capitalist alternative**. There has, of course, always been verbal acknowledgment of this and even a few efforts among socialists to recognize and act upon settler colonialism. Still, it has rarely figured prominently or centrally in any socialist platform in this part of the world, **nor have the contradictions inherent in a Eurocentric socialism** (in which I include anarchism) **been systematically confronted**—at least not without less than flattering results (see for example the book edited by Ward Churchill, number 7 on our list of readings below). It is disconcerting that most socialists, especially in the U.S., still cannot grasp what should be most obvious: The decolonization of Great Turtle Island would mean the end of U.S. imperialism everywhere—and with it a likely fatal weakening of all U.S.-supported institutions of repression worldwide. This is even more reason for considering the matter to be of some urgency. The recurring, intertwined social and environmental catastrophes generated through the capitalist mode of production are most clearly expressed in the genocides perpetrated against Indigenous Peoples. To put the matter succinctly, capitalist environmental degradation (not just global warming) is threatening or has already destroyed lives and livelihoods worldwide, with or without U.S. imperialism, and largely at the expense of the least powerful. Meanwhile, catastrophes are used to deflect attention away from capitalism as the root cause of those very same catastrophes. Indigenous Peoples have played and continue to play a pivotal role in the struggle against the capitalist mode of production and against any attempt to obscure the causes of worldwide environmental devastation.¶ We should, of course, acknowledge that **any expectation of a unified perspective and/or action developing among socialists and revolutionaries** (now a small, often marginalized if not persecuted political fraction of mainstream settler colonial society) **and all Indigenous Peoples of Great Turtle Island, or even of the Indigenous communities themselves, would be unrealistic**. Indigenous societies, for many reasons (some traceable to pre-invasion histories) are internally fractured, if not at times even mutually hostile. Some are even openly supportive of colonial governments. And socialists are similarly divided and politically diverse. But such **difficulties can be no excuse for the continuing indifference of most socialists towards the settler colonial dictatorships on which the modern industrial living standards** (shared, for the most part by these groups of radicals themselves) are based.¶ A counter-trend might be developing with recent collaboration and expressions of affinity among some Indigenous and socialist activists, especially in Canada (see works 1, 3, 11 and 14 on the list below). With **the tendency worldwide for Indigenous Peoples to play a central role in resisting further capitalist encroachments and ecological destruction,** such linkages could not be more opportune, as noted by Hugo Blanco (again see list of readings). **Indigenous Peoples on Great Turtle Island do not need socialists to carry on with their struggles.** Major capitalist assaults on livelihoods and ecosystems have been successfully repelled through alliances between Indigenous communities and parts of the rural working class in places like Wisconsin, to cite one example, while most socialists, especially Marxists, have largely missed the boat. Arguably, this is due to several assumptions that are both long-standing and foundational. Then let us add: completely **Eurocentric.** Such **assumptions must be shed once and for all—which will also, of course, mean major shifts in political organizing practices and programmatic objectives.** But if **an ecologically sensible socialist current** (or really any socialist current) **is to flourish and challenge the status-quo in Great Turtle Island such a paradigm shift is essential**. These **Eurocentric assumptions include** inter-related notions of 1) **stage-based social change, with one "mode of production" giving way logically and inevitably to another, socialism becoming possible only based on the productive forces generated by capitalism** (which Marx himself began rethinking, even if extremely late in his life, thanks to Vera Zasulich); 2) **the working class as the only revolutionary subject within capitalist society;** and 3) the state as the primary vehicle for revolutionary change. (See also, from this last point of view, reading 5 below.) The first assumption remains common to most left-wing groups which, among other things, persist in their belief that progress is tied to integrating masses of people into a single polity (with democratic central planning) and increasing the level of technology (now of an environmentally friendly variety). **If we start with these assumptions, the claims for land restitution raised by Indigenous Peoples, and their reticence to accept any assimilation, immediately become obstacles to "progress." Further, there is no room for Indigenous traditional life-ways in this worldview, because these stand in the way of resource extraction for the sake of the (not so) general good**. **The second assumption makes it necessary to explain away actual revolutionary subjects** that do not live up to Marxist preconceptions, such as peasants in the Russian, Mexican, and Chinese revolutions, and **Indigenous Peoples** who are **countering both settler colonialism (capitalist expansionism) and environmental devastation** simultaneously. For most socialists it remains too difficult to abandon these two foundational assumptions. But the third—the role of the state—probably raises the most tenacious resistance. And **yet if we continue to insist on statist strategies in a context where states have been imposed on often previously egalitarian societies, it is tantamount to partaking in a reinforcement of the settler colonial dictatorship and in the complete annihilation of such egalitarian societies once and for all**. This is not only a matter of subordinating questions related to Indigenous Peoples' sovereignty to other "more central" struggles. **In territories such as Great Turtle Island and northern Siberia, where states did not exist prior to colonizer invasions, projecting a centralized state as the key to creating a socialist society actively undermines Indigenous Peoples' anti-colonial struggles and thereby any prospect of establishing ecologically sustainable egalitarian** (i.e., ecosocialist) **societies.** But even anarchist currents are not immune to criticism. Why, for example, have anarchists only recently paid close attention to settler colonialism? This includes even some Indigenous activist currents. Eurocentric anti-statism, such as Proudhon's federalism or Landauer's structural renewal, is just as counterproductive as the traditional Marxist approach. There is even the occasional proposal for "a radical rehabilitation of the state" coming from Indigenous communities themselves—for example in Canada. These are reminiscent of the reformist concept of "democratizing" the state, and not therefore likely to be of use. This is because **the capitalist mode of production, which is inherently expansionistic, is based on the state as one of its main pillars. There is no confederacy or Indigenous- settler coexistence possible alongside a capitalist system of production, with its relentless pressure to ransack ecosystems everywhere for the endless accumulation of capital.** The mere everyday bustling of a capitalist society, with its incessant internal conflicts and violent repressions, necessitates ever-larger amounts of resources, often taken violently.

### Relationality DA

**Their pursuit of anti-capitalism absent a program of conscientization ensures the communities they create, socialist as they may be, will prosper off of the material kickbacks of imperial plunder, locking in global power relations of domination.**

**Peju 1960** [Marcel, one of the editors of *Temps Modernes*, “Mourir pour de Gaulle?,” in *Temps Modernes* No. 175-176, October-November. Found as a footnote on page 59 of *Wretched of the Earth*, Trans. Richard Philcox]

To make a radical distinction between the construction of socialism in Europe and “relations with the Third World” (as if any of our relations with it were external) is, knowingly or unknowingly, giving priority to restructuring the colonial heritage over the liberation of the underdeveloped countries, in other words constructing a de luxe type of socialism on the fruits of imperial plunder—as if a gang were to share out the loot more or less equitably even if it means giving a little to the poor by way of charity and forgetting they are giving back to the people they stole from.

### Root Cause

**Settler colonialism is foundational to class relations—extermination of indigenous populations enabled the techniques of managing surplus and capitalism can only be theorized as a spatial phenomenon**

**Lloyd and Wolfe 15**

[07 May 2015, David Lloyd and Patrick Wolfe, “Settler colonial logics and the neoliberal regime”, Settler Colonial Studies, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2201473X.2015.1035361]

It is highly significant that the distinctive characteristics of this emergent global regime have been locally prefigured in modes of repression **developed internally by settler colonial states**. As Israeli architect and specialist on urban warfare, Eyal Weizman, has argued, for instance, the West Bank can be seen as an extreme model – perhaps a laboratory – of a territorial and urban conflict that can take place in other places. Globalization takes the periphery straight to the center, the frontier between the First and Third worlds starts running through the middle of world cities.3 Weizmann's phrasing signals a genealogy for contemporary transformations in the longer history of colonialism as a repertoire of both tropes and practices of social control, brought together today in Israel's operations as a settler colonial state, anomalous only in that its project of expansion remains unfinished.4 The notable convergence of Israel and the USA (together with an ever-compliant Australia), expressed as much in their political solidarity as in their military and security collaborations, suggests to us a wider historical affinity between states that share a settler colonial history, one that continues to impress itself on both psychic and institutional formations. In this respect, to Weizmann's invocation of the first and third worlds, we should add the histories of dispossession and resistance through which Indigenous peoples of the ‘fourth world’ have shaped our understanding of the dynamics of settler colonialism and its lessons for the present. We suggest that the fundamental continuity between the historical development of European settler colonialism and the present-day development of the neoliberal world order **resides in the exigencies of managing surplus populations**. So far as settlers have been concerned, the salient surplus has, of course, been the Native population, whose refractory presence has prompted a range of techniques of elimination – from outright homicide to various forms of removal and/or confinement, and, once their numbers have been appropriately reduced in the post-frontier era, to Natives’ assimilation into settler society – techniques that have met with mixed success in the face of Native modes of resistance which have varied as creatively as the settlers’ own repertoire of strategies. In this overall historical process, the key shift is the ending of the frontier, which generally coincides with the consolidation of the settler state, and which is typically marked by intensified programs of Native assimilation, so many mopping-up exercises for civilization. Thus it is consistent that Israel, which remains bogged down in an incomplete expansion of its frontier, should rigorously eschew any semblance of Native assimilation, insisting instead on the sharpest of distinctions between Palestinians, who may or may not be citizen/residents of the Israeli state, and members of the so-called ‘Jewish nation’ wherever they may live. The exclusion of the Palestinian population is particularly apparent in the ease with which shifting economic and demographic circumstances – especially the large-scale immigration of Arab-Jews (Mizrahim) and Russians – have transformed what was once a reserve Palestinian labor force into a largely unemployed surplus. Bereft of potential productive utility, and with pauperization attenuating its value as a market, the Palestinian population has become subject to policies of removal and confinement that recall those adopted by other settler states while the expansion of their frontiers remained incomplete. Locally, therefore, Israel is straightforwardly settler colonial and bears comparison in important respects to the respective histories of settler societies such as Australia or the USA in the eras before these societies had completed the initial seizure of Native peoples’ land and inheritances. Globally, however, the twenty-first century context in which Israel is seeking to complete the seizure of what remains of Mandate Palestine differs crucially from the nineteenth-century context in which settlers in Australia and North America completed their seizure of the Native estate. Globally, the **dispossession of Indigenous peoples in Australia and North America took place in the context of (and formatively enabled) the titanic growth of industrial capitalism**. As Karl Polanyi observed, doing scant justice to Marx, an unprecedented feature of the emergence of industrial society was the sheer scale of the investment that was involved in factories. Not even shipbuilding had previously come close to the financial input required by the establishment of factories, with their heavy plant and infrastructure. Nor had any previous investment required maintenance for the length of time that it took factories to become profitable. To vouchsafe these investments, and to project factories’ viability forward through generations, required the total reorganization of society, complete with novel forms of surveillance, policing and war-making, that marked industrialization in the nineteenth century.5 This much is hardly novel. For our purposes, the crucial feature of the great nineteenth-century transformation is that it did not necessarily conduce to permanently superfluous populations. Rather, working populations grew dramatically. In addition to providing capital with its labor, the industrial proletariat provided a market for the fruits of its own alienated production. True, temporary labor surpluses were generated in the course of the periodic slumps and depressions that overtook the capitalist economy, especially after the 1870s, but this labor could be re-employed, even if only for warfare, once industrial demand was reinstated. Moreover, throughout this period, colonial settlement provided an outlet for the Malthusian excess, industrial society's surplus poor, who departed their Dickensian slums for Indigenous people's stolen homelands. The present situation is entirely different from the socially expansive context of nineteenth-century industrial capitalism. As many have noted, in the phenomenon of automation, capitalism has, as it were, over-succeeded, not only freeing itself from dependence on troublesome human labor but thereby simultaneously generating a population that, in contrast to waged labor, is not even much use as a market. As distinct from resistant Natives, this human surplus is produced within capitalism rather than external to it. In common with Natives, however, it obstructs rather than enables capitalist expansion. It is in relation to this community of redundancy, we believe, th**at settler colonialism's inventory of local strategies is becoming increasingly congenial to neoliberalism's emergent world orde**r. As we have noted elsewhere, in relation to Black people in the contemporary USA, the blatant racial zoning of large cities and the penal system suggests that, once colonized people outlive their utility, settler societies can fall back on the repertoire of strategies (in this case, spatial sequestration) **whereby they have also dealt with the Native surplus.**6 In this connection, we might view the phenomenon of warehousing, characterized by Klein, Jeff Halper and, above all, by Mike Davis,7 as **prefigured in the late-nineteenth-century Indian reservation**. The comparison may also serve to qualify the pessimism that consideration of this topic understandably engenders. Territorial concentration is both confining and enabling. From the settlers’ point of view, Indian reservations may have originated as holding pens for conquered peoples, but they also constitute unsurrendered, albeit diminished, repositories of Native sovereignty, focal points for survival and renewal. State strategies for **managing the warehoused surplus evince characteristics that are distinctly settler colonial in relation to other forms of colonialism**. In particular, the spatial **confinement of unwanted populations recapitulates the territorial adjacencies of settler colonialism**, which differs from blue-water colonialism in its spatial imbrication of metropolis and periphery.8 In expanding across continuous territory, settler colonialism seeks to **render the outside inside, a process that necessarily produces enemies within**. The intimacies of conquest militate against indiscriminate procedures, encouraging the spatial confinement of populations targeted for repression. In such ways, we believe, the ongoing history of settler colonialism **forms a crucial terrain through which to understand the systemic harmony between military occupation as a further version of colonial intervention and the formations and practices of the neoliberal state that have emerged to regulate and promote a new regime of capital accumulation**. We may be witnessing the consolidation of a new ‘nomos of the earth’, to use Carl Schmitt's term, but it is clear that the means and techniques of governance that maintain and police that nomos draw from longer histories of domination.9 As a Nazi, and an acutely reflexive one at that, Schmitt was singularly qualified to articulate the logic of oppression.10 He argued that every nomos or ordering of the world is instituted on the basis of a primary appropriation, Nahme or Landnahme, which establishes a bounding line, or enclosure, and stands as ‘a constitutive act of spatial ordering’.11 That initial act is **also ‘the original constitution, the concrete primal norm, the beginning of law and property’**.12 Locke's primal fiction that ‘In the beginning, all the world was America’ was for Schmitt a concrete historical fact. For him, the modern, Eurocentric world order, which in 1950 he already perceived as ‘foundering’, had a very specific origin in the conquest of the Americas, ‘the basic event in the history of European international law – the land-appropriation of the new world’.13 The nomos of the earth established by the European law of nations (later international law) dominated the globe up till the Second World War with the establishment of a quite literal line that ran through the Azores and Canary Islands and divided the sovereign, territorial states of Europe from what was now defined as ‘free land’, together with the no less ‘free sea’. ‘At this “line”, Europe ended and the “New World” began’.14 This ‘new world’ of ‘free land’ was open to appropriation; furthermore, This freedom meant that the line set aside an area where force could be used freely and ruthlessly. … Everything that occurred ‘beyond the line’ remained outside the legal, moral, and political values recognized on this [sic] side of the line.15 It is important to stress that this ‘line’, the bounding line of the modern, colonial-capitalist nomos, was a specific and recognized geographical marker, a longitude or meridian, that divided the world spatially. But is was also simultaneously a line that demarcated the world legally and morally between those subject to force and those subject to law, between the ‘subjects of transparency’ and the ‘subjects of affectability’, to use Denise da Silva's terms.16 This spatio-moral line has determined historically the distribution of law and civility to some, to others coercion and force. It represents, as Schmitt went on to show, not only the Hobbesian ‘abyss between freedom (the lawlessness of the state of nature) and an orderly “civil” mode of existence’, but also ‘a designated zone of free and empty space’ subject to a ‘state of exception’, that is, ‘a suspension of all law for a certain time and in a certain space’.17 Our analysis of settler colonialism prompts a crucial clarification of the temporality built into Schmitt's schema. In addition to the temporally bounded states of emergency that periodically legitimate the exception's application across society as a whole, **settler colonialism permanently schedules the refractory Native alternative for elimination**. Typically, this structural bifurcation has **a spatial correlate**. Zones set aside for the Native surplus, ‘beyond the Pale’ enclaves such as the Indian reservation, the Palestinian refugee camp, Gaza, or the Aboriginal fringe-camp, **constitute settler colonialism's permanent spaces of exception**. The bounding line that insulates these spaces must, therefore, be understood as simultaneously both spatial and juridical, determining the subjects of the law: the law and its abrogation are dialectical reflexes of each other.18 Thus a further revision to analytical temporalities is required. Settler colonialism is not some transitional phase that gives way to – or even provides a laboratory for – the emergent global order. **In both the originary and the continuing senses, it is foundational to that order**. It has often been assumed that, while both capitalism and the modern state originated in processes including primitive accumulation, imperialism, colonialism and conquest, modernization in both the political and economic spheres gradually leaves those stages behind, allowing for some form of cosmopolitan transnational globality to emerge. In particular, settler colonialism and primitive accumulation have been understood to belong to early stages of colonial-capitalist expansion and accordingly to be formations lodged in the past. Challenged initially by Rosa Luxemburg, as Sarita See shows in her essay below, Marx's understanding of primitive accumulation as an initial and by-passed stage of capitalism has more recently been critiqued by David Harvey, **who** proposes the term ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in its place, to designate a more rigorous understanding of the ongoing nature of the process. To this we would add that, just as ‘primitive accumulation’ continues and renews its forms, **neither settler colonialism nor military occupation can be consigned to the past**.19 Both continue to shape not only the states that locally originated in them but, increasingly, the emergent global order that settler colonialism underpins.