## **NC FW**

**I negate resolution that The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust**

**My value criteria is maximizing aggregate utility of the general population – For life to be worth living, it is agreed upon that each member of a society must have an equal opportunity to maximize their general happiness and welfare, which are tangible experiences derived from material conditions**

**Default to an aggregate utilitarian calculus – Maximizing aggregate utility for the general population allows for policies that align with each actor’s preference for equal material outcomes.**

**Allen 17** (Daneille Allen, Director of the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University and professor in Harvard’s Department of Government and Graduate School of Education, political theorist who has published broadly in democratic theory, political sociology, and the history of political thought, “Political Equality and Empowering Economies-- Toward a New Political Economy” Page 2 – 7 <http://henryfarrell.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Allen_equality.pdf>,)

We were of course surprised not just by Brexit and Trump but also by the recession of 2008. We have therefore been living in a state of intellectual surprise for almost a decade. Why is it that we have been so blind-sided? The answer lies, I suggest, in the dominant liberal policy-making paradigms. The dominant liberal policy paradigm, emerging from places like Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and operating in Washington think-tanks and policy making-spaces, fuses two things: utilitarian economic welfarism and Rawlsian welfarism. Let me explain**. On the utilitarian model the goal of policy is to maximize happiness or, better, utility, as the economists label it, for society. In its crudest forms, the effort to maximize aggregate utility relies on cost-benefit analyses, linked to preferences typically cast in terms of material goods.** Much modeling of utility maximization in relation to preferences has abstracted away from the contextual, social, psychological, and cultural particularities of individual economic actors. **The pursuit of utilitarian welfare maximization has typically focused on maximizing aggregate growth—in terms of income and wealth--and on using redistributive policies to spread the benefit of that growth**. John Rawls is a philosopher who in 1971 published an important book called Theory of Justice; and one of his main goals was to overturn utilitarianism. He sought to prioritize the right over the good, establishing as the purpose of political order the protection of a framework of right, not the pursuit of any particular good, even utility or happiness. Yet even as, philosophically, he sought to overturn utilitarianism, in many ways Rawlsianism has reinforced its practical applications. In the Rawlsian framework, the goal of a just society is to do two things. The first goal is to protect a set of basic liberties. Those basic liberties include things like the right of association, the right to free expression, and the right to participate politically. The second goal is to pursue social and economic structures, within the constraint of protecting those rights, that are to the benefit of the least well of in society (“the difference principle”) and that secure fair equal opportunity throughout the society. Rawls’ innovative and influential difference principle has anchored the major part of the reception of his work and led to a dominant focus, in philosophical discussions of justice, on the economic questions of distributive justice. These questions have gotten far more attention than his discussion of basic rights. Indeed, in the policy world, Rawlsianism has turned into a basic focus on redistributive taxation as the starting point for building a policy framework. Without intending to, Rawls reinforced the utilitarian paradigm precisely by hiving off consideration of basic rights from his treatment, via the difference principle, of social and economic spheres. **He provided support for the utilitarian focus on growth, so long as it was tethered to redistribution.** **In both utilitarian welfarism and Rawlsian welfarism, as expressed in the policy world, the core question for justice is one of material distribution**. **This is recognizable. When someone invokes the concept of “social justice,” the first thing that comes to mind tends to be matters of economic distribution and welfarist social rights**. Similarly, when a speaker invokes the concept of inequality, the relevant kind of inequality the speaker has in mind is almost invariably economic inequality. That’s what scholars and the general public know how to talk about, thanks to the intellectual support provided by policy paradigms coming out of utilitarian welfarism, on the one hand, and Rawlsian welfarism, on the other. Two features of this fused utilitarian-Rawlsian policy paradigm merit attention. The first is that both the utilitarian paradigm and the Rawlsian paradigm are universalizing. **That is, they both abstract away from the contextual specifics of any given society to develop their overarching policy guidelines (utility maximization, on the one hand; and the difference principle, on the other).** For instance, in Theory of Justice, Rawls seeks the definition of the right by asking us to imagine stepping behind “a veil of ignorance,” where we no longer know anything about our own social situation; from that perspective in the imagination, we are to try to identify the principles that would constitute a just society, **one that we will consider just regardless of whether we turn out to be one of the just society’s wealthier or poorer, male or female, black or white citizens and so forth**. The principles of justice are to be devised without taking into account any underlying demographic features of a society. Moreover, **they are understood to apply universally, to any social context.** In the context of utilitarianism, the move to abstract away from social particularity is less a matter of the intentional design of the theory and more a necessary consequence of its mathematization. In principle, utility is a concept that can embrace not only a given actors preferences for material outcomes but also his or her values and norms. But the project of “maximizing” utility requires that we convert preferences into something arithmetic, and so financial interests are conventionally used as a proxy for utility, thus flattening the particularities of preference that may in fact give meaning and shape to the life of any particular agent. As in the Rawlsian case, the move to treat material gain, money, as a proxy for utility permits universalization. Financial stakes can be translated into a currency and compared across countries and contexts without reference to the underlying demographic facts or situations on the ground in any given country. In other words, one of the things both of these intellectual paradigms do is turn our attention away from the underlying demographic and institutionalarrangements of a society. Our minds are trained away from questions such as: Who has power and on account of what sorts of institutional structures and according to what sorts of allocations of resources and opportunities? We lose the habit of analyzing the demographic and political specificity of any given society to the degree that we embrace and reinforce the habits of using utilitarian and/or Rawlsian welfarism. To give you a concrete example of the kind of abstraction I am trying to pinpoint, think about how the World Bank historically operated throughout the late 20th century. A set of boilerplate requirements for economic liberalization were applied to developing economies as conditions for receiving loans from the bank. The fact the stability of these welfarist policy paradigms has taught us to overlook underlying social and political phenomena flows, I think, from a small philosophical mistake made in the early 19th century, and characterizing most variants of liberalism ever since. The mistake was to draw a distinction between two halves of that set of basic rights protected by liberalism. I introduced the concept of basic rights in describing Rawls’ Theory of Justice, and provided as examples freedom of association, freedom of expression, and the right to participate in politics. With these three examples, I was limning the full spectrum of basic rights, including both halves as distinguished in the early 19th century. What does this mean exactly? An early 19th century French thinker named Benjamin Constant was the first to divide basic rights, basic human rights, into two categories. He called them the rights of the ancients and the rights of the moderns. The rights of the ancients comprised rights to participate in politics, in shaping the collective life of a society. We now call these positive liberties. The rights of the moderns, in contrast, comprise a right to property and the right to be left alone to take your property, which you have a right to, and to engage in commercial transactions in pursuit of your own wellbeing as you see fit. We call these negative liberties. The rights of the ancients were political rights, a right to be a part of a society that was working together to steer itself through collective decision making**. The rights of the moderns, forConstant, were about private autonomy, having the right to steer your own life, and being more or less left alone by any collective decision- making, to the maximum degree possible.** That distinction has worked its way into the philosophical tradition, and was extended by Isaiah Berlin in the early 20th century (who introduced the terms negative and positive liberties). Rawls, in Theory of Justice, argues that he’s putting the two sets of rights back together again and that we need to protect the whole set of basic rights. In fact, however, the political rights become sacrifice-able in his argument, in various technical ways that I won’t go into here (but do detail in Allen, “Difference without Domination”). Over the whole arc of Theory of Justice, we end up primarily focusing our thinking about politics on the conjunction of our private rights (the right to autonomy, property, association, expression, and so forth) with the economic questions associated with those rights-- the wealth associated with property and the need for redistribution that comes from the unequal flow of the gains of productivity across a population. In other words, when you lose sight of the political rights and focus primarily on the private rights or negative liberties, you can easily come to focus exclusively on economic questions and lose sight of political questions. That is what I see as having happened in the policy paradigms that dominated U.S. policy-making in the late 20th century. Another part of the story about the development of a truncated focus on economic questions— without reference to underlying political questions—relates to the transition over the course of the 20th century from the influence of law on public policy to the influence of economics. Sociologist Elizabeth Popp Berman (2014) has written well about the variety of factors— including new capacities for computation—that drove that change, and much more could be said about this transition. But the transition from law to economics also underscores the point I’m making**.** Legal thinking is fundamentally about the institutions of specific societies and about the consequences of particularities of those institutions for specific societies. Even sub-disciplines like comparative law that compare the legal systems in different places must begin by seeing the specificity of the legal institutions in each place under comparison. When law dominated the policy-making universe, universalizing policy approaches that abstracted from demographic and social specificity, were not broadly available. The abstracting, universalizing features of the fused utilitarian/Rawlsian welfarism that dominated policy making of the late 20th century seem to me to have produced the blindspots to society, politics, and political rights, that left us surprised not only by 2008 but also by Brexit and Trump.

## **Contention One: Private companies are key to US-China deterrence.**

#### **Remote-sensing satellites and other innovations put the United States ahead of other adversaries seeking to control space, but Chinese and Russian military doctrines prove a desire to counteract U.S. military capabilities in space**

**Council of Economic Advisers 21** ("Economic Report of the President," Together with The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers January 2021 page 247 – 248 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/2021-ERP.pdf>)

Box 8-2. National Security and Space

Space-based capabilities are crucial for the United States’ security. Space has become a primary component of U.S. military operations, including missile warning, geolocation and navigation, target identification, and activities to track adversaries. **Remote-sensing satellites have greatly improved military and intelligence collection capabilities, thereby reducing other countries’ ability to carry out covert military exercises and operations**. **As advancements in the space sector occur, such as technological improvements and lower barriers to entry, foreign governments are developing capabilities that could threaten the United States’ freedom to operate in space**. In a 2020 report, **the Defense Intelligence Agency points out how China and Russia, in particular, are trying to undermine the United States’ advantage in space** (DIA 2019). For example, **Chinese and Russian military doctrines present a view that counterspace capabilities serve as a tool to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. and allied military forces**. Both countries have developed extensive space surveillance networks that enable them to monitor, track, and target American and allied forces. Additionally, both China and Russia are working on their cyberspace and jamming capabilities. The Trump Administration recognizes the importance of establishing and maintaining influence in space and providing space security for U.S. interests and the American people. In March 2018, the White House unveiled a new National Space Strategy that places an emphasis on “peace through strength in the space domain.” **Though adversaries are attempting to use space as a weapon, the United States’ stance is to protect the space domain from conflict and secure the United States’ vital interests in space—namely, the freedom of operation in space to advance security, economic prosperity, and scientific knowledge**. Although peace in the space domain is a top priority, the National Space Strategy affirms that **the United States needs to be vigilant about any harmful interference within the space domain that negatively affects America’s or its allies’ vital interests and must “deter, counter, and defeat” any such threats**. **Space systems are vital to the U.S. economy and national security, and they enable key functions such as global communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; scientific observation; exploration; weather monitoring; and multiple vital national defense applications.** In September 2020, President Trump issued Space Policy Directive (SPD)–5, “Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems,” which provides guidance on the protection of space assets and supporting infrastructure from evolving cyber threats. The National Space Strategy also emphasizes the importance of better leveraging and supporting the commercial sector to ensure that American companies are leaders in space technology. This is discussed more throughout this chapter. To strengthen the United States’ military position in the space domain, President Trump established the United States Space Force (USSF) as the sixth branch of the U.S. Armed Forces by signing the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2020. Vice President Pence has stated that the mission of the Space Force is to “develop and implement the unique strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures our armed forces need to deter and defeat a new generation of threats in space” (Pence 2019). Its responsibilities include “developing military space professionals, acquiring military space systems, maturing the military doctrine for space power, and organizing space forces to present to our Combatant Commands” (USSF 2020).

#### **U.S. Defensive Space strategy is essential to deterring aggressive Chinese Expansion and preventing conflict**

**Grossman and Langeland 21** (Derek Grossman***,*** *senior defense analyst at the* RAND Corporation focused on a range of national security policy and Indo-Pacific security issues, KRISTA LANGELAND, received her PhD in Materials Science in 2012. She is currently an Associate Physical Scientist at RAND Corporation, "Tailoring Deterrence for China in Space*" CHAPTER FIVE Implications for the United States* Page 37 – 42 <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA900/RRA943-1/RAND_RRA943-1.pdf>)

A deterrence strategy tailored to the space domain will need to consider capabilities, actions, and retaliatory responses in other domains and use this to shape China’s perception of the costs and gains of interfering in space. **From our analysis here, several initial observations on how the United States could best shape China’s perception of cost and gains become apparent**. First, given that Beijing clearly believes that space deterrence is part and parcel of undermining the overall will and capabilities of an adversary to resist in armed conflict, Washington might need to rethink how it responds to the Chinese escalation ladder. For example, if Beijing escalates from military space exercises to space force deployments, as described by Jiang and Wang above, then Washington should seek to convey to Beijing that its space deterrence strategy is not working. **This would entail the United States demonstrating resolve to fight on in the confrontation, and might require meeting Chinese space escalation with countervailing U.S. responses in the space domain, other domains, or both.** **Doing so would reinforce the message that Beijing is failing to achieve the desired end state.** **Communicating the United States’ ability and intent to respond in other domains is important for this tailored deterrence strategy.** From this perspective, it is concerning that official U.S. space strategy still generally conceptualizes American space deterrence efforts as confined to the space domain. According to the Pentagon’s Defense Space Strategy Summary, published in June 2020, **Washington seeks “to deter and defeat adversary hostile use of space” in order to “maintain space superiority” as well as “deter aggression inspace” to “ensure space stability**.”1 The strategy does not address how Washington would effectively prevent Chinese actions in space from undermining terrestrial-based U.S. joint military operations in all other domains. In the first USSF Chief of Space Operations’ planning guidance of November 2020, however, the United States approaches doing so by stating that “**we will support a position of strategic stability, United States advantage in space, and a space warfighting posture that deters aggression and ensures Joint and Coalition warfighters can employ forces in the time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing.”**2 Further, the United States Space Command, while previously focused on providing capabilities that support other military operations, such as communication satellites and missile warning, has shifted to a new paradigm that recognizes that, should U.S. space capabilities be targeted, the United States Space Command would need to be supported by other combatant commands.3 These recent shifts that recognize the supporting and supported role of the space domain are positive moves toward a multidomain approach to space deterrence. The bottom line is that the United States’ public statements should avoid space-to-space calculations and encompass deterring China’s plans to impact the entirety of the United States’ war effort through activities in space. Doing so could convince Beijing that such a plan would not work, or at least that it would be less effective than previously thought. Second, the United States might seek ways of demonstrating that it is not as highly dependent on satellite-enabled warfare as Beijing has come to believe in recent years. As discussed above, China assesses that U.S. satellites were an essential enabler of Washington’s successful joint military operations against Iraq. In order to modify Chinese perceptions that the United States is heavily reliant on space and therefore reduce Beijing’s focus on space deterrence, Washington could publicly reveal new capabilities outside of the space domain, such as advancedsurveillance remote piloted vehicles or new communications systems, which demonstrate redundancy of its space-based capabilities. Developing and messaging the existence of this redundancy could encourage China to reconsider the value of taking escalatory steps in space. From this perspective, the establishment of USSF is counterproductive because the new service implies that Beijing is correct—that is, that the United States does highly value outer space and must defend it at all costs to avoid vulnerabilities on Earth. USSF Chief of Space Operations’ guidance says as much: “Space is a vital national interest. Activities on land, at sea, in the air, through cyberspace, and in the electromagnetic spectrum all depend on space superiority. The nation established the United States Space Force to ensure freedom of action for the United States in, from, and to space.”4 Chinese observers have also accurately identified the rationale behind the establishment of USSF, with one noting that “the U.S. military believes that entering, utilizing and controlling space is of great strategic significance for maintaining national defense security. The United States military has been committed to innovating tactics and strategies to control space power, strengthening the support of space organization system to ensure the technical advantages of space equipment.”5 This is not to say, however, that the establishment of USSF is an error or is somehow misguided. But the fact of USSF’s existence does perhaps unavoidably show just how important defending space is for the United States and thereby confirms the Chinese approach. Third, the United States would probably benefit from encouraging China to question its own ability to leverage the space domain in support of the PLA’s system-of-systems concept of modern warfare and terrestrial-based joint operations. This might be accomplished via a demonstration of capabilities that would compromise PLA space systems, perhaps through enhanced U.S. cyberhacking, spoofing, jamming, or other dazzling capabilities against China, but could also include kinetic options as well. **If Beijing believes** **its ability to leverage space for terrestrial-based joint operations is no longer reliable, or lessreliable than previously assessed, then it might have to look elsewhere to achieve these capabilities. In this scenario, the United States may observe a reduction in China’s emphasis on achieving space supremacy and its corresponding deterrence activities in space. Beijing might be compelled to cede gains toward space superiority in favor of gains in more advantageous domains. In this regard, the establishment of USSF serves the very important purpose of keeping pressure on China in space. From a Chinese perspective, it is worrying that the United States Defense Space Strategy calls for “build[ing] a comprehensive military advantage in space” by “building capabilities to counter hostile uses of space.” The strategy further states that “DoD [will develop an agile space enterprise that can take advantage of emerging technological and commercial innovation in order to continually outpace adversary threats.”**6 Beijing is undoubtedly concerned about USSF’s long-term plans. **There is the possibility that the United States eventually outcompetes China in space, which would ultimately prompt China to back down.** Threats to outspend Moscow during the Cold War and how this strategy contributed to the Soviet Union’s demise is an intriguing and relatively recent historical analogy. However, one Chinese article also highlights the destabilizing effect of USSF, noting that “the United States’ increased space deterrence not only directly poses a clear threat to its opponents, but also causes international space security to increasingly slip into an arms race and security dilemma. This change at the level of the international system caused by the United States’ pursuit of space hegemony has in turn shaped the current space security relationship, prompting other countries to make complex responses including counter-deterrence under system pressure.”7 Thus, USSF deterrence activities may have to be carefully calibrated to mitigate concern about its role. Messaging about USSF could emphasize its role in maintaining equitable access to space or resilience and reconstitution capabilities that deny PLA successes in space rather than simply ramping up punitive capabilities that can be mirrored on the other side. Fourth, and finally, the United States might want to consider the nature of its deterrence messaging to China in space. **As mentioned above, Washington would likely benefit from increased clarity in its warnings and intentions, signaling to Beijing that the United States will not “submit to the deterrer’s volition” as China moves up its spacedeterrence escalation ladder. There is a move in the space community away from technical warnings based on easily measurable metrics such as vicinity constraints in favor of behavior-based warnings, and messaging to China would benefit from following this shift. For example, the United Nations General Assembly recently passed a resolution drafted by the United Kingdom that focuses on such a behavior-based approach rather than an object-based approach.8 The resolution, “Reducing Space Threats Through Norms, Rules, and Principles of Responsible Behaviors,” gives states the flexibility to assess threats from their own national security perspective rather than presenting a unilateral assessment of threat based on an object itself.** The focus of this resolution on building norms and establishing an international code of conduct is in contrast to an object-based approach that would seek a treaty that bans specific kinds of ASAT tests. This shift toward a focus on behavioral norms is a positive step toward building a deterrence strategy with effective redlines.9 It is also the current position of the U.S. Department of State that behaviors should be the driver of deterrence messaging rather than technology and technical limits on its use.10 The implication would be that if China does not follow acceptable behavioral norms, then negative consequences could follow. This approach could accomplish two things. First, Beijing might be less likely to place counterspace assets just beyond Washington’s minimum standoff distance from the United States, thereby providing the United States with more reaction time in the event of attacks. And second, it would put the onuson China to be a more responsible power in space. Heeding Marquez’s advice to shift away from vicinity-based warnings in favor of behaviorbased warnings could make space force deployments, the third rung on the Chinese space escalation ladder, fraught with greater risk to China. At present, China seems to have more of an appreciation for vicinitybased messaging, as in the U.S. delineation of specific locations as redlines, as it typically loiters in the standoff threshold. Beijing typically disregards behavior-based messaging. The shift in the international space community toward establishing norms of behavior, coupled with a shift in Washington toward behavior-based messaging, may serve to increase the perceived importance of behavior-based messaging in Beijing’s mind by presenting them with increased costs should they violate these norms. Additionally, by placing the onus on China to act responsibly in space through threat of punishment or denial, this behavior-based messaging would in effect challenge Beijing’s objective to “seize the initiative” early to win in space. The United States has noted China’s inconsistency in its words and deeds in space, and this inconsistency is facilitated by the absence of behavioral-based norms in space.11 China routinely advocates the peaceful use of space and use of military force for defensive purposes only, yet continues the development and testing of counterspace weapons. Widespread adoption of international norms of behavior may resonate in China and, hopefully, keep Beijing true to its words (not deeds) and compel it to change its behavior going forward.12

#### **The failure of U.S. Space deteese Space Weaponizrrence spurs Chination and makes a space war inevitable. A space war would have detrimental effects on society through destroying logistics, communications, navigation systems, supply chains, and health care.**

**Erwin 21** (Sandra Erwin, covers the military and national security beat as a Senior Staff Writer at SpaceNews, "U.S. generals planning for a space war they see as all but inevitable" September 17, 2021 https://spacenews.com/u-s-generals-planning-for-a-space-war-they-see-as-all-but-inevitable/)

A ship in the Pacific Ocean carrying a high-power laser takes aim at a U.S. spy satellite, blinding its sensors and denying the United States critical eyes in the sky. This is one scenario that military officials and civilian leaders fear could lead to escalation and wider conflict as rival nations like China and Russia step up development and deployments of anti-satellite weapons. If a satellite came under attack, depending on the circumstances, “the appropriate measures can be taken,” said Lt. Gen. John Shaw, deputy commander of U.S. Space Command. The space battlefield is not science fiction and anti-satellite weapons are going to be a reality in future armed conflicts, Shaw said at the recent 36th Space Symposium in Colorado Springs. U.S. Space Command is responsible for military operations in the space domain, which starts at the Kármán line, some 100 kilometers (62 miles) above the Earth’s surface. This puts Space Command in charge of protecting U.S. satellites from attacks and figuring out how to respond if hostile acts do occur. Military space assets like satellites and ground systems typically have been considered “support” equipment that provide valuable services such as communications, navigation data and early warning of missile launches. But as the Pentagon has grown increasingly dependent on space, satellites are becoming strategic assets and coveted targets for adversaries. “It is impossible to overstate the importance of space-based systems to national security,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said in a keynote speech at the symposium. Shaw noted that Gen. John Hyten, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “likes to talk about satellites as being ‘big fat juicy targets.’” “I agree with that,” said Shaw. “But how do we change that? How do we make it more difficult for a potential adversary to think they could succeed in depriving us of our space capabilities?” Those questions are now being debated as Space Command develops what Shaw describes as “space warfighting doctrine.” A laser blinding a satellite is just an example of the types of attacks the U.S. has to prepare for, said Shaw. If that happened, the Defense Department would have to decide how to respond to that threat. Conceivably, naval or aerial forces would be called upon to take retaliatory action. “[W]e are only starting to grapple with… what space warfighting really means,” Shaw said. U.S. in a ‘long-term strategic competition’ A competition for space dominance between the United States and rival powers China and Russia prompted the Trump administration and Congress in 2019 to re-establish U.S. Space Command — which had been deactivated since 2002 — and create the U.S. Space Force as an independent service branch. Kendall, who was sworn in late July as the civilian leader of the Air Force and the Space Force, said **the United States is in a “long-term strategic competition” with China. The implications for space are significant, he said, as “China has moved aggressively to weaponize space.” The Space Force will invest in new capabilities to deter and win if deterrence fails,** Kendall said. **Any type of escalation can result in miscalculations and human errors which is why a space war is a “conflict that no one wants,” he said. The U.S. military’s space weapons that presumably would deter China from firing the first shot against a satellite are classified.** In a rare disclosure, the Space Force last year said it deployed an advanced ground-based communications jammer made by L3Harris that could be used as an “offensive weapon” to disrupt enemies’ satellite transmissions. Chris Kubasik, L3Harris vice chairman and CEO, said **there should be more awareness of the risks of an attack against a satellite precipitating a broader conflict.** “**I think it’s the biggest threat facing our nation,”** Kubasik said at the Space Symposium. **A war in space would be “detrimental to society” because satellites play such a central role in everyday life for most people. “If you think of the impact of a war in space and how it impacts something as simple as our cellphones, navigation, supply chain, logistics, healthcare. I think it is a serious issue. And I think we have to continue to talk about it**.” Public awareness and education about the nation’s dependence on space are needed to help DoD “get the funding to make sure that we deter or defeat our adversaries in space,” he said. Unlike conflicts on Earth, a space war is not easy to visualize. “I call it an invisible war with invisible hardware that people can’t see, it’s a little different than being here on the ground,” said Kubasik. First shot could be against satcom The military’s reliance on commercial satellites for communications makes these systems one of the most likely targets of enemy jammers and cyber disruptions, said Travis Langster, vice president and general manager of Comspoc, a company that monitors space traffic and tracks orbital activities. “Given the plethora of commercial space, based on the observations and activities we’ve seen at Comspoc, the target of that first shot is likely to be a commercial satellite,” Langster said during a Space Symposium panel discussion. By launching an electronic or cyberattack against a commercial satellite that is used by DoD for military operations, an enemy would be “trying to send a very specific message” that it does not draw a line between commercial and military space assets. The most likely scenario is a “reversible attack,” meaning some temporary loss of a space-based service, said Langster. “In this day and age, the first shot will likely be a cyberattack.” Carey Smith, CEO of defense and cybersecurity contractor Parsons, said space-based networks already are under attack. “Jamming is occurring today; there’s obviously cyber attacks that are occurring across the infrastructure,” she said. And there have been many documented attempts to interfere with communications signals in war zones where U.S. forces operate. But the question is whether these activities will escalate and lead to broader conflict. “I think the path to war in space is really based upon a space arms race, and we’ve been fortunate that we’ve been able to delay it up until this point, but it is perhaps imminent,” she added. A key reason why the space race is accelerating is that technology is advancing so rapidly, Smith said. A second reason is the absence of “binding commitments on what the operating norms are going to be in space,” she said. “And without that, we’re very likely to have a space war.” The only foundation of international space law that currently exists, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, is outdated and doesn’t address most space security issues that could set off a war, Smith noted. The treaty bans the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, prohibits military activities on celestial bodies and contains legally binding rules governing the peaceful exploration and use of space. But a new set of rules is needed for the current space age, Smith said. “We really haven’t addressed some of the very difficult questions. Can a nation tailgate another nation’s satellite? Is preemptive self defense going to be permissible? Are we going to ban any form of weapons in space?” Frank Backes, senior vice president of space and defense contractor Kratos, echoed that sentiment. “We’ve seen very intentional interference within regional conflicts to take military systems offline,” he said. Of particular concern to the Pentagon are disruptions to satellite communications networks that are used to operate unmanned surveillance aircraft. Drones rely on GPS and satellite communications systems to track and strike targets. “Those types of reversible effects have already entered into the space layer, but I agree with Carrie Smith. It is the space race that is turning space into a warfighting domain,” said Backes. “What that looks like going forward definitely could be devastating to our commercial and international use of space.” DoD wants resilient space architecture Experts point out that there are increasingly more ways to permanently or temporarily damage satellites so it would be virtually impossible for DoD to defend against a multitude of weapons. China and Russia, for example, have direct-ascent weapons that are launched on a sub-orbital trajectory to strike a satellite in orbit. They also have co-orbital weapons that are placed into orbit and then later maneuvered toward their intended target. Additionally, China and Russia are deploying non-kinetic space weapons, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. These include lasers that can be used to temporarily dazzle or permanently blind sensors on satellites, and jamming devices that interfere with the communications to or from satellites by generating noise in the same radio frequencies. In the face of these threats, the United States aims to make space networks more resilient by using a diversity of satellites in different orbits,complicating an adversary’s ability to launch an effective attack. Kendall said resiliency “isn’t just about the individual satellite, it’s about the architecture.” DoD’s Space Development Agency is looking to demonstrate what it hopes will be a more resilient space architecture. The agency is working to deploy a proliferated constellation of small satellites in low Earth orbit as an alternative to the traditional large, expensive spacecraft that DoD has traditionally flown in higher orbits but much smaller numbers. “We’re getting away from ‘juicy targets’,” said SDA Director Derek Tournear. The idea of a proliferated architecture is to have enough satellites in orbit that “we can handle some attrition.”

#### **If a conflict were to happen China would not back down – statements from Chinese military and political officials prove**

**Klein 19** (John J. Klein, Senior Fellow and Strategist at Falcon Research, USA; and serves as an adjunct professor at the George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, "Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space" 2019 Page 96 – 99 **5** **Space Strategy for Great Powers)**

Historical experience illustrates that states will compete in space, and this competition includes an assessment of fear, honor, and interest. When considering the space strategies for states, the categories of great, medium, and emerging powers are useful for discerning relevant considerations for strategy’s formulation. Even though the concepts and principles described in Chapter 2 stand on their own, the strategies for states and actors with varying degrees of power and capabilities will likely be different by necessity. Strategy involves balancing desired ends with available means, and the available means will be predicated, in part, on space-related capabilities commensurate with each category of space power. Because of the expected strategy preferences among the different types of space powers, the next three chapters consider those areas likely to be most germane for great, medium, and emerging space powers. That said, just because a concept is described in one category of power does not mean that it cannot be thoughtfully considered and implemented in another. Every competition or conflict between states is different, and therefore, the concepts discussed here are not meant to be prescriptive but only illustrative of those areas where thoughtful deliberations should occur. Deganit Paikowsky has provided an insightful arrangement for those considered to be in the “space club,” which can be used to differentiate between the levels of emerging, medium, and great space powers.1 Using Paikowsky’s framework, emerging space powers include the numerous states that indigenously can develop, maintain and control satellites but that are unable to launch them through indigenous means. There are many countries within the group, but examples include Canada and Saudi Arabia. Medium space powers include those states with the indigenous capability to launch, develop, and control satellites.2 The contenders presently for the label of medium space power include the European Space Agency (ESA), the European member states of ESA that support ESA’s space launch capabilities, Japan, India, Israel, Ukraine (which inherited its launch capability through the former Soviet Union), and Iran. In contrast, great space powers are defined as those having the aforementioned medium space power capabilities but also having the indigenous capability of human spaceflight, which includes China, Russia, and the United States. Even though the United States has not had indigenous human spaceflight capability since the2011 retirement of the Space Shuttle, it is still considered a great space power because of its legacy of such capability. Of the various categories of space powers, it is perhaps great space power that is understood best because we have decades of historical experience to draw upon. This chapter will examine great power competition in space—namely the more recent activities of China, Russia, and the United States—to highlight potential challenges and opportunities for international cooperation. After gleaning any lessons or worthwhile considerations from history, topics for the practical implementation of space strategy will be discussed. While the ideas presented here will be in line with the general concepts and principles discussed previously, the ideas and topics in this chapter are thought to be especially salient for great space powers. China China’s meteoric rise as a space power has been striking. With its manned space program starting in 2003, its anti-satellite testing in 2007, 2010, and 2013, and its plan for a large space station by 2020, the achievements illustrate how rapidly China has matured as a space power.3 In October 2003, China independently launched and recovered its first taikonaut—or astronaut— becoming just the third member of an elite spacefaring club with Russia and the United States. In January 2007, China successfully tested a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon in low Earth orbit, thereby again joining Russia and the United States as one of only three states known to have demonstrated this capability.4 Regrettably, this test created over 3,000 pieces of trackable space debris.5 Three years later, China reportedly conducted a test with two microsatellites performing proximity operations and apparently intentionally “bumping” each other, a capability which only a few countries have at present.6 It is assessed that this test helped improve Chinese anti-satellite systems. In May 2013, China conducted a self-described “high-altitude science mission,” which was assessed by the U.S. Defense Department to be a counterspace test designed to reach satellites in geostationary orbit.7 **Concerning military operations in space, the intent of the Chinese leadership is difficult to discern. It has been suggested, however, that China understands that to conduct war effectively it must be a space power**. Joan Johnson-Freese writes that **Beijing understands that it cannot control space all the time, nor does it believe it has to control it**. It needs only to buy the time it needs to accomplish its goals by interfering with its opponent’s capabilities.8 Similarly, **Chinese military doctrine states that a “soft kill” against an opponent’s space system can be achieved by interfering with information systems and ground stations, electromagnetic pulses, camouflage, flare, and deception.**9 **Chinese political and military leadership have concluded that information operations and space capabilities are required to fight and win in future conflicts**. Recent Chinese efforts to both exploit and deny space and cyber domains are central to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) focus on fighting and winningfuture “informationized local wars,” of which dominance of outer space, cyber space, maritime, and nuclear domains will play a part.10 It is generally understood that the capabilities of the PLA are steadily expanding in every facet. A 2017 Report to the U.S. Congress states: The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s counterspace capabilities. In addition to the research and possible development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers, China is also developing anti-satellite capabilities and probably has made progress on the antisatellite missile system that it tested in July 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is testing dual-use technologies in space that could be applied to counterspace missions.11 Moreover, China has concluded that space warfare will be an integral part of future wartime operations.12 Waging “local war under modern, high-tech conditions” would necessitate space capabilities.13 **In Chinese strategy, space is thought to be important for the advantage it confers when collecting, transmitting, and exploiting information, rather than for space’s own sake.14 Chinese analysis concluded that future joint operations will involve multiple services operating together across significant distances**. Victory in future conflicts will not only require unfettered access to space for one’s own forces but also the denial of the same ability to the adversary.15 In the 2013 edition of the Chinese journal The Science of Military Strategy, space is said to be the “high ground in wars under informationized conditions,” while being tied to the struggles in the future battlegrounds of network space and the electromagnetic spectrum.16 Chinese space strategy embraces what would be called joint or multi-domain in Western militaries. Dean Cheng writes that the Chinese embrace an “all aspects unified,” thereby viewing the land, sea, air, electromagnetic spectrum, and space in a joint fashion, with operations in each domain contributing to, and receiving support from, the other domains.17 All operations in these domains are considered to be aimed ultimately at predetermined political ends.18 Based upon PLA analysts, Chinese military space operations are likely to entail five broad “styles” or mission areas: space deterrence, space blockades, space strike operations, space defense operations, and space information support.19 China’s growing power and space emphasis may become manifest in mostly peaceful and cooperative ways, or its expanding capabilities may lead to increased competition. Peter Hays has noted, “**China presents the global community with both the greatest opportunities and the most difficult challenges for space cooperation.”**20 **Many security analysts believe that if the United States and others can successfully engage China in effective space cooperation and confidence-building activities, this may help reduce the risks associated with increasing competition**. Furthermore, state leaders must avoid the mistake of treating China like the Soviet Union or seeing this relationship through the lens of the Cold War.21 Brad Roberts has suggested that a potentially more useful historical lens is the interwar period between World Wars I and II, because thatperiod was exemplified by a multipolar world of state competition.**22 If Roberts is correct, historical experience of that period teaches that fear, distrust, miscalculation, and ambiguity should be addressed directly to help avoid any future global conflict.**

#### **The thesis here is that private innovation and commercialization is key to U.S. Deterrence; China has made it clear that it will cede superiority if this is the case. However, if private appropriation were to halt, China would pull ahead; “military doctrines present a view that counterspace capabilities serve as a tool to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. and allied military forces.” We also say that this would lead to war, and we would descend into a chaotic space race that sabotages communications and other networks.**

## **Case**

#### **Disregard their arguments in favor government managing the appropriation of outer space because they are informed by a pro state bias. The reality is that government is prone to corruption and compulsion which causes government to mismanage enterprises and drives up costs. Each wasteful expenditure of the state adds another hindrance to the long - suffering taxpayer.**

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”Space Capitalism How Humans will Colonize Planets, Moons, and Asteroids” Page 1 – 5 http://d.zaix.ru/iYG3.pdf)

We argue two things in this book. One, space travel is vital and beneficial to human well-being. Two, it should be done privately; the state should be kept as far from this initiative as possible, ideally, totally.1 These two principles inspire this book. We believe that an overwhelming majority of citizens will wonder if we have gone completely bonkers. Our critics will tend to dismiss both propositions out of hand. So, what persuades us to favor these themes? Our main motivation for the first is love for human beings.2Why space—it is so … well, “OUT THERE.” As Star Trek would have it, explorers are driven “to go where no man3 has gone before.” That, alone, suffices. Then, there are the more practical considerations. Moving into space will be profitable. We will learn new technologies which will endow the remaining earthlings with electrifying spillover advantages. For example, will near or actual weightlessness cure diseases? Will resources be discovered in the heavenly bodies (apart from the Moon’s green cheese) that will open new horizons? We find our second theme, that efforts in this regard be undertaken by market participants, not crony capitalists supported via compulsory tax payments, similarly compelling. **Real entrepreneurs throw the dice with their own funds, or those voluntarily entrusted to them. They coerce no one**. Why this limitation? Would not our first goal, space exploration, be better served by government itself, given its taxing power or, at the very least, via a partnership between the state and private interests? Absolutely not! Says Rothbard (2015): **The myth has arisen that government research is made necessary by our technological age, because only planned, directed, large-scale ‘team’ research can produce important inventions or develop them properly.** **The day of the individual or small-scale inventor is supposedly over and done with. And the strong inference is that government, as potentially the ‘largest-scale’ operator, must play a leading role in even non-militaryscientific research**. This common myth has been completely exploded by the researches of John Jewkes, David Sawers, and Richard Stillerman in their highly important recent work.4 Pretty **much anything touched by government comes with fatal flaws starting with corruption and compulsion. Eliminating state involvement in space frees people rather than limits them.** Besides, **the ruling powers notoriously mismanage all enterprises.5 It becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, because that very incompetence makes the venture appear far more expensive than it really needs to be**. The record of “picking winners” on the part of governing establishments6 does not engender much confidence in government’s capacity to promote this goal. **Nor is “contracting out” to private interests likely to provide efficiency in this context. If government cannot do the job itself, there is no reason to believe it will be effective in choosing and funding collaborators.** In addition, we believe that even **if the state could be effective in promoting such tasks, it would still be improper for it to do so, since its funds are mulcted, unwillingly, from their rightful owners, the long-suffering taxpayers** (Rothbard, M. 1998). In addition to the two primary themes, in a third we note that our species, while admirable in many ways such as the need to explore, is also often quite silly and even more destructive. We have developed weapons of mass destruction, and one despicable government apparatus, venerated by many worldwide, even used them, twice, in 1945.7 But we do notneed to resort to such high technology to murder our fellow creatures. We are fully capable of doing so on a massive scale, without such sophistication. Estimates are that governments have done away with almost 200 million of their citizens in the twentieth century, and this is apart from wars8 and traffic fatalities on public highways.9 In support of this contention, much in the following pages details the violent nature and destructive results of states. The same applies to wouldbe governments like ISIS and others that go around shooting police officers. In recent days and months, the evening news (of whichever source the reader consults) has been filled with graphical depictions of bombings and shootings.10 These are being done by those who do not so much disapprove of government per-se but who do not like this state and wish to substitute their own. In addition to being anarchists, we do not approve of would-be states either. As Shaw (1903) said: “He who slays a king and he who dies for him are alike idolaters.” We concur completely that one who ambushes or kills or purposely injures policemen simply lowers himself to the level of these idolaters. To be libertarian requires adoption of the Non-Aggression Principle. That in turn does not admit of murder, assault, or aggression in any way whatsoever against even those of whom we most strongly disapprove. How will space travel help alleviate mankind’s tendency to kill us? Simple. If we can establish colonies starting with the Moon, Venus, and Mars, and then later, as improved technology will permit, on other planets and moons,11 the odds will improve that if people blow up any one home of the human race, there will still be others, so that our species will still “live long and prosper.” There are of course other ways of raising the odds that our fellow creatures will survive their base instincts. There is psychology; perhaps we can eradicate our malevolent impulses through talk therapy. There is biology; maybe human beings can be engineered so that we are not so given to mass murder. Who knows? Maybe we can hypnotize ourselves so that we are more likely to continue to live. But those are topics for other books. The present one assumes away these elegant possibilities for changing the human element.12 We probe, instead, the inelegant scenario of leaving members of our species exactly as they are in terms of viciousness, and instead keeping us apart from each other,13 so that at least some branch of homo sapiens can continue forever.14 This is but one result that could naturally follow from space exploration. The point is, we desperately want to save (remnants?) of the human race, but, we impose upon ourselves one essential constraint: we obligate ourselves to the non-aggression principle (NAP).15 Why? Because in our view, violations of the rights of men constitute a significant danger justifying departure from Earth in the first place.16

### **The affirmative thinks that capitalism is bad. However, we believe that it is very good. The private sector is great and is crucial in maintaining the peace between China and US right now, and it also saves the economy, boosts innovation, and solves poverty.**

**1] Capitalism is amazing and helps the environment tremendously – data proves we’re entering the golden age**

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The past 30 years have seen immense progress **in improving the quality of life for much of humanity**. Extreme poverty — the number of people living on less than $1.90 per day — has fallen by nearly two-thirds, from 1.9 **billion to** around 650 **million**. Life expectancy has risen in most of the world, along with literacy and access to education, while infant mortality has fallen. Despite perceptions to the contrary, **the average person born today is likely to have access to more opportunities and have a better quality of life than at any other point in human history**. Much of this increase in human wellbeing has been propelled by rapid economic growth driven largely by state-led industrial policy, particularly in poor-to-middle income countries. However, this growth has come at a cost: between 1990 and 2019, global emissions of CO2 **increased by 56%.** Historically, economic growth has been closely linked to increased energy consumption — and increased CO2 emissions in particular — leading some to argue that a more prosperous world is one that necessarily has more impacts on our natural environment and climate. There is a lively academic debate about our ability to “absolutely decouple” emissions and growth — that is, the extent to which the adoption of clean energy technology can allow emissions to decline while economic growth continues. Over the past 15 years, however, **something has begun to change.** Rather than a 21st century dominated by coal that energy modelers foresaw, **global coal use peaked in 2013 and is now in structural decline**. We have succeeded in making clean energy cheap, with solar power and battery storage costs falling 10-fold since 2009. The world produced more electricity from clean energy — solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear — than from coal over the past two years. And, according to some major oil companies, **peak oil is upon us** — not because we have run out of cheap oil to produce, but because demand is falling and companies expect further decline as consumers increasingly shift to electric vehicles. The world has long been experiencing a relative **decoupling** between economic growth and CO2 emissions, with the emissions per unit of GDP **falling for the past 60 years**. This is the case even in countries like **India and China** that have been undergoing rapid economic growth. But relative decoupling alone is inadequate in a world where global CO2 emissions need to peak and decline in the next decade to give us any chance at limiting warming to well below 2℃, in line with Paris Agreement targets. Thankfully, there is increasing evidence that the world is on track **to absolutely decouple CO2 emissions and economic growth** — with global CO2 emissions potentially having peaked in 2019 **and unlikely to increase substantially in the coming decade**. While an emissions peak is just the first and easiest step towards eventually reaching the net-zero emissions required to stop the world from continuing to warm, it demonstrates that linkages between emissions and economic activity are not an immutable law, but rather simply a result of our current means of energy production. In recent years we have seen more and more examples of absolute decoupling — economic growth accompanied by falling CO2 emissions. Since 2005, 32 countries with a population of at least one million people **have absolutely decoupled** emissions from economic growth, both for terrestrial emissions (those within national borders) and consumption emissions (emissions embodied in the goods consumed in a country). This includes the United States, Japan, Mexico, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Poland, Romania, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Belarus, Austria, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Singapore, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, Croatia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Cyprus. Figure 1, below, shows the declines in territorial emissions (blue) and increases in GDP (red). To qualify as having experienced absolute decoupling, we require countries included in this analysis to pass four separate filters: a population of at least one million (to focus the analysis on more representative cases), declining territorial emissions over the 2005-2019 period (based on a linear regression), declining consumption emissions, and increasing real GDP (on a purchasing power parity basis, using constant 2017 international $USD). We chose not to include 2020 in this analysis because it is not particularly representative of longer-term trends, and consumption and territorial emissions estimates are not yet available for many countries. There is a wide range of rates of economic growth between 2005-2019 among countries experiencing absolute decoupling. Somewhat counterintuitively, there is no significant relationship between the rate of economic growth and the magnitude of emissions reductions within the group. **While it is unlikely that there is not at least some linkage between the two factors, there are plenty of examples of countries (e.g., Singapore, Romania, and Ireland) experiencing both extremely rapid economic growth and large reductions in CO2 emissions.** One of the primary criticisms of some prior analyses of absolute decoupling is that they ignore **leakage**. Specifically, the offshoring of manufacturing from high-income countries over the past three decades to countries like China has led to “illusory” drops in emissions, where the emissions associated with high-income country consumption are simply shipped overseas and no longer show up in territorial emissions accounting. There is some truth in this critique, as there was a large increase in emissions embodied in imports from developing countries between 1990 and 2005. After 2005, however, structural changes in China and a growing domestic market led to a reversal of these trends; the amount of emissions “exported” from developed countries to developing countries **has actually declined over the past 15 years.** This means that, for many countries, both territorial emissions and consumption emissions (which include any emissions “exported” to other countries) **have jointly declined**. In fact, on average, consumption emissions have been declining slightly faster than territorial emissions since 2005 in the 32 countries we identify as experiencing absolute decoupling. Figure 2, below, shows the change in consumption emissions (teal) and GDP (red) between 2005 and 2019. There is a pretty wide variation in the extent to which these countries have reduced their territorial and consumption emissions since 2005. Some countries — such as the UK, Denmark, Finland, and Singapore – have seen territorial emissions fall faster than consumption emissions, while the US, Japan, Germany, and Spain (among others) have seen consumption emissions fall faster. Figure 3 shows reductions in consumption and territorial emissions for each country, with the size of the dot representing the size of the population in 2019. **Absolute decoupling is possible.** There is no physical law requiring economic growth — and broader increases in human wellbeing — to necessarily be linked to CO2 emissions. All of the **services that we rely on today that emit fossil fuels** — electricity, transportation, heating, food — can in principle **be replaced by near-zero carbon alternatives**, though these are more mature in some sectors (electricity, transportation, buildings) than in others (industrial processes, agriculture).

**2) Capitalism is key to effective space exploration and development, governments cannot match up to the efficiency of those private companies.**

**Blundell 4** [John, director general of the Institute of Economic Affairs, “Mission to Mars must go private to succeed”, Feb 2, <http://news.scotsman.com/marsexploration/Mission-to-Mars-must-go.2499794.jp>]

Bush is not finding the billions himself. Rather the tab will be picked up by US taxpayers in perhaps 20 years’ time. **What arrests me is the** unchallenged **assumption that space exploration must be a nationalised industry**. The Soviet effort may be stalled but the Chinese seem committed to joining the race. The European Space Agency is a strange combination of nationalised bodies. NASA is a pure old-fashioned nationalised entity. I argue **we should relinquish the expectationthat space has to be limited to vast quangos.** The mindset we all share is an echo of the rivalry between the evaporated USSR and the still dynamic US. The first bleeps of the Sputnik galvanised the US into accelerating its space effort. **What we need is capitalists in space. Capitalism needs property rights, enforcement of contracts and the rule of law.** The ideological tussle does not cease once we are beyond the ionosphere. With the exception of Arthur C Clarke, **none of us imagined the entertainment potential from satellites**. Geostationary lumps of electronic gadgetry beam us our BSkyB television pictures. I remain in awe that Rupert Murdoch can place a device in the skies above Brazil that sends a signal to every home in each hemisphere. Who could have foreseen that mobile phones could keep us chattering without any wiring, or that global position techniques could plot where we all are to within a metre? **These are business applications. Business is already in space.** Markets detect and apply opportunities that are not envisaged by even the most accomplished technicians. I’m not saying Murdoch has special competences. I imagine he is as baffled by digital miracles as I am. The point is that **companies define and refine what public bodies cannot achieve**. Lift the veil of course and all those **satellite firms are an intricate web of experts supplying ideas and services. We have an infant space market.**  What use will the Moon be? Is there value on Mars other than the TV rights? The answer is nobody can know. We can only make some guesses. The Spanish ships that set off for the US thought they would get to India. The Portuguese knew they’d reach China. The English followed them westwards seeking gold. In fact, they got tobacco. Events always confound expectations. The arguments for putting men on Mars are expressly vague from President Bush. Perhaps he was really bidding for votes. From my reading the **best results may be medical. Zero, or low, gravity techniques may allow therapies of which we are ignorant.** It seems facetious to suggest tourism may be a big part of space opportunity but as both the North and South poles are over-populated and there is a queue at the top of Mount Everest, a trip to the Sea of Tranquility may prove a magnet for the wealthy. **Instead of NASA’s grotesque bureaucracy it may be Thomas Cook will be a greater force for exploration.** NASA could be a procurement body. It need not design and run all space ventures. It could sub-contract far more extensively. Without specialised engineering expertise it is not easy to criticise projects such as the shuttle. It seems to be excessively costly and far too fragile. **There are private space entrepreneurs already.** They are tiddlers up against the mighty NASA. Yet Dan **Goldin, the NASA leader, says he favours the privatisation of space: "We can’t afford to do solar system exploration until we turn these activities over to the cutting edge private sector**

#### **I believe that the government is terrible at giving rights adequate to certain groups such as minorities and women. For example, countries such as Russia and Germany only revolutionzied and gave rights a couple hundred years ago. Instead, you should vote for the negative, who wishes to solve war, and also gender violence.**

#### **The negative solves gender violence better than the aff. If there is a full on space war, policy making will halt, which means that we must solve a space war FIRST before doing the affiramtive to solve gender violence.**

#### **1999 Jupiter Case – NASA forgot to convert units, which led to them sending a multi billion dollar investment into Jupiter, destroying it. Simple units conversion is a mistake a high schooler can catch, and is a huge mistake. It’s like reading the neg case on the aff. This shows that the government doesn’t care about the money they drain and innovation in space.**

#### **No repercussions – Theres no reason for the government to care since they aren’t a private company. They can simply extract more money from the Treasury even if they mess up. If Elon Musk did something carelessly, he would definitely lose stock and investor confidence and there would be severe repercussions. This boosts efficiency and higher quality in space exploration through private companies.**

#### **Profit-based incentives – If private companies do well, they make a lot of money. But the government doesn’t really get anything. If the government runs out of money, they can just be like: “Oh let’s raise some taxes!!!” That’s the Block and Nelson evidence.**

#### **Tax increase – Judge if you think that the government’s appropriation of space is good you can vote aff, but they really are terrible. Do you want to pay taxes and give your hard earned money to the government so they can screw up in space exploration? An increase in private sector space appropriation would mean less government mess ups, and less unnecessary taxes. Governments have done everything wrong in the context of space. Extra taxes would have better use in hands of education, infrastructure, and environmental protection.**

#### **Solvency deficit – Countries such as China and Russia won’t listen to your government action to enforce your plan. In fact, they will do everything they can to go against western policies to compete. You can’t just make believe that these countries comply. We can see that sanctions don’t work, and current day Russia and its invasion Ukraine proves. You think they will listen to your plan? You talk about how private companies are unjust but you have no viable way to enforce it, which means you can never solve.**

#### **Solvency deficit – When I give you a copy of a computer I made, you own the copy, but not the rights to the computer. As I was the one who built it, I understand it better than you. Private sector companies build the spacecrafts and give it to the governments, but private companies still own the rights to the spacecraft. This means that government space exploration is reliant on the private sector, so the aff can never completely ban private appropriation.**