#### **At the level of ontology, cartesian metaphysics paradigmatically informs the discussion of whether the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. Endemic to the Cartesian interpretation of the world is a divide between mind and matter, subject and object, as well as nature and culture. Outer space is understood as an object that rational and autonomous subjects exert mastery over the external natural order through the acquisition of material resources. A cultural cognitive and affective shift in our relationality to the earth is necessary to envision relationality to the earth and enable new bio social becomings.**

**Schultz 17** (KARSTEN A. SCHULZ, Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the Governance and Sustainability Lab at the University of Trier, Germany, where he works on the political ecology of climate change adaptation and urban water use in West Africa. He completed his M.A. in Political Science at the University of Bonn, and his Ph.D. in Political Geography at the Center for Development Research (ZEF). He has previously published on a variety of topics such as climate change adaptation, urbanization, changing nature-society relations, and sustainability transformations. He is also a Research Fellow with the Earth System Governance Project. His latest publication is “Decolonizing political ecology: ontology, technology and the enchantment of nature” (Journal of Political Ecology). Decolonising the Anthropocene: The Mytho-Politics of Human Mastery Page 55 – 58 <https://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Critical-Epistemologies-of-Global-Politics-E-IR.pdf>, MC)

This being said, wide consensus exists among historians that the radical elevation of the human species over the nonhuman world by means of reflexive reason and scientific self-improvement is an idea of European origin (Leiss 1994). Moreover, there seems to be fair agreement that the idea of human mastery over nature has been progressively shaped by three influential cultural currents, the first of which is arguably the intellectual and artistic tradition of ancient Greece. In his broad historical account entitled The Beginnings of Western Science, David C. Lindberg (2007) illustrates that the emergence of pre-Socratic natural philosophy during the sixth century BC was marked by a distinct turn from a mythical worldview toward independent inquiry and generalised scepticism. **Nature came to be understood as an autonomous object which had to be comprehended through logical reasoning.** However, the gradual change that took place in Greece from the beginning of the sixth century BC was not simply a miraculous turn from mythos to logos that signalled the end of Greek mythology. Mythical thought can be found in every period of ancient Greece for which evidence exists ― to the end of antiquity and into the Middle Ages (Lloyd 1979). These influential mythical tropes certainly played their part in naturalising the ideology of human mastery within western cultural imaginaries. **Aristotelian, Platonic, and Stoic philosophy as well as the works of the Greek playwright Sophocles explicitly emphasised the divinity of the world, while simultaneously asserting ‘the godlike rationality and hence superiority of human beings, and the rightfulness of ruling over land, vegetable and animal life’** (Wybrow 1991: 129). **Western ideas of human mastery, in other words, never developed in a historical and scientific vacuum that was entirely free from mythical thought,** particularly if we turn our attention toward the second mythical tradition that played a decisive role in legitimising the human dominion over nature, the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Decreed by divine providence, ‘Man’ was given dominium terrae, the cultural mandate to rule over God’s creation. Occasionally this mandate was interpreted in the sense of a paternalistic stewardship, while in other cases it was taken quite literally as a divine decree to subdue the earth and all living things.5 As a dominant cultural force and frame of reference for the interpretation of what I would call ‘second degree’ mythical thought (mythical thought that openly disavowed any intention to make a claim of absolute truth), **Christianity exerted a continuous influence throughout the entire early modern period — a period that witnessed the scientific revolution, the colonisation of the Americas, and the emergence of capitalism and the modern nation-state.** Reinforced by technological and scientific progress taking place at a hitherto unprecedented pace, **mythical themes of mastery ― that ‘man’ and spirit stand apart from nature and that human beings rightfully exercise authority over nature ― slowly blended with the modern scientific and capitalist worldview**. In the seventeenth century, iconic thinkers such as Francis Bacon and René Descartes set out to conquer nature by means of philosophy, science, and technology, driven by the desire to reconcile and transmute mythical, alchemical, and Christian influences under the aegis of a naturalistic and rationalistic worldview (Leiss 1994). **Particularly the Cartesian dualism between the extended physical world and the nonphysical world of thought was seen as the definitive completion of the pre-Socratic turn from mythos to logos, when myth finally became synonymous with the subjective and the irrational** (Scarborough 1994). From this point onward, myths could neither serve as cosmological narratives of the universe, nor as valid allegories of nature, for they were now fully associated with the inner realm of subjective experience and not with the outer realm of the objective physical world. In the same vein, myths had to be sharply distinguished from history as well, since history could from then on only refer to objective events. This Cartesian schism was further exacerbated by the spread of Enlightenment thought during the eighteenth century, which celebrated the power of reason and embraced a triumphalist scientism. Even though the Enlightenment was not a unified cultural expression with a single doctrine, it nevertheless gave rise to new forms of secular modernism which gradually reduced the influence of mythical and religious thinking as a dominant cultural frame of reference. **Simultaneously, the Enlightenment created its own utopian paradigm of the rational and autonomous individual who imposed upon nature as well as on herself or himself the orderly totality of a universal reason**. Nevertheless, the persistence of various mythical or spiritual imaginaries in our contemporary societies certainly illustrates that such a lasting demystification of life turned out to be a rather short-lived illusion. **If we consider contemporary discussions about the Anthropocene, we can easily see that the sediments of powerful mythical narratives advancing the idea of human mastery and distinguishing mind from matter, subject from object, and nature from culture can still be found in today’s political debates**. A number of scientists recently suggested that the Anthropocene should be seen as an opportunity and, ultimately, as a ‘good’ epoch in which human ingenuity and technology will provide the means to solve the critical environmental problems of our time (see, for example, Ellis 2011). These Promethean myths of ecomodernism, synthetic biology, and geoengineering are not only fallacies of control in the light of unprecedented changes which are currently occurring in the earth’s ecosystems. **They are also about to be woven into a new geopolitical master narrative that is on the verge of replacing the abstract totality of a single humanity with the abstract plurality of more-than-human entanglements**. Put differently, it is important to realise that more-than-human or posthuman accounts of the Anthropocene provide the discursive background for the mytho-politics of the newly proclaimed human epoch. From the contested metaphor of Gaia, popularised by James Lovelock as a synonym for earth system science (and recently reworked by the French philosopher and anthropologist Bruno Latour), to animistic and pantheistic currents in western environmental philosophy and non-western thought, there currently exists an intriguing interest in imagining other possible ways of relating to the world at large.6 **Decolonial scholars nevertheless argue that such attempts at conceptualising the relations between humans and more-than-human nature(s) must pay attention to the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being, while becoming more sensitive to the vital role that myth and mythology play in articulating alternatives to hegemonic western knowledge practices.** The idea of border thinking, in particular, alerts us to the limiting modes of relationality and representation that are inherent to the anthropocentric worldview, a worldview which perceives more-than-human nature primarily as an object (socially produced, biophysically constituted, or both). The gradual delinking from such a limiting perspective, and the simultaneous consideration of cosmologies which see nature as an active and ‘ensouled’ subject in its own right, so it seems, must therefore appear as one of the most radical projects imaginable vis-à-vis the epistemic hierarchy of westerncentric technoscience. Quite possibly, many scholars would fervently revolt against such a proposed bridging of established science/myth, rational/ primitive or fact/value divides ― particularly if such an attempt is performed without a certain ironic or subjective gesture ― for it conjures up vivid images of seemingly regressive elements that have been expelled from today’s dominant scholarly discourses: essence, spirit, esotericism, non-modernism, non-rationalism, romanticism, totalitarianism, and so on. And yet **it is evident that the predicaments of the Anthropocene, whether they are taken to be economic, spiritual, or sociopolitical in nature, will require a cultural-cognitive and affective shift in how (many) humans relate to the world they inhabit**. **While imagining the possibilities for new biosocial becomings, it is crucial to realise that contemporary societies are still influenced by older mythological substrata that carry with them the sediments of the ‘grand narratives’ of human mastery.** Such deep-seated sociocultural patterns must be taken very seriously in their capacity to shape the future outcomes of Anthropocene politics. After all, the ideology of human mastery might well survive without the much-critiqued nature/culture binary and become enshrouded in new Anthropocene myths. Advanced algorithmic or biopolitical control mechanisms and the capitalist-materialistic ethos of desire, production, and consumption are certainly well attuned to the Anthropocene rhetoric of biosocial complexity, indeterminacy, interconnectedness, and plurality (Pellizzoni 2015). By contrast, decolonial scholarship reminds us of the liberating potential and integrative function of myth and myth-making. The concept of mytho-politics, which I have outlined here, thus draws attention to the complex openness and suggestiveness of myth in the sense of an ideological ‘both/and.’ This means that, even if the role of mytho-politics in transforming imaginaries of biosocial relations is fully recognised, it is difficult to predict how the Anthropocene debate might develop in the near future. Will the discussion become more open to different views of knowing and being? Will it include marginalised perspectives which reject the objectification of nature and point toward the need for a decolonial politics of ‘delinking’ and ‘re-learning’? Or will the debate remain entrenched in western-centric and anthropocentric ideas of planetary stewardship, managerial control, and (bio-)technological fixes? Whatever the case may be, **it is clear that the discussion about the Anthropocene has already moved beyond questions of mere geological evidence. It has become a lively debate about the principles of thought, speech, and action which provide the seemingly ‘natural’ foundations for the idea of unlimited human mastery over the earth.**

#### **Dualist understanding of outer space presuppose a spirit/matter distinction that grants humanity a privileged position as the authority figure that can harness outer space as a system of resources. Such a presupposition of spirit and material denies the entanglement of the natural world.**

**Mitchell 11** (JAMES MITCHELL MADDOX B.A., The University of Virginia, 2004 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS ATHENS, GEORGIA 2011, <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/maddox_james_m_201108_ma.pdf>, MC)

Galileo‘s optical affirmation of a mathematical discovery is a fitting, if symbolic, beginning of the Scientific Revolution, which gave us a new vocabulary for describing our world. It may be obvious why the church had an interest in maintaining the divine order of cosmos. It gave them a privileged position, a connection to the ―heavens,‖ which, as Donne wrote, were high above us in the perfect order of the firmament—God‘s realm. As we see in his verse, that cosmic order was an integral part of the poet‘s existence—a way to describe the world physically and figuratively. We use the word ―metaphysical‖ to describe Donne‘s poetry because of his skill at drawing long comparisons, or conceits, between our lives and the world around us. It was a way of understanding who we are in the cosmos, not so distant from the cosmos in which the ancients placed themselves. Though the cosmos at this point was essentially Catholic real estate, our position within it gave us meaning, just as our position in our current model of the universe gives us meaning today. The poetry of Donne‘s day, as Francis Bacon believed, ―[expresses] the spiritual condition of humanity, for presenting a ‗more perfect order‘ than one could find in nature ‗since the fall.‘‖ (Craige 17). Today no academic would aver such a claim, though that physical-metaphysical duality persists. **The belief that there is a soul that is somehow separate from the world, a ―spirit/matter dualism that itself can be traced back to Plato,‖ is intimately tied to our representations of the cosmos and where we fit into the cosmic order** (Craig 15). **Christian cosmology, especially in the hands of authority figures, has reinforced that duality and continues to reinforce it**.9 **In this story, that duality is the conflict between the discourses and how we handle outer space and we fit in it.** Today we now know that every atom in our bodies was manufactured in a star at some point during the history of the universe. We learn in school about the ―origin of species,‖ the origins of stars, and the role of DNA in shaping our physical and psychological characteristics. Only a fanatic would argue that Earth is the center of the universe. But we still find that occasionally the scientific narrative falls short. Many of us feel we must be more than ―star stuff,‖ as Carl Sagan once said (Cosmos, episode 9). And indeed, alongside all the great astronomical discoveries, from Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, to William Herschel, to Einstein and Hubble, poets have attempted to satisfy our desire to fill in the gaps that science has left us in our cosmological model. **The vestige of dualist metaphysics still exists in our popular understanding, even if it was parceled out from the church‘s holdings long ago, and even if the academic and artistic discourse communities have completely disassembled it.** Ideas don‘t change overnight. The pervasiveness of that duality in our thinking is the backbone of this comparison between scientific and poetic ontologies, which have evolved together as two stars in a binary system. One of Galileo‘s attackers, Jesuit mathematics professor Orazio Grassi, wrote, ―Even with his telescope, the lynx-eyed astrologer [Galileo] cannot look into the inner thoughts of the mind‖ (Reston 181). His use of the word ―astrologer‖ is a slight that implies that astronomy, a science, is the domain of the church and that Galileo‘s business is not serious work. We know who we side with today. Even the Church would disagree with Grassi today. But did Grassi have a point? The lexical and ontological distance between astronomical discourse and the language of poetry seems at first to support his snub against Galileo, at least objectively, but Catholicdoctrine is not the answer. Nor is poetry. These are ontological salves which work similarly in that they construct a discourse community and a sense of meaning. Science provides, for me at any rate, a more agreeable, secular vocabulary for describing the world, but we cannot explain all our experiences with science. Science even has a word for the experiences that are neurologically elusive: qualia. But even when science creates new vocabulary to signify ever more obscure phenomena, its ontology, as constructed by its discourse, is infinite (like that of any given academic discipline). Science uses the word ―qualia‖ to describe phenomena that are not otherwise quantifiable or otherwise communicable as phenomena in the conscious experience of humans, just as medicine uses the term ―idiopathic‖ to describe medical phenomena that have not yet been worked out by researchers, and just as astronomy uses the term ―dark matter‖ to describe material in the universe whose presence is known but whose physical makeup is unknown. We find all the time that we got something wrong and have to revise. One might think that art, like poetry, is an attempt to fill in those gaps, but it turns out that art too cannot be seen as value-free. So Grassi was right in one thing: **no single discourse can satisfy all our questions about who and what we are. This paper is even a testament to the fact that we‘re still working it out. But the goal for me, like the holistic thinkers whose work has inspired my research, is to work out a narrative that reduces the power relationships between global citizens, and not simply within discourse communities whose discourses might be used to take advantage of those who are not in the know.**

#### **Cartesian metaphysics perpetually reduces land to an unlimited resource that is retrofitted into a commodity for sustainable labor. Perpetual reduction of relationality to land to that of an external commodity entangled within a network of capitalist relations necessitates the anthropocentric deadening of being. Indigenous economies that centralize relationality to land become degraded components of primitive and arcane life that are not measurable within settler registers of materialism.**

**Henderson 14** (Worlds on the Edge: The Politics of Settler Resentment on the Saugeen/Bruce Peninsula by Phil Henderson B.A., The University of Western Ontario, 2014 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Political Science <https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/7414/Henderson_Phil_MA_2016.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> Page 69 – 72, MC)

As Emma Lowman and Adam Barker assert, attempting to disentangle and isolate capitalist, racial, gender, or colonial oppressions from one another is misguided. Each of these 3 processes operate simultaneously, overlapping and reinforcing one another in a variety of nonschematic ways. Still, settler states such as Canada remain committed to ongoing colonization, and this is the background condition establishing and enabling - or, rather, disabling - what settlers perceive as the immutable ground or bedrock upon which all possible political projects must be built. Glen Coulthard observes that settler colonies mobilize “discursive and nondiscursive facets of economic, gendered, racial, and state power” to secure the continuance of hierarchical social orders predicated from their genesis on dispossessing indigenous peoples. 4 As such, **a decolonial account of dispossession begins by rejecting settlers’ claims to territorial sovereignty as a matter of course**. Moreover, this rejection must continue to contour how political and economic issues are understood within the context of settler colonialism. Narrating the dispossessive drive’s development begins with this rejection, and with a subsequent coming to terms, as Michael Asch says, with the fact that wherever **indigenous peoples and persons are in Turtle Island today**, whether on rural reserves or in urban centres, they live on land that remains under their sovereignty and jurisdiction; and that **we [settlers] ourselves live on ‘unceded land’…** rather than arguing over the point, we need to begin by determining the implications for us and accepting the reality of our status on Indigenous lands.5 Analyses of dispossession that attend to this fact by recognizing the ongoing decolonial struggle to disrupt the settler colony’s presumption of sovereignty and its highly destructive economy begin to accommodate the radical alterity of multiple subject positions. A decolonial critique underscores that the neoliberal regime, which many scholars portray as something radically new, 70 is only an extension of the dispossessive drives which were initiated by and continue to sustain the processes of settler colonization, and now also begin to operate against newly disposable populations of settlers. Neoliberalization does not emerge ex nihilo; rather, it maintains colonization, expanding and entrenching processes of dispossession while striving to open North America to deeper exploitation by the settler economy. For the purposes of this project it is sufficient to trace the initiation of this animating dispossessive drive only as far back as its origins in North America. Though a longer history exists, and is a project worthy of serious consideration, it is nevertheless both too broad and too deep to be contained in this work. 6 With notable and important exceptions, the earliest settlers primarily aimed to establish trade and military alliances between Europe and the various indigenous peoples of northeastern Turtle Island. As Europe’s economy transformed, however, the importance of these partnerships 7 declined precipitously in the reckoning of settlers. The rise of a regime of accumulation predicated on industrial capitalism saw European populations and markets undergo a massive expansion**. To the instrumentalized mentality of early industrial capitalists, the territories of indigenous peoples represented at once a nearly unlimited resource to be commodified and a site to which the “Malthusian excesses” of Europe could be conveniently relocated and used as labour in the extractive economy.** The presence of sovereign indigenous peoples, who may have 8 traded with Europeans but would object to the total exploitation and destruction of their territories by industry, became an impediment to the unbridled expansion of capitalist markets. Exemplified in the repeatedly violated treaties between the Saugeen Anishinaabek and the Crown, as discussed in chapter one, the settler state continually ignored both the letter and spirit 71 of these treaties, using subterfuge and coercion to advance an economy that necessitates the dispossession of their treaty-partners. It is tempting to assert that this is merely an example of cynical self-interest trumping treaties - and, to some degree, it no doubt is. I do not, however, think this explanation can fully account for the voraciousness and reflexivity with which settlers continue dispossessing indigenous peoples. **Settler colonialism relies, as all political regimes do, on the development of a political subject through discourses and social practices that naturalize the distribution of power.** Developed just prior to the initiation of settler colonization, John Locke’s “powerfully and influentially elaborated” labour theory of property provided settlers with a cogent narrative to support their sense of proprietorship. Asserting that all the world was a commons awaiting a 9 claim to private ownership via its transformation through human labour, Locke’s theory presented North America as radically open to the imposition of European possession. 10 In actual fact, and this should be so clear as to hardly require comment, the indigenous peoples of Turtle Island had been extensively labouring in their territories since time immemorial. The economies of indigenous peoples were, however, radically different from those of Europeans. Many of these economies were “based on the land and the free, unrestricted access of everyone to its resources.” Because many indigenous peoples did not engage in the 11 same sort of hierarchically structured and highly destructive economies as Europeans, settlers discounted indigenous labour as too ‘rudimentary’ to warrant acknowledgement. This enabled settlers to assert that North America was unassisted by human improvement and, therefore, that indigenous peoples’ territorial sovereignty need not be recognized. These abstractive discourses encouraged settlers to transplant into North America the material “preconditions underwriting 72 the capital relation” in Europe. Through the regimes of private property, which were codified 12 into laws and enforced by both the violence of the settler state and by vigilante mobs of settlers, indigenous peoples’ access to their territories was gradually eroded by settler enclosures. Enclosure of North America into a patchwork of private properties initiates what Karl Marx refers to as primitive [ursprünglich: original, initial] accumulation. Repeated wherever 13 capitalist relations instantiate themselves, this process represents the severance of a people from their direct access to the land, and the mediating of that access through hierarchical proprietary regimes. As such, in North America, the development of capitalist relations and the foundations of private property - of settlers’ sense possessing land - enacts the dispossession of indigenous peoples of their territories and the degradation of their original economies through processes of settler colonization. This is to say that while the development of capitalism may not necessitate colonialism - the case of England problematizes such a linear causality - in North America the emergence and maintenance of capitalism relies on ongoing processes of settler colonization. That said, **the initiation of the dispossessive drive in North America through the processes of settler colonization cannot be reduced solely, or even primarily, to a materialist account.** As Lowman and Barker note, **beginning the story of dispossession from a materialist standpoint presents the risk that our narrative will act as a conduit for smuggling settler “biases into Indigenous ways of being.”** Instead - as treaty-partners - we must struggle to do the 14 difficult work of learning from indigenous peoples’ ontologies, especially as indigenous peoples have long been required to learn our systems of knowledge in an effort to merely survive settler coloniality’s capriciousness. **of the indigenous peoples across Turtle Island their ontologies place the initial moment of sociality in a culture of relationality to the land, which offers up knowledge to guide the proper conduct of relationships with human and nonhuman others. This is radically different from the anthropocentric deadening of being that is foisted on all nonhuman subjects within the ontological orientations of settlers - who generally hold that the human is the subject of primary consequence.** Put differently, the settler is produced as a subject within a regime of power that 19 locates the human - and, even then, only some humans historically - as the site of ethical concern or relationality. **Settler regimes of proprietorship** - of possessiveness - imposed by colonization, **attempt the dispossession of more than mere materiality**. **It is also always already working to dispossess indigenous peoples of their ways of being in relation to the world, their grounded understandings of responsibility to all relations.** Aileen Moreton-Robinson asserts that the processes of settler coloniality function to “disavow and dispossess the Indigenous subject of an ontology that exists outside the logic of capital”. 20 **As a matter of course settler colonization attempts to eliminate indigenous peoples’ ontological alterity and subsequently to reground the colonized subject in the colonizers’ ontology.** Duncan Campbell Scott confessed to this very aim when he suggested that the Indian Act (1876) would “solve the Indian problem” by ensuring that “there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic.” All difference was to be flattened 21 into the homogeneity of the settler subject. Used throughout the anglophone settler colonies, Residential Schools are a particularly vicious example of the technologies employed in the effort to dispossess indigenous children of all ontological alterity. Designed to “obliterate young children’s connections to indigenous culture”, Residential Schools simultaneously imposed 75 settler ontologies onto indigenous children. The goal, as Stephanie McMullen notes, was to 22 reproduce indigenous children as “assimilated subjects”, imbued with the values of “selfsupporting Christian farmers”. The dispossessive drive that animates settler colonization in its 23 commodification and exploitation of the land operates at two levels simultaneously: attempting to strip indigenous peoples of both their material and ontological relationship to their territories. In a decolonial critique these processes of dispossession must not, as happens so often, be rendered as merely historic events which recede with the passage of time. Moreton-Robinson notes that overwhelmingly settler accounts of colonialism reduce dispossession to “a mere blemish on the historical record,” an event which no longer brings weight to bear on the present except as an historic grievance. Even Marx is ambivalent about the contemporary relevance of 24 the originary dispossessive movement. In the first volume of Capital he writes that primitive accumulation “is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production… it forms the pre-historic stage of capital”. Marx thus relegates the 25 material and ontological dispossessions that initiate enclosures to a discrete and historically finalized fact. Subsequent Marxist scholars have worked to temper this historicizing tendency somewhat. David Harvey notably asserts that the concept of ‘primitive’ accumulation is misleading as it suggests that the processes of enclosure occurred in the past. He proposes subsuming what Marx identifies as primitive accumulation within the phrase “accumulation by dispossession”, a process that he says is occurring “at a certain level” to this day. Despite 26 recognizing primitive accumulation as operating in the present, Harvey nevertheless subtly recapitulates Marx’s historicism, suggesting that dispossession through primitive accumulation 76 occurs through a series of discrete and foreclosed acts. He writes that primitive accumulation is a “necessary though ugly stage” in the developmental movement of economies. While Harvey 27 recovers primitive accumulation from the archaic past, his insistence on stadial development imparts a certain historicism to the process: suggesting that dispossession occurs as a series of singular events, the conclusion and political neutralization of which are determinable. Such an account ignores the always ongoing struggle involved in sustaining dispossession. As MoretonRobinson notes, it “takes a great deal of work” to maintain the processes dispossessing indigenous peoples in the face of their ongoing resistance. Settler possession of the colony is 28 thus never achieved with finality; rather it is a continuous reiteration of dispossessive acts.

#### **Thus, from the perspective of an Earth Centered Conscientization, I affirm Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.**

#### **An Earth Centered Conscientization constitutes continual relationality with Mother Earth for all beings. Collective histories and lived realities of Indigenous people all form a historical consciousness that activates sentiments of relationality and intimate stewardship. Giving voice to all our relations enables activists and organizers to dissolve colonial conceptions of a separate natural world and embark in a social web of human and non-human relations that protects the Earth.**

**Klutz and Walter 18** (Jenalee Kluttz PhD Student, Education University of British Columbia Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada , Pierre Walter 17. THEORIZING ADULT EDUCATION, POWER AND SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE A Consideration of the Climate Justice Movement Page 195 – 198 INDIGENOUS FEMINISM, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, AND DECOLONIZING EDUCATION, MC)

How then do notions of power, privilege and socio-environmental change play out in an Earth-centred positionality of place in environmental adult education? Since we as urbanized, colonized human beings have removed ourselves so thoroughly from being able to listen to and seek advice directly from the Earth (nor could we represent knowledge gained this way in textual form), we have no choice but to turn to human theorizing once more. Here, we look to Indigenous feminism, environmental justice, and decolonizing education for guidance. From theoretical work in Indigenous feminism, we understand that although Indigenous identities, societies and peoples are traditionally of Mother Earth, and have a history of working within an equitably differentiated gendered division of labor, and while both Indigenous men and women have been subject to genocidal colonial histories, dispossession of land and culture, White Supremacy and racism, Indigenous women also suffer additionally from systems of colonial-induced patriarchy cutting across indigeneity. That is, “**Indigenous women have endured a double erasure and (marginalization) – first, as indigenous peoples, and secondly, as women”** (Grande, 2004, p. 127). Thus, while maintaining an Earth-based positionality, Indigenous feminism seeks to identify and resist “the ways in which (Indigenous) women are subordinated to men and how women can be emancipated from this subordination” (Green, 2007, p. 21). Decolonizing education requires ,first, the historical study of human systems of oppression – settler colonialism, capitalism, patriarchy, systemic racism – which have destroyed Mother Earth and dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of their basic human rights to land, culture and livelihood. Second, it normally demands a recognition of direct personal complicity in these acts, not only by all present-day settler colonial peoples living on stolen lands (e.g. Canada, U.S. Japan, China, Australia, all of Latin America, Africa), but also by those residing in colonial states built upon these genocidal and environmentally catastrophic histories (England, Spain, France, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal). **An ‘Earth-centred conscientization’ of adult learners continues through the histories and lived realities of Indigenous, poor, and racialized people bearing the costs of toxic waste, polluted water, and climate change; that is, of environmental racism, classism and oppression** (Irlbacher-Fox, 2014). Third, **decolonizing education recognizes that Indigenous Peoples have been defending the Earth and their very lands, lives, cultures, livelihood, human rights and identity against the violent onslaught of colonialism continuously for almost 600 years, continue to struggle today for the restoration of stolen ancestral lands, and are actively working to recover scared sites and cultural knowledge ripped away from them by non-Indigenous People** (Tuck & Yang, 2012). Finally, **with this historical consciousness in place, the question becomes how to re-establish a personal relationship with Mother Earth for all peoples (Plumwood, 2003), and for non-Indigenous people, how to develop a respectful and humble relationship with Indigenous Peoples, who are at once our teachers and ‘co-resisters’ as well as co-advocates for the return of stolen lands, the struggle against climate injustice, capitalism, racism and patriarchy, and the struggle for reconciliation and the healing of the Earth**. The Tsleil-Waututh Nation leading the movement against Trans Mountain are Sklilwkta or ‘People of the Inlet’: they are among the people most directly impacted by the pipeline construction and potential oil spills**. As people of the water, protection of the water is not simply a moral or ethical mandate, it is protection of self, of identity and existence, as well as a spiritual duty.** Yet all Tsleil-Waututh people do not experience their relationship to the water and the powers that threaten it in the same way: intersections of gender, “kinship, age, wealth, race, religion, political situation, and other characteristics affect and frame what one experiences as an indigenous person” (Whyte, 2014, p. 604), just like any other. **The positionality of Indigenous women within Tsleil-Waututh culture grants them particular understandings, identities, relations and responsibilities to water, similar to those they might have to children, elders or other family members**. Starting with water in the womb, water is thought of as life-giving and life-sustaining, and as such, women have a special duty to protect this relation. Of course, not all Indigenous women take up this responsibility, but elders acting as leaders of the movement often speak of this connection. When Indigenous women within the movement talk of their sacred duty to protect the water, they speak of it quite differently from non-Indigenous women or others who might see water as life-sustaining, but not as a living relation. **These different positionalities both embody and create different types of learning and knowledge generation and exchange within and from the movement. A non-Indigenous woman may resist the pipeline to protect the water as a social or moral responsibility, while an Indigenous woman struggles against colonial ideas that challenge her ability to do her spiritual or cultural duty to a relation (water**). Thus, for a non-Indigenous woman, protecting the water may bring about social or environmental consciousness, while for an Indigenous woman, it may support cultural learning and reconnection to spiritual practice. In the same sense, abuses of power, marginalization and oppression are not experienced by non-Indigenous women (or men) in quite the same way. However, by working side-by-side in the movements, these **adults co-enact a decolonizing education, learning from each other, questioning, revealing, undoing and replacing the hegemony of colonial truths with new knowledge of Indigenous history, epistemologies, colonialism, Earth-centered positionality and relations.** **Decolonizing education places human identity and social action into a web of both human and non-human relations - water, land, air, plants, animals - who cannot then be considered exploitable natural 'resources', and whom we are obligated to protect from harm** (Adams, 2003). Thus, 'water protector' becomes not only a name, but also an identity, a relation, a sacred duty, and a way of being. Centering Indigenous voices and leadership, activists and organizers are able to reflect on differences of oppression, identity, and ways of being, **as well as their roles within the movement and their own positioning as part of the collective we in relation to place.** Non-Indigenous climate justice activists in B.C. also have strong ties to land and water, sea, and sky, based on livelihood, life history, spirituality and identity. Some depend on agricultural production, fishing or coastal tourism to support themselves. **Many feel a deep spiritual connection to the immense beauty of B.C.'s landscapes and wild spaces**; others value the opportunities affored by the land and sea for hiking, kayaking, skiing, hunting, camping, boating or fishing. Some ties are shallow, some deep, some cultural, others spiritual or material. Some believe in rights to property and ownership; others see open, un-owned lands for all. However, in learning to see through a decolonizing lens, these and other adults in the movement begin to better understand the situated nature of power in relation to place and Indigenous peoples. **New knowledge uncovers our colonial mindset toward the Earth, where people's relations with nature are controlled by oil companies, governments, courts, rich white men, etc. working against, rather than with, nature** (Adams, 2003). Through a decolonizing lens, this knowledge is not limited to the present - where the fossil fuel industry is controlling relationships to land with implications for human and non-human futures - but also extends to the past teaching lessons of the reality of colonization that has controlled Indigenous communities' relationships to the land for hundreds of years. Positionality in relation to place is complex and varied among adults, in part depending on the extent to which their livelihood is place-based. For some, the Trans Mountain project is understood as both an immediate and future threat to ocean- and land-based livelihood because of oil spills, tanker traffic through marine ecosystems, and the effects of climate change, including sea level rise, acidification and warming. An understanding of environmental justice as integral to decolonizing education highlights these and other positionalities. Wealth, power and education may allow some to shift livelihood in the case of an oil spill or sea levels rise; poorer coastal fishing communities may not have the means to do so. A non-Indigenous organizer working in the coastal tourism industry may be more directly threatened by the pipeline than an Indigenous woman professional working in an urban office, and so on. The threat of the pipeline is experienced and learned differently - culturally, socially, spiritually and economically - depending on the intersects of social categories and positionality within the larger power structures in connection to place. Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists, for example, differ somewhat in their perspectives of the Earth’s role within the movement. Some colonial-settler activists, talking of protecting the non-human world (waterways, orcas, salmon, etc.), frame the Earth as a separate entity, and something to be guarded. **By contrast, Indigenous leaders not only speak of a responsibility to protect their relations, but also acknowledge the non-human world’s participation in the struggle. This is done in ways as simple as recognizing the presence of trees, birds, animals, and plants in the everyday events and activities of resistance**. It might mean drawing attention to eagles flying overhead who are watching over protest marches and rallies, or, before a protest action, acknowledging the history of a place; not only human histories, but also histories of other beings. In this way, **the non-human world is included in the movement rather than simply being a beneficiary of it, giving voice to ‘all our relations’, not just human voices. These recognitions and inclusions provide moments of learning where activists and organizers are encouraged to question colonial conceptions of a separate non-human world.** **Through learning from Indigenous leadership, the Earth and non-human relations are moved from the margins to “take their place as narrative subjects in a speaking and participating land, full of narratives and mythic voices” (Plumwood, 2003, p. 67). Inviting the Earth to be part of the conversation teaches an Earth-centred positionality, facilitated by Indigenous leaders and others who recognize the Earth’s agency and challenge a colonial ‘deafness’ to the non-human world** (Plumwood, 2003). In doing so, they begin a decolonizing dialogue in environmental adult education in which the Earth is an inseparable part of adult learning and education, culture, community, identity and human existence.

#### **Framing**

#### **You’re an ethical facilitator and your role should be to prioritize an ethical consciousness formation.**

#### **Debate is a place of consciousness formation – all processes of observation and measurement endemic to their research model contribute to our understanding of a subject that stands as an outside observer to an external physical world. Our intervention in the curriculum is necessary to recalibrate how we formulate and understand consciousness by situating it within the natural world instead of against it.**

#### **We must question the performative practices through which ideas and inquiry manifest. Practices of scholarship, knowing, and civic responsibility are bound to cartesian premises of observer as subject and an external world as object of study. Re modulating a conception of inquiry outside of Cartesian dogma necessitates integrating affect and cognition in processes that enable being, feeling, committing, and living in the natural world.**

**Rosiek et al 20** (Jerry Lee Rosiek, Professor of Education Studies at the University of Oregon where he teaches courses on the cultural foundations of education, the racial politics of education practice and policy, and qualitative research methodology. His scholarship has experimented with the use of fiction and narrative modes of representations and is informed by revisionist pragmatism, new materialist philosophy, critical race theory, and Indigenous studies literature. His writing has appeared in journals such as Harvard Educational Review, Education Theory, Educational Research and Phi Delta Kapan and his recently published book, Resegregation as Curriculum (coauthored with Kathy Kinslow), won the American Association for Teaching and Curriculum 2016 Book of the Year Award. Jimmy Snyder is a PhD candidate in the Critical and Sociocultural Studies in Education program at the University of Oregon with interests in tribal critical theory and the use of narratives in the education of social studies teachers. He is a citizen of the Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas and has over 20 years of experience working in tribal communities including teaching high school social studies on Kickapoo and Navajo reservations and coaching football at Haskell University. Scott L. Pratt is Professor of Philosophy and Executive Vice Provost for Academic Affairs at the University of Oregon where he teaches graduate seminars in American philosophy, surveys of African American and Native American philosophy, and feminist pragmatism as well as courses on the work of John Dewey, William James, Josiah Royce, Jane Addams, C. S. Peirce, and W. E. B. Du Bois. He is the author of a number of books, including Native Pragmatism, Logic: Inquiry, Argument and Order, and American Philosophy From Wounded Knew to the Present (co-authored with Erin Mckenna). He is a past president of the Josiah Royce Society and the most recent PastPresident of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. "The New Materialisms and Indigenous Theories of Non-Human Agency: Making the Case for Respectful Anti-Colonial Engagement" **2020, Vol. 26(3-4) 331–346 Agential Realism: Ambitious Interventions and Performative Challenges** Page 335 Final Paragraph on page is not included in text displayed in card <https://coe.uoregon.edu/rosiek/files/2020/01/Indigenous-Theories-and-the-New-Materialisms-hard-published-edition.pdf>)

One of the central challenges of applying agential realism to the practice of social science inquiry is working out its specific implications for methodological practice. The philosophies gathered under the banner of “new materialism” reconsider several foundational concepts central to social science as it has been traditionally understood—such as taken for granted notions of representation (MacLure, 2013), the idea of a single or stable object of inquiry (Barad, 2007; Mol, 2002), and the concept of “data” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, MC).

**Agent ontologies, however, put more than these individual concepts under reconsideration. They also question the performative practices through which we “have” ideas and the very idea of the “we” of inquiry itself. Barad’s agential realism is an effort to transform not just the ontology of our objects of study but also the ontology of subjects involved in inquiry, and the relation between objects and subjects.** More colloquially, it gestures toward a practice of inquiry that involves transformations not just of our ways of knowing but also of our ways of being, feeling, committing, and living in the world. We should not expect such a reorientation would be a smooth process even for those convinced of its necessity, that it would involve lurches, false starts, and backsliding of various forms. **The material-semiotic architecture that both enables and constrains our practices of scholarship, knowing, and civic responsibility in Western settler colonial societies is very old and runs deep. It is encoded into our language; our habits of perception, feeling, and desire, our identities, the social communities that sustain those identities and desires, the legal codes that bound and bind those communities, the material arrangements of property, land, food consumption, power grids, and much more.** We can critically question one part of this matrix, but the others remain as ballast that draw us back into past practices that are networked with other cultural and material aspects of the world. Consequently, as new materialist scholars invent ways to enact agentially realist inquiries, there is a significant risk that proposed innovations will be superficial and will be interpolated back into deeply ingrained practices of knowing and being. As Maggie MacLure (2017) observed in her 2016 Keynote to the International Congress of Qualitative Inquiry, It is difficult to think outside of the Enlightenment structures of the Cartesian self, and the stories it tells itself about progress, reason and the advancement of knowledge. So although we have come a long way in formulating cartographies for new materialist research, we are necessarily some way from the anticipated ontological transformations to our field. . . I think we continue to underestimate the sheer difficulty of shedding the anthropocentrism that is built into our world-views and our language habits. (p. 55) One of the risks for the new materialisms involves framing the goal of inquiry as producing an improved description of our objects of inquiry, while leaving unchanged the construction of the inquirer as a spectator subject. This can be seen in the emerging literature that seeks to document the operation of self-organizing nonhuman phenomena. This includes research on algorithms, cognitive biology, and neuroscience (Dixon-Roman, 2016, 2017; Hayles, 2017) that identify the ways in which non-human systems engage in pattern recognition and response to changing environments. It can also be seen in research on self-organizing socio-material systems such as disease (Mol, 2002), political formations (Bennett, 2010), or institutionalized racism (Rosiek & Kinslow, 2016). Such scholarship provides informative accounts of the materially dynamic, evolving, nature of our objects of inquiry often through the use of the Deleuzian vocabulary of assemblage (e.g., Alaimo, 2016; Bennett, 2010; Fox & Alldred, 2015; Mazzei, 2017; Taguchi, 2018). However, the ontology of the knowing subject assumed in scholars’ representation of these dynamic objects of study remains largely unaltered (MacLure, 2017). This reinscription of the enlightenment spectator subject can also be seen in the turn to affect in some new materialist scholarship (e.g., Clough, 2009; Gregg & Seigworth, 2010; Massumi, 2002; Zembylas, 2014). **In an effort to get outside of a conception of inquiry based primarily on linguistic representation, cognition, and epistemology, many scholars are shifting their attention to the immediacy of affect. Scholars working in this vein offer that the influence of non-human agents on us may take the form of influence on our affect as much as our cognition.** However, **in an effort to explicate this expanded view of knowledge, scholars often resort to descriptions of the ways affect and cognition are integrated in some practices of knowing, as opposed to performing that integration.**

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#### **Conflict is caused when settler models of government and population management enter international politics to correct uncivilized and undeveloped states**

**Bell and Schreiner 18** (Colleen Bell, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Faculty Member in Political Studies, University of Saskatchewan, Kendra Schreiner, London School of Economics, “The International Relations of Police Power in Settler Colonialism: The ‘‘civilizing’’ mission of Canada’s Mounties,” Page 125 – 127 International Journal 2018, Vol. 73(1) 111–128  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0020702018768480>, ) MC

Conclusion We have argued that Canada’s Mounties have an older international history than is commonly acknowledged, and certainly older than the RCMP’s mission to Namibia in 1989. As demonstrated, many officers themselves understood their work—especially in the Northern frontier—as an international encounter with Indigenous peoples who understood themselves then, like now, as autonomous nations. Similarly, the work of the Mounties defies clear institutional distinctions between police and military, in part because their work was as much about securing the ‘‘inside’’ as it was about establishing the sovereign status of Canada itself. Not only is our reinterpretation of history inclusive of First Nations and Indigenous accounts of themselves and ‘‘Canada,’’ but it also contributes to contextualization of settler colonialism as a set of international occurrences. Our analysis thus eschews the European Westphalian state as the starting point from which to analyze the ‘‘international.’’ Our analysis shows that in order for theories of international relations to accurately account for key events in international politics, **they must include the colonial dimension**. To develop our argument, we examined three dimensions of police power in international relations historically and with respect to the role of the Mounties specifically. First, we showed that the concept of police power, although initially conceived of in domestic terms, was internationalized following the onset of ideas of civilization. Hence, European ideas of civilization which had initially beenfocused on disorder within, came to furnish British colonial ambitions. We then addressed the role of imperial or colonial policing in the settlement of Canada involving an elaborate array of ‘‘civilizing’’ techniques, many of which are still in operation today in the policing of Indigenous nations and dispossession of their lands. Finally, we connect the Mounties’ role in settler colonialism in Canada to the emergence of a ‘‘Greater Britain,’’ a twentieth-century movement of Anglo-Saxon states who have disproportionately shaped international relations and institutions ever since. Historians of imperialism note that there is no easy separation between the dynamics of power within colonial spaces and imperial homelands. Models of governance and population management in both spheres have proven to have a dynamic cross-fertilization. Hence, domestic policing was not simply turned outwards at particular moments, but the model of colonial policing also informed the development of policing within imperial metropoles. More specifically, this crossfertilization provided ‘‘the model for involvement by British police in peacekeeping and police reform missions in post-colonial and neocolonial situations.’’66 It provided a base of expertise and institutional capability to police in both ‘‘domestic’’ contexts and ‘‘international’’ ones. Likewise, Canada’s role in recent international missions in the global periphery cannot be considered independent of its own internal periphery and the conflict between claims to nationhood and sovereignty. Surprisingly, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau seemed to edge towards recognition of this important connection in a recent appearance at the UN General Assembly in which he highlighted Canada’s mistreatment of Indigenous peoples. Some media outlets regarded his speech as a ‘‘strange inward-looking focus[,] ... a misuse of the UN platform at worst and a missed opportunity at best.’’67 Although government policy that is in line with his words is questionable, the sentiment does reveal a glimmer of recognition that reconciliation with Indigenous nations will never be possible if Canada cannot set the historical record straight. In contrast to former prime minister Stephen Harper’s statement at a 2009 press conference at the G20 that Canada has ‘‘no history of colonialism,’’ Trudeau’s comments are a sign of hope that internationalisms can become more inclusive of Indigenous experiences and perspectives.68 However, imperial policing continues to guide the counterinsurgency strategies deployed in the Global South by a number of Western states, including Canada, the US, and the United Kingdom.69 Counterinsurgency promises to exercise notonly traditional war-fighting techniques, but also strategies of governance and development over the masses, as one solution to insurgency. Although the civilizing discourse that was connected to colonization and imperial policing fell out of use for some time, it has returned as a category of international power with the ‘‘war on terror.’’ From this perspective**, conflict is deemed to be a consequence of underdevelopment and failed governance. In other words, civilizational claims (even if named differently) inform this analysis. And yet such a framing treats conflict and underdevelopment as internal dynamics threatening to emanate outwards, and misses the international politics at work in their making.** Rather than an acceptance of this ‘‘internal’’ framing, what is needed is further analysis on the politics of violence involved in the production of liberal societies and the destruction of non-liberal ones.70 This article makes clear one instance of this political violence, which too often has been ignored in conceptual debates within the discipline of international relations. This study shows that ‘‘the international’’ is not simply restricted to the war and balance of power dynamics among Westphalian sovereign states. Rather, international politics is also evident in the use of force in the making of settler colonial states. Such ‘‘small wars’’ demand that there be more consideration of how the organization of world politics, indeed the contemporary international system of states, is informed by imperialism and hierarchy.71 In addition, this view challenges conventional definitions of war, and begs for further analysis of police power in the use of force internationally. Rather than merely a clash of force between states, war is at the heart of the construction of ‘‘civilization’’—in this case, settler society in Canada. **The arguments presented here challenge us to consider the limits of conceptions of the international that are derived from a set of presuppositions about the existence of Westphalian states or their formation from the perspective of imperial actors. In most cases, these conceptualizations lack attentiveness to sovereignty not simply as a ‘‘fact’’ but as a complex ensemble of living on the land and making claims to it, in the presence of other political communities who might make similar claims.**

#### **Prioritizing materiality confines indigenous being to the western domain of physicality where being indigenous is always understood as being the irrational savage at an anatomical level – this legitimizes Indigenous erasure.**

**Hokowhitu 09** (Brendan Hokowhitu, The University of Waikato Te Pua Wānanga ki te Ao, The Faculty of Māori & Indigenous StudiesHamilton, New Zealand Position Dean and Professor, The University of Waikato, Indigenous Existentialism and the Body Page 108 – 111, January 2009)

Exhuming ghosts: A genealogy of the Indigenous body Indigenous studies, as with feminist cultural studies, is best to position itself outside the Western, white masculine intellectual tradition of mind/body dualism: ‘an approach which refuses to privilege mind over body … and which assumes that the body cannot be transcended, is one which … emphasises contingency, locatedness, the irreducibility of difference, the passage of emotions and desire, and the worldliness of being’.13 Such a positioning is double-edged, however, as **the colonial project ‘limited the identity of the colonised to the materiality of their bodies’14 and thus the analysis must be at once deconstructory and existential.** Meaning, it is dangerous ground not to firstly problematise Indigenous theorisation stemming from the body, prior to foregrounding the body as a realm of study from where Indigenous existentialism can develop. Hence, this sub-section entitled ‘exhuming ghosts’. In part, white colonial patriarchy effected colonisation because it claimed to embody the power of reason and, consequently, universal interests. Key to enlightenment rationalism and its reliance on reason to know and to authenticate the objective world was its faith in the mind/body dichotomy orated by Plato and canonised by Descartes. In his 1871 book, The Descent of Man, 15 Charles Darwin emphasises the key differences in intellectual development (that is to say language, observation, curiosity, memory, imagination and reason) between primitive and civilised peoples.16 Darwin and other evolution theorists played an indirect but nonetheless highly significant role in the tainting of European accounts of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous cultures as unenlightened were, from an occipital logic, inherently more ‘physical’, ruled by their passions, and less intelligent than their civilised brethren**. The apparent lack of division between the indigene’s mind, body, spirit and the external world only served to augment the belief of European colonisers that they were indeed encountering savage races. Moreover, Enlightenment philosophers avoided questions of inconsistency in equality and autonomy arising from colonial subjugation by locating the Indigenous being in the realm of the physical and irrational, a site that denied full humanity itself.**17 **If savagery is understood from the perspective of Enlightenment rationalism, then it is apparent that it portends a state of unenlightenment, where reason is ruled by physical impulses and/or superstition.** What Foucault refers to as the invisible ‘breath’ that inhabits discontinuous discourses, even as they mutate,18 I conceive of as ‘physicality’ with reference to the colonised Indigenous savage. **As a sub-theme of the primitive/modern dialectic, physicality describes a complex of interconnecting discourses that enables unitary discursive knowledge to develop around the colonised Indigenous subject.** The thematic of Indigenous 108 VOLUME15 NUMBER2 SEP2009 physicality in the colonial state was ‘capable of linking, and animating a group of discourses, like an organism with its own needs, its own internal force and its own capacity for survival’.19 Darwin’s evolutionary theory, for instance, ‘directed research from afar’ acting as ‘a preposition rather than named, regrouped, and explained … a theme that always presupposed more than one was aware of … forcibly transformed into discursive knowledge’.20 Such discursive knowledge underpinned Indigenous ‘savagery’ and was transcribed into physical terms, onto the Indigenous body and about Indigenous bodily practices. For this essay, it is important to establish that the collision of supposedly embodied Indigenous epistemologies with disembodied Enlightenment rationalism left an inauthentic void that the Europeans, at least, desired to chart through authenticating disciplines such as anthropology and archaeology**. Enlightenment reason, as the determinant of truth and falsehood, was applied to the untranslatable—the epistemologies of other cultures.** The process involved, firstly, authenticating Indigenous knowledge by translating the untranslatable. That is, by encompassing and reconfiguring the incomprehensible into comprehensible forms. The authentication element in this equation is crucial because from the premise of the Enlightenment reason, knowledge was only authentic if it was known to the mind. That is, the embodied cultural concepts from ‘other’ epistemologies were only authentic if they were comprehensible to Western cognition**. The first principle of colonising the Indigenous body, then, was to bring the philosophical underpinnings of the savage under the logic of the coloniser, to authenticate the inauthentic.**21 In the universe of disembodied Enlightenment rationalism, it was assumed that reason (that is, European reason) could differentiate between truth and falsehood and, thus, the physical world was inherently translatable. The embodied practices of Indigenous epistemologies challenged that knowable world and, as a result, the reason of Enlightenment rationalism. The embodied holistic epistemologies of Indigenous societies determined the non-compartmentalisation of the ‘physical’. As opposed to the rational European subject, Indigenous subjectivity was not divorced from the body, nor the rationale from the passions, and so forth.22 **It is also important to recognise Indigenous subjectivities and their consequent bodily practices were often communally defined. Here the distinction can be made with the Western individual subject (who has prevailed in Western thought since the Enlightenment), whose person is comprised of a central and unique core, which determines their distinct identity.** The dissimilarity is important because, as opposed to a singular self, it indicates an Indigenous existentialism that incorporates multiple identities across time, including genealogical and spiritual associations, and communally defined bodily practices. The importance of the visible appearance of indigeneity and its genealogical tithing to moral deficiencies cannot be underestimated to the conception of the Indigenous body today. The Western conception of what it means to be Indigenous is in great part a visual BRENDAN HOKOWHITU—INDIGENOUS EXISTENTIALISM 109 phenomenon, ‘with all the political and ideological force that the seemingly naturalness of the body as the locus of difference can claim … [a] cultural training that quite literally teaches the eye not only how but what to see’.23 Allegorically, it is crucial to make the connection of the rationality of the European with the body of the colonised Other, underscored by: the eighteenth century resurrection of classical values of beauty and their similitude with the criteria of value in the classical economic tradition. Equilibrium and utility functioned in classical economic theory in ways analogous to proportion, symmetry, and refinement for classical aesthetics. Both sets of criteria determined an order of balance and harmony established on the basis of the geometric model ... By the late eighteenth century, beauty was established in terms of racial properties: fair skin, straight hair, organthous jaw, skull shape and size, well composed bodily proportions, and so on. To fail to possess these traits was considered a fault inheritance … Aesthetic value solidified into natural law, which in the eighteenth century was considered as compelling as the laws of nature, economics and morality precisely because they were all deemed to derive from the same rational basis.24 **The corporeal ‘reality’ of the asymmetrical Indigenous body undoubtedly naturalised colonial endeavour and Indigenous subjugation, allowing colonialist claims to moral superiority dependent upon what Robyn Wiegman refers to as ‘bodily fictions’ that ‘unproblematically reflect the natural meaning of flesh**’.25 Here, Bourdieu is useful as he conceives of the body metaphorically: ‘the bearer of symbolic meaning and values and a key site through which social differences are created, perpetuated and reinforced’.26 Bourdieu is also useful in thinking of the Indigenous body in terms of ‘physical capital’,27 especially in relation to mind/body duality in that symbolic meaning inscribed onto the Indigenous body determined inferior mental capacity and thus only contained capital in the inverse sense. The Indigenous body symbolised the physical realm and, thus, was employed for its physical labour, observed for its performativity, and humanised through the physical pursuits of sport.28 For many of the Indigenous parents of my generation, Bourdieu’s analysis becomes important because of its concern with the body in relation to the working class who, through bodily cognition as a necessary effect of a physically intensive life, developed different relations to their bodies than the white middle or dominant classes.29 Moreover, for Indigenous communities, sub-cultures developed throughout much of the twentieth century based on a relationship with a physically labouring body that, in turn, has come to symbolise traditional Indigenous cultures. For instance, the relationship between physical labour and sport with the Mäori male body has determined a traditional Mäori masculinity symbolically reified within the physical realm.30 As a consequence, many Indigenous communities remain predominantly working class. However, if we are to perceive of present day culture 110 VOLUME15 NUMBER2 SEP2009 as ‘postmodern’ then the relationship to the body with work and production becomes less important than an analysis of the fragmentation of the Indigenous body within late-capitalism.

#### **Any metric for evaluating impacts that doesn’t start with the relationship between subjectivity and land reproduces native ontological erasure and should be refused. Humanist consequentialism presumes an individual subject with freedom and dominion over land which alienates the non- human Native as a target for obliteration.**

**Paperson 17** (Paperson, associate professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego. "A Third University Is Possible" June 2017, The text shown in the article follows the section titled “The Settler–Native–Slave Triad Does Not Describe Identities” <https://manifold.umn.edu/read/a-third-university-is-possible/section/e33f977a-532b-4b87-b108-f106337d9e53>) MC

One of the main interventions of settler colonial studies has been to insist that the patterning of **social relations is shaped by colonialism’s thirst for land and thus is shaped to fit modes of empire.** Because colonialism is a perverted affair, our relationships are also warped into complicitous arrangements of violation, trespass, and collusion with its mechanisms.¶ For Fanon, the psychosis of colonialism arises from the patterning of violence into the binary relationship between the immune humanity of the white settler and the **impugned humanity of the native**. For Fanon, the supremacist “right” **to create settler space that is immune from violence, and the “right” to abuse the body of the Native to maintain white immunity**, this is **the spatial and fleshy immediacy of settler colonialism.** Furthermore, the “humanity” of the settler is constructed upon his agency over the land and nature. As Maldonado-Torres explains, **“I think, therefore I am**” is actually an articulation of **“I conquer, therefore I am,**” a sense of identity posited upon the **harnessing of nature and its “natural” people**.[8] This creates a host of post+colonial problems that have come to define modernity. Because **the humanity of the settler is predicated on his ability to “write the world,”** to make history upon and over the natural world, the colonized is instructed to make her claim to humanity by similarly acting on the world or, more precisely, acting in his. Indeed, for Fanon, **it is the perverse ontology of settler becomings—**becoming landowner or becoming property, becoming killable or becoming a killer—and the mutual implication of tortured and torturer that mark the psychosis of colonialism.¶ This problem of modernity and colonial psychosis is echoed in Jack Forbes’s writings:¶ Columbus was a wétiko. He was mentally ill or insane, the carrier of a terribly contagious psychological disease, the wétiko psychosis. . . .¶ The wétiko psychosis, and the problems it creates, have inspired many resistance movements and efforts at reform or revolution. Unfortunately, most of these efforts have failed because they have never diagnosed the wétiko.[9]¶ Under Western modernity, becoming “free” means becoming a colonizer, and because of this, “the central contradiction of modernity is freedom.”[10]¶ Critiques of settler colonialism, therefore, do not offer just another “type” of colonialism to add to the literature but a mode of analysis that has repercussions for any diagnosis of coloniality and for understanding the modern conditions of freedom. By modern conditions of freedom, I mean that Western freedom is a product of colonial modernity, and I mean that such freedom comes with conditions, with strings attached, most manifest as terms of **unfreedom for nonhumans**. As Cindi Mayweather says, “your freedom’s in a bind.”[11]¶ For grasping the twisted plotlines written by colonialism, the settler–native–slave triad is one of the most useful and most problematic heuristics in settler colonial studies. This triad is useful because it quickly describes the crooked relationships constructed by settler colonialism: the settler who accumulates rights, land, and property; the native whose presence on land must be extinguished; the chattel slave who must be kept landless. Although simple, it nonetheless quickly complicates the binaries in terms of which we are trained to think: oppressor–oppressed, black–white, settler–native. Even though white supremacy might be a prime architect in the triad, a triadic analysis decenters white supremacy as the absolute pole or umbrella of oppression. Instead, it shows our skewed participation in the colonization of other peoples and places. We are all complicit, just some of us a lot more than others. We can think of the triad as a quick sketch of colonialism on a napkin. It is useful for drawing attention to a complicated problem and for disrupting other paradigms. That is about how useful it is.¶ However, the settler–native–slave triad has also forwarded many problems, in large part because it seems to describe racial identities: settlers, Indigenous peoples, and Black people. Thinking of this triad as identities creates major pitfalls—four of which are pointed out in what follows. The most obvious is the misconstrued question, are Black people settlers? This question is symptomatic of a pitfall of settler elision, where everyone non-Native is assumed to fit the category of settler: settlers = non-Natives = people of color = migrants of color = settlers of color = Black people. Such a question cannot reckon with how Black people are often confronted by the impossibility of settlement, because antiblackness positions Black people as “out of place” on land. More revealing questions would be more specific: when and where have Black communities been settlers? When and where do they cease to be settlers? The same might be asked of other communities, Black and not, indeed, Indigenous and not. Such questions are not directly engaged by the triad, because “the slave” is not shorthand for a generalizable anywhere, anytime Black community anyway.¶ We have another pitfall of turning the triad into an identity spectrum, where settler–native–slave are thought of as points on a graph and individuals or ethnic groups can be located partway between different categories. Settler–native–slave technologies operate everywhere on everybody in intersecting, sometimes contradictory ways, and always with a dynamic specificity that radically changes with context. Antiblack technologies operate on Mien people in Oakland, California, in 2016 differently from how antiblack/anti-Indigenous/pro-settler technologies might try to reconstruct Mien students into Asian students just a few miles away at UC Berkeley.¶ We have the pitfall of anthropocentricism. Anthropocentric analyses of colonialism prefer to talk about colonized peoples, not animals, earth, water, and air. This continual return to the racialized human subject—which is identity’s main referent—undermines the work that Indigenous studies has done to emphasize the geopolitical, the land, and the circle of relations that do not begin and end with the human.¶ Finally, we have another pitfall of untranslatability of North American identities to non-North settings, because settler–native–slave do not map neatly onto other racialized groups elsewhere.¶ If not identities, then what are the settler–native–slave in the triad? The triad is a figurative shorthand—settler–native–slave are figurae to describe relations of power with respect to land. They sound like identities, but they are not identities per se. As figurae, they represent sites of exception that reveal the underlying logic of settler colonial power. As a suitable analogy, sites of exception are like planets, supernovae, and black holes. None is quite comparable to the others; yet each can be analyzed for its particular gravitational effects, which in interaction come to define the field of gravity in the surrounding space. Sites of exception are not comparable, even though their effects can be felt as an interlocking lattice of power. The “settler” is a juridical space; the “native” is a world to be disavowed and dismembered; the “slave” is an ontological system. Space, world, and system are not of the same scale or form. They are not comparable units of analysis.¶ **The “settler” is** not an identity; it is **the idealized juridical space of exceptional rights granted to normative settler citizens and the idealized exceptionalism by which the settler state exerts its sovereignty**. The “settler” is a site of exception from which whiteness emerges. **Whiteness is property; it is the right to have rights; it is the legal human; the anthropocentric normal is written in its image**. Not all settlers at all times enjoy the full privileges available to the “settler”; rather, settler supremacy is constructed and maintained by a number of technologies: citizenship, private property, civil and criminal innocence, normative settler sexuality, and so on. Settler technologies may be to your advantage always, sometimes, or never, depending on who you are, where you are, and what time it is.[12]¶ **The “native” is not an Indigenous identity; it is a world to be obliterated, exceptionalized as the necropolitical target,** and also to be splintered into pieces that are constructed as “naturally” eligible for “primitive accumulation.”[13] The “native” is a site of exception for that which and those who are written as premodern, primitive, and thus “before” law and “before” rights. **The “native” is thus exceptionalized from having any recognizable laws or rights that matter in modernity**. Technologies of Indigenous erasure include military **materiel and methodologies to carry out terror or genocide or containment; frontier law that legitimates murder, rape, torture, and abduction;** racial science of disappearance (such as blood quantum); the partitioning of earth into “natural resources” that can be separated, owned, sold, and developed; land privation, privatization, fungibility, and development; boarding schools and institutions of cultural assimilation; resource development and cultivation, and so on. **Technologies of Indigenous erasure are applied to Indigenous people, but some are also applied to enemy Others in war, some are recommissioned to reinvent spaces** of frontier and border, some are used to gentrify and redevelop ghettoized space.[14] Anti-indigenous technologies are applied to nonhumans—sometimes specifically to eliminate Indigenous people, such as killing the buffalo as a means to starve Plains peoples; sometimes in the name of progress, such as the killing of Haitian Kreyòl pigs; sometimes as a reflex of desecration, such as the poisoning of nonwhite waters. Primitive accumulation involves not only the gathering of “natural” resources as assets but also the externalizing of the “cost” of the accumulation in the form of contaminated water, disease, and other traumas to the “natural,” nonpropertied, that is, “indigenous,” world. **To be subject to anti-Indian technologies does not require you to be an Indigenous person.**¶ The “slave” describes how blackness is transfigured into enslavability and murderability. The “slave” should not be analyzed as a category of labor that “reduces Blackness to a mere tool of settlement” but rather as an ontology of total fungibility and unending property constitutive of the very world order of settler colonialism.[15] That is, the logic of racial capital creates an indefinite being of property to be exchanged, to be shipped or stored, to be parted out, to be disposed. The technologies of antiblackness create ontological illegality or criminal presence, landlessness, lethal geographies, carceral apparatuses, trafficking and abduction, nonpersonhood, and so on. Obviously, technologies of antiblackness circulate onto non-Black bodies. In a U.S.–Mexican borderland context, for example, we see the condensation of antiblack and anti-Indigenous technologies to dispose of brown bodies and to create frontier space—a militarized zone of policing and death. In North American ghetto contexts, we see the wide-scale application of antiblack technologies upon whole communities who can be of mixed ethnicities. However, one incomparable technology of antiblackness is the production of the Black body as in itself the preeminent site for antiblackness.[16] Whereas settler technologies can focus on space, and technologies of Indigenous erasure can focus on land, technologies of antiblackness have a corporeal priority.