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-===NC – Property Rights=== |
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-====I negate and value freedom. ==== |
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-====There exists no universal good – ==== |
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-====1~~ Open Question argument – it's impossible to equate any property X with the good since if it was, the coherent question of "is X good" would be the meaningless tautology "is good good." Means no universal good exists. ==== |
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-====2~~ Regress – it's always possible to challenge conceptions of goodness by merely asking "why?" infinitely==== |
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-====3~~ Widespread moral disagreement in ethics is best explained by relativism since it's improbable that the majority of agent who have equal access to logical reasoning are incorrect. ==== |
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-====Thus, ethical theories cannot appeal to objective values but instead to internal goods that each creates. Mutual restraint on property is internally motivating as it is a prerequisite to successful action itself. ==== |
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-Narveson, Jan (2010). Property and rights. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):101-134. JS |
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-How, then, do we get to property? In brief, the answer |
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-a deal if it were offered, and so, mutual benefit ensues. |
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-====Impacts:==== |
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-====1~~ Liberal conceptions of property are inevitable – since resources are scarce and often incompatible among different people, the only way to effectively use resources is to distribute particular objects to particular individuals through a system of property.==== |
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-====2~~ The aff's taking of action presupposes non-interference else no action could happen, which concedes the moral authority of freedom. ==== |
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-====Thus, the standard is consistency with libertarianism, or a system of respecting the property rights and freedom of others. Prefer this:==== |
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-====1~~ Performativity – discourse presupposes self-ownership since its intrinsic purpose is to compel belief through persuasion rather than coercion– this means contestations of my framework in debate presuppose it. ==== |
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-====2~~ The seperateness of persons justifies a right to self-ownership and property that cannot be aggregated with the interests of others. ==== |
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-Narveson, Jan (2010). Property and rights. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):101-134. JS |
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-The idea of self ownership—that is, of a general right to liberty |
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-can and want to acquire, compatibly with the similar right of others. |
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-====3~~ Viewing others as ends in themselves is a prerequisite for moral value – coercion treats others as a mere means for one's own purposes.==== |
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-**Korsgaard '83** (Christine M., "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS |
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-The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as |
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--and, in general, to make the highest good our end. |
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-====Impact Calc—==== |
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-====1~~ The only moral wrongs are those that intentionally infringe upon their rights, not those that make property less available for others. For example, I don't wrong you by buying the last carton of milk at the grocery store when you want milk, but it's mere happening==== |
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-====2~~ Moral responsibility is only possible via the standard – if we didn't regard agents as free, then we can't hold them culpable for immoral actions since there would be no possibility of them doing otherwise and being moral.==== |
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-====I defend the squo – now negate:==== |
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-====Liberal conception of property rights are awesome and egalitarian – space exploration only changes the location and not the nature of property claims, which makes private appropriation just.==== |
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-Baca, Kurt Anderson Property Rights in Outer Space, 58 J. Air L. and Com. 1041 (1993) https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol58/iss4/4 JS |
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-The powers necessary to constitute an efficient system of property rights on Earth have been |
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-is most beneficial on Earth will be most beneficial on the celestial bodies. |
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-====There is no such thing as unjust initial acquisition – an injustice requires one whose right has been violated, which cannot be the case if a resource is unclaimed.==== |
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-Feser, E. (2005). THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION. Social Philosophy and Policy, 22(1), 56–80. doi:10.1017/s0265052505041038 JS |
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-The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is |
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-impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition. |
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-====That negates – space is not under ownership by any state now, which proves that acquisition cannot be unjust==== |