Tournament: UT | Round: 1 | Opponent: Opponent | Judge: Judge
I affirm. First, Framework:
Ought implies a moral obligation:
Smith 11 (Holly M. Smith, 8/2011, Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University, "The 'Prospective View' of Obligation," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, pg, 1, http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/hsmith/Papers/Smith,20The20Prospective20View20of20Moral20Obligation,20Webpage206-08-11.pdf)
To resolve the debate among these views, Zimmerman urges that we first fix our concept of "overall moral obligation." He argues that "overall moral obligation" should be understood as the kind of moral obligation with which the "morally conscientious person" is primarily concerned. When confronting some moral choice a person may ask herself, out of conscientiousness, "What ought I to do?" In this question "ought" expresses overall moral obligation. According to Zimmerman, "conscientiousness precludes deliberately doing what one believes to be overall morally wrong," although it does not "require deliberately doing, or trying to do, only what one believes to be overall morally right, since on occasion one may find oneself forced to act while lacking any belief about the overall moral status of one's act."3
Thus, I value morality, because desirability can only be determined when based in some ethical system.
First, we can determine what's moral only by placing ourselves under a veil of ignorance. Because it is the only circumstance under which bias can be prevented, the ignorance that results allows us to determine the moral principles that are consistent universally.
Rawls 85 (John Rawls, Summer 1985, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical John Rawls Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3. pp. 223-251)
Now suppose justice as fairness were to achieve its aim and a publicly acceptable political conception of justice is found. Then this conception provides a publicly recognized point of view from which all citizens can examine before one another whether or not their political and social institutions are just. It enables them to do this by citing what are recognized among them as valid and sufficient reasons singled out by that conception itself. Society's main institutions and how they fit together into one scheme of social cooperation can be examined on the same basis by each citizen, whatever that citizen's social position or more particular interests. It should be observed that, on this view, justification is not regarded simply as valid argument from listed premises, even should these premises be true. Rather, justification is addressed to others who disagree with us, and therefore it must always proceed from some consensus, that is, from premises that we and others publicly recognize as true; or better, publicly recognize as acceptable to us for the purpose of establishing a worlung agreement on the fundamental questions of political justice. It goes without saying that this agreement must be in formed and uncoerced, and reached by citizens in ways consistent with their being viewed as free and equal persons." I now take up the idea ofthe original position. Thisidea is introduced in order to work out which traditional conception of justice, or which variant of one of those conceptions, specifies the most appropriate principles for realizing liberty and equality once society is viewed as a system of cooperation between free and equal persons. Assuming we had this purpose in mind, let's see why we would introduce the idea of the original position and how it serves its purpose. Consider again the idea of social cooperation. Let's ask: how are the fair terms of cooperation to be determined? Are they simply laid down by some outside agency distinct from the persons cooperating? Are they, for example, laid down by God's law? Or are these terms to be recognized by these persons as fair by reference to their knowledge of a prior and independent moral order? For example, are they regarded as required by natural law, or by a realm of values known by rational intuition? Or are these terms to be established by an undertalung among these persons themselves in the light of what they regard as their mutual advantage? Depending on which answer we give, we get a different conception of cooperation. Since justice as fairness recasts the doctrine of the social contract, it adopts a form of the last answer: the fair terms of social cooperation are conceived as agreed to by those engaged in it, that is, by free and equal persons as citizens who are born into the society in which they lead their lives. But their agreement, like any other valid agreement, must be entered into under appropriate conditions. In particular, these conditions must situate free and equal persons fairly and must not allow some persons greater bargaining advantages than others. Further, threats of force and coercion, deception and fraud, and so on, must be excluded.
And, under the veil of ignorance, rational individuals would choose to maximize opportunities, rights, and starting position in society.
Freeman 96 (Samuel Freeman, 2/27/96, Professor of Philosophy and Law At UPenn, "Original Position," http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=original-position)
It is often claimed that Rawls's parties are "risk-averse;" otherwise they would never follow the maximin rule but would take a chance on riskier but potentially more rewarding outcomes provided by the principle of utility. Thus, John Harsanyi contends that it is more rational under conditions of complete uncertainty always to choose according to the principle of insufficient reason and assume an equal probability of occupying any position in society. When the equiprobability assumption is made, the parties in the original position would choose the principle of average utility instead of the principles of justice (see Harsanyi 1975). Rawls denies that the parties have a psychological disposition to risk-aversion. He argues howeverthat it is rational to choose as if one were risk averse under the highly exceptional circumstances of the original position. Even if one knew in the original position that the citizen one represents enjoys risk-taking, this would still not be a reason to gamble with his or her rights, opportunities, and starting position in society; for if she were born into a traditional, repressive, or fundamentalist society, she might well have little opportunity for risk-taking, gambling, entrepreneurship, and the like. It is rational then even for the risk-taker to choose conservatively in the original position and guarantee her future opportunities to take risks.(And assuming that the parties are trustees, then it would be not simply irrational but a dereliction of duty to choose otherwise.) Harsanyi and other orthodox Bayesians contend that maximin is an irrational decision rule, and provide ample examples. But simply because maximin is under many circumstances irrational does not mean that it is never rational. No doubt maximin is an irrational strategy under most circumstances of choice uncertainty, particularly under circumstances where we have future opportunities to recoup potential losses and choose again. But these are not the circumstances of ~In~ the original position; once the rules of justice are decided they apply in perpetuity, and there is no opportunity to renegotiate or escape the situation. One who relies on the equiprobability assumption in choosing principles of justice in the original position is being foolishly reckless given the gravity of choice at stake. It is not being risk-averse, but rather entirely rational to be unwilling to gamble with the basic liberties, opportunities and resources needed to pursue one's most cherished ends and commitments for the sake of gaining the marginally greater income and wealth that may be available in a society governed entirely by the principle of utility.
Morality requires aiding those in need by redressing arbitrary inequality.
Rawls 71 (John Rawls, 1971, James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition, pg. 86-87)
First we may observe that the difference principle gives some weigh to the considerations singled out by the principle of redress.This is the principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow compensated for. 17Thus the principle holds that in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to those born into the less favorable social positions. The idea is to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality. In pursuit of this principle greater resources might be spent on the education of the less rather than the more intelligent, at least over a certain time of life, say the earlier years of school. Now the principle of redress has not to my knowledge been proposed as the sole criterion of justice, as the single aim of the social order. It is plausible as most such principles are only as a prima facie principle, one that tis to be weighed in balance with others. For example, we are to weigh it against the principle to improve the average standard of life, or to advance the common good. 18 But whatever other principles we hold, the claims of redress are to be taken into account. It is thought to represent one of the elements in our conception of justice. Now the difference principle is not of course the principle of redress. It does not require society to try to even out handicaps as if all were expected to compete on a fair basis in the same race. But the difference principle would allocate resources in education, say, so as to improve the long-term expectation the least favored. If this end is attained by giving more attention to the better endowed, it is permissible; otherwise not. And in making this decision, the value of education should not be assessed solely in terms of economic efficiency and social welfare.Equally if not more important is the role of education in enabling a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to take part in its affairs, and in this way to provide for each individual a secure sense of his own worth. Thus although the difference principle is not the same as that of redress, it does achieve some of the intent of the latter principle. It transforms the aims of the basic structure so that the total scheme of institutions no longer emphasizes social efficiency and technocratic values.The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as in some respects a common asset and to share in the greater social and economic benefits made possible by the complementarities of this distribution. Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out. The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place In society.But, of course, there is no reason to ignore, much less to eliminate these distinctions. Instead, the basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate. Thus we are led to the difference principle if we wish to set up the social system so that no one gains or losses from his arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or his initial position in society without giving or receiving compensating advantages in return.
It would be irrational to will a world of non-beneficence.
Herman 84 (Barbara Herman, July 1984, Professor of Philosophy and Law at UCLA, "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons' Ethics," p 586)
We are not like the wanton in that there are ends that we may be unwilling to forgo because of their value to us-because of the sense or meaning their pursuit gives to our lives. (The stoic represents an extreme form of attachment to a single end.) We are like the wanton in that even ends that we may be unwilling to give up can be given up nonetheless. Ends, however, that are necessary to sustain oneself as a rational being cannot (on rational grounds) be given up. Insofar as one has ends at all, one has already willed the continued exercise of one's agency as a rational being. The ends which must be realized if a person is to function (or continue to function) as a rational, end-setting agent come from what Kant calls the "true needs" of human agents.'5 They are the conditions of our "power to set an end" that is the "characteristic of humanity" (DV 51). The ends set to meet our true needs are like all other ends-we cannot guarantee that Hi we can realize them unaided. But in contrast to all other ends, we cannot, on rational grounds, forgo them. Thus neither the wanton, nor any human agent, may permanently alienate what may be necessary to satisfy true needs. Willing universal non-beneficence thus conflicts with what, as dependent rational beings, we must will, if we will anything at all.
Individual wills of freedom and equality can thus serve as the basis of government action.
Wenar 8 (Leif Wenar, 3/25/08, Chair of Ethics at King's College London, "John Rawls," http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=rawls)
Rawls's account of the reasonable citizen accords with his view of human nature. Humans are not irredeemably self-centered, dogmatic, or driven by what Hobbes called, "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power." (1651, 58) Humans have at least the capacity for genuine toleration and mutual respect. This capacity gives hope that the diversity of worldviews in a democratic society may represent not merely pluralism, but reasonable pluralism. Rawls hopes, that is, that the religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines that citizens accept will themselves endorse toleration and accept the essentials of a democratic regime. In the religious sphere for example a reasonable pluralism might contain a reasonable Catholicism, a reasonable interpretation of Islam, a reasonable atheism, and so on. Being reasonable, none of these doctrines will advocate the use of coercive political power to impose conformity on non-believers. The possibility of reasonable pluralism softens but does not solve the problem of legitimacy: how a particular set of basic laws can legitimately be imposed on a diverse citizenry. For even in a society of reasonable pluralism it would be unreasonable to expect everyone to endorse, say, a reasonable Catholicism as the basis for a constitutional settlement. Reasonable Muslims or atheists cannot be expected to endorse Catholicism as setting the basic terms for social life. Nor, of course, can Catholics be expected to accept Islam or atheism as the fundamental basis of law. No comprehensive doctrine can be accepted by all reasonable citizens, and so no comprehensive doctrine can serve as the basis for the legitimate use of coercive political power. Yet where else then to turn to find the ideas that will flesh out society's most basic laws, which all citizens will be required to obey? Since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common; and so we begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture in the hope of developing from them a political conception that can gain free and reasoned agreement in judgment. (PL, 100–01) There is only one source of fundamental ideas that can serve as a focal point for all reasonable citizens of a liberal society, which is the society's public political culture. The public political culture of a democratic society, Rawls says, "comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge" (PL, 13–14). Rawls looks to fundamental ideas implicit, for example, in the design of the society's government, in the written constitution that specifies individual rights, and in the historic decisions of important courts. These fundamental ideas from the public political culture can then be crafted into a political conception of justice. 3.4 Political Conceptions of Justice Rawls's solution to the problem of legitimacy in a liberal society is for political power to be exercised in accordance with a political conception of justice. A political conception of justice is a moral conception generated from the fundamental ideas implicit in that society's public political culture. A political conception is not derived from any particular comprehensive doctrine, nor is it a compromise among the worldviews that happen to exist in society at the moment. Rather a political conception is freestanding: its content is set out independently of the comprehensive doctrines that citizens affirm. Reasonable citizens, who want to cooperate with one another on mutually acceptable terms, will see that a freestanding political conception generated from ideas in the public political culture is the only basis for cooperation that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse. The use of coercive political power guided by the principles of a political conception of justice will therefore be legitimate coercion. The three most fundamental ideas that Rawls finds in the public political culture of a democratic society are that citizens are free and equal, and that society should be a fair system of cooperation. All liberal political conceptions of justice will therefore be centered on interpretations of these three fundamental ideas. As there are many reasonable interpretations of free, equal and fair, there are many liberal political conceptions of justice. Since all the members of this family interpret the same fundamental ideas, however, all liberal political conceptions of justice will share certain basic features: A liberal political conception of justice will ascribe to all citizens familiar individual rights and liberties, such as rights of free expression, liberty of conscience, and free choice of occupation; A political conception will give special priority to these rights and liberties, especially over demands to further the general good (e.g., greater national wealth) or perfectionist values (e.g., the values of cultural flourishing); A political conception will assure for all citizens sufficient all-purpose means to make effective use of their freedoms.
Thus, the standard is promoting social equality, this would require us to preserve the twin principles of freedom and equality for all agents.
The thesis of the Affirmative is that providing an unconditional right to strike promotes social equality, thus making it moral
Contention 1 is Freedom
The right to strike represents a preservation of the principal of freedom, which is the basis for a socially equal society thus making it moral
Croucher, Richard and Kelly, Mark G. E. and Miles, Lilian. (2012). A Rawlsian basis for core labor rights. Comparative Labor law and Policy Journal. 33. 297-320.
The right to strike appears as a special and controversial case, then, but we argue that from a rights perspective it is a simple, fundamental freedom. The right to conduct industrial action is in effect that to withdraw their labour in some way (quitting, striking, going slow) unless collective demands are met. As individuals, every worker, if they are not a slave (and slavery is explicitly not permitted under Rawls's first principle) has a right to withdraw their own labour, and might of course threaten this in individual negotiations with their employer. Effectively, what occurs in industrial action is a pooling of individual rights into collective rights, via the individual freedom to associate with our peers, and in this respect we may still discuss these collective rights qua individual rights under Rawls's first principle of justice. That is, individuals may be said to have an individual right to join in collective industrial action to improve their conditions. Of course, it will be argued that there is no right to strike if it involves a breach of contract. However, no contract can literally force labour – if it did that, it would breach the right to freedom from slavery. Rather, it can only schedule penalties, typically financial, where labour is not performed. In effect, as long as the freedom to contract is limited by the right to freedom from slavery, there is an implied freedom to strike. Thus, it is because of the very lack of complete freedom to make contracts that prevents us having a primary right to bargain that we do have a primary freedom to strike. We cannot, according to Rawls, sign away our basic freedom to refuse to do any particular job.40
The strike, foundationally, represents freedom of choice making it the morally correct approach to negotiations
Lim 19
Woojin Lim (Editor for the Harvard Crimson). "The Right to Strike." The Harvard Crimson. 11 December 2019. JDN. https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/12/11/lim-right-to-strike/
Strikes are not only a means of demanding and achieving an adequate provision of basic liberties but also are themselves intrinsic, self-determined expressions of freedom and human rights. The exercise of the power to strike affirms a quintessential corpus of values akin to liberal democracies, notably those of dignity, liberty, and autonomy. In acts of collective defiance, strikers assert their freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. Acts of striking, marching, and picketing command the attention of the media and prompt public forums of discussion and dialogue. The question of civic obligations, however, remains at stake. Perhaps those disgruntled with the strike might claim on a whiff that the strike impedes upon their own freedom of movement, educational rights, privacy, and so forth. Do strikers, in virtue of expressing their own freedoms, shirk valid civic norms of reciprocity they owe to members of the community, for instance, to students? No. The right to strike stems from the premise of an unjust flaw in the social order, that is, the recognition that the benefits from shouldering the burdens of social cooperation are not fairly distributed. Strikes and protests publicize this recognition and demand reform.
Contention 2- Is Equality
This freedom of association goes hand in hand with the right to strike, meaning that an unconditional right to strike would, inherently, preserve and promote the freedom of association
Malebye 14
Cynthia Dithato Malebye (Department of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria). "The Right to Strike in Respect of Employment Relationships and Collective Bargaining." Dissertation. University of Pretoria, April 2014. JDN. https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/43163/Malebye_Right_2014.pdf?sequence=1
Freedom of association is a universal human right. It gives rise to the establishment of democratic institutions such as trade unions which promote democracy, both in the workplace and in society at large.54 Employees have the freedom to associate for the purpose of collective bargaining.55 Freedom of association provides a basis for employees to inter alia form and join a trade union. A legal scheme aimed at protecting employees' and their unions' right to bargain collectively with their employer will be meaningless if the underlying right to first belong to that union were not safeguarded.56 Conversely, freedom of association would remain an ineffective right if the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike were not recognised as well. These rights have the balancing of the unequal bargaining position of employees and employers in common. For this reason it is often accepted that the right to strike, for example, must be inferred from the right to associate freely, even though the right to strike is not explicitly mentioned.57
The ability to associate is the underpinning of an egalitarian society, preserving social equality between subjects. Affirming preserves this as it encourages association through an unconditional right to striking
Croucher, Richard and Kelly, Mark G. E. and Miles, Lilian. (2012). A Rawlsian basis for core labor rights. Comparative Labor law and Policy Journal. 33. 297-320.
Unions are, however, 'instrumental associations' in that their 'primary purpose is to secure for ~their~ members improved access to strategic goods, such as income and wealth, the possession of which is important from the standpoint of more or less any conception of the good life'. Hence, state neutrality can be dispensed with. The strategic goods that unions secure, such as employment, education, training, income and job security, are primary goods that enable different citizens to pursue a diverse range of options. Consequently, to promote instrumental associations is not to force or impose any specific conception of the good on citizens. More positively, insofar as unions contribute to a more egalitarian distribution of primary goods, the liberal State should promote them as part of its more general duty to secure justice for its citizens. How might a promotional stance be carried out? Arguably, the state might include trade unions in structures of public governance such as skills forums or wage settlement through national income policies. This strategy of inclusion in public governance 'directly promotes union influence, enhances the public utility of unions, and may also thereby enhances the legitimacy of unions in the eyes of the wider citizenry, so encouraging union growth'. White however, makes a qualification for the promotion of trade unionism (pp.340). There is no place for weak and ineffective unionism in his argument, for he asserts that the state should promote a unionism which is both encompassing and which possesses strong capacities for coordinated decision making. Bogg (2009) takes this theme further and argues for laws, institutions and the political economy of the State to shape this kind of trade unionism.51 Since group actions are 'a product of opportunities and incentives that are induced by the structure of political institutions and the substance of political choices', this entails that associational patterns can be reshaped through a modification of the regulatory framework that creates those opportunities and incentives. Bargaining institutions and regulatory environments are inextricably linked and mutually
reinforcing; States are invariably implicated in the extent to which national institutions promote egalitarianism. Consequently, it is impossible to disentangle the State's own regulatory choices from the egalitarian shortcomings of a particular system of collective bargaining. Accordingly, the liberal egalitarian State is dutybound to promote encompassing and authoritative bargaining institutions that are well placed to realise egalitarian ends.52
extentions
extend my coucher 12 card which states that striking is a freedom we should all have and that employers don't have the right to force labour on anyone.
extend my lin 19 card which states that striking is a right and taking that away would be considered unjust.
extend my malebye 14 card which states that striking is a freedom even though it is not verbally mentioned .